Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal law prohibits corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech defined as an "electioneering communication" or for speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. 2 U.S.C. § 441b. Limits on electioneering communications were upheld in McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 203-209, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003). The holding of McConnell rested to a large extent on an earlier case, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990). Austin had held that political speech may be banned based on the speaker's corporate identity.
In this case we are asked to reconsider Austin and, in effect, McConnell. It has been noted that "Austin was a significant departure from ancient First Amendment principles," Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 490, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007) (WRTL) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). We agree with that conclusion and hold that stare decisis does not compel the continued acceptance of Austin. The Government may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether. We turn to the case now before us.
Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation. It brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of
Citizens United has an annual budget of about $12 million. Most of its funds are from donations by individuals; but, in addition, it accepts a small portion of its funds from for-profit corporations.
In January 2008, Citizens United released a film entitled Hillary: The Movie. We refer to the film as Hillary. It is a 90-minute documentary about then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who was a candidate in the Democratic Party's 2008 Presidential primary elections. Hillary mentions Senator Clinton by name and depicts interviews with political commentators and other persons, most of them quite critical of Senator Clinton. Hillary was released in theaters and on DVD, but Citizens United wanted to increase distribution by making it available through video-on-demand.
Video-on-demand allows digital cable subscribers to select programming from various menus, including movies, television shows, sports, news, and music. The viewer can watch the program at any time and can elect to rewind or pause the program. In December 2007, a cable company offered, for a payment of $1.2 million, to make Hillary available on a video-on-demand channel called "Elections '08." App. 255a-257a. Some video-on-demand services require viewers to pay a small fee to view a selected program, but here the proposal was to make Hillary available to viewers free of charge.
To implement the proposal, Citizens United was prepared to pay for the video-on-demand; and to promote the film, it produced two 10-second ads and one 30-second ad for Hillary. Each ad includes a short (and, in our view, pejorative) statement about Senator Clinton, followed by the name of the movie and the movie's Website address. Id., at 26a-27a. Citizens United desired to promote the video-on-demand offering by running advertisements on broadcast and cable television.
Before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), federal law prohibited—and still does prohibit— corporations and unions from using general treasury funds to make direct contributions to candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in connection with certain qualified federal elections. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000 ed.); see McConnell, supra, at 204, and n. 87, 124 S.Ct. 619; Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986) (MCFL). BCRA § 203 amended § 441b to prohibit any "electioneering communication" as well. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006 ed.). An electioneering communication is defined as "any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication" that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office" and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election. § 434(f)(3)(A). The Federal Election Commission's (FEC) regulations further define an electioneering communication as a communication that is "publicly distributed." 11 CFR § 100.29(a)(2) (2009). "In the case of a candidate for nomination for President ... publicly distributed means" that the communication "[c]an be received by 50,000 or more persons in a State where a primary election ... is being held within 30 days." § 100.29(b)(3)(ii). Corporations and unions are barred from using their general treasury funds for express advocacy or electioneering communications. They may establish, however, a "separate segregated fund" (known as a political action committee, or PAC) for these purposes. 2 U.S.C.
Citizens United wanted to make Hillary available through video-on-demand within 30 days of the 2008 primary elections. It feared, however, that both the film and the ads would be covered by § 441b's ban on corporate-funded independent expenditures, thus subjecting the corporation to civil and criminal penalties under § 437g. In December 2007, Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the FEC. It argued that (1) § 441b is unconstitutional as applied to Hillary; and (2) BCRA's disclaimer and disclosure requirements, BCRA §§ 201 and 311, are unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and to the three ads for the movie.
The District Court denied Citizens United's motion for a preliminary injunction, 530 F.Supp.2d 274 (D.D.C.2008) (per curiam), and then granted the FEC's motion for summary judgment, App. 261a-262a. See id., at 261a ("Based on the reasoning of our prior opinion, we find that the [FEC] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Citizen[s] United v. FEC, 530 F.Supp.2d 274 (D.D.C.2008) (denying Citizens United's request for a preliminary injunction)"). The court held that § 441b was facially constitutional under McConnell, and that § 441b was constitutional as applied to Hillary because it was "susceptible of no other interpretation than to inform the electorate that Senator Clinton is unfit for office, that the United States would be a dangerous place in a President Hillary Clinton world, and that viewers should vote against her." 530 F.Supp.2d, at 279. The court also rejected Citizens United's challenge to BCRA's disclaimer and disclosure requirements. It noted that "the Supreme Court has written approvingly of disclosure provisions triggered by political speech even though the speech itself was constitutionally protected under the First Amendment." Id., at 281.
We noted probable jurisdiction. 555 U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1471, 170 L.Ed.2d 294 (2008). The case was reargued in this Court after the Court asked the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether we should overrule either or both Austin and the part of McConnell which addresses the facial validity of 2 U.S.C. § 441b. See 557 U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1732, 170 L.Ed.2d 511 (2009).
Before considering whether Austin should be overruled, we first address whether Citizens United's claim that § 441b cannot be applied to Hillary may be resolved on other, narrower grounds.
Citizens United contends that § 441b does not cover Hillary, as a matter of statutory interpretation, because the film does not qualify as an "electioneering communication." § 441b(b)(2). Citizens United raises this issue for the first time before us, but we consider the issue because "it was addressed by the court below." Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U.S. 374, 379, 115 S.Ct. 961, 130 L.Ed.2d 902 (1995); see 530 F.Supp.2d, at 277, n. 6. Under the definition of electioneering communication, the video-on-demand showing of Hillary on cable television would have been a "cable... communication" that "refer[red] to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office" and that was made within 30 days of a primary election. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i). Citizens United, however, argues that Hillary was not "publicly
This argument ignores the regulation's instruction on how to determine whether a cable transmission "[c]an be received by 50,000 or more persons." § 100.29(b)(3)(ii). The regulation provides that the number of people who can receive a cable transmission is determined by the number of cable subscribers in the relevant area. §§ 100.29(b)(7)(i)(G), (ii). Here, Citizens United wanted to use a cable video-on-demand system that had 34.5 million subscribers nationwide. App. 256a. Thus, Hillary could have been received by 50,000 persons or more.
One amici brief asks us, alternatively, to construe the condition that the communication "[c]an be received by 50,000 or more persons," § 100.29(b)(3)(ii)(A), to require "a plausible likelihood that the communication will be viewed by 50,000 or more potential voters"—as opposed to requiring only that the communication is "technologically capable" of being seen by that many people, Brief for Former Officials of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae 5. Whether the population and demographic statistics in a proposed viewing area consisted of 50,000 registered voters—but not "infants, pre-teens, or otherwise electorally ineligible recipients"— would be a required determination, subject to judicial challenge and review, in any case where the issue was in doubt. Id., at 6.
In our view the statute cannot be saved by limiting the reach of 2 U.S.C. § 441b through this suggested interpretation. In addition to the costs and burdens of litigation, this result would require a calculation as to the number of people a particular communication is likely to reach, with an inaccurate estimate potentially subjecting the speaker to criminal sanctions. The First Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney, conduct demographic marketing research, or seek declaratory rulings before discussing the most salient political issues of our day. Prolix laws chill speech for the same reason that vague laws chill speech: People "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the law's] meaning and differ as to its application." Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). The Government may not render a ban on political speech constitutional by carving out a limited exemption through an amorphous regulatory interpretation. We must reject the approach suggested by the amici. Section 441b covers Hillary.
Citizens United next argues that § 441b may not be applied to Hillary under the approach taken in WRTL. McConnell decided that § 441b(b)(2)'s definition of an "electioneering communication" was facially constitutional insofar as it restricted speech that was "the functional equivalent of express advocacy" for or against a specific candidate. 540 U.S., at 206, 124 S.Ct. 619. WRTL then found an unconstitutional application of § 441b where the speech was not "express advocacy or its functional equivalent." 551 U.S., at 481, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). As explained by THE CHIEF JUSTICE's controlling opinion in WRTL, the functional-equivalent test is objective: "a court should find that [a communication] is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if [it] is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal
Under this test, Hillary is equivalent to express advocacy. The movie, in essence, is a feature-length negative advertisement that urges viewers to vote against Senator Clinton for President. In light of historical footage, interviews with persons critical of her, and voiceover narration, the film would be understood by most viewers as an extended criticism of Senator Clinton's character and her fitness for the office of the Presidency. The narrative may contain more suggestions and arguments than facts, but there is little doubt that the thesis of the film is that she is unfit for the Presidency. The movie concentrates on alleged wrongdoing during the Clinton administration, Senator Clinton's qualifications and fitness for office, and policies the commentators predict she would pursue if elected President. It calls Senator Clinton "Machiavellian," App. 64a, and asks whether she is "the most qualified to hit the ground running if elected President," id., at 88a. The narrator reminds viewers that "Americans have never been keen on dynasties" and that "a vote for Hillary is a vote to continue 20 years of a Bush or a Clinton in the White House," id., at 143a-144a.
Citizens United argues that Hillary is just "a documentary film that examines certain historical events." Brief for Appellant 35. We disagree. The movie's consistent emphasis is on the relevance of these events to Senator Clinton's candidacy for President. The narrator begins by asking "could [Senator Clinton] become the first female President in the history of the United States?" App. 35a. And the narrator reiterates the movie's message in his closing line: "Finally, before America decides on our next president, voters should need no reminders of ... what's at stake—the well being and prosperity of our nation." Id., at 144a-145a.
As the District Court found, there is no reasonable interpretation of Hillary other than as an appeal to vote against Senator Clinton. Under the standard stated in McConnell and further elaborated in WRTL, the film qualifies as the functional equivalent of express advocacy.
Citizens United further contends that § 441b should be invalidated as applied to movies shown through video-on-demand, arguing that this delivery system has a lower risk of distorting the political process than do television ads. Cf. McConnell, supra, at 207, 124 S.Ct. 619. On what we might call conventional television, advertising spots reach viewers who have chosen a channel or a program for reasons unrelated to the advertising. With video-on-demand, by contrast, the viewer selects a program after taking "a series of affirmative steps": subscribing to cable; navigating through various menus; and selecting the program. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 867, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997).
While some means of communication may be less effective than others at influencing the public in different contexts, any effort by the Judiciary to decide which means of communications are to be preferred for the particular type of message and speaker would raise questions as to the courts' own lawful authority. Substantial questions would arise if courts were to begin saying what means of speech should be preferred or disfavored. And in all events, those differentiations might soon prove to be irrelevant or outdated by technologies that are in rapid flux. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 639, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994).
Citizens United also asks us to carve out an exception to § 441b's expenditure ban for nonprofit corporate political speech funded overwhelmingly by individuals. As an alternative to reconsidering Austin, the Government also seems to prefer this approach. This line of analysis, however, would be unavailing.
In MCFL, the Court found unconstitutional § 441b's restrictions on corporate expenditures as applied to nonprofit corporations that were formed for the sole purpose of promoting political ideas, did not engage in business activities, and did not accept contributions from for-profit corporations or labor unions. 479 U.S., at 263-264, 107 S.Ct. 616; see also 11 CFR § 114.10. BCRA's so-called Wellstone Amendment applied § 441b's expenditure ban to all nonprofit corporations. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(6); McConnell, 540 U.S., at 209, 124 S.Ct. 619. McConnell then interpreted the Wellstone Amendment to retain the MCFL exemption to § 441b's expenditure prohibition. 540 U.S., at 211, 124 S.Ct. 619. Citizens United does not qualify for the MCFL exemption, however, since some funds used to make the movie were donations from for-profit corporations.
The Government suggests we could find BCRA's Wellstone Amendment unconstitutional, sever it from the statute, and hold that Citizens United's speech is exempt from § 441b's ban under BCRA's Snowe-Jeffords Amendment, § 441b(c)(2). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38 (Sept. 9, 2009). The Snowe-Jeffords Amendment operates as a backup provision that only takes effect if the Wellstone Amendment is invalidated. See McConnell, supra, at 339, 124 S.Ct. 619 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). The Snowe-Jeffords Amendment would exempt from § 441b's expenditure ban the political speech of certain nonprofit corporations if the speech were funded "exclusively" by individual donors and the funds were maintained in a segregated account. § 441b(c)(2). Citizens United would not qualify for the Snowe-Jeffords exemption, under its terms as written, because Hillary was funded in part with donations from for-profit corporations.
Consequently, to hold for Citizens United on this argument, the Court would be required to revise the text of MCFL, sever BCRA's Wellstone Amendment, § 441b(c)(6), and ignore the plain text of BCRA's Snowe-Jeffords Amendment, § 441b(c)(2). If the Court decided to create a de minimis exception to MCFL or the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment, the result would be to allow for-profit corporate general treasury funds to be spent for independent expenditures that support candidates. There is no principled basis
Though it is true that the Court should construe statutes as necessary to avoid constitutional questions, the series of steps suggested would be difficult to take in view of the language of the statute. In addition to those difficulties the Government's suggestion is troubling for still another reason. The Government does not say that it agrees with the interpretation it wants us to consider. See Supp. Brief for Appellee 3, n. 1 ("Some courts" have implied a de minimis exception, and "appellant would appear to be covered by these decisions"). Presumably it would find textual difficulties in this approach too. The Government, like any party, can make arguments in the alternative; but it ought to say if there is merit to an alternative proposal instead of merely suggesting it. This is especially true in the context of the First Amendment. As the Government stated, this case "would require a remand" to apply a de minimis standard. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39 (Sept. 9, 2009). Applying this standard would thus require case-by-case determinations. But archetypical political speech would be chilled in the meantime. "`First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive.' " WRTL, supra, at 468-469, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963)). We decline to adopt an interpretation that requires intricate case-by-case determinations to verify whether political speech is banned, especially if we are convinced that, in the end, this corporation has a constitutional right to speak on this subject.
As the foregoing analysis confirms, the Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower ground without chilling political speech, speech that is central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 168 L.Ed.2d 290 (2007). It is not judicial restraint to accept an unsound, narrow argument just so the Court can avoid another argument with broader implications. Indeed, a court would be remiss in performing its duties were it to accept an unsound principle merely to avoid the necessity of making a broader ruling. Here, the lack of a valid basis for an alternative ruling requires full consideration of the continuing effect of the speech suppression upheld in Austin.
Citizens United stipulated to dismissing count 5 of its complaint, which raised a facial challenge to § 441b, even though count 3 raised an as-applied challenge. See App. 23a (count 3: "As applied to Hillary, [§ 441b] is unconstitutional under the First Amendment guarantees of free expression and association"). The Government argues that Citizens United waived its challenge to Austin by dismissing count 5. We disagree.
First, even if a party could somehow waive a facial challenge while preserving an as-applied challenge, that would not prevent the Court from reconsidering Austin or addressing the facial validity of § 441b in this case. "Our practice `permit[s] review of an issue not pressed [below] so long as it has been passed upon. . . .'" Lebron, 513 U.S., at 379, 115 S.Ct. 961 (quoting United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 41, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992); first alteration in original). And here, the District Court addressed Citizens United's facial challenge. See 530 F.Supp.2d, at 278 ("Citizens wants us to enjoin the operation of BCRA § 203 as a facially unconstitutional burden on the First Amendment right to
Second, throughout the litigation, Citizens United has asserted a claim that the FEC has violated its First Amendment right to free speech. All concede that this claim is properly before us. And "`[o]nce a federal claim is properly presented, a party can make any argument in support of that claim; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made below.'" Lebron, supra, at 379, 115 S.Ct. 961 (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992); alteration in original). Citizens United's argument that Austin should be overruled is "not a new claim." Lebron, 513 U.S., at 379, 115 S.Ct. 961. Rather, it is—at most—"a new argument to support what has been [a] consistent claim: that [the FEC] did not accord [Citizens United] the rights it was obliged to provide by the First Amendment." Ibid.
Third, the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is not so well defined that it has some automatic effect or that it must always control the pleadings and disposition in every case involving a constitutional challenge. The distinction is both instructive and necessary, for it goes to the breadth of the remedy employed by the Court, not what must be pleaded in a complaint. See United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. 454, 477-478, 115 S.Ct. 1003, 130 L.Ed.2d 964 (1995) (contrasting "a facial challenge" with "a narrower remedy"). The parties cannot enter into a stipulation that prevents the Court from considering certain remedies if those remedies are necessary to resolve a claim that has been preserved. Citizens United has preserved its First Amendment challenge to § 441b as applied to the facts of its case; and given all the circumstances, we cannot easily address that issue without assuming a premise—the permissibility of restricting corporate political speech—that is itself in doubt. See Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv. L.Rev. 1321, 1339 (2000) ("[O]nce a case is brought, no general categorical line bars a court from making broader pronouncements of invalidity in properly `as-applied' cases"); id., at 1327-1328. As our request for supplemental briefing implied, Citizens United's claim implicates the validity of Austin, which in turn implicates the facial validity of § 441b.
When the statute now at issue came before the Court in McConnell, both the majority and the dissenting opinions considered the question of its facial validity. The holding and validity of Austin were
The McConnell majority considered whether the statute was facially invalid. An as-applied challenge was brought in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 546 U.S. 410, 411-412, 126 S.Ct. 1016, 163 L.Ed.2d 990 (2006) (per curiam), and the Court confirmed that the challenge could be maintained. Then, in WRTL, the controlling opinion of the Court not only entertained an as-applied challenge but also sustained it. Three Justices noted that they would continue to maintain the position that the record in McConnell demonstrated the invalidity of the Act on its face. 551 U.S., at 485-504, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). The controlling opinion in WRTL, which refrained from holding the statute invalid except as applied to the facts then before the Court, was a careful attempt to accept the essential elements of the Court's opinion in McConnell, while vindicating the First Amendment arguments made by the WRTL parties. 551 U.S., at 482, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.).
As noted above, Citizens United's narrower arguments are not sustainable under a fair reading of the statute. In the exercise of its judicial responsibility, it is necessary then for the Court to consider the facial validity of § 441b. Any other course of decision would prolong the substantial, nation-wide chilling effect caused by § 441b's prohibitions on corporate expenditures. Consideration of the facial validity of § 441b is further supported by the following reasons.
