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CHICAGO REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS v. ONSITE WOODWORK CORPORATION
CHICAGO REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS, Plaintiff,
v.
ONSITE WOODWORK CORPORATION, Defendant.
No. 11 C 8365.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
December 12, 2012.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERVIRGINIA M. KENDALL, District Judge. Plaintiff Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters (the "Union") filed suit against Defendant Onsite Woodwork Corp. ("Onsite"), pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1851, to confirm the entry of an arbitration award. Onsite has moved for summary judgment. It asserts that confirmation is improper because there is no showing that any controversy exists regarding the validity of or their compliance with the award. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses Onsite's Complaint. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL UNDISPUTED FACTS2
Onsite is an Illinois corporation that makes architectural woodwork, including wall panels, doors, trim, casework, and specialty furniture. (Doc. 14, Def. 56.1, ¶ 4.) It has been a Union shop since 1982. (Id.) Onsite and the Union have entered into a collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA"). (Id. at ¶ 5.) In November 2010, the Union filed a grievance with Onsite. (Id. at ¶ 8.) The grievance alleged that when Onsite recalled Union members, who had previously been laid off, Onsite did not pay those members appropriate wages or benefits. (Id. at Ex. C.) The Union identified Roberto Roman, Josephine Vasquez, Jeremy Larsen, Carlos Contreras, Brent Karis, and Steve Seymore as Grievants. Each of these employees were recalled after a layoff which lasted six months or more, and upon recall, each of these employees was required to undergo a period of re-orientation. (Id. at ¶ 15.) The Union's Grievance was not resolved by the parties and proceeded to arbitration. (Id. at ¶ 12.) The arbitrator conducted a hearing and entered the following award: The grievance is granted in part and denied in part. Any grievant recalled from layoff after six months and removed from the bargaining unit must be reinstated and dues and initiation fees, if any, restored to them. Also, recalled employees designated as trainees must be made whole for any loss in pay or benefits. As there was no clear loser in this case, the arbitrator's fees and expenses must be shared y the parties.
1. The Union also attempts to bring its suit pursuant to Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. However, it is well established in the labor law context that the standards of the Federal Arbitration Act are superseded by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. In seeking to confirm the arbitration award at issue here, recourse is to the LMRA, not the FAA. See Martin v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 911 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990).
2. Throughout this Opinion, the Court refers to the Parties' Local Rule 56.1 Statements of Undisputed Material Facts as follows: citations to Onsite's Statement of Uncontested Facts have been abbreviated to "Def. 56.1 ¶ or Ex. ___, p. ___."; and citations to the Union's Response to Onsite's Statement of Uncontested Facts have been abbreviated to "Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ ___."
3. Onsite originally contested the validity of the arbitration award on the basis that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in making the award after finding that the Union had failed to comply with the proper procedures for filing a grievance under the CBA. (Doc. 13.) However, in its reply brief, Onsite withdrew this argument and conceded the validity of the arbitration award because it admitted it failed to move the Court to vacate the arbitration award within the three month statute of limitations provided by 9 U.S.C. § 12. (Doc. 22.) Since this case is governed by the LMRA, and not the FAA, the statute of limitations in 9 U.S.C. § 12 is inapplicable here. However, the applicable statute of limitations is still only 90 days. See Sullivan v. Gilchrist, 87 F.3d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no dispute as to whether the award is valid.,"
4. Five of the six Grievants in this case were already union members when they were laid off. Upon recall, they were not designated as trainees or removed from the collective bargaining unit. Grievant Josephine Vasquez was originally laid off before she completed her initial orientation period. She never became a member of the Union. Accordingly, pursuant to the arbitrator's ruling, it is not improper to designate her as a "Trainee" upon recall. (See Def. 56-1, Ex. 1, at 12 ["any employees who were recalled after six months and designated a trainee, and were still Union members, should be made whole for any losses in wages or benefits"] [emphasis added].).
5. The Union also objects to Onsite's use of a Declaration by Tim Fruin, Onsite's Vice President of Manufacturing, in support of its motion for summary judgment because the Declaration was not evidence that was presented to the arbitrator. (See, e.g., Doc. 21, ¶ 18.) However, Onsite has not offered this Declaration to contest the validity of the award, they have offered it in support of whether or not they are currently in violation of the award. Therefore, the Court may consider the Declaration in determining whether or not to confirm the award. See, e.g., Webster v. A.T. Kearney, Inc., 507 F.3d 568, 570-71 (7th Cir. 2007); see also St. Aubin v. Unilever HPC NA, No. 09 C 1874, 2009 WL 1871679, *2 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
6. Even though Onsite framed their motion as one for summary judgment, it effectively became a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction after they conceded the underlying validity of the award. As a result, the Court should dismiss the case, without prejudice, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), as opposed to rendering judgment in Onsite's favor.
7. Courts that have confirmed arbitration awards when there is no live controversy generally do so out of a concern that the plaintiff could be prejudiced if the statute of limitations for confirming the award expires before a controversy under the award arises. See, e.g., National Football League Players Assoc. 2009 WL 855946, at *3. This Court believes that the risk of prejudice is negligible. First, there is a five-year statute of limitations for confirming the award. See Roughneck Concrete Drilling & Sawing v. Plumbers' Pension Fund, Local 130, 640 F.3d 761, 765 (7th Cir. 2011). This period is more than sufficient to cover any dispute arising under the current CBA, as it expires in 2012. More importantly, even if the statute of limitations runs, the Union would not be deprived of its substantive rights under the award. An arbitrator's award, whether or not confirmed, can always be pleaded as res judicata in a subsequent suit. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 361 (7th Cir. 1997); Rudell v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 802 F.2d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 1986).
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