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ANDERSON v. HALE
159 F.Supp.2d 1116 (2001)
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
August 23, 2001.
Defendants' attacks on the magistrate judge's opinion are unpersuasive. They argue that the plain meaning of the rule does not prohibit surreptitious taping. But the law recognizes, in countless areas, that omitting material facts can be as misleading as affirmative misstatements. Attorneys, as officers of the court, are held to a particularly high standard of candor. This may include volunteering information that is not explicitly requested. That a conversation is being recorded is a material fact that must be disclosed by an attorney. Defendants also argue that modern technology and norms make the 1974 ABA opinion obsolete. The fact that recording conversations is much simpler and more pervasive now does not make it proper. If anything, it makes the need for this rule more compelling. The magistrate judge did not accept the ABA opinion blindly. He addressed each of these arguments, and his reasoning in rejecting them is thorough and logical. We agree with Magistrate Judge Ashman's reasoning in its entirety, and consequently need not repeat it here.
We also agree with the magistrate judge's reference to the Illinois Eavesdropping Act in applying Rule 83.54.4. Contrary to defendants' assertion, the magistrate judge did not apply the statute to counsel directly. Rather, he properly used it to construe the court's rules, to which counsel is indisputably subject.The magistrate judge's reasoning, once again, is sound. By appearing pro hoc vice, counsel agrees to familiarize himself with and abide by local rules and local law, including substantive law. Regardless of whether this statute is directly applicable to out-of-state recordings, it provides a reference point for what rights must be respected by attorneys practicing here.1 Illinois has conferred on its citizens a right not to be recorded without their consent. Because surreptitiously recording conversations violates a right recognized in this jurisdiction, attorneys appearing before this court may not do so. We also agree with Magistrate Judge Ashman's analysis of the importance of a level playing field. This court's rules must apply uniformly to all attorneys appearing here, regardless of their offices' location. To permit otherwise is not only illogical, but would interfere with the fair administration of justice, in general, and undermine the purpose of the work product doctrine, in particular. Given the rhetoric in the papers filed with respect to this difficult ethical question, we wish to clarify one last matter. We are applying rules here, not judging character. As the magistrate judge noted, although ultimately unsuccessful, defendants' arguments were reasonable. Defense counsel could have reasonably believed that his conduct was permissible. Although we find that his conduct did violate the rules, our rejection of his position does not equate to an indictment as an unethical person. For the foregoing reasons, defendants' objections are overruled. Per the magistrate judge's order, they must cease the practice of recording witnesses without consent and disclose any recordings currently in their possession.
1. The fact that counsel may be beyond the statute's reach for purposes of a civil suit is immaterial.
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