First is the uncertainty caused by the litigating position of the Government. As discussed above, see Part II-D, supra, the Government suggests, as an alternative argument, that an as-applied challenge might have merit. This argument proceeds on the premise that the nonprofit corporation involved here may have received only de minimis donations from for-profit corporations and that some nonprofit corporations may be exempted from the operation of the statute. The Government also suggests that an as-applied challenge to § 441b's ban on books may be successful, although it would defend § 441b's ban as applied to almost every other form of media
Second, substantial time would be required to bring clarity to the application of the statutory provision on these points in order to avoid any chilling effect caused by some improper interpretation. See Part II-C, supra. It is well known that the public begins to concentrate on elections only in the weeks immediately before they are held. There are short timeframes in which speech can have influence. The need or relevance of the speech will often first be apparent at this stage in the campaign. The decision to speak is made in the heat of political campaigns, when speakers react to messages conveyed by others. A speaker's ability to engage in political speech that could have a chance of persuading voters is stifled if the speaker must first commence a protracted lawsuit. By the time the lawsuit concludes, the election will be over and the litigants in most cases will have neither the incentive nor, perhaps, the resources to carry on, even if they could establish that the case is not moot because the issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." WRTL, supra, at 462, 126 S.Ct. 1016 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.) (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911)). Here, Citizens United decided to litigate its case to the end. Today, Citizens United finally learns, two years after the fact, whether it could have spoken during the 2008 Presidential primary—long after the opportunity to persuade primary voters has passed.
Third is the primary importance of speech itself to the integrity of the election process. As additional rules are created for regulating political speech, any speech arguably within their reach is chilled. See Part II-A, supra. Campaign finance regulations now impose "unique and complex rules" on "71 distinct entities." Brief for Seven Former Chairmen of FEC et al. as Amici Curiae 11-12. These entities are subject to separate rules for 33 different types of political speech. Id., at 14-15, n. 10. The FEC has adopted 568 pages of regulations, 1,278 pages of explanations and justifications for those regulations, and 1,771 advisory opinions since 1975. See id., at 6, n. 7. In fact, after this Court in WRTL adopted an objective "appeal to vote" test for determining whether a communication was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, 551 U.S., at 470, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.), the FEC adopted a two-part, 11-factor balancing test to implement WRTL's ruling. See 11 CFR § 114.15; Brief for Wyoming Liberty Group et al. as Amici Curiae 17-27 (filed Jan. 15, 2009).
This regulatory scheme may not be a prior restraint on speech in the strict sense of that term, for prospective speakers are not compelled by law to seek an advisory opinion from the FEC before the speech takes place. Cf. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 712-713, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). As a practical matter, however, given the complexity of the regulations and the deference courts show to administrative determinations, a speaker who wants to avoid threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending against FEC enforcement must ask a governmental agency for prior permission to speak. See 2 U.S.C. § 437f; 11 CFR § 112.1. These onerous
This is precisely what WRTL sought to avoid. WRTL said that First Amendment standards "must eschew `the open-ended rough-and-tumble of factors,' which `invit[es] complex argument in a trial court and a virtually inevitable appeal.'" 551 U.S., at 469, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.) (quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 547, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995); alteration in original). Yet, the FEC has created a regime that allows it to select what political speech is safe for public consumption by applying ambiguous tests. If parties want to avoid litigation and the possibility of civil and criminal penalties, they must either refrain from speaking or ask the FEC to issue an advisory opinion approving of the political speech in question. Government officials pore over each word of a text to see if, in their judgment, it accords with the 11-factor test they have promulgated. This is an unprecedented governmental intervention into the realm of speech.
The ongoing chill upon speech that is beyond all doubt protected makes it necessary in this case to invoke the earlier precedents that a statute which chills speech can and must be invalidated where its facial invalidity has been demonstrated. See WRTL, supra, at 482-483, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (ALITO, J., concurring); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940). For these reasons we find it necessary to reconsider Austin.
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." Laws enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at different points in the speech process. The following are just a few examples of restrictions that have been attempted at different stages of the speech process—all laws found to be invalid: restrictions requiring a permit at the outset, Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 153, 122 S.Ct. 2080, 153 L.Ed.2d 205 (2002); imposing a burden by impounding proceeds on receipts or royalties, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 108, 123, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991); seeking to exact a cost after the speech occurs, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., at 267, 84 S.Ct. 710; and subjecting the speaker to
The law before us is an outright ban, backed by criminal sanctions. Section 441b makes it a felony for all corporations—including nonprofit advocacy corporations—either to expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a general election. Thus, the following acts would all be felonies under § 441b: The Sierra Club runs an ad, within the crucial phase of 60 days before the general election, that exhorts the public to disapprove of a Congressman who favors logging in national forests; the National Rifle Association publishes a book urging the public to vote for the challenger because the incumbent U.S. Senator supports a handgun ban; and the American Civil Liberties Union creates a Web site telling the public to vote for a Presidential candidate in light of that candidate's defense of free speech. These prohibitions are classic examples of censorship.
Section 441b is a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a corporation can still speak. See McConnell, 540 U.S., at 330-333, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). A PAC is a separate association from the corporation. So the PAC exemption from § 441b's expenditure ban, § 441b(b)(2), does not allow corporations to speak. Even if a PAC could somehow allow a corporation to speak—and it does not—the option to form PACs does not alleviate the First Amendment problems with § 441b. PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations. For example, every PAC must appoint a treasurer, forward donations to the treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons making donations, preserve receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and report changes to this information within 10 days. See id., at 330-332, 124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S., at 253-254, 107 S.Ct. 616).
And that is just the beginning. PACs must file detailed monthly reports with the FEC, which are due at different times depending on the type of election that is about to occur:
PACs have to comply with these regulations just to speak. This might explain why fewer than 2,000 of the millions of corporations in this country have PACs. See Brief for Seven Former Chairmen of FEC et al. as Amici Curiae 11 (citing FEC, Summary of PAC Activity 1990-2006, online at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2007/ 20071009pac/sumhistory.pdf); IRS, Statistics of Income: 2006, Corporation
Section 441b's prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech. As a "restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign," that statute "necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam). Were the Court to uphold these restrictions, the Government could repress speech by silencing certain voices at any of the various points in the speech process. See McConnell, supra, at 251, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of SCALIA, J.) (Government could repress speech by "attacking all levels of the production and dissemination of ideas," for "effective public communication requires the speaker to make use of the services of others"). If § 441b applied to individuals, no one would believe that it is merely a time, place, or manner restriction on speech. Its purpose and effect are to silence entities whose voices the Government deems to be suspect.
Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people. See Buckley, supra, at 14-15, 96 S.Ct. 612 ("In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential"). The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it. The First Amendment "`has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a campaign for political office." Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272, 91 S.Ct. 621, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971)); see Buckley, supra, at 14, 96 S.Ct. 612 ("Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution").
For these reasons, political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence. Laws that burden political speech are "subject to strict scrutiny," which requires the Government to prove that the restriction "furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." WRTL, 551 U.S., at 464, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.). While it might be maintained that political speech simply cannot be banned or restricted as a categorical matter, see Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S., at 124, 112 S.Ct. 501 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment), the quoted language from WRTL provides a sufficient framework for protecting the relevant First Amendment interests in this case. We shall employ it here.
Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000) (striking down content-based restriction). Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others. See First Nat. Bank of Boston v.
Quite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content, moreover, the Government may commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker's voice. The Government may not by these means deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration. The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.
The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons, but these rulings were based on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions. See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986) (protecting the "function of public school education"); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977) (furthering "the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) (ensuring "the capacity of the Government to discharge its [military] responsibilities" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 557, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) ("[F]ederal service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than political service"). The corporate independent expenditures at issue in this case, however, would not interfere with governmental functions, so these cases are inapposite. These precedents stand only for the proposition that there are certain governmental functions that cannot operate without some restrictions on particular kinds of speech. By contrast, it is inherent in the nature of the political process that voters must be free to obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their votes. At least before Austin, the Court had not allowed the exclusion of a class of speakers from the general public dialogue.
We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead us to this conclusion.
The Court has recognized that First Amendment protection extends to corporations. Bellotti, supra, at 778, n. 14, 98 S.Ct. 1407 (citing Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S.Ct. 958, 47 L.Ed.2d 154 (1976); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) (per curiam); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 87 S.Ct. 534, 17 L.Ed.2d 456 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686; Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp.
This protection has been extended by explicit holdings to the context of political speech. See, e.g., Button, 371 U.S., at 428-429, 83 S.Ct. 328; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936). Under the rationale of these precedents, political speech does not lose First Amendment protection "simply because its source is a corporation." Bellotti, supra, at 784, 98 S.Ct. 1407; see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8, 106 S.Ct. 903, 89 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("The identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the `discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to foster" (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 783, 98 S.Ct. 1407)). The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not "natural persons." Id., at 776, 98 S.Ct. 1407; see id., at 780, n. 16, 98 S.Ct. 1407. Cf. id., at 828, 98 S.Ct. 1407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
At least since the latter part of the 19th century, the laws of some States and of the United States imposed a ban on corporate direct contributions to candidates. See B. Smith, Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform 23 (2001). Yet not until 1947 did Congress first prohibit independent expenditures by corporations and labor unions in § 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947, 61 Stat. 159 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 251 (1946 ed., Supp. I)). In passing this Act Congress overrode the veto of President Truman, who warned that the expenditure ban was a "dangerous intrusion on free speech." Message from the President of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 334, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1947).
For almost three decades thereafter, the Court did not reach the question whether restrictions on corporate and union expenditures are constitutional. See WRTL, 551 U.S., at 502, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). The question was in the background of United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 92 L.Ed. 1849 (1948). There, a labor union endorsed a congressional candidate in its weekly periodical. The Court stated that "the gravest doubt would arise in our minds as to [the federal expenditure prohibition's] constitutionality" if it were construed to suppress that writing. Id., at 121, 68 S.Ct. 1349. The Court engaged in statutory interpretation
In United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 77 S.Ct. 529, 1 L.Ed.2d 563 (1957), the Court again encountered the independent expenditure ban, which had been recodified at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1952 ed.). See 62 Stat. 723-724. After holding only that a union television broadcast that endorsed candidates was covered by the statute, the Court "[r]efus[ed] to anticipate constitutional questions" and remanded for the trial to proceed. 352 U.S., at 591, 77 S.Ct. 529. Three Justices dissented, arguing that the Court should have reached the constitutional question and that the ban on independent expenditures was unconstitutional:
The dissent concluded that deeming a particular group "too powerful" was not a "justificatio[n] for withholding First Amendment rights from any group—labor or corporate." Id., at 597, 77 S.Ct. 529. The Court did not get another opportunity to consider the constitutional question in that case; for after a remand, a jury found the defendants not guilty. See Hayward, Revisiting the Fable of Reform, 45 Harv. J. Legis. 421, 463 (2008).
Later, in Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 400-401, 92 S.Ct. 2247, 33 L.Ed.2d 11 (1972), the Court reversed a conviction for expenditure of union funds for political speech—again without reaching the constitutional question. The Court would not resolve that question for another four years.
In Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, the Court addressed various challenges to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) as amended in 1974. These amendments created 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (1970 ed., Supp. V), see 88 Stat. 1265, an independent expenditure ban separate from § 610 that applied to individuals as well as corporations and labor unions, Buckley, 424 U.S., at 23, 39, and n. 45, 96 S.Ct. 612.
Before addressing the constitutionality of § 608(e)'s independent expenditure ban, Buckley first upheld § 608(b), FECA's limits on direct contributions to candidates. The Buckley Court recognized a "sufficiently important" governmental interest in "the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption." Id., at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612; see id., at 26, 96 S.Ct. 612. This followed from the Court's concern that large contributions could be given "to secure a political quid pro quo." Ibid.
The Buckley Court explained that the potential for quid pro quo corruption distinguished
Buckley did not consider § 610's separate ban on corporate and union independent expenditures, the prohibition that had also been in the background in CIO, Automobile Workers, and Pipefitters. Had § 610 been challenged in the wake of Buckley, however, it could not have been squared with the reasoning and analysis of that precedent. See WRTL, supra, at 487, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (opinion of SCALIA, J.) ("Buckley might well have been the last word on limitations on independent expenditures"); Austin, 494 U.S., at 683, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). The expenditure ban invalidated in Buckley, § 608(e), applied to corporations and unions, 424 U.S., at 23, 39, n. 45, 96 S.Ct. 612; and some of the prevailing plaintiffs in Buckley were corporations, id., at 8., 96 S.Ct. 612 The Buckley Court did not invoke the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine, see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973), to suggest that § 608(e)'s expenditure ban would have been constitutional if it had applied only to corporations and not to individuals, 424 U.S., at 50, 96 S.Ct. 612. Buckley cited with approval the Automobile Workers dissent, which argued that § 610 was unconstitutional. 424 U.S., at 43, 96 S.Ct. 612 (citing 352 U.S., at 595-596, 77 S.Ct. 529 (opinion of Douglas, J.)).
Notwithstanding this precedent, Congress recodified § 610's corporate and union expenditure ban at 2 U.S.C. § 441b four months after Buckley was decided. See 90 Stat. 490. Section 441b is the independent expenditure restriction challenged here.
Less than two years after Buckley, Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707, reaffirmed the First Amendment principle that the Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity. Bellotti could not have been clearer when it struck down a state-law prohibition on corporate independent expenditures related to referenda issues:
Bellotti did not address the constitutionality of the State's ban on corporate independent expenditures to support candidates. In our view, however, that restriction would have been unconstitutional under Bellotti's central principle: that the First Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker's corporate identity. See ibid.
Thus the law stood until Austin. Austin "uph[eld] a direct restriction on the independent expenditure of funds for political speech for the first time in [this Court's] history." 494 U.S., at 695, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). There, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce sought to use general treasury funds to run a newspaper ad supporting a specific candidate. Michigan law, however, prohibited corporate independent expenditures that supported or opposed any candidate for state office. A violation of the law was punishable as a felony. The Court sustained the speech prohibition.
To bypass Buckley and Bellotti, the Austin Court identified a new governmental interest in limiting political speech: an antidistortion interest. Austin found a compelling governmental interest in preventing "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." 494 U.S., at 660, 110 S.Ct. 1391; see id., at 659, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (citing MCFL, 479 U.S., at 257, 107 S.Ct. 616; NCPAC, 470 U.S., at 500-501, 105 S.Ct. 1459).
The Court is thus confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line that forbids restrictions on political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity and a post-Austin line that permits them. No case before Austin had held that Congress could prohibit independent expenditures for political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity. Before Austin Congress had enacted legislation for this purpose, and the Government urged the same proposition before this Court. See MCFL, supra, at 257, 107 S.Ct. 616 (FEC posited that Congress intended to "curb the political influence of `those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital'" (quoting Automobile Workers, supra, at 585, 77 S.Ct. 529)); California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 201, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981) (Congress believed that "differing structures and purposes" of corporations and unions "may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process"). In neither of these cases did the Court adopt the proposition.
In its defense of the corporate-speech restrictions in § 441b, the Government notes the antidistortion rationale on which Austin and its progeny rest in part, yet it all but abandons reliance upon it. It argues instead that two other compelling interests support Austin's holding that corporate expenditure restrictions are constitutional: an anticorruption interest, see 494 U.S., at 678, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (STEVENS, J., concurring), and a shareholder-protection interest, see id., at 674-675, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (Brennan, J., concurring). We consider the three points in turn.
As for Austin's antidistortion rationale, the Government does little to defend it. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 45-48 (Sept. 9, 2009). And with good reason, for the rationale cannot support § 441b.
If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech. If the antidistortion rationale were to be accepted, however, it would permit Government to ban political speech simply because the speaker is an association that has taken on the corporate form. The Government contends that Austin permits it to ban corporate expenditures for almost all forms of communication stemming from a corporation. See Part II-E, supra; Tr. of Oral Arg. 66 (Sept. 9, 2009); see also id., at 26-31 (Mar. 24, 2009). If Austin were correct, the Government could prohibit a corporation from expressing political views in media beyond those presented here, such as by printing books. The Government responds "that the FEC has never applied this statute to a book," and if it did, "there would be quite [a] good as-applied challenge." Tr. of Oral Arg. 65 (Sept. 9, 2009). This troubling assertion of brooding governmental power cannot be reconciled with the confidence and stability in civic discourse that the First Amendment must secure.
Political speech is "indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual." Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 777, 98 S.Ct. 1407 (footnote omitted); see ibid. (the worth of speech "does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual"); Buckley, 424 U.S., at 48-49, 96 S.Ct. 612 ("[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment"); Automobile Workers, 352 U.S., at 597, 77 S.Ct. 529 (Douglas, J., dissenting); CIO, 335 U.S., at 154-155, 68 S.Ct. 1349 (Rutledge, J., concurring in result). This protection for speech is inconsistent with Austin's antidistortion rationale. Austin sought to defend the antidistortion rationale as a means to prevent corporations from obtaining "`an unfair advantage in the political marketplace'" by using "`resources amassed in the economic marketplace.' " 494 U.S., at 659, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (quoting MCFL, supra, at 257, 107 S.Ct. 616). But Buckley rejected the premise that the Government has an interest "in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections." 424 U.S., at 48, 96 S.Ct. 612; see Bellotti, supra, at 791, n. 30, 98 S.Ct. 1407. Buckley was specific in stating that "the skyrocketing cost of political campaigns" could not sustain the governmental prohibition. 424 U.S., at 26, 96 S.Ct. 612. The First Amendment's protections do not depend on the speaker's "financial ability to engage in public discussion." Id., at 49, 96 S.Ct. 612.
The Court reaffirmed these conclusions when it invalidated the BCRA provision that increased the cap on contributions to one candidate if the opponent made certain expenditures from personal funds. See Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 2774, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) ("Leveling electoral opportunities means making and implementing judgments about which strengths should be permitted to contribute to the outcome of an election. The Constitution, however, confers upon voters, not Congress, the power to choose the Members of the House of Representatives, Art. I, § 2, and it is a dangerous business for Congress to use the election laws to influence
Either as support for its antidistortion rationale or as a further argument, the Austin majority undertook to distinguish wealthy individuals from corporations on the ground that "[s]tate law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets." 494 U.S., at 658-659, 110 S.Ct. 1391. This does not suffice, however, to allow laws prohibiting speech. "It is rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment rights." Id., at 680, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (SCALIA, J., dissenting).
It is irrelevant for purposes of the First Amendment that corporate funds may "have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." Id., at 660, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (majority opinion). All speakers, including individuals and the media, use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech. The First Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it was enabled by economic transactions with persons or entities who disagree with the speaker's ideas. See id., at 707, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) ("Many persons can trace their funds to corporations, if not in the form of donations, then in the form of dividends, interest, or salary").
