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STATE v. HENDERSON
27 A.3d 872 (2011)
208 N.J. 208
STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Larry R. HENDERSON, Defendant-Respondent.
062218.
Supreme Court of New Jersey.
Decided August 24, 2011.
Argued January 20, 2009.
Remanded February 26, 2009.
Special Master's Report Filed June 21, 2010.
Reargued March 28, 2011.
Alison S. Perrone argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey.
Chief Justice RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court. Table of Contents
I. Introduction .............................................................. 877
II. Facts and Procedural History .............................................. 879
A. Facts .................................................................. 879
B. Photo Identification and Wade Hearing .................................. 880
C. Trial .................................................................. 882
D. Appellate Division ..................................................... 883
E. Certification and Remand Order ......................................... 884
III. Proof of Misidentifications ............................................... 885
IV. Current Legal Framework ................................................... 889
V. Scope of Scientific Research .............................................. 892
VI. How Memory Works .......................................................... 894
A. System Variables ...................................................... 896
1. Blind Administration ............................................... 896
2. Pre-identification Instructions .................................... 897
3. Lineup Construction ................................................ 897
4. Avoiding Feedback and Recording
Confidence ....................................................... 899
5. Multiple Viewings .................................................. 900
6. Simultaneous v. Sequential Lineups ................................. 901
7. Composites ......................................................... 902
8. Showups ............................................................ 902
B. Estimator Variables
1. Stress ............................................................. 904
2. Weapon Focus ....................................................... 904
3. Duration ........................................................... 905
4. Distance and Lighting .............................................. 906
5. Witness Characteristics ............................................ 906
6. Characteristics of Perpetrator ..................................... 907
7. Memory Decay ....................................................... 907
8. Race Bias .......................................................... 907
9. Private Actors ..................................................... 907
10. Speed of Identification ............................................ 909
C. Juror Understanding .................................................... 910
D. Consensus Among Experts ................................................ 911
VII. Responses to Scientific Studies ........................................... 912
VIII. Parties'Arguments ......................................................... 914
IX. Legal Conclusions ......................................................... 916
A. Scientific Evidence .................................................... 916
B. The Manson/Madison Test Needs to be
Revised .............................................................. 918
C. Revised Framework ...................................................... 919
D. Pretrial Hearing ....................................................... 922
E. Trial .................................................................. 924
X. Revised Jury Instructions ................................................. 925
XI. Application ............................................................... 926
XII. Retroactivity Analysis .................................................... 926
XIII. Conclusion ................................................................ 928
XIV. Judgment .................................................................. 928
Appendix A Remand Order ........................................................... 929
I. IntroductionIn the thirty-four years since the United States Supreme Court announced a test for the admission of eyewitness identification evidence, which New Jersey adopted soon after, a vast body of scientific research about human memory has emerged. That body of work casts doubt on some commonly held views relating to memory. It also calls into question the vitality of the current legal framework for analyzing the reliability of eyewitness identifications. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977); State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223, 536 A.2d 254 (1988). In this case, defendant claims that an eyewitness mistakenly identified him as an accomplice to a murder. Defendant argues that the identification was not reliable because the officers investigating the case intervened during the identification process and unduly influenced the eyewitness. After a pretrial hearing, the trial court found that the officers' behavior was not impermissibly suggestive and admitted the evidence. The Appellate Division reversed. It held that the officers' actions were presumptively suggestive because they violated guidelines issued by the Attorney General in 2001 for conducting identification procedures.
1. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).
2. The prosecution played a tape of Clark's statement at trial as well. It placed Henderson at the apartment but largely exculpated him. According to the record, the parties acknowledged that references in the statement to a co-defendant, namely Henderson, would have to be redacted under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Defense counsel did not seek redaction, though, specifically because the court had admitted the photo lineup and because of the tape's exculpatory nature.
3. After defendant's conviction, this Court decided State v. Romero, 191 N.J. 59, 76, 922 A.2d 693 (2007), which held that jurors are to be warned that "a witness's level of confidence, standing alone, may not be an indication of the reliability of the identification."
4. Defendant was still in prison on September 17, 2009, when the remand proceedings began. Through counsel, he waived his right to appear. Defendant was paroled on November 30, 2009, after which he again waived his appearance.
5. This book was published after the remand hearing, and a part was submitted to the Court and addressed by the parties. The book analyzes the first 250 DNA exoneration cases in the United States, and its author reviewed the full trial record in most of those matters. See Garrett, supra, at 7.
6. In Marquez, supra, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that "scientific literature. . . with respect to eyewitness identification procedures is far from universal or even well established, and that the research is in great flux." 967 A.2d at 77. Marquez considered six scientific articles and reports in reaching that conclusion, id. at 72-78, including an Illinois field study that has been strongly criticized, see id. at 75 & n. 24; see also Daniel L. Schacter et al., Policy Forum: Studying Eyewitness Investigations in the Field, 32 Law & Hum. Behav. 3 (2008). The more extensive record presented and tested on remand provides a stronger basis for an assessment of eyewitness identification research.
7. This section focuses only on post-identification confidence. Meta-analysis shows that eyewitness confidence in the ability to make an identification before viewing a lineup does not correlate with accuracy. See Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Forensically Relevant Moderators of the Relation Between Eyewitness Identification Accuracy and Confidence, 74 J. Applied Psychol. 650, 652 (1989).
8. We do not consider the disputed Illinois field study, see Sheri H. Mecklenburg, Ill. Police Dep't, Report to the Legislature of the State of Illinois: The Illinois Pilot Program on Sequential Double-Blind Identification Procedures (2006), referred to supra at 231 n. 5, 27 A.3d at 886 n. 5.
9. The State correctly notes that there is no way to know the precise number of identifications that may have been suppressed at the trial court level, but even the State conceded at oral argument that suppression "does not happen often." We also note that with the exception of one case reversed on appeal, we have found no reported Appellate Division decision since 1977 that reversed a conviction because the trial court failed to suppress identification evidence. State v. Ford, 165 N.J.Super. 249, 398 A.2d 101 (1978), rev'd on dissent, 79 N.J. 136, 398 A.2d 95 (1979). (The Special Master found one unreported Appellate Division decision, which we do not cite consistent with Rule 1:36-3.)
10. We have no authority, of course, to modify Manson. The expanded protections stem from the due process rights guaranteed under the State Constitution. Compare N.J. Const. art. I, § 1 ("All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."), with U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."); see Jamgochian v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 196 N.J. 222, 239, 952 A.2d 1060 (2008) ("[W]e have, from time to time, construed Article 1, Paragraph 1 [of the New Jersey Constitution] to provide more due process protections than those afforded under the United States Constitution."); see also State v. Reid, 194 N.J. 386, 396-97, 945 A.2d 26 (2008) (recognizing greater protection of individual rights under New Jersey Constitution).
11. A defendant, of course, may make a tactical choice not to explore an estimator variable pretrial, in order to "save up" cross-examination for trial.
12. The Appellate Division directed that the matter be assigned to a different judge on remand. See Henderson, supra, 397 N.J.Super. at 416, 937 A.2d 988. That issue is moot because the original trial judge has retired.
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