CORONADO v. STATE
654 So.2d 1267 (1995)
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
May 17, 1995.
Appellant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of aggravated battery on either Tice or Harbaugh. He maintains first that the state did not prove that the stick used to hit Tice was a deadly weapon. He contends that the same reasoning applies to Harbaugh and that Harbaugh's injuries did not constitute great bodily harm.
Although the evidence is conflicting as to whether the stick was a deadly weapon, there was competent, substantial evidence to support the determination that it was a deadly weapon. Since this was a jury question, we will not disturb the jury's determination unless it was clearly in error. We decline to reverse on this point.
Further, Harbaugh did suffer great bodily harm. He suffered a facial fracture, numbness and a great deal of pain around the eye and face. Appellant's characterization of Harbaugh's injuries as a "black eye" is simply incorrect. Great bodily harm has been defined as follows:
Great bodily harm defines itself and means great as distinguished from slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises as are likely to be inflicted in a simple assault and battery... . Whether the evidence describing such harm or injury is within the meaning of the statute ... is generally a question of fact for the jury.
Owens v. State,289 So.2d 472, 474 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). We conclude that Harbaugh's injuries meet this definition, and find no error here. Appellant's final challenge is to his sentence. Upon review of the sentencing transcript and the written sentence, we agree with appellant, vacate appellant's sentence and remand for resentencing. Appellant was sentenced as an adult under section 39.059(7)(d), Florida Statues (1991) to two four-year prison terms, followed by eighteen months community control concurrent. Under Troutman v. State,630 So.2d 528 (Fla. 1993), however, the written findings under section 39.059(7)(d), Florida Statutes (1991) must be issued contemporaneously with the written sentence. Here, those findings, although substantively adequate under the statute, were not issued until eleven days following the sentencing. Appellant was sentenced orally on March 18, 1994, and the written findings of suitability for adult sanctions were not filed until March 29, 1994. Although the court specifically stated that the written findings were entered nunc pro tunc to March 18, 1994, this could not avoid the contemporaneous requirement of Troutman. We observe that in resentencing, the court may again sentence appellant as an adult so long as the written reasons are entered contemporaneously. We also note parenthetically that on resentencing, each count must be sentenced separately. The two sentencing orders before us fail in this regard since each one purports to sentence appellant for both Counts I and II in the same order.
In summary, we affirm appellant's convictions, but remand for resentencing because of the court's failure to issue the written findings of adult sanctions suitability contemporaneously with the oral sentence.