Austin's antidistortion rationale would produce the dangerous, and unacceptable, consequence that Congress could ban political speech of media corporations. See McConnell, 540 U.S., at 283, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) ("The chilling endpoint of the Court's reasoning is not difficult to foresee: outright regulation of the press"). Cf. Tornillo, 418 U.S., at 250, 94 S.Ct. 2831 (alleging the existence of "vast accumulations of unreviewable power in the modern media empires"). Media corporations are now exempt from § 441b's ban on corporate expenditures. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(9)(B)(i), 434(f)(3)(B)(i). Yet media corporations accumulate wealth with the help of the corporate form, the largest media corporations have "immense aggregations of wealth," and the views expressed by media corporations often "have little or no correlation to the public's support" for those views. Austin, 494 U.S., at 660, 110 S.Ct. 1391. Thus, under the Government's reasoning, wealthy media corporations could have their voices diminished to put them on par with other media entities. There is no precedent for permitting this under the First Amendment.
The media exemption discloses further difficulties with the law now under consideration. There is no precedent supporting laws that attempt to distinguish between corporations which are deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those which are not. "We have consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers." Id., at 691, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 782, 98 S.Ct. 1407); see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 784, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and STEVENS, JJ., dissenting); id., at 773, 105 S.Ct. 2939 (White, J., concurring in judgment). With the advent of the Internet and the decline of print and broadcast media, moreover, the line between the media and others who wish to
The law's exception for media corporations is, on its own terms, all but an admission of the invalidity of the antidistortion rationale. And the exemption results in a further, separate reason for finding this law invalid: Again by its own terms, the law exempts some corporations but covers others, even though both have the need or the motive to communicate their views. The exemption applies to media corporations owned or controlled by corporations that have diverse and substantial investments and participate in endeavors other than news. So even assuming the most doubtful proposition that a news organization has a right to speak when others do not, the exemption would allow a conglomerate that owns both a media business and an unrelated business to influence or control the media in order to advance its overall business interest. At the same time, some other corporation, with an identical business interest but no media outlet in its ownership structure, would be forbidden to speak or inform the public about the same issue. This differential treatment cannot be squared with the First Amendment.
There is simply no support for the view that the First Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the suppression of political speech by media corporations. The Framers may not have anticipated modern business and media corporations. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 360-361, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Yet television networks and major newspapers owned by media corporations have become the most important means of mass communication in modern times. The First Amendment was certainly not understood to condone the suppression of political speech in society's most salient media. It was understood as a response to the repression of speech and the press that had existed in England and the heavy taxes on the press that were imposed in the colonies. See McConnell, 540 U.S., at 252-253, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of SCALIA, J.); Grosjean, 297 U.S., at 245-248, 56 S.Ct. 444; Near, 283 U.S., at 713-714, 51 S.Ct. 625. The great debates between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists over our founding document were published and expressed in the most important means of mass communication of that era—newspapers owned by individuals. See McIntyre, 514 U.S., at 341-343, 115 S.Ct. 1511; id., at 367, 115 S.Ct. 1511 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). At the founding, speech was open, comprehensive, and vital to society's definition of itself; there were no limits on the sources of speech and knowledge. See B. Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 5 (1967) ("Any number of people could join in such proliferating polemics, and rebuttals could come from all sides"); G. Wood, Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, p. 6 (1969) ("[I]t is not surprising that the intellectual sources of [the Americans'] Revolutionary thought were profuse and various"). The Framers may have been unaware of certain types of speakers or forms of communication, but that does not mean that those speakers and media are entitled to less First Amendment protection than those types of speakers and media that provided the means of communicating political ideas when the Bill of Rights was adopted.
Austin interferes with the "open marketplace" of ideas protected by the First Amendment. New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208, 128 S.Ct. 791, 169 L.Ed.2d 665 (2008); see ibid. (ideas "may compete" in this marketplace "without government interference"); McConnell, supra, at 274, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). It permits the
The censorship we now confront is vast in its reach. The Government has "muffle[d] the voices that best represent the most significant segments of the economy." McConnell, supra, at 257-258, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). And "the electorate [has been] deprived of information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function." CIO, 335 U.S., at 144, 68 S.Ct. 1349 (Rutledge, J., concurring in result). By suppressing the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests. Factions will necessarily form in our Republic, but the remedy of "destroying the liberty" of some factions is "worse than the disease." The Federalist No. 10, p. 130 (B. Wright ed.1961) (J. Madison). Factions should be checked by permitting them all to speak, see ibid., and by entrusting the people to judge what is true and what is false.
The purpose and effect of this law is to prevent corporations, including small and nonprofit corporations, from presenting both facts and opinions to the public. This makes Austin's antidistortion rationale all the more an aberration. "[T]he First Amendment protects the right of corporations to petition legislative and administrative bodies." Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 792, n. 31, 98 S.Ct. 1407 (citing California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-511, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972); Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-138, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961)). Corporate executives and employees counsel Members of Congress and Presidential administrations on many issues, as a matter of routine and often in private. An amici brief filed on behalf of Montana and 25 other States notes that lobbying and corporate communications with elected officials occur on a regular basis. Brief for State of Montana et al. as Amici Curiae 19. When that phenomenon is coupled with § 441b, the result is that smaller or nonprofit corporations cannot raise a voice to object when other corporations, including those with vast wealth, are cooperating with the Government. That cooperation may sometimes be voluntary, or it may be at the demand of a Government official who uses his or her authority, influence, and power to threaten corporations to support the Government's policies. Those kinds of interactions are often unknown and unseen. The speech that § 441b forbids, though, is public, and all can judge its content and purpose. References to massive corporate treasuries should not mask the real operation of this law. Rhetoric ought not obscure reality.
When Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought. This is unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.
What we have said also shows the invalidity of other arguments made by the Government. For the most part relinquishing the antidistortion rationale, the Government falls back on the argument that corporate political speech can be banned in order to prevent corruption or its appearance. In Buckley, the Court found this interest "sufficiently important" to allow limits on contributions but did not extend that reasoning to expenditure limits. 424 U.S., at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. When Buckley examined an expenditure ban, it found "that the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption [was] inadequate to justify [the ban] on independent expenditures." Id., at 45, 96 S.Ct. 612.
With regard to large direct contributions, Buckley reasoned that they could be given "to secure a political quid pro quo," id., at 26, 96 S.Ct. 612, and that "the scope of such pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained," id., at 27, 96 S.Ct. 612. The practices Buckley noted would be covered by bribery laws, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201, if a quid pro quo arrangement were proved. See Buckley, supra, at 27, and n. 28, 96 S.Ct. 612 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839-840, and nn. 36-38 (CADC 1975) (en banc) (per curiam)). The Court, in consequence, has noted that restrictions on direct contributions are preventative, because few if any contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo arrangements. MCFL, 479 U.S., at 260, 107 S.Ct. 616; NCPAC, 470 U.S., at 500, 105 S.Ct. 1459; Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210, 103 S.Ct. 552, 74 L.Ed.2d 364 (1982) (NRWC). The Buckley Court, nevertheless, sustained limits on direct contributions in order to ensure against the reality or appearance of corruption. That case did not extend this rationale to independent expenditures, and the Court does not do so here.
"The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." Buckley, 424 U.S., at 47, 96 S.Ct. 612; see ibid. (independent expenditures have a "substantially diminished potential for abuse"). Limits on independent expenditures, such as § 441b, have a chilling effect extending well beyond the Government's interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. The anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the speech here in question. Indeed, 26 States do not restrict independent expenditures
A single footnote in Bellotti purported to leave open the possibility that corporate independent expenditures could be shown to cause corruption. 435 U.S., at 788, n. 26, 98 S.Ct. 1407. For the reasons explained above, we now conclude that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption. Dicta in Bellotti's footnote suggested that "a corporation's right to speak on issues of general public interest implies no comparable right in the quite different context of participation in a political campaign for election to public office." Ibid. Citing the portion of Buckley that invalidated the federal independent expenditure ban, 424 U.S., at 46, 96 S.Ct. 612, and a law review student comment, Bellotti surmised that "Congress might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections." 435 U.S., at 788, n. 26, 98 S.Ct. 1407. Buckley, however, struck down a ban on independent expenditures to support candidates that covered corporations, 424 U.S., at 23, 39, n. 45, 96 S.Ct. 612, and explained that "the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application," id., at 42, 96 S.Ct. 612. Bellotti's dictum is thus supported only by a law review student comment, which misinterpreted Buckley. See Comment, The Regulation of Union Political Activity: Majority and Minority Rights and Remedies, 126 U. Pa. L.Rev. 386, 408 (1977) (suggesting that "corporations and labor unions should be held to different and more stringent standards than an individual or other associations under a regulatory scheme for campaign financing").
Seizing on this aside in Bellotti's footnote, the Court in NRWC did say there is a "sufficient" governmental interest in "ensur[ing] that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed" by corporations would not "be used to incur political debts from legislators who are aided by the contributions." 459 U.S., at 207-208, 103 S.Ct. 552 (citing Automobile Workers, 352 U.S., at 579, 77 S.Ct. 529); see 459 U.S., at 210, and n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 552; NCPAC, supra, at 500-501, 105 S.Ct. 1459 (NRWC suggested a governmental interest in restricting "the influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate form"). NRWC, however, has little relevance here. NRWC decided no more than that a restriction on a corporation's ability to solicit funds for its segregated PAC, which made direct contributions to candidates, did not violate the First Amendment. 459 U.S., at 206, 103 S.Ct. 552. NRWC thus involved contribution limits, see NCPAC, supra, at 495-496, 105 S.Ct. 1459, which, unlike limits on independent expenditures, have been an accepted means to prevent quid pro quo corruption, see McConnell, 540 U.S., at 136-138, and n. 40, 124 S.Ct. 619; MCFL, supra, at 259-260, 107 S.Ct. 616. Citizens United has not made direct contributions to candidates, and it has not suggested that the Court should reconsider whether contribution limits should be subjected to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny.
When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption. See McConnell, supra, at 296-298, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of
Reliance on a "generic favoritism or influence theory . . . is at odds with standard First Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no limiting principle." Id., at 296, 124 S.Ct. 619.
The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate. See Buckley, supra, at 46, 96 S.Ct. 612. The fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected officials. This is inconsistent with any suggestion that the electorate will refuse "`to take part in democratic governance'" because of additional political speech made by a corporation or any other speaker. McConnell, supra, at 144, 124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000)).
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009), is not to the contrary. Caperton held that a judge was required to recuse himself "when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or imminent." Id., at ___, 129 S.Ct., at 2263-2264. The remedy of recusal was based on a litigant's due process right to a fair trial before an unbiased judge. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). Caperton's holding was limited to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant's political speech could be banned.
The McConnell record was "over 100,000 pages" long, McConnell I, 251 F.Supp.2d, at 209, yet it "does not have any direct examples of votes being exchanged for . . . expenditures," id., at 560 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.). This confirms Buckley's reasoning that independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption. In fact, there is only scant evidence that independent expenditures even ingratiate. See 251 F.Supp.2d, at 555-557 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Ingratiation and access, in any event, are not corruption. The BCRA record establishes that certain donations to political parties, called "soft money," were made to gain access to elected officials. McConnell, supra, at 125, 130-131, 146-152, 124 S.Ct. 619; see McConnell I, 251 F.Supp.2d, at 471-481, 491-506 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 842-843, 858-859 (opinion of Leon, J.). This case, however, is about
The Government contends further that corporate independent expenditures can be limited because of its interest in protecting dissenting shareholders from being compelled to fund corporate political speech. This asserted interest, like Austin's antidistortion rationale, would allow the Government to ban the political speech even of media corporations. See supra, at 905-906. Assume, for example, that a shareholder of a corporation that owns a newspaper disagrees with the political views the newspaper expresses. See Austin, 494 U.S., at 687, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). Under the Government's view, that potential disagreement could give the Government the authority to restrict the media corporation's political speech. The First Amendment does not allow that power. There is, furthermore, little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders "through the procedures of corporate democracy." Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 794, 98 S.Ct. 1407; see id., at 794, n. 34, 98 S.Ct. 1407.
Those reasons are sufficient to reject this shareholder-protection interest; and, moreover, the statute is both underinclusive and overinclusive. As to the first, if Congress had been seeking to protect dissenting shareholders, it would not have banned corporate speech in only certain media within 30 or 60 days before an election. A dissenting shareholder's interests would be implicated by speech in any media at any time. As to the second, the statute is overinclusive because it covers all corporations, including nonprofit corporations and for-profit corporations with only single shareholders. As to other corporations, the remedy is not to restrict speech but to consider and explore other regulatory mechanisms. The regulatory mechanism here, based on speech, contravenes the First Amendment.
We need not reach the question whether the Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing our Nation's political process. Cf. 2 U.S.C. § 441e (contribution and expenditure ban applied to "foreign national[s]"). Section 441b is not limited to corporations or associations that were created in foreign countries or funded predominately by foreign shareholders. Section 441b therefore would be overbroad even if we assumed, arguendo, that the Government has a compelling interest in limiting foreign influence over our political process. See Broadrick, 413 U.S., at 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908.
Our precedent is to be respected unless the most convincing of reasons demonstrates that adherence to it puts us
These considerations counsel in favor of rejecting Austin, which itself contravened this Court's earlier precedents in Buckley and Bellotti. "This Court has not hesitated to overrule decisions offensive to the First Amendment." WRTL, 551 U.S., at 500, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). "[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604 (1940).
For the reasons above, it must be concluded that Austin was not well reasoned. The Government defends Austin, relying almost entirely on "the quid pro quo interest, the corruption interest or the shareholder interest," and not Austin's expressed antidistortion rationale. Tr. of Oral Arg. 48 (Sept. 9, 2009); see id., at 45-46. When neither party defends the reasoning of a precedent, the principle of adhering to that precedent through stare decisis is diminished. Austin abandoned First Amendment principles, furthermore, by relying on language in some of our precedents that traces back to the Automobile Workers Court's flawed historical account of campaign finance laws, see Brief for Campaign Finance Scholars as Amici Curiae; Hayward, 45 Harv. J. Legis. 421; R. Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and Courts 33-35, 153-157 (1988). See Austin, supra, at 659, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S., at 257-258, 107 S.Ct. 616; NCPAC, 470 U.S., at 500-501, 105 S.Ct. 1459); MCFL, supra, at 257, 107 S.Ct. 616 (quoting Automobile Workers, 352 U.S., at 585, 77 S.Ct. 529); NCPAC, supra, at 500, 105 S.Ct. 1459 (quoting NRWC, 459 U.S., at 210, 103 S.Ct. 552); id., at 208, 103 S.Ct. 552 ("The history of the movement to regulate the political contributions and expenditures of corporations and labor unions is set forth in great detail in [Automobile Workers], supra, at 570-584, 77 S.Ct. 529, and we need only summarize the development here").
Austin is undermined by experience since its announcement. Political speech is so ingrained in our culture that speakers find ways to circumvent campaign finance laws. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S., at 176-177, 124 S.Ct. 619 ("Given BCRA's tighter restrictions on the raising and spending of soft money, the incentives . . . to exploit [26 U.S.C. § 527] organizations will only increase"). Our Nation's speech dynamic is changing, and informative voices should not have to circumvent onerous restrictions to exercise their First Amendment rights. Speakers have become adept at presenting citizens with sound bites, talking points, and scripted messages that dominate the 24-hour news cycle. Corporations, like individuals, do not have monolithic views. On certain topics corporations may possess valuable expertise, leaving them the best equipped to point out errors or fallacies in speech of all sorts, including the speech of candidates and elected officials.
Rapid changes in technology—and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of
No serious reliance interests are at stake. As the Court stated in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), reliance interests are important considerations in property and contract cases, where parties may have acted in conformance with existing legal rules in order to conduct transactions. Here, though, parties have been prevented from acting—corporations have been banned from making independent expenditures. Legislatures may have enacted bans on corporate expenditures believing that those bans were constitutional. This is not a compelling interest for stare decisis. If it were, legislative acts could prevent us from overruling our own precedents, thereby interfering with our duty "to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
Due consideration leads to this conclusion: Austin, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652, should be and now is overruled. We return to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.
Austin is overruled, so it provides no basis for allowing the Government to limit corporate independent expenditures. As the Government appears to concede, overruling Austin "effectively invalidate[s] not only BCRA Section 203, but also 2 U.S.C. 441b's prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds for express advocacy." Brief for Appellee 33, n. 12. Section 441b's restrictions on corporate independent expenditures are therefore invalid and cannot be applied to Hillary.
Given our conclusion we are further required to overrule the part of McConnell that upheld BCRA § 203's extension of § 441b's restrictions on corporate independent expenditures. See 540 U.S., at 203-209, 124 S.Ct. 619. The McConnell Court relied on the antidistortion interest recognized in Austin to uphold a greater restriction on speech than the restriction upheld in Austin, see 540 U.S., at 205, 124 S.Ct. 619, and we have found this interest unconvincing and insufficient. This part of McConnell is now overruled.
Citizens United next challenges BCRA's disclaimer and disclosure provisions as applied to Hillary and the three advertisements for the movie. Under BCRA § 311, televised electioneering communications funded by anyone other than a candidate must include a disclaimer that
Disclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they "impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities," Buckley, 424 U.S., at 64, 96 S.Ct. 612, and "do not prevent anyone from speaking," McConnell, supra, at 201, 124 S.Ct. 619 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The Court has subjected these requirements to "exacting scrutiny," which requires a "substantial relation" between the disclosure requirement and a "sufficiently important" governmental interest. Buckley, supra, at 64, 66, 96 S.Ct. 612 (internal quotation marks omitted); see McConnell, supra, at 231-232, 124 S.Ct. 619.
In Buckley, the Court explained that disclosure could be justified based on a governmental interest in "provid[ing] the electorate with information" about the sources of election-related spending. 424 U.S., at 66, 96 S.Ct. 612. The McConnell Court applied this interest in rejecting facial challenges to BCRA §§ 201 and 311. 540 U.S., at 196, 124 S.Ct. 619. There was evidence in the record that independent groups were running election-related advertisements "`while hiding behind dubious and misleading names.'" Id., at 197, 124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting McConnell I, 251 F.Supp.2d, at 237). The Court therefore upheld BCRA §§ 201 and 311 on the ground that they would help citizens "`make informed choices in the political marketplace.'" 540 U.S., at 197, 124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting McConnell I, supra, at 237); see 540 U.S., at 231, 124 S.Ct. 619.
Although both provisions were facially upheld, the Court acknowledged that as-applied challenges would be available if a group could show a "`reasonable probability'" that disclosure of its contributors' names "`will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.'" Id., at 198, 124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting Buckley, supra, at 74, 96 S.Ct. 612).
For the reasons stated below, we find the statute valid as applied to the ads for the movie and to the movie itself.
Citizens United sought to broadcast one 30-second and two 10-second ads to promote Hillary. Under FEC regulations, a communication that "[p]roposes a commercial transaction" was not subject to 2 U.S.C. § 441b's restrictions on corporate or union funding of electioneering communications. 11 CFR § 114.15(b)(3)(ii). The regulations, however, do not exempt those communications from the disclaimer and disclosure requirements in BCRA §§ 201 and 311. See 72 Fed.Reg. 72901 (2007).
Citizens United argues that the disclaimer requirements in § 311 are unconstitutional as applied to its ads. It contends that the governmental interest in providing information to the electorate does not justify requiring disclaimers for
Citizens United argues that § 311 is underinclusive because it requires disclaimers for broadcast advertisements but not for print or Internet advertising. It asserts that § 311 decreases both the quantity and effectiveness of the group's speech by forcing it to devote four seconds of each advertisement to the spoken disclaimer. We rejected these arguments in McConnell, supra, at 230-231, 124 S.Ct. 619. And we now adhere to that decision as it pertains to the disclosure provisions.
As a final point, Citizens United claims that, in any event, the disclosure requirements in § 201 must be confined to speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy. The principal opinion in WRTL limited 2 U.S.C. § 441b's restrictions on independent expenditures to express advocacy and its functional equivalent. 551 U.S., at 469-476, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.). Citizens United seeks to import a similar distinction into BCRA's disclosure requirements. We reject this contention.
The Court has explained that disclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech. See, e.g., MCFL, 479 U.S., at 262, 107 S.Ct. 616. In Buckley, the Court upheld a disclosure requirement for independent expenditures even though it invalidated a provision that imposed a ceiling on those expenditures. 424 U.S., at 75-76, 96 S.Ct. 612. In McConnell, three Justices who would have found § 441b to be unconstitutional nonetheless voted to uphold BCRA's disclosure and disclaimer requirements. 540 U.S., at 321, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of KENNEDY, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and SCALIA, J.). And the Court has upheld registration and disclosure requirements on lobbyists, even though Congress has no power to ban lobbying itself. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954) (Congress "has merely provided for a modicum of information from those who for hire attempt to influence legislation or who collect or spend funds for that purpose"). For these reasons, we reject Citizens United's contention that the disclosure requirements must be limited to speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy.
Citizens United also disputes that an informational interest justifies the application of § 201 to its ads, which only attempt to persuade viewers to see the film. Even if it disclosed the funding sources for the ads, Citizens United says, the information would not help viewers make informed choices in the political marketplace. This is similar to the argument rejected above with respect to disclaimers. Even if the ads only pertain to a commercial transaction, the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election. Because the informational
Last, Citizens United argues that disclosure requirements can chill donations to an organization by exposing donors to retaliation. Some amici point to recent events in which donors to certain causes were blacklisted, threatened, or otherwise targeted for retaliation. See Brief for Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae 13-16; Brief for Alliance Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae 16-22. In McConnell, the Court recognized that § 201 would be unconstitutional as applied to an organization if there were a reasonable probability that the group's members would face threats, harassment, or reprisals if their names were disclosed. 540 U.S., at 198, 124 S.Ct. 619. The examples cited by amici are cause for concern. Citizens United, however, has offered no evidence that its members may face similar threats or reprisals. To the contrary, Citizens United has been disclosing its donors for years and has identified no instance of harassment or retaliation.
Shareholder objections raised through the procedures of corporate democracy, see Bellotti, supra, at 794, and n. 34, 98 S.Ct. 1407, can be more effective today because modern technology makes disclosures rapid and informative. A campaign finance system that pairs corporate independent expenditures with effective disclosure has not existed before today. It must be noted, furthermore, that many of Congress' findings in passing BCRA were premised on a system without adequate disclosure. See McConnell, 540 U.S., at 128, 124 S.Ct. 619 ("[T]he public may not have been fully informed about the sponsorship of so-called issue ads"); id., at 196-197, 124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting McConnell I, 251 F.Supp.2d, at 237). With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters. Shareholders can determine whether their corporation's political speech advances the corporation's interest in making profits, and citizens can see whether elected officials are "`in the pocket' of so-called moneyed interests." 540 U.S., at 259, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of SCALIA, J.); see MCFL, supra, at 261, 107 S.Ct. 616. The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.
For the same reasons we uphold the application of BCRA §§ 201 and 311 to the ads, we affirm their application to Hillary. We find no constitutional impediment to the application of BCRA's disclaimer and disclosure requirements to a movie broadcast via video-on-demand. And there has been no showing that, as applied in this case, these requirements would impose a chill on speech or expression.
When word concerning the plot of the movie Mr. Smith Goes to Washington reached the circles of Government, some officials sought, by persuasion, to discourage its distribution. See Smoodin, "Compulsory" Viewing for Every Citizen: Mr. Smith and the Rhetoric of Reception, 35 Cinema Journal 3, 19, and n. 52 (Winter 1996) (citing Mr. Smith Riles Washington, Time, Oct. 30, 1939, p. 49); Nugent, Capra's Capitol Offense, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1939, p. X5. Under Austin, though, officials could have done more than discourage
Modern day movies, television comedies, or skits on Youtube.com might portray public officials or public policies in unflattering ways. Yet if a covered transmission during the blackout period creates the background for candidate endorsement or opposition, a felony occurs solely because a corporation, other than an exempt media corporation, has made the "purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value" in order to engage in political speech. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i). Speech would be suppressed in the realm where its necessity is most evident: in the public dialogue preceding a real election. Governments are often hostile to speech, but under our law and our tradition it seems stranger than fiction for our Government to make this political speech a crime. Yet this is the statute's purpose and design.
Some members of the public might consider Hillary to be insightful and instructive; some might find it to be neither high art nor a fair discussion on how to set the Nation's course; still others simply might suspend judgment on these points but decide to think more about issues and candidates. Those choices and assessments, however, are not for the Government to make. "The First Amendment underwrites the freedom to experiment and to create in the realm of thought and speech. Citizens must be free to use new forms, and new forums, for the expression of ideas. The civic discourse belongs to the people, and the Government may not prescribe the means used to conduct it." McConnell, supra, at 341, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.).
The judgment of the District Court is reversed with respect to the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. § 441b's restrictions on corporate independent expenditures. The judgment is affirmed with respect to BCRA's disclaimer and disclosure requirements. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Chief Justice ROBERTS, with whom Justice ALITO joins, concurring.
The Government urges us in this case to uphold a direct prohibition on political speech. It asks us to embrace a theory of the First Amendment that would allow censorship not only of television and radio broadcasts, but of pamphlets, posters, the Internet, and virtually any other medium that corporations and unions might find useful in expressing their views on matters of public concern. Its theory, if accepted, would empower the Government to prohibit newspapers from running editorials or opinion pieces supporting or opposing candidates for office, so long as the newspapers were owned by corporations—as the major ones are. First Amendment rights could be confined to individuals, subverting the vibrant public discourse that is at the foundation of our democracy.
The Court properly rejects that theory, and I join its opinion in full. The First Amendment protects more than just the individual on a soapbox and the lonely pamphleteer. I write separately to address the important principles of judicial restraint and stare decisis implicated in this case.
Judging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is "the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called upon to
The majority and dissent are united in expressing allegiance to these principles. Ante, at 892; post, at 936-937 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But I cannot agree with my dissenting colleagues on how these principles apply in this case.
The majority's step-by-step analysis accords with our standard practice of avoiding broad constitutional questions except when necessary to decide the case before us. The majority begins by addressing— and quite properly rejecting—Citizens United's statutory claim that 2 U.S.C. § 441b does not actually cover its production and distribution of Hillary: The Movie (hereinafter Hillary). If there were a valid basis for deciding this statutory claim in Citizens United's favor (and thereby avoiding constitutional adjudication), it would be proper to do so. Indeed, that is precisely the approach the Court took just last Term in Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2504, 174 L.Ed.2d 140 (2009), when eight Members of the Court agreed to decide the case on statutory grounds instead of reaching the appellant's broader argument that the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional.
It is only because the majority rejects Citizens United's statutory claim that it proceeds to consider the group's various constitutional arguments, beginning with its narrowest claim (that Hillary is not the functional equivalent of express advocacy) and proceeding to its broadest claim (that Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990) should be overruled). This is the same order of operations followed by the controlling opinion in Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007) (WRTL). There the appellant was able to prevail on its narrowest constitutional argument because its broadcast ads did not qualify as the functional equivalent of express advocacy; there was thus no need to go on to address the broader claim that McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003), should be overruled. WRTL, 551 U.S., at 482, 127 S.Ct. 2652; id., at 482-483, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (ALITO, J., concurring). This case is different—not, as the dissent suggests, because the approach taken in WRTL has been deemed a "failure," post, at 935, but because, in the absence of any valid narrower ground of decision, there is no way to avoid Citizens United's broader constitutional argument.
The dissent advocates an approach to addressing Citizens United's claims that I find quite perplexing. It presumably agrees with the majority that Citizens United's narrower statutory and constitutional arguments lack merit—otherwise its conclusion that the group should lose this case would make no sense. Despite agreeing
This approach is based on a false premise: that our practice of avoiding unnecessary (and unnecessarily broad) constitutional holdings somehow trumps our obligation faithfully to interpret the law. It should go without saying, however, that we cannot embrace a narrow ground of decision simply because it is narrow; it must also be right. Thus while it is true that "[i]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more," post, at 937 (internal quotation marks omitted), sometimes it is necessary to decide more. There is a difference between judicial restraint and judicial abdication. When constitutional questions are "indispensably necessary" to resolving the case at hand, "the court must meet and decide them." Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (No. 11, 558) (CC Va. 1833) (Marshall, C.J.).
Because it is necessary to reach Citizens United's broader argument that Austin should be overruled, the debate over whether to consider this claim on an asapplied or facial basis strikes me as largely beside the point. Citizens United has standing—it is being injured by the Government's enforcement of the Act. Citizens United has a constitutional claim—the Act violates the First Amendment, because it prohibits political speech. The Government has a defense—the Act may be enforced, consistent with the First Amendment, against corporations. Whether the claim or the defense prevails is the question before us.
Given the nature of that claim and defense, it makes no difference of any substance whether this case is resolved by invalidating the statute on its face or only as applied to Citizens United. Even if considered in as-applied terms, a holding in this case that the Act may not be applied to Citizens United—because corporations as well as individuals enjoy the pertinent First Amendment rights—would mean that any other corporation raising the same challenge would also win. Likewise, a conclusion that the Act may be applied to Citizens United—because it is constitutional to prohibit corporate political speech—would similarly govern future cases. Regardless whether we label Citizens United's claim a "facial" or "as-applied" challenge, the consequences of the Court's decision are the same.
The text and purpose of the First Amendment point in the same direction: Congress may not prohibit political speech, even if the speaker is a corporation or union. What makes this case difficult is the need to confront our prior decision in Austin.
This is the first case in which we have been asked to overrule Austin, and thus it is also the first in which we have had reason to consider how much weight to give stare decisis in assessing its continued validity. The dissent erroneously declares
Fidelity to precedent—the policy of stare decisis—is vital to the proper exercise of the judicial function. "Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). For these reasons, we have long recognized that departures from precedent are inappropriate in the absence of a "special justification." Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984).
At the same time, stare decisis is neither an "inexorable command," Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003), nor "a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision," Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604 (1940), especially in constitutional cases, see United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978). If it were, segregation would be legal, minimum wage laws would be unconstitutional, and the Government could wiretap ordinary criminal suspects without first obtaining warrants. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954); Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D. C., 261 U.S. 525, 43 S.Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). As the dissent properly notes, none of us has viewed stare decisis in such absolute terms. Post, at 938-939; see also, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 274-281, 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to overrule its invalidation of limits on independent expenditures on political speech in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam)).
Stare decisis is instead a "principle of policy." Helvering, supra, at 119, 60 S.Ct. 444. When considering whether to reexamine a prior erroneous holding, we must balance the importance of having constitutional questions decided against the importance of having them decided right. As Justice Jackson explained, this requires a "sober appraisal of the disadvantages of the innovation as well as those of the questioned case, a weighing of practical effects of one against the other." Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A.B.A.J. 334 (1944).
In conducting this balancing, we must keep in mind that stare decisis is not an end in itself. It is instead "the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion."
Thus, for example, if the precedent under consideration itself departed from the Court's jurisprudence, returning to the "`intrinsically sounder' doctrine established in prior cases" may "better serv[e] the values of stare decisis than would following [the] more recently decided case inconsistent with the decisions that came before it." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995); see also Helvering, supra, at 119, 60 S.Ct. 444; Randall, supra, at 274, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Abrogating the errant precedent, rather than reaffirming or extending it, might better preserve the law's coherence and curtail the precedent's disruptive effects.
Likewise, if adherence to a precedent actually impedes the stable and orderly adjudication of future cases, its stare decisis effect is also diminished. This can happen in a number of circumstances, such as when the precedent's validity is so hotly contested that it cannot reliably function as a basis for decision in future cases, when its rationale threatens to upend our settled jurisprudence in related areas of law, and when the precedent's underlying reasoning has become so discredited that the Court cannot keep the precedent alive without jury-rigging new and different justifications to shore up the original mistake. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 808, 817, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2088-2089, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009) (stare decisis does not control when adherence to the prior decision requires "fundamentally revising its theoretical basis").
These considerations weigh against retaining our decision in Austin. First, as the majority explains, that decision was an "aberration" insofar as it departed from the robust protections we had granted political speech in our earlier cases. Ante, at 907; see also Buckley, supra; First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). Austin undermined the careful line that Buckley drew to distinguish limits on contributions to candidates from limits on independent expenditures on speech. Buckley rejected the asserted government interest in regulating independent expenditures, concluding that "restrict[ing] the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." 424 U.S., at 48-49, 96 S.Ct. 612; see also Bellotti, supra, at 790-791, 98 S.Ct. 1407; Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981). Austin, however, allowed the Government to prohibit these same expenditures out of concern for "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth" in the marketplace of ideas. 494 U.S., at 660, 110 S.Ct. 1391. Austin's reasoning was—and remains—inconsistent with Buckley's explicit repudiation of any government interest in "equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections." 424 U.S., at 48-49, 96 S.Ct. 612.
Austin was also inconsistent with Bellotti's clear rejection of the idea that "speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment loses that
Second, the validity of Austin's rationale—itself adopted over two "spirited dissents," Payne, 501 U.S., at 829, 111 S.Ct. 2597—has proved to be the consistent subject of dispute among Members of this Court ever since. See, e.g., WRTL, 551 U.S., at 483, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (SCALIA, J., joined by KENNEDY and THOMAS, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); McConnell, 540 U.S., at 247, 264, 286, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinions of SCALIA, THOMAS, and KENNEDY, JJ.); Beaumont, 539 U.S., at 163, 164, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (opinions of KENNEDY and THOMAS, JJ.). The simple fact that one of our decisions remains controversial is, of course, insufficient to justify overruling it. But it does undermine the precedent's ability to contribute to the stable and orderly development of the law. In such circumstances, it is entirely appropriate for the Court—which in this case is squarely asked to reconsider Austin's validity for the first time—to address the matter with a greater willingness to consider new approaches capable of restoring our doctrine to sounder footing.
Third, the Austin decision is uniquely destabilizing because it threatens to subvert our Court's decisions even outside the particular context of corporate express advocacy. The First Amendment theory underlying Austin's holding is extraordinarily broad. Austin's logic would authorize government prohibition of political speech by a category of speakers in the name of equality—a point that most scholars acknowledge (and many celebrate), but that the dissent denies. Compare, e.g., Garrett, New Voices in Politics: Justice Marshall's Jurisprudence on Law and Politics, 52 Howard L.J. 655, 669 (2009) (Austin "has been understood by most commentators to be an opinion driven by equality considerations, albeit disguised in the language of `political corruption'") with post, at 970 (Austin's rationale "is manifestly not just an `equalizing' ideal in disguise").
It should not be surprising, then, that Members of the Court have relied on Austin's expansive logic to justify greater incursions on the First Amendment, even outside the original context of corporate advocacy on behalf of candidates running for office. See, e.g., Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 2780, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on Austin and other cases to justify restrictions on campaign spending by individual candidates, explaining that "there is no reason that their logic—specifically, their concerns about the corrosive and distorting effects of wealth on our political process—is not
If taken seriously, Austin's logic would apply most directly to newspapers and other media corporations. They have a more profound impact on public discourse than most other speakers. These corporate entities are, for the time being, not subject to § 441b's otherwise generally applicable prohibitions on corporate political speech. But this is simply a matter of legislative grace. The fact that the law currently grants a favored position to media corporations is no reason to overlook the danger inherent in accepting a theory that would allow government restrictions on their political speech. See generally McConnell, supra, at 283-286, 124 S.Ct. 619 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
These readings of Austin do no more than carry that decision's reasoning to its logical endpoint. In doing so, they highlight the threat Austin poses to First Amendment rights generally, even outside its specific factual context of corporate express advocacy. Because Austin is so difficult to confine to its facts—and because its logic threatens to undermine our First Amendment jurisprudence and the nature of public discourse more broadly—the costs of giving it stare decisis effect are unusually high.
Finally and most importantly, the Government's own effort to defend Austin— or, more accurately, to defend something that is not quite Austin—underscores its weakness as a precedent of the Court. The Government concedes that Austin "is not the most lucid opinion," yet asks us to reaffirm its holding. Tr. of Oral Arg. 62 (Sept. 9, 2009). But while invoking stare decisis to support this position, the Government never once even mentions the compelling interest that Austin relied upon in the first place: the need to diminish "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." 494 U.S., at 660, 110 S.Ct. 1391.
Instead of endorsing Austin on its own terms, the Government urges us to reaffirm Austin's specific holding on the basis of two new and potentially expansive interests—the need to prevent actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption, and the need to protect corporate shareholders. See Supp. Brief for Appellee 8-10, 12-13. Those interests may or may not support the result in Austin, but they were plainly not part of the reasoning on which Austin relied.
To its credit, the Government forthrightly concedes that Austin did not embrace either of the new rationales it now urges upon us. See, e.g., Supp. Brief for Appellee 11 ("The Court did not decide in Austin... whether the compelling interest in preventing actual or apparent corruption provides a constitutionally sufficient justification
To be clear: The Court in Austin nowhere relied upon the only arguments the Government now raises to support that decision. In fact, the only opinion in Austin endorsing the Government's argument based on the threat of quid pro quo corruption was Justice STEVENS's concurrence. 494 U.S., at 678, 110 S.Ct. 1391. The Court itself did not do so, despite the fact that the concurrence highlighted the argument. Moreover, the Court's only discussion of shareholder protection in Austin appeared in a section of the opinion that sought merely to distinguish Austin's facts from those of Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986). Austin, supra, at 663, 110 S.Ct. 1391. Nowhere did Austin suggest that the goal of protecting shareholders is itself a compelling interest authorizing restrictions on First Amendment rights.
To the extent that the Government's case for reaffirming Austin depends on radically reconceptualizing its reasoning, that argument is at odds with itself. Stare decisis is a doctrine of preservation, not transformation. It counsels deference to past mistakes, but provides no justification for making new ones. There is therefore no basis for the Court to give precedential sway to reasoning that it has never accepted, simply because that reasoning happens to support a conclusion reached on different grounds that have since been abandoned or discredited.
Doing so would undermine the rule-of-law values that justify stare decisis in the first place. It would effectively license the Court to invent and adopt new principles of constitutional law solely for the purpose of rationalizing its past errors, without a proper analysis of whether those principles have merit on their own. This approach would allow the Court's past missteps to spawn future mistakes, undercutting the very rule-of-law values that stare decisis is designed to protect.
None of this is to say that the Government is barred from making new arguments to support the outcome in Austin. On the contrary, it is free to do so. And of course the Court is free to accept them. But the Government's new arguments must stand or fall on their own; they are not entitled to receive the special deference we accord to precedent. They are, as grounds to support Austin, literally unprecedented. Moreover, to the extent the Government relies on new arguments— and declines to defend Austin on its own terms—we may reasonably infer that it lacks confidence in that decision's original justification.
Because continued adherence to Austin threatens to subvert the "principled and intelligible" development of our First Amendment jurisprudence, Vasquez, 474 U.S., at 265, 106 S.Ct. 617, I support the Court's determination to overrule that decision.
* * *
We have had two rounds of briefing in this case, two oral arguments, and 54 amicus
Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice ALITO joins, and with whom Justice THOMAS joins in part, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court.
I write separately to address Justice STEVENS' discussion of "Original Understandings," post, at 948 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (hereinafter referred to as the dissent). This section of the dissent purports to show that today's decision is not supported by the original understanding of the First Amendment. The dissent attempts this demonstration, however, in splendid isolation from the text of the First Amendment. It never shows why "the freedom of speech" that was the right of Englishmen did not include the freedom to speak in association with other individuals, including association in the corporate form. To be sure, in 1791 (as now) corporations could pursue only the objectives set forth in their charters; but the dissent provides no evidence that their speech in the pursuit of those objectives could be censored.
Instead of taking this straightforward approach to determining the Amendment's meaning, the dissent embarks on a detailed exploration of the Framers' views about the "role of corporations in society." Post, at 949. The Framers didn't like corporations, the dissent concludes, and therefore it follows (as night the day) that corporations had no rights of free speech. Of course the Framers' personal affection or disaffection for corporations is relevant only insofar as it can be thought to be reflected in the understood meaning of the text they enacted—not, as the dissent suggests, as a freestanding substitute for that text. But the dissent's distortion of proper analysis is even worse than that. Though faced with a constitutional text that makes no distinction between types of speakers, the dissent feels no necessity to provide even an isolated statement from the founding era to the effect that corporations are not covered, but places the burden on petitioners to bring forward statements showing that they are ("there is not a scintilla of evidence to support the notion that anyone believed [the First Amendment] would preclude regulatory distinctions based on the corporate form," post, at 948).
Despite the corporation-hating quotations the dissent has dredged up, it is far from clear that by the end of the 18th century corporations were despised. If so, how came there to be so many of them? The dissent's statement that there were few business corporations during the eighteenth century—"only a few hundred during all of the 18th century"—is misleading. Post, at 949, n. 53. There were approximately 335 charters issued to business corporations in the United States by the end of the 18th century.
Even if we thought it proper to apply the dissent's approach of excluding from First Amendment coverage what the Founders disliked, and even if we agreed that the Founders disliked founding-era corporations; modern corporations might not qualify for exclusion. Most of the Founders' resentment towards corporations was directed at the state-granted monopoly privileges that individually chartered corporations enjoyed.
The lack of a textual exception for speech by corporations cannot be explained on the ground that such organizations did not exist or did not speak. To the contrary, colleges, towns and cities, religious institutions, and guilds had long been organized as corporations at common law and under the King's charter, see 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 455-473 (1765); 1 S. Kyd, A
Historical evidence relating to the textually similar clause "the freedom of ... the press" also provides no support for the proposition that the First Amendment excludes conduct of artificial legal entities from the scope of its protection. The freedom of "the press" was widely understood to protect the publishing activities of individual editors and printers. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 360, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment); see also McConnell, 540 U.S., at 252-253, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). But these individuals often acted through newspapers, which (much like corporations) had their own names, outlived the individuals who had founded them, could be bought and sold, were sometimes owned by more than one person, and were operated for profit. See generally F.
In passing, the dissent also claims that the Court's conception of corruption is unhistorical. The Framers "would have been appalled," it says, by the evidence of corruption in the congressional findings supporting the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Post, at 963. For this proposition, the dissent cites a law review article arguing that "corruption" was originally understood to include "moral decay" and even actions taken by citizens in pursuit of private rather than public ends. Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell L.Rev. 341, 373, 378 (2009). It is hard to see how this has anything to do with what sort of corruption can be combated by restrictions on political speech. Moreover, if speech can be prohibited because, in the view of the Government, it leads to "moral decay" or does not serve "public ends," then there is no limit to the Government's censorship power.
The dissent says that when the Framers "constitutionalized the right to free speech in the First Amendment, it was the free speech of individual Americans that they had in mind." Post, at 950. That is no doubt true. All the provisions of the Bill of Rights set forth the rights of individual men and women—not, for example, of trees or polar bears. But the individual person's right to speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons. Surely the dissent does not believe that speech by the Republican Party or the Democratic Party can be censored because it is not the speech of "an individual American." It is the speech of many individual Americans, who have associated in a common cause, giving the leadership of the party the right to speak on their behalf. The association of individuals in a business corporation is no different—or at least it cannot be denied the right to speak on the simplistic ground that it is not "an individual American."
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice GINSBURG, Justice BREYER, and Justice SOTOMAYOR join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The real issue in this case concerns how, not if, the appellant may finance its electioneering. Citizens United is a wealthy nonprofit corporation that runs a political action committee (PAC) with millions of dollars in assets. Under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), it could have used those assets to televise and promote Hillary: The Movie wherever and whenever it wanted to. It also could have spent unrestricted sums to broadcast Hillary at any time other than the 30 days before the last primary election. Neither Citizens United's nor any other corporation's speech has been "banned," ante, at 886. All that the parties dispute is whether Citizens United had a right to use the funds in its general treasury to pay for broadcasts during the 30-day period. The notion that the First Amendment dictates an affirmative answer to that question is, in my judgment, profoundly misguided. Even more misguided is the notion that the Court must rewrite
The basic premise underlying the Court's ruling is its iteration, and constant reiteration, of the proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on a speaker's identity, including its "identity" as a corporation. While that glittering generality has rhetorical appeal, it is not a correct statement of the law. Nor does it tell us when a corporation may engage in electioneering that some of its shareholders oppose. It does not even resolve the specific question whether Citizens United may be required to finance some of its messages with the money in its PAC. The conceit that corporations must be treated identically to natural persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also inadequate to justify the Court's disposition of this case.
In the context of election to public office, the distinction between corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters. The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral process. Our lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to take measures designed to guard against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and national races.
The majority's approach to corporate electioneering marks a dramatic break from our past. Congress has placed special limitations on campaign spending by corporations ever since the passage of the Tillman Act in 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. We have unanimously concluded that this "reflects a permissible assessment of the dangers posed by those entities to the electoral process," FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209, 103 S.Ct. 552, 74 L.Ed.2d 364 (1982) (NRWC), and have accepted the "legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation," id., at 209-210, 103 S.Ct. 552. The Court today rejects a century of history when it treats the distinction between corporate and individual campaign spending as an invidious novelty born of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990). Relying largely on individual dissenting opinions, the majority blazes through our precedents, overruling or disavowing a body of case law including FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007) (WRTL), McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003), FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003), FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986) (MCFL), NRWC, 459 U.S. 197, 103 S.Ct. 552, 74 L.Ed.2d 364, and California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981).
In his landmark concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936), Justice Brandeis stressed the importance of adhering to rules the Court has "developed ... for its own governance" when deciding constitutional questions. Because departures from those rules always enhance the risk of error, I shall review the background of this case in some detail before explaining why the Court's analysis rests on a faulty understanding of Austin and McConnell and
The Court's ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation. The path it has taken to reach its outcome will, I fear, do damage to this institution. Before turning to the question whether to overrule Austin and part of McConnell, it is important to explain why the Court should not be deciding that question.
Scope of the Case
The first reason is that the question was not properly brought before us. In declaring § 203 of BCRA facially unconstitutional on the ground that corporations' electoral expenditures may not be regulated any more stringently than those of individuals, the majority decides this case on a basis relinquished below, not included in the questions presented to us by the litigants, and argued here only in response to the Court's invitation. This procedure is unusual and inadvisable for a court.
In the District Court, Citizens United initially raised a facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 203. App. 23a-24a. In its motion for summary judgment, however, Citizens United expressly abandoned its facial challenge, 1:07-cv-2240-RCL-RWR, Docket Entry No. 52, pp. 1-2 (May 16, 2008), and the parties stipulated to the dismissal of that claim, id., Nos. 53 (May 22, 2008), 54 (May 23, 2008), App. 6a. The District Court therefore resolved the case on alternative grounds,
"`It is only in exceptional cases coming here from the federal courts that questions not pressed or passed upon below are reviewed,' " Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 234, 96 S.Ct. 1399, 47 L.Ed.2d 701 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Duignan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 200, 47 S.Ct. 566, 71 L.Ed. 996 (1927)), and it is "only in the most exceptional cases" that we will consider issues outside the questions presented, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481, n. 15, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). The appellant in this case did not so much as assert an exceptional circumstance, and one searches the majority opinion in vain for the mention of any. That is unsurprising, for none exists.
Setting the case for reargument was a constructive step, but it did not cure this fundamental problem. Essentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law.
As-Applied and Facial Challenges
This Court has repeatedly emphasized in recent years that "[f]acial challenges are disfavored." Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008); see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329, 126 S.Ct. 961, 163 L.Ed.2d 812 (2006) ("[T]he `normal rule' is that `partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the required course,' such that a `statute may ... be declared invalid to the extent that it reaches too far, but otherwise left intact'" (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985); alteration in original)). By declaring § 203 facially unconstitutional, our colleagues have turned an as-applied challenge into a facial challenge, in defiance of this principle.
This is not merely a technical defect in the Court's decision. The unnecessary resort to a facial inquiry "run[s] contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint
The problem goes still deeper, for the Court does all of this on the basis of pure speculation. Had Citizens United maintained a facial challenge, and thus argued that there are virtually no circumstances in which BCRA § 203 can be applied constitutionally, the parties could have developed, through the normal process of litigation, a record about the actual effects of § 203, its actual burdens and its actual benefits, on all manner of corporations and unions.
Faced with this gaping empirical hole, the majority throws up its hands. Were we to confine our inquiry to Citizens United's as-applied challenge, it protests, we would commence an "extended" process of "draw[ing], and then redraw[ing], constitutional
The majority proposes several other justifications for the sweep of its ruling. It suggests that a facial ruling is necessary because, if the Court were to continue on its normal course of resolving as-applied challenges as they present themselves, that process would itself run afoul of the First Amendment. See, e.g., ante, at 890 (as-applied review process "would raise questions as to the courts' own lawful authority"); ibid. ("Courts, too, are bound by the First Amendment"). This suggestion is perplexing. Our colleagues elsewhere trumpet "our duty `to say what the law is,'" even when our predecessors on the bench and our counterparts in Congress have interpreted the law differently. Ante, at 913 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)). We do not typically say what the law is not as a hedge against future judicial error. The possibility that later courts will misapply a constitutional provision does not give us a basis for pretermitting litigation relating to that provision.
The majority suggests that a facial ruling is necessary because anything less would chill too much protected speech. See ante, at 890-891, 892, 894-897. In addition to begging the question what types of corporate spending are constitutionally protected and to what extent, this claim rests on the assertion that some significant number of corporations have
The majority suggests that, even though it expressly dismissed its facial challenge, Citizens United nevertheless preserved it—not as a freestanding "claim," but as a potential argument in support of "a claim that the FEC has violated its First Amendment right to free speech." Ante, at 892-893; see also ante, at 919 (ROBERTS, C.J., concurring) (describing Citizens United's claim as: "[T]he Act violates the First Amendment"). By this novel logic, virtually any submission could be reconceptualized as "a claim that the Government has violated my rights," and it would then be available to the Court to entertain any conceivable issue that might be relevant to that claim's disposition. Not only the as-applied/facial distinction, but the basic relationship between litigants and courts, would be upended if the latter had free rein to construe the former's claims at such high levels of generality. There would be no need for plaintiffs to argue their case; they could just cite the constitutional provisions they think relevant, and leave the rest to us.
Finally, the majority suggests that though the scope of Citizens United's claim may be narrow, a facial ruling is necessary as a matter of remedy. Relying on a law review article, it asserts that Citizens United's dismissal of the facial challenge does not prevent us "`from making broader pronouncements of invalidity in properly "as-applied" cases.'" Ante, at 893 (quoting Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv. L.Rev. 1321, 1339 (2000) (hereinafter Fallon)); accord, ante, at 919 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.) ("Regardless whether we label Citizens United's claim a `facial' or `as-applied' challenge, the consequences of the Court's decision are the same"). The majority is on firmer conceptual ground here. Yet even if one accepts this part of Professor Fallon's thesis, one must proceed
Citizens United's as-applied challenge was not of this sort. Until this Court ordered reargument, its contention was that BCRA § 203 could not lawfully be applied to a feature-length video-on-demand film (such as Hillary) or to a nonprofit corporation exempt from taxation under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)
It is all the more distressing that our colleagues have manufactured a facial challenge, because the parties have advanced numerous ways to resolve the case that would facilitate electioneering by nonprofit advocacy corporations such as Citizens
Consider just three of the narrower grounds of decision that the majority has bypassed. First, the Court could have ruled, on statutory grounds, that a feature-length film distributed through video-on-demand does not qualify as an "electioneering communication" under § 203 of BCRA, 2 U.S.C. § 441b. BCRA defines that term to encompass certain communications transmitted by "broadcast, cable, or satellite." § 434(f)(3)(A). When Congress was developing BCRA, the video-on-demand medium was still in its infancy, and legislators were focused on a very different sort of programming: short advertisements run on television or radio. See McConnell, 540 U.S., at 207, 124 S.Ct. 619. The sponsors of BCRA acknowledge that the FEC's implementing regulations do not clearly apply to video-on-demand transmissions. See Brief for Senator John McCain et al. as Amici Curiae 17-19. In light of this ambiguity, the distinctive characteristics of video-on-demand, and "[t]he elementary rule ... that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality," Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657, 15 S.Ct. 207, 39 L.Ed. 297 (1895), the Court could have reasonably ruled that § 203 does not apply to Hillary.
Second, the Court could have expanded the MCFL exemption to cover § 501(c)(4) nonprofits that accept only a de minimis amount of money from for-profit corporations. Citizens United professes to be such a group: Its brief says it "is funded predominantly by donations from individuals who support [its] ideological message." Brief for Appellant 5. Numerous Courts of Appeal have held that de minimis business support does not, in itself, remove an otherwise qualifying organization from the ambit of MCFL.
Finally, let us not forget Citizens United's as-applied constitutional challenge.
This brief tour of alternative grounds on which the case could have been decided is not meant to show that any of these grounds is ideal, though each is perfectly "valid," ante, at 892 (majority opinion).
The final principle of judicial process that the majority violates is the most transparent: stare decisis. I am not an absolutist when it comes to stare decisis, in the campaign finance area or in any other. No one is. But if this principle is to do any meaningful work in supporting the rule of law, it must at least demand a significant justification, beyond the preferences of five Justices, for overturning settled doctrine. "[A] decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). No such justification exists in this case, and to the contrary there are powerful prudential reasons to keep faith with our precedents.
The Court's central argument for why stare decisis ought to be trumped is that it does not like Austin. The opinion "was not well reasoned," our colleagues assert, and it conflicts with First Amendment
Perhaps in recognition of this point, the Court supplements its merits case with a smattering of assertions. The Court proclaims that "Austin is undermined by experience since its announcement." Ante, at 912. This is a curious claim to make in a case that lacks a developed record. The majority has no empirical evidence with which to substantiate the claim; we just have its ipse dixit that the real world has not been kind to Austin. Nor does the majority bother to specify in what sense Austin has been "undermined." Instead it treats the reader to a string of non sequiturs: "Our Nation's speech dynamic is changing," ante, at 912; "[s]peakers have become adept at presenting citizens with sound bites, talking points, and scripted messages," ibid.; "[c]orporations ... do not have monolithic views," ibid. How any of these ruminations weakens the force of stare decisis, escapes my comprehension.
The majority also contends that the Government's hesitation to rely on Austin's antidistortion rationale "diminishe[s]" "the principle of adhering to that precedent." Ante, at 912; see also ante, at 923 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.) (Government's litigating position is "most importan[t]" factor undermining Austin). Why it diminishes the value of stare decisis is left unexplained. We have never thought fit to overrule a precedent because a litigant has taken any particular tack. Nor should we. Our decisions can often be defended on multiple grounds, and a litigant may have strategic or case-specific reasons for emphasizing only a subset of them. Members of the public, moreover, often rely on our bottom-line holdings far more than our precise legal arguments; surely this is true for the legislatures that have been regulating corporate electioneering since Austin. The task of evaluating the continued viability of precedents falls to this Court, not to the parties.
We have recognized that "[s]tare decisis has special force when legislators or citizens `have acted in reliance on a previous decision, for in this instance overruling the decision would dislodge settled rights and expectations or require an extensive legislative response.'" Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 714, 115 S.Ct. 1754, 131 L.Ed.2d 779 (1995) (quoting Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202, 112 S.Ct. 560, 116 L.Ed.2d 560 (1991)). Stare decisis protects not only personal rights involving property or contract but also the ability of the elected branches to shape their laws in an effective and coherent fashion. Today's decision takes away a power that we have long permitted these branches to exercise. State legislatures have relied on their authority to regulate corporate electioneering, confirmed in Austin, for more than a century.
By removing one of its central components, today's ruling makes a hash out of BCRA's "delicate and interconnected regulatory scheme." McConnell, 540 U.S., at 172, 124 S.Ct. 619. Consider just one example of the distortions that will follow: Political parties are barred under BCRA from soliciting or spending "soft money," funds that are not subject to the statute's disclosure requirements or its source and amount limitations. 2 U.S.C. § 441i; McConnell, 540 U.S., at 122-126, 124 S.Ct. 619. Going forward, corporations and unions will be free to spend as much general treasury money as they wish on ads that support or attack specific candidates, whereas national parties will not be able to spend a dime of soft money on ads of any kind. The Court's ruling thus dramatically enhances the role of corporations and unions—and the narrow interests they represent—vis-à-vis the role of political parties—and the broad coalitions they represent—in determining who will hold public office.
Beyond the reliance interests at stake, the other stare decisis factors also cut against the Court. Considerations of antiquity
In fact, no one has argued to us that Austin's rule has proved impracticable, and not a single for-profit corporation, union, or State has asked us to overrule it. Quite to the contrary, leading groups representing the business community,
In the end, the Court's rejection of Austin and McConnell comes down to nothing more than its disagreement with their results.
The novelty of the Court's procedural dereliction and its approach to stare decisis is matched by the novelty of its ruling on the merits. The ruling rests on several premises. First, the Court claims that Austin and McConnell have "banned" corporate speech. Second, it claims that the First Amendment precludes regulatory distinctions based on speaker identity, including the speaker's identity as a corporation. Third, it claims that Austin and McConnell were radical outliers in our First Amendment tradition and our campaign finance jurisprudence. Each of these claims is wrong.
The So-Called "Ban"
Pervading the Court's analysis is the ominous image of a "categorical ba[n]" on corporate speech. Ante, at 910. Indeed, the majority invokes the specter of a "ban" on nearly every page of its opinion. Ante, at 886-887, 889, 891-892, 894, 896-898, 900-907, 909-912, 915, 916. This characterization is highly misleading, and needs to be corrected.
In fact it already has been. Our cases have repeatedly pointed out that, "[c]ontrary to the [majority's] critical assumptions," the statutes upheld in Austin and McConnell do "not impose an absolute ban on all forms of corporate political spending." Austin, 494 U.S., at 660, 110 S.Ct. 1391; see also McConnell, 540 U.S., at 203-204, 124 S.Ct. 619; Beaumont, 539 U.S., at 162-163, 123 S.Ct. 2200. For starters, both statutes provide exemptions for PACs, separate segregated funds established by a corporation for political purposes. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 169.255 (West 2005). "The ability to form and administer separate segregated funds," we observed in McConnell, "has provided corporations and unions with a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to engage in express advocacy. That has been this Court's unanimous view." 540 U.S., at 203, 124 S.Ct. 619.
Under BCRA, any corporation's "stockholders and their families and its executive or administrative personnel and their families" can pool their resources to finance electioneering communications. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i). A significant and growing number of corporations avail themselves of this option;
The laws upheld in Austin and McConnell leave open many additional avenues for corporations' political speech. Consider the statutory provision we are ostensibly evaluating in this case, BCRA § 203. It has no application to genuine issue advertising—a category of corporate speech Congress found to be far more substantial than election-related advertising, see McConnell, 540 U.S., at 207, 124 S.Ct. 619—or to Internet, telephone, and print advocacy.
At the time Citizens United brought this lawsuit, the only types of speech that could be regulated under § 203 were: (1) broadcast, cable, or satellite communications;
In many ways, then, § 203 functions as a source restriction or a time, place, and manner restriction. It applies in a viewpoint-neutral fashion to a narrow subset of advocacy messages about clearly identified candidates for federal office, made during discrete time periods through discrete channels. In the case at hand, all Citizens United needed to do to broadcast Hillary right before the primary was to abjure business contributions or use the funds in its PAC, which by its own account is "one of the most active conservative PACs in America," Citizens United Political Victory Fund, http://www.cupvf.org/.
So let us be clear: Neither Austin nor McConnell held or implied that corporations may be silenced; the FEC is not a "censor"; and in the years since these
The second pillar of the Court's opinion is its assertion that "the Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker's ... identity." Ante, at 902; accord, ante, at 886, 898, 900, 902-904, 912-913. The case on which it relies for this proposition is First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). As I shall explain, infra, at 958-960, the holding in that case was far narrower than the Court implies. Like its paeans to unfettered discourse, the Court's denunciation of identity-based distinctions may have rhetorical appeal but it obscures reality.
"Our jurisprudence over the past 216 years has rejected an absolutist interpretation" of the First Amendment. WRTL, 551 U.S., at 482, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.). The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Apart perhaps from measures designed to protect the press, that text might seem to permit no distinctions of any kind. Yet in a variety of contexts, we have held that speech can be regulated differentially on account of the speaker's identity, when identity is understood in categorical or institutional terms. The Government routinely places special restrictions on the speech rights of students,
The free speech guarantee thus does not render every other public interest an illegitimate basis for qualifying a speaker's autonomy; society could scarcely function if it did. It is fair to say that our First Amendment doctrine has "frowned on" certain identity-based distinctions, Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 47, n. 4, 120 S.Ct. 483, 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999) (STEVENS, J., dissenting), particularly those that may reflect invidious discrimination or preferential treatment of a politically powerful group. But it is simply incorrect to suggest that we have prohibited all legislative distinctions based on identity or content. Not even close.
The election context is distinctive in many ways, and the Court, of course, is right that the First Amendment closely guards political speech. But in this context, too, the authority of legislatures to enact viewpoint-neutral regulations based on content and identity is well settled. We have, for example, allowed state-run broadcasters to exclude independent candidates from televised debates. Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998).
The same logic applies to this case with additional force because it is the identity of corporations, rather than individuals, that the Legislature has taken into account. As we have unanimously observed, legislatures are entitled to decide "that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation" in an electoral context. NRWC, 459 U.S., at 209-210, 103 S.Ct. 552.
If taken seriously, our colleagues' assumption that the identity of a speaker has no relevance to the Government's ability to regulate political speech would lead to some remarkable conclusions. Such an assumption would have accorded the propaganda broadcasts to our troops by "Tokyo Rose" during World War II the same protection as speech by Allied commanders. More pertinently, it would appear to afford the same protection to multinational corporations
In short, the Court dramatically overstates its critique of identity-based distinctions, without ever explaining why corporate identity demands the same treatment as individual identity. Only the most wooden approach to the First Amendment could justify the unprecedented line it seeks to draw.
Our First Amendment Tradition
A third fulcrum of the Court's opinion is the idea that Austin and McConnell are radical outliers, "aberration[s]," in our First Amendment tradition. Ante, at 907; see also ante, at 910, 916-917 (professing fidelity to "our law and our tradition"). The Court has it exactly backwards. It is today's holding that is the radical departure from what had been settled First Amendment law. To see why, it is useful to take a long view.
1. Original Understandings
Let us start from the beginning. The Court invokes "ancient First Amendment principles," ante, at 886 (internal quotation marks omitted), and original understandings, ante, at 906-907, to defend today's ruling, yet it makes only a perfunctory attempt to ground its analysis in the principles or understandings of those who drafted and ratified the Amendment. Perhaps this is because there is not a scintilla of evidence to support the notion that anyone believed it would preclude regulatory distinctions based on the corporate form. To the extent that the Framers' views are discernible and relevant to the disposition of this case, they would appear to cut strongly against the majority's position.
This is not only because the Framers and their contemporaries conceived of speech more narrowly than we now think of it, see Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind.
The individualized charter mode of incorporation reflected the "cloud of disfavor under which corporations labored" in the early years of this Nation. 1 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 2, p. 8 (rev. ed.2006); see also Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-549, 53 S.Ct. 481, 77 L.Ed. 929 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing fears of the "evils" of business corporations); L. Friedman, A History of American Law 194 (2d ed.1985) ("The word `soulless' constantly recurs in debates over corporations.... Corporations, it was feared, could concentrate the worst urges of whole groups of men"). Thomas Jefferson famously fretted that corporations would subvert the Republic.
The Framers thus took it as a given that corporations could be comprehensively
The Court observes that the Framers drew on diverse intellectual sources, communicated through newspapers, and aimed to provide greater freedom of speech than had existed in England. Ante, at 906. From these (accurate) observations, the Court concludes that "[t]he First Amendment was certainly not understood to condone the suppression of political speech in society's most salient media." Ibid. This conclusion is far from certain, given that many historians believe the Framers were focused on prior restraints on publication and did not understand the First Amendment to "prevent the subsequent punishment of such [publications] as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare."
As a matter of original expectations, then, it seems absurd to think that the First Amendment prohibits legislatures from taking into account the corporate identity of a sponsor of electoral advocacy. As a matter of original meaning, it likewise seems baseless—unless one evaluates the First Amendment's "principles," ante, at 886, 912, or its "purpose," ante, at 919-920 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.), at such a high level of generality that the historical understandings of the Amendment cease to be a meaningful constraint on the judicial task. This case sheds a revelatory light on the assumption of some that an impartial judge's application of an originalist methodology is likely to yield more determinate answers, or to play a more decisive role in the decisional process, than his or her views about sound policy.
Justice SCALIA criticizes the foregoing discussion for failing to adduce statements from the founding era showing that corporations were understood to be excluded from the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Ante, at 925-926, 929. Of course, Justice SCALIA adduces no statements to suggest the contrary proposition, or even to suggest that the contrary proposition better reflects the kind of right that the drafters and ratifiers of the Free Speech Clause thought they were enshrining. Although Justice SCALIA makes a perfectly sensible argument that an individual's right to speak entails a right to speak with others for a common cause, cf. MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539, he does not explain why those two rights must be precisely identical, or why that principle applies to electioneering by corporations that serve no "common cause." Ante, at 928. Nothing in his account dislodges my basic point that members of the founding generation held a cautious view of corporate power and a narrow view of corporate rights (not that they "despised" corporations, ante, at 925), and that they conceptualized speech in individualistic terms. If no prominent Framer bothered to articulate that corporate speech would have lesser status than individual speech, that may well be because the contrary proposition—if not also the very notion of "corporate speech"— was inconceivable.
Justice SCALIA also emphasizes the unqualified nature of the First Amendment text. Ante, at 925, 928-929. Yet he would seemingly read out the Free Press Clause: How else could he claim that my purported views on newspapers must track my views on corporations generally? Ante, at 927.
The truth is we cannot be certain how a law such as BCRA § 203 meshes with the original meaning of the First Amendment.
In fairness, our campaign finance jurisprudence has never attended very closely to the views of the Framers, see Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 280, 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (STEVENS, J., dissenting), whose political universe differed profoundly from that of today. We have long since held that corporations are covered by the First Amendment, and many legal scholars have long since rejected the concession theory of the corporation. But "historical context is usually relevant," ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted), and in light of the Court's effort to cast itself as guardian of ancient values, it pays to remember that nothing in our constitutional history dictates today's outcome. To the contrary, this history helps illuminate just how extraordinarily dissonant the decision is.
2. Legislative and Judicial Interpretation
A century of more recent history puts to rest any notion that today's ruling is faithful to our First Amendment tradition. At the federal level, the express distinction between corporate and individual political spending on elections stretches back to 1907, when Congress passed the Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, banning all corporate contributions to candidates. The Senate Report on the legislation observed that "[t]he evils of the use of [corporate] money in connection with political elections are so generally recognized that the committee deems it unnecessary to make any
The Court has surveyed the history leading up to the Tillman Act several times, see WRTL, 551 U.S., at 508-510, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (Souter, J., dissenting); McConnell, 540 U.S., at 115, 124 S.Ct. 619; Automobile Workers, 352 U.S., at 570-575, 77 S.Ct. 529, and I will refrain from doing so again. It is enough to say that the Act was primarily driven by two pressing concerns: first, the enormous power corporations had come to wield in federal elections, with the accompanying threat of both actual corruption and a public perception of corruption; and second, a respect for the interest of shareholders and members in preventing the use of their money to support candidates they opposed. See ibid.; United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 92 L.Ed. 1849 (1948); Winkler, "Other People's Money": Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 Geo. L.J. 871 (2004).
Over the years, the limitations on corporate political spending have been modified in a number of ways, as Congress responded to changes in the American economy and political practices that threatened to displace the commonweal. Justice Souter recently traced these developments at length.
Our colleagues emphasize that in two cases from the middle of the 20th century, several Justices wrote separately to criticize the expenditure restriction as applied to unions, even though the Court declined to pass on its constitutionality. Ante, at 900-901. Two features of these cases are of far greater relevance. First, those Justices were writing separately; which is to
This principle was carried forward when Congress enacted comprehensive campaign finance reform in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 86 Stat. 3, which retained the restriction on using general treasury funds for contributions and expenditures, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a). FECA codified the option for corporations and unions to create PACs to finance contributions and expenditures forbidden to the corporation or union itself. § 441b(b).
By the time Congress passed FECA in 1971, the bar on corporate contributions and expenditures had become such an accepted part of federal campaign finance regulation that when a large number of plaintiffs, including several nonprofit corporations, challenged virtually every aspect of the Act in Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, no one even bothered to argue that the bar as such was unconstitutional. Buckley famously (or infamously) distinguished direct contributions from independent expenditures, id., at 58-59, 96 S.Ct. 612, but its silence on corporations only reinforced the understanding that corporate expenditures could be treated differently from individual expenditures. "Since our decision in Buckley, Congress' power to prohibit corporations and unions from using funds in their treasuries to finance advertisements expressly advocating the election or defeat of candidates in federal elections has been firmly embedded in our law." McConnell, 540 U.S., at 203, 124 S.Ct. 619.
Thus, it was unremarkable, in a 1982 case holding that Congress could bar nonprofit corporations from soliciting nonmembers for PAC funds, that then-Justice Rehnquist wrote for a unanimous Court
The corporate/individual distinction was not questioned by the Court's disposition, in 1986, of a challenge to the expenditure restriction as applied to a distinctive type of nonprofit corporation. In MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539, we stated again "that `the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation,'" id., at 256, 107 S.Ct. 616 (quoting NRWC, 459 U.S., at 209-210, 103 S.Ct. 552), and again we acknowledged that the Government has a legitimate interest in "regulat[ing] the substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form," 479 U.S., at 257, 107 S.Ct. 616 (internal quotation marks omitted). Those aggregations can distort the "free trade in ideas" crucial to candidate elections, ibid., at the expense of members or shareholders who may disagree with the object of the expenditures, id., at 260, 107 S.Ct. 616 (internal quotation marks omitted). What the Court held by a 5-to-4 vote was that a limited class of corporations must be allowed to use their general treasury funds for independent expenditures, because Congress' interests in protecting shareholders and "restrict[ing] `the influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate form,'" id., at 257, 107 S.Ct. 616 (quoting FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 501, 105 S.Ct. 1459, 84 L.Ed.2d 455 (1985) (NCPAC)), did not apply to corporations that were structurally insulated from those concerns.
It is worth remembering for present purposes that the four MCFL dissenters, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, thought the Court was carrying the First Amendment too far. They would have recognized congressional authority to bar general treasury electioneering expenditures even by this class of nonprofits; they acknowledged that "the threat from corporate political activity will vary depending on the particular characteristics of a given corporation," but believed these "distinctions among corporations" were "distinctions in degree," not "in kind," and thus "more properly drawn by the Legislature than by the Judiciary." 479 U.S., at 268, 107 S.Ct. 616 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Not a single Justice suggested that regulation of corporate
Four years later, in Austin, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652, we considered whether corporations falling outside the MCFL exception could be barred from using general treasury funds to make independent expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, candidates. We held they could be. Once again recognizing the importance of "the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas" in candidate elections, MCFL, 479 U.S., at 257, 107 S.Ct. 616, we noted that corporations have "special advantages—such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets," 494 U.S., at 658-659, 110 S.Ct. 1391—that allow them to spend prodigious general treasury sums on campaign messages that have "little or no correlation" with the beliefs held by actual persons, id., at 660, 110 S.Ct. 1391. In light of the corrupting effects such spending might have on the political process, ibid., we permitted the State of Michigan to limit corporate expenditures on candidate elections to corporations' PACs, which rely on voluntary contributions and thus "reflect actual public support for the political ideals espoused by corporations," ibid. Notwithstanding our colleagues' insinuations that Austin deprived the public of general "ideas," "facts," and "knowledge," ante, at 906-907, the decision addressed only candidate-focused expenditures and gave the State no license to regulate corporate spending on other matters.
In the 20 years since Austin, we have reaffirmed its holding and rationale a number of times, see, e.g., Beaumont, 539 U.S., at 153-156, 123 S.Ct. 2200, most importantly in McConnell, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491, where we upheld the provision challenged here, § 203 of BCRA.
When we asked in McConnell "whether a compelling governmental interest justifie[d]" § 203, we found the question "easily answered": "We have repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at `the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas.'" 540 U.S., at 205, 124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S., at 660, 110 S.Ct. 1391). These precedents "represent respect for the legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation." 540 U.S., at 205, 124 S.Ct. 619 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Moreover, recent cases have recognized that certain restrictions on corporate electoral involvement permissibly hedge against `"circumvention of [valid] contribution limits."'" Ibid. (quoting Beaumont, 539 U.S., at 155, 123 S.Ct. 2200, in turn quoting FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456, and n. 18, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461 (2001) (Colorado II); alteration in original). BCRA, we found, is faithful to the compelling governmental interests in "`preserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, . . . sustaining the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of the government,'" and maintaining "`the individual citizen's confidence in government.'" 540 U.S., at 206-207, n. 88, 124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 788-789, 98 S.Ct. 1407; some internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). What made the answer even easier than it might have been otherwise was the option to form PACs, which give corporations, at the least, "a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to engage in" independent expenditures. 540 U.S., at 203, 124 S.Ct. 619.
3. Buckley and Bellotti
Against this extensive background of congressional regulation of corporate campaign spending, and our repeated affirmation of this regulation as constitutionally sound, the majority dismisses Austin as "a significant departure from ancient First Amendment principles," ante, at 886 (internal quotation marks omitted). How does the majority attempt to justify this claim? Selected passages from two cases, Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, and Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707, do all of the work. In the Court's view, Buckley and Bellotti decisively rejected the possibility of distinguishing corporations from natural persons in the 1970's; it just so happens that in every single case in which the Court has reviewed campaign finance legislation in the decades since, the majority failed to grasp this truth. The Federal Congress and dozens of state legislatures, we now know, have been similarly deluded.
The majority emphasizes Buckley's statement that "`[t]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.'" Ante, at 904 (quoting 424 U.S., at 48-49, 96 S.Ct. 612); ante, at 921 (opinion of ROBERTS,
For that matter, it should go without saying that when we made this statement in Buckley, we could not have been casting doubt on the restriction on corporate expenditures in candidate elections, which had not been challenged as "foreign to the First Amendment," ante, at 904 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S., at 49, 96 S.Ct. 612), or for any other reason. Buckley's independent expenditure analysis was focused on a very different statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. V). It is implausible to think, as the majority suggests, ante, at 901-902, that Buckley covertly invalidated FECA's separate corporate and union campaign expenditure restriction, § 610 (now codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b), even though that restriction had been on the books for decades before Buckley and would remain on the books, undisturbed, for decades after.
The case on which the majority places even greater weight than Buckley, however, is Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707, claiming it "could not have been clearer" that Bellotti's holding forbade distinctions between corporate and individual expenditures like the one at issue here, ante, at 902. The Court's reliance is odd. The only thing about Bellotti that could not be clearer is that it declined to adopt the majority's position. Bellotti ruled, in an explicit limitation on the scope of its holding, that "our consideration of a corporation's right to speak on issues of general public interest implies no comparable right in the quite different context of participation in a political campaign for election to public office." 435 U.S., at 788, n. 26, 98 S.Ct. 1407; see also id., at 787-788, 98 S.Ct. 1407 (acknowledging that the interests in preserving public confidence in Government and protecting dissenting shareholders may be "weighty . . . in the context of partisan candidate elections"). Bellotti, in other words, did not touch the question presented in Austin and McConnell, and the opinion squarely disavowed the proposition for which the majority cites it.
The majority attempts to explain away the distinction Bellotti drew—between general corporate speech and campaign speech intended to promote or prevent the election of specific candidates for office—
The Bellotti Court confronted a dramatically different factual situation from the one that confronts us in this case: a state statute that barred business corporations' expenditures on some referenda but not others. Specifically, the statute barred a business corporation "from making contributions or expenditures `for the purpose of. . . influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation,'" 435 U.S., at 768, 98 S.Ct. 1407 (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp.1977); alteration in original), and it went so far as to provide that referenda related to income taxation would not "`be deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of the corporation,'" 435 U.S., at 768, 98 S.Ct. 1407. As might be guessed, the legislature had enacted this statute in order to limit corporate speech on a proposed state constitutional amendment to authorize a graduated income tax. The statute was a transparent attempt to prevent corporations from spending money to defeat this amendment, which was favored by a majority of legislators but had been repeatedly rejected by the voters. See id., at 769-770, and n. 3, 98 S.Ct. 1407. We said that "where, as here, the legislature's suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment is plainly offended." Id., at 785-786, 98 S.Ct. 1407 (footnote omitted).
Bellotti thus involved a viewpoint-discriminatory statute, created to effect a particular policy outcome. Even Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, had to acknowledge that "a very persuasive argument could be made that the [Massachusetts Legislature], desiring to impose a personal income tax but more than once defeated in that desire by the combination of the Commonwealth's referendum provision and corporate expenditures in opposition to such a tax, simply decided to muzzle corporations on this sort of issue so that it could succeed in its desire." Id., at 827, n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 1407. To make matters worse, the law at issue did not make any allowance for corporations to spend money through PACs. Id., at 768, n. 2, 98 S.Ct. 1407 (opinion of the Court). This really was a
The majority grasps a quotational straw from Bellotti, that speech does not fall entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment merely because it comes from a corporation. Ante, at 902-903. Of course not, but no one suggests the contrary and neither Austin nor McConnell held otherwise. They held that even though the expenditures at issue were subject to First Amendment scrutiny, the restrictions on those expenditures were justified by a compelling state interest. See McConnell, 540 U.S., at 205, 124 S.Ct. 619; Austin, 494 U.S., at 658, 660, 110 S.Ct. 1391. We acknowledged in Bellotti that numerous "interests of the highest importance" can justify campaign finance regulation. 435 U.S., at 788-789, 98 S.Ct. 1407. But we found no evidence that these interests were served by the Massachusetts law. Id., at 789, 98 S.Ct. 1407. We left open the possibility that our decision might have been different if there had been "record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment interests." Ibid.
Austin and McConnell, then, sit perfectly well with Bellotti. Indeed, all six Members of the Austin majority had been on the Court at the time of Bellotti, and none so much as hinted in Austin that they saw any tension between the decisions. The difference between the cases is not that Austin and McConnell rejected First Amendment protection for corporations whereas Bellotti accepted it. The difference is that the statute at issue in Bellotti smacked of viewpoint discrimination, targeted one class of corporations, and provided no PAC option; and the State has a greater interest in regulating independent corporate expenditures on candidate elections than on referenda, because in a functioning democracy the public must have faith that its representatives owe their positions to the people, not to the corporations with the deepest pockets.
* * *
In sum, over the course of the past century Congress has demonstrated a recurrent need to regulate corporate participation in candidate elections to "`[p]reserv[e] the integrity of the electoral process, preven[t] corruption, . . . sustai[n] the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen,'" protect the expressive interests of shareholders, and "`[p]reserv[e] . . . the individual citizen's confidence in government.'" McConnell, 540 U.S., at 206-207, n. 88, 124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 788-789, 98 S.Ct. 1407; first alteration in original). These understandings provided the combined impetus behind the Tillman Act in 1907, see Automobile Workers, 352 U.S., at 570-575, 77 S.Ct. 529, the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, see WRTL, 551 U.S., at 511, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (Souter, J., dissenting), FECA in 1971, see NRWC, 459 U.S., at 209-210, 103 S.Ct. 552, and BCRA in 2002, see McConnell, 540 U.S., at 126-132, 124 S.Ct. 619. Continuously for over 100 years, this line of "[c]ampaign finance reform has been a series of reactions to documented threats to electoral integrity obvious to any voter, posed by large sums of money from corporate or union treasuries." WRTL, 551 U.S., at 522, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (Souter, J., dissenting). Time and again, we have recognized these realities in approving
Having explained why this is not an appropriate case in which to revisit Austin and McConnell and why these decisions sit perfectly well with "First Amendment principles," ante, at 886, 912, I come at last to the interests that are at stake. The majority recognizes that Austin and McConnell may be defended on anticorruption, antidistortion, and shareholder protection rationales. Ante, at 903-911. It badly errs both in explaining the nature of these rationales, which overlap and complement each other, and in applying them to the case at hand.
The Anticorruption Interest
Undergirding the majority's approach to the merits is the claim that the only "sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption" is one that is "limited to quid pro quo corruption." Ante, at 909-910. This is the same "crabbed view of corruption" that was espoused by Justice KENNEDY in McConnell and squarely rejected by the Court in that case. 540 U.S., at 152, 124 S.Ct. 619. While it is true that we have not always spoken about corruption in a clear or consistent voice, the approach taken by the majority cannot be right, in my judgment. It disregards our constitutional history and the fundamental demands of a democratic society.
On numerous occasions we have recognized Congress' legitimate interest in preventing the money that is spent on elections from exerting an "`undue influence on an officeholder's judgment'" and from creating "`the appearance of such influence,'" beyond the sphere of quid pro quo relationships. Id., at 150, 124 S.Ct. 619; see also, e.g., id., at 143-144, 152-154, 124 S.Ct. 619; Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 441, 121 S.Ct. 2351; Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 389, 120 S.Ct. 897. Corruption can take many forms. Bribery may be the paradigm case. But the difference between selling a vote and selling access is a matter of degree, not kind. And selling access is not qualitatively different from giving special preference to those who spent money on one's behalf. Corruption operates along a spectrum, and the majority's apparent belief that quid pro quo arrangements can be neatly demarcated from other improper influences does not accord with the theory or reality of politics. It certainly does not accord with the record Congress developed in passing BCRA, a record that stands as a remarkable testament to the energy and ingenuity with which corporations, unions, lobbyists, and politicians may go about scratching each other's backs—and which amply supported Congress' determination to target a limited set of especially destructive practices.
The District Court that adjudicated the initial challenge to BCRA pored over this record. In a careful analysis, Judge Kollar-Kotelly made numerous findings about the corrupting consequences of corporate and union independent expenditures in the years preceding BCRA's passage. See McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d, at 555-560, 622-625; see also id., at 804-805, 813, n. 143 (Leon, J.) (indicating agreement). As summarized in her own words:
Many of the relationships of dependency found by Judge Kollar-Kotelly seemed to have a quid pro quo basis, but other arrangements were more subtle. Her analysis shows the great difficulty in delimiting the precise scope of the quid pro quo category, as well as the adverse consequences that all such arrangements may have. There are threats of corruption that are far more destructive to a democratic society than the odd bribe. Yet the majority's understanding of corruption would leave lawmakers impotent to address all but the most discrete abuses.
Our "undue influence" cases have allowed the American people to cast a wider net through legislative experiments designed to ensure, to some minimal extent, "that officeholders will decide issues . . . on the merits or the desires of their constituencies," and not "according to the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions"—or expenditures— "valued by the officeholder." McConnell, 540 U.S., at 153, 124 S.Ct. 619.
The cluster of interrelated interests threatened by such undue influence and its appearance has been well captured under the rubric of "democratic integrity." WRTL, 551 U.S., at 522, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (Souter, J., dissenting). This value has underlined a century of state and federal efforts to regulate the role of corporations in the electoral process.
Unlike the majority's myopic focus on quid pro quo scenarios and the free-floating "First Amendment principles" on which it rests so much weight, ante, at 886, 912, this broader understanding of corruption has deep roots in the Nation's history. "During debates on the earliest [campaign finance] reform acts, the terms `corruption' and `undue influence' were used nearly interchangeably." Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 2008 U. Ill. L.Rev. 599, 601. Long before Buckley, we appreciated that "[t]o say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard . . . an election from the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self protection." Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545, 54 S.Ct. 287, 78 L.Ed. 484 (1934). And whereas we have no evidence to support the notion that the Framers would have wanted corporations to have the same rights as natural persons in the electoral context, we have ample evidence to suggest that they would have been appalled by the evidence of corruption that Congress unearthed in developing BCRA and that the Court today discounts to irrelevance. It is fair to say that "[t]he Framers were obsessed with corruption,"
Quid Pro Quo Corruption
There is no need to take my side in the debate over the scope of the anticorruption interest to see that the Court's merits holding is wrong. Even under the majority's "crabbed view of corruption," McConnell, 540 U.S., at 152, 124 S.Ct. 619, the Government should not lose this case.
"The importance of the governmental interest in preventing [corruption through the creation of political debts] has never been doubted." Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 788, n. 26, 98 S.Ct. 1407. Even in the cases that have construed the anticorruption interest most narrowly, we have never suggested that such quid pro quo debts must take the form of outright vote buying or bribes, which have long been distinct crimes. Rather, they encompass the myriad ways in which outside parties may induce an officeholder to confer a legislative benefit in direct response to, or anticipation of, some outlay of money the parties have made or will make on behalf of the officeholder. See McConnell, 540 U.S., at 143, 124 S.Ct. 619 ("We have not limited [the anticorruption] interest to the elimination of cash-for-votes exchanges. In Buckley, we expressly rejected the argument that antibribery laws provided a less restrictive alternative to FECA's contribution limits, noting that such laws `deal[t] with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action'" (quoting 424 U.S., at 28, 96 S.Ct. 612; alteration in original)). It has likewise never been doubted that "[o]f almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption." Id., at 27, 96 S.Ct. 612. Congress may "legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). A democracy cannot function effectively when its constituent members believe laws are being bought and sold.
In theory, our colleagues accept this much. As applied to BCRA § 203, however, they conclude "[t]he anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the speech here in question." Ante, at 908.
Although the Court suggests that Buckley compels its conclusion, ante, at 908-910, Buckley cannot sustain this reading. It is true that, in evaluating FECA's ceiling on independent expenditures by all persons, the Buckley Court found the governmental interest in preventing corruption "inadequate." 424 U.S., at 45, 96 S.Ct. 612. But Buckley did not evaluate corporate expenditures specifically, nor did it rule out the possibility that a future Court might find otherwise. The opinion reasoned that an expenditure limitation covering only express advocacy (i.e., magic words) would likely be ineffectual, ibid., a problem that Congress tackled in BCRA, and it concluded that "the independent advocacy restricted by [FECA § 608(e)(1)] does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions," id., at 46, 96 S.Ct. 612 (emphasis added). Buckley expressly contemplated that an anticorruption
The Austin Court did not rest its holding on quid pro quo corruption, as it found the broader corruption implicated by the antidistortion and shareholder protection rationales a sufficient basis for Michigan's restriction on corporate electioneering. 494 U.S., at 658-660, 110 S.Ct. 1391. Concurring in that opinion, I took the position that "the danger of either the fact, or the appearance, of quid pro quo relationships [also] provides an adequate justification for state regulation" of these independent expenditures. Id., at 678, 110 S.Ct. 1391. I did not see this position as inconsistent with Buckley's analysis of individual expenditures. Corporations, as a class, tend to be more attuned to the complexities of the legislative process and more directly affected by tax and appropriations measures that receive little public scrutiny; they also have vastly more money with which to try to buy access and votes. See Supp. Brief for Appellee 17 (stating that the Fortune 100 companies earned revenues of $13.1 trillion during the last election cycle). Business corporations must engage the political process in instrumental terms if they are to maximize shareholder value. The unparalleled resources, professional lobbyists, and single-minded focus they bring to this effort, I believed, make quid pro quo corruption and its appearance inherently more likely when they (or their conduits or trade groups) spend unrestricted sums on elections.
It is with regret rather than satisfaction that I can now say that time has borne out my concerns. The legislative and judicial proceedings relating to BCRA generated a substantial body of evidence suggesting that, as corporations grew more and more adept at crafting "issue ads" to help or harm a particular candidate, these nominally independent expenditures began to corrupt the political process in a very direct sense. The sponsors of these ads were routinely granted special access after the campaign was over; "candidates and officials knew who their friends were," McConnell, 540 U.S., at 129, 124 S.Ct. 619. Many corporate independent expenditures, it seemed, had become essentially interchangeable with direct contributions in their capacity to generate quid pro quo arrangements. In an age in which money and television ads are the coin of the campaign realm, it is hardly surprising that corporations deployed these ads to curry favor with, and to gain influence over, public officials.
The majority appears to think it decisive that the BCRA record does not contain "direct examples of votes being exchanged for . . . expenditures." Ante, at 910 (internal quotation marks omitted). It would have been quite remarkable if Congress had created a record detailing such behavior by its own Members. Proving that a specific vote was exchanged for a specific expenditure has always been next to impossible: Elected officials have diverse motivations, and no one will acknowledge that he sold a vote. Yet, even if "[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption" themselves, ibid., they are necessary prerequisites to it; they can create both the opportunity for, and the appearance of, quid pro quo arrangements. The influx of unlimited corporate money into the electoral
In her analysis of the record, Judge Kollar-Kotelly documented the pervasiveness of this ingratiation and explained its significance under the majority's own touchstone for defining the scope of the anticorruption rationale, Buckley. See McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d, at 555-560, 622-625. Witnesses explained how political parties and candidates used corporate independent expenditures to circumvent FECA's "hard-money" limitations. See, e.g., id., at 478-479. One former Senator candidly admitted to the District Court that "`[c]andidates whose campaigns benefit from [phony "issue ads"] greatly appreciate the help of these groups. In fact, Members will also be favorably disposed to those who finance these groups when they later seek access to discuss pending legislation.'" Id., at 556 (quoting declaration of Sen. Dale Bumpers). One prominent lobbyist went so far as to state, in uncontroverted testimony, that "`unregulated expenditures—whether soft money donations to the parties or issue ad campaigns—can sometimes generate far more influence than direct campaign contributions.'" Ibid. (quoting declaration of Wright Andrews; emphasis added). In sum, Judge Kollar-Kotelly found, "[t]he record powerfully demonstrates that electioneering communications paid for with the general treasury funds of labor unions and corporations endears those entities to elected officials in a way that could be perceived by the public as corrupting." Id., at 622-623. She concluded that the Government's interest in preventing the appearance of corruption, as that concept was defined in Buckley, was itself sufficient to uphold BCRA § 203. 251 F.Supp.2d, at 622-625. Judge Leon agreed. See id., at 804-805 (dissenting only with respect to the Wellstone Amendment's coverage of MCFL corporations).
When the McConnell Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court regarding § 203, we did not rest our holding on a narrow notion of quid pro quo corruption. Instead we relied on the governmental interest in combating the unique forms of corruption threatened by corporations, as recognized in Austin's antidistortion and shareholder protection rationales, 540 U.S., at 205, 124 S.Ct. 619 (citing Austin, 494 U.S., at 660, 110 S.Ct. 1391), as well as the interest in preventing circumvention of contribution limits, 540 U.S., at 128-129, 205, 206, n. 88, 124 S.Ct. 619. Had we felt constrained by the view of today's Court that quid pro quo corruption and its appearance are the only interests that count in this field, ante, at 903-911, we of course would have looked closely at that issue. And as the analysis by Judge Kollar-Kotelly reflects, it is a very real possibility that we would have found one or both of those interests satisfied and § 203 appropriately tailored to them.
The majority's rejection of the Buckley anticorruption rationale on the ground that independent corporate expenditures "do not give rise to [quid pro quo] corruption or the appearance of corruption," ante, at 909, is thus unfair as well as unreasonable. Congress and outside experts have generated significant evidence corroborating this rationale, and the only reason we do not have any of the relevant materials before us is that the Government had no reason
The insight that even technically independent expenditures can be corrupting in much the same way as direct contributions is bolstered by our decision last year in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009). In that case, Don Blankenship, the chief executive officer of a corporation with a lawsuit pending before the West Virginia high court, spent large sums on behalf of a particular candidate, Brent Benjamin, running for a seat on that court. "In addition to contributing the $1,000 statutory maximum to Benjamin's campaign committee, Blankenship donated almost $2.5 million to `And For The Sake Of The Kids,'" a § 527 corporation that ran ads targeting Benjamin's opponent. Id., at ___, 129 S.Ct., at 2257. "This was not all. Blankenship spent, in addition, just over $500,000 on independent expenditures. . . `"to support . . . Brent Benjamin."'" Id., at ___, 129 S.Ct., at 2257 (second alteration in original). Applying its common sense, this Court accepted petitioners' argument that Blankenship's "pivotal role in getting Justice Benjamin elected created a constitutionally intolerable probability of actual bias" when Benjamin later declined to recuse himself from the appeal by Blankenship's corporation. Id., at ___, 129 S.Ct., at 2262. "Though n[o] . . . bribe or criminal influence" was involved, we recognized that "Justice Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts to get him elected." Ibid. "The difficulties of inquiring into actual bias," we further noted, "simply underscore the need for objective rules," id., at ___, 129 S.Ct., at 2263—rules which will perforce turn on the appearance of bias rather than its actual existence.
In Caperton, then, we accepted the premise that, at least in some circumstances, independent expenditures on candidate elections will raise an intolerable specter of quid pro quo corruption. Indeed, this premise struck the Court as so intuitive that it repeatedly referred to Blankenship's spending on behalf of Benjamin—spending that consisted of 99.97% independent expenditures ($3 million) and 0.03% direct contributions ($1,000)—as a "contribution." See, e.g., id., at ___, 129 S.Ct., at 2257 ("The basis for the [recusal] motion was that the justice had received campaign contributions in an extraordinary amount from" Blankenship); id., at ___, 129 S.Ct., at 2258 (referencing "Blankenship's $3 million in contributions"); id., at ___, 129 S.Ct., at 2264 ("Blankenship contributed some $3 million to unseat the incumbent and replace
Caperton is illuminating in several additional respects. It underscores the old insight that, on account of the extreme difficulty of proving corruption, "prophylactic measures, reaching some [campaign spending] not corrupt in purpose or effect, [may be] nonetheless required to guard against corruption." Buckley, 424 U.S., at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612; see also Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 392, n. 5, 120 S.Ct. 897. It underscores that "certain restrictions on corporate electoral involvement" may likewise be needed to "hedge against circumvention of valid contribution limits." McConnell, 540 U.S., at 205, 124 S.Ct. 619 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 456, 121 S.Ct. 2351 ("[A]ll Members of the Court agree that circumvention is a valid theory of corruption"). It underscores that for-profit corporations associated with electioneering communications will often prefer to use nonprofit conduits with "misleading names," such as And For The Sake Of The Kids, "to conceal their identity" as the sponsor of those communications, thereby frustrating the utility of disclosure laws. McConnell, 540 U.S., at 128, 124 S.Ct. 619; see also id., at 196-197, 124 S.Ct. 619.
And it underscores that the consequences of today's holding will not be limited to the legislative or executive context. The majority of the States select their judges through popular elections. At a time when concerns about the conduct of judicial elections have reached a fever pitch, see, e.g., O'Connor, Justice for Sale, Wall St. Journal, Nov. 15, 2007, p. A25; Brief for Justice at Stake et al. as Amici Curiae 2, the Court today unleashes the floodgates of corporate and union general treasury spending in these races. Perhaps "Caperton motions" will catch some of the worst abuses. This will be small comfort to those States that, after today, may no longer have the ability to place modest limits on corporate electioneering even if they believe such limits to be critical to maintaining the integrity of their judicial systems.
Deference and Incumbent Self-Protection
Rather than show any deference to a coordinate branch of Government, the majority thus rejects the anticorruption rationale without serious analysis.
In my view, we should instead start by acknowledging that "Congress surely has both wisdom and experience in these matters that is far superior to ours." Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 650, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Many of our campaign finance precedents explicitly and forcefully affirm the propriety of such presumptive deference. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S., at 158, 124 S.Ct. 619; Beaumont, 539 U.S., at 155-156, 123 S.Ct. 2200; NRWC, 459 U.S., at 209-210, 103 S.Ct. 552. Moreover, "[j]udicial deference is particularly warranted where, as here, we deal with a congressional judgment that has remained essentially unchanged throughout a century of careful legislative adjustment." Beaumont, 539 U.S., at 162, n. 9, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 391, 120 S.Ct. 897 ("The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised"). In America, incumbent legislators pass the laws that govern campaign finance, just like all other laws. To apply a level of scrutiny that effectively bars them from regulating electioneering whenever there is the faintest whiff of self-interest, is to deprive them of the ability to regulate electioneering.
This is not to say that deference would be appropriate if there were a solid basis for believing that a legislative action was motivated by the desire to protect incumbents or that it will degrade the competitiveness of the electoral process.
We have no record evidence from which to conclude that BCRA § 203, or any of the dozens of state laws that the Court today calls into question, reflects or fosters such invidious discrimination. Our colleagues have opined that "`any restriction upon a type of campaign speech that is equally available to challengers and incumbents tends to favor incumbents.'" McConnell, 540 U.S., at 249, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). This kind of airy speculation could easily be turned on its head. The electioneering prohibited by
So we do not have a solid theoretical basis for condemning § 203 as a front for incumbent self-protection, and it seems equally if not more plausible that restrictions on corporate electioneering will be self-denying. Nor do we have a good empirical case for skepticism, as the Court's failure to cite any empirical research attests. Nor does the legislative history give reason for concern. Congress devoted years of careful study to the issues underlying BCRA; "[f]ew legislative proposals in recent years have received as much sustained public commentary or news coverage"; "[p]olitical scientists and academic experts . . . with no self-interest in incumbent protectio[n] were central figures in pressing the case for BCRA"; and the legislation commanded bipartisan support from the outset. Pildes, The Supreme Court 2003 Term Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv. L.Rev. 28, 137 (2004). Finally, it is important to remember just how incumbent-friendly congressional races were prior to BCRA's passage. As the Solicitor General aptly remarked at the time, "the evidence supports overwhelmingly that incumbents were able to get re-elected under the old system just fine." Tr. of Oral Arg. in McConnell v. FEC, O.T. 2003, No. 02-1674, p. 61. "It would be hard to develop a scheme that could be better for incumbents." Id., at 63.
In this case, then, "there is no convincing evidence that th[e] important interests favoring expenditure limits are fronts for incumbency protection." Randall, 548 U.S., at 279, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). "In the meantime, a legislative judgment that `enough is enough' should command the greatest possible deference from judges interpreting a constitutional provision that, at best, has an indirect relationship to activity that affects the quantity . . . of repetitive speech in the marketplace of ideas." Id., at 279-280, 126 S.Ct. 2479. The majority cavalierly ignores Congress' factual findings and its constitutional judgment: It acknowledges the validity of the interest in preventing corruption, but it effectively discounts the value of that interest to zero. This is quite different from conscientious policing for impermissibly anticompetitive motive or effect in a sensitive First Amendment context. It is the denial of Congress' authority to regulate corporate spending on elections.
Austin and Corporate Expenditures
Just as the majority gives short shrift to the general societal interests at stake in campaign finance regulation, it also overlooks the distinctive considerations raised by the regulation of corporate expenditures. The majority fails to appreciate that Austin's antidistortion rationale is itself an anticorruption rationale, see 494 U.S., at 660, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (describing "a different type of corruption"), tied to the special concerns raised by corporations. Understood properly, "antidistortion" is simply a variant on the classic governmental interest in protecting against improper influences on officeholders that debilitate the democratic process. It is manifestly not just an "`equalizing'" ideal in disguise. Ante, at 904 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S., at 48, 96 S.Ct. 612).
The fact that corporations are different from human beings might seem to need no elaboration, except that the majority opinion almost completely elides it. Austin set forth some of the basic differences. Unlike natural persons, corporations have "limited liability" for their owners and managers, "perpetual life," separation of ownership and control, "and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets . . . that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy their resources in ways that maximize the return on their shareholders' investments." 494 U.S., at 658-659, 110 S.Ct. 1391. Unlike voters in U.S. elections, corporations may be foreign controlled.
These basic points help explain why corporate electioneering is not only more likely to impair compelling governmental interests, but also why restrictions on that electioneering are less likely to encroach upon First Amendment freedoms. One fundamental concern of the First Amendment is to "protec[t] the individual's interest in self-expression." Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 530, 534, n. 2, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980); see also Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 777, n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 1407. Freedom of speech helps "make men free to develop their faculties," Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S.Ct. 641, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), it respects their "dignity and choice," Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971), and it facilitates the value of "individual self-realization," Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L.Rev. 591, 594 (1982). Corporate speech, however, is derivative speech, speech by proxy. A regulation such as BCRA § 203 may affect the way in which individuals disseminate certain messages through the corporate form, but it does not prevent anyone from speaking in his or her own voice. "Within the realm of [campaign spending] generally," corporate spending is "furthest from the core of political expression." Beaumont, 539 U.S., at 161, n. 8, 123 S.Ct. 2200.
It is an interesting question "who" is even speaking when a business corporation places an advertisement that endorses or attacks a particular candidate. Presumably it is not the customers or employees, who typically have no say in such matters. It cannot realistically be said to be the shareholders, who tend to be far removed from the day-to-day decisions of the firm and whose political preferences may be opaque to management. Perhaps the officers or directors of the corporation have the best claim to be the ones speaking, except their fiduciary duties generally prohibit them from using corporate funds for personal ends. Some individuals associated with the corporation must make the decision to place the ad, but the idea that these individuals are thereby fostering their self-expression or cultivating their critical faculties is fanciful. It is entirely possible that the corporation's electoral message will conflict with their personal convictions. Take away the ability to use general treasury funds for some of those ads, and no one's autonomy, dignity, or political equality has been impinged upon in the least.
Corporate expenditures are distinguishable from individual expenditures in this respect. I have taken the view that a legislature may place reasonable restrictions on individuals' electioneering expenditures in the service of the governmental interests explained above, and in recognition of the fact that such restrictions are not direct restraints on speech but rather on its financing. See, e.g., Randall, 548
In this transactional spirit, some corporations have affirmatively urged Congress to place limits on their electioneering communications. These corporations fear that officeholders will shake them down for supportive ads, that they will have to spend increasing sums on elections in an ever-escalating arms race with their competitors, and that public trust in business will be eroded. See id., at 10-19. A system that effectively forces corporations to use their shareholders' money both to maintain access to, and to avoid retribution from, elected officials may ultimately prove more harmful than beneficial to many corporations. It can impose a kind of implicit tax.
In short, regulations such as § 203 and the statute upheld in Austin impose only a limited burden on First Amendment freedoms not only because they target a narrow subset of expenditures and leave untouched the broader "public dialogue," ante, at 899, but also because they leave untouched the speech of natural persons. Recognizing the weakness of a speaker-based critique of Austin, the Court places primary emphasis not on the corporation's right to electioneer, but rather on the listener's interest in hearing what every possible speaker may have to say. The Court's central argument is that laws such as § 203 have "`deprived [the electorate] of information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function,'" ante, at 907 (quoting CIO, 335 U.S., at 144, 68 S.Ct. 1349 (Rutledge, J., concurring in judgment)), and this, in turn, "interferes with the `open marketplace' of ideas protected by the First Amendment," ante, at 906 (quoting New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208, 128 S.Ct. 791, 169 L.Ed.2d 665 (2008)).
There are many flaws in this argument. If the overriding concern depends on the interests of the audience, surely the public's perception of the value of corporate speech should be given important weight. That perception today is the same as it
Austin recognized that there are substantial reasons why a legislature might conclude that unregulated general treasury expenditures will give corporations "unfai[r] influence" in the electoral process, 494 U.S., at 660, 110 S.Ct. 1391, and distort public debate in ways that undermine rather than advance the interests of listeners. The legal structure of corporations allows them to amass and deploy financial resources on a scale few natural persons can match. The structure of a business corporation, furthermore, draws a line between the corporation's economic interests and the political preferences of the individuals associated with the corporation; the corporation must engage the electoral process with the aim "to enhance the profitability of the company, no matter how persuasive the arguments for a broader or conflicting set of priorities," Brief for American Independent Business Alliance as Amicus Curiae 11; see also ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 2.01(a), p. 55 (1992) ("[A] corporation . . . should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain"). In a state election such as the one at issue in Austin, the interests of nonresident corporations may be fundamentally adverse to the interests of local voters. Consequently, when corporations grab up the prime broadcasting slots on the eve of an election, they can flood the market with advocacy that bears "little or no correlation" to the ideas of natural persons or to any broader notion of the public good, 494 U.S., at 660, 110 S.Ct. 1391. The opinions of real people may be marginalized. "The expenditure restrictions of [2 U.S.C.] § 441b are thus meant to ensure that competition among actors in the political arena is truly competition among ideas." MCFL, 479 U.S., at 259, 107 S.Ct. 616.
In addition to this immediate drowning out of noncorporate voices, there may be deleterious effects that follow soon thereafter. Corporate "domination" of electioneering, Austin, 494 U.S., at 659, 110 S.Ct. 1391, can generate the impression that corporations dominate our democracy. When citizens turn on their televisions and radios before an election and hear only corporate electioneering, they may lose faith in their capacity, as citizens, to influence public policy. A Government captured by corporate interests, they may come to believe, will be neither responsive to their needs nor willing to give their views a fair hearing. The predictable result is cynicism and disenchantment: an increased perception that large spenders "`call the tune'" and a reduced "`willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.'" McConnell, 540 U.S., at 144, 124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 390, 120 S.Ct. 897). To the extent that corporations are allowed to exert undue influence in electoral races, the speech of the eventual winners of those races may also be chilled. Politicians who fear that a certain corporation can make or break their reelection chances may be cowed into silence about that corporation. On a variety of levels, unregulated corporate electioneering
The majority's unwillingness to distinguish between corporations and humans similarly blinds it to the possibility that corporations' "war chests" and their special "advantages" in the legal realm, Austin, 494 U.S., at 659, 110 S.Ct. 1391, may translate into special advantages in the market for legislation. When large numbers of citizens have a common stake in a measure that is under consideration, it may be very difficult for them to coordinate resources on behalf of their position. The corporate form, by contrast, "provides a simple way to channel rents to only those who have paid their dues, as it were. If you do not own stock, you do not benefit from the larger dividends or appreciation in the stock price caused by the passage of private interest legislation." Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. Chi. L.Rev. 1103, 1113 (2002). Corporations, that is, are uniquely equipped to seek laws that favor their owners, not simply because they have a lot of money but because of their legal and organizational structure. Remove all restrictions on their electioneering, and the door may be opened to a type of rent seeking that is "far more destructive" than what noncorporations are capable of. Ibid. It is for reasons such as these that our campaign finance jurisprudence has long appreciated that "the `differing structures and purposes' of different entities `may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process.'" NRWC, 459 U.S., at 210, 103 S.Ct. 552 (quoting California Medical Assn., 453 U.S., at 201, 101 S.Ct. 2712).
The Court's facile depiction of corporate electioneering assumes away all of these complexities. Our colleagues ridicule the idea of regulating expenditures based on "nothing more" than a fear that corporations have a special "ability to persuade," ante, at 923 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.), as if corporations were our society's ablest debaters and viewpoint-neutral laws such as § 203 were created to suppress their best arguments. In their haste to knock down yet another straw man, our colleagues simply ignore the fundamental concerns of the Austin Court and the legislatures that have passed laws like § 203: to safeguard the integrity, competitiveness, and democratic responsiveness of the electoral process. All of the majority's theoretical arguments turn on a proposition with undeniable surface appeal but little grounding in evidence or experience, "that there is no such thing as too much speech," Austin, 494 U.S., at 695, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (SCALIA, J., dissenting).
None of this is to suggest that corporations can or should be denied an opportunity to participate in election campaigns or in any other public forum (much less that a work of art such as Mr. Smith Goes to Washington may be banned), or to deny that some corporate speech may contribute significantly to public debate. What it shows, however, is that Austin's "concern about corporate domination of the political process," 494 U.S., at 659, 110 S.Ct. 1391, reflects more than a concern to protect governmental interests outside of the First Amendment. It also reflects a concern to facilitate First Amendment values by preserving some breathing room around the electoral "marketplace" of ideas, ante, at 896, 904, 906, 914, 915, the marketplace in which the actual people of this Nation determine how they will govern themselves. The majority seems oblivious to the simple truth that laws such as § 203 do not merely pit the anticorruption interest against the First Amendment, but also pit competing First Amendment values against each other. There are, to be sure, serious concerns with any effort to balance the First Amendment rights of speakers against the First Amendment rights of listeners. But when the speakers in question are not real people and when the appeal to "First Amendment principles" depends almost entirely on the listeners' perspective, ante, at 886, 912, it becomes necessary to consider how listeners will actually be affected.
In critiquing Austin's antidistortion rationale and campaign finance regulation more generally, our colleagues place tremendous weight on the example of media corporations. See ante, at 905-907, 911; ante, at 917, 923 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.); ante, at 927-928 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). Yet it is not at all clear that Austin would permit § 203 to be applied to them. The press plays a unique role not only in the text, history, and structure of the First Amendment but also in facilitating public discourse; as the Austin Court explained, "media corporations differ significantly from other corporations in that their resources are devoted to the collection of information and its dissemination to the public," 494 U.S., at 667, 110 S.Ct. 1391. Our colleagues have raised some interesting and difficult questions about Congress' authority to regulate electioneering by the press, and about how to define what constitutes the press. But that is not the case before us. Section 203 does not apply to media corporations, and even if it did, Citizens United is not a media corporation. There would be absolutely no reason to consider the issue of media corporations if the majority did not, first, transform Citizens United's as-applied challenge into a facial challenge and, second, invent the theory that legislatures must eschew all "identity"-based distinctions and treat a local nonprofit news outlet exactly the same as General Motors.
It would be perfectly understandable if our colleagues feared that a campaign finance
The Court's blinkered and aphoristic approach to the First Amendment may well promote corporate power at the cost of the individual and collective self-expression the Amendment was meant to serve. It will undoubtedly cripple the ability of ordinary citizens, Congress, and the States to adopt even limited measures to protect against corporate domination of the electoral process. Americans may be forgiven if they do not feel the Court has advanced the cause of self-government today.
2. Shareholder Protection
There is yet another way in which laws such as § 203 can serve First Amendment values. Interwoven with Austin's concern to protect the integrity of the electoral process is a concern to protect the rights of shareholders from a kind of coerced speech: electioneering expenditures that do not "reflec[t] [their] support." 494 U.S., at 660-661, 110 S.Ct. 1391. When corporations use general treasury funds to praise or attack a particular candidate for office, it is the shareholders, as the residual claimants, who are effectively footing the bill. Those shareholders who disagree with the corporation's electoral message may find their financial investments being used to undermine their political convictions.
The PAC mechanism, by contrast, helps assure that those who pay for an electioneering communication actually support its content and that managers do not use general treasuries to advance personal agendas. Ibid. It "`allows corporate political participation without the temptation to use corporate funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders or members.'" McConnell, 540 U.S., at 204, 124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting Beaumont, 539 U.S., at 163, 123 S.Ct. 2200). A rule that privileges the use of PACs thus does more than facilitate the political speech of like-minded shareholders; it also curbs the rent seeking behavior of executives and respects the views of dissenters. Austin's acceptance of restrictions on general treasury spending "simply allows people who have invested in the business corporation for purely economic reasons"—the vast majority of investors, one assumes—"to avoid being taken advantage of, without sacrificing their economic objectives." Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 Loyola (LA) L.Rev. 133, 201 (1998).
The concern to protect dissenting shareholders and union members has a long history in campaign finance reform. It provided a central motivation for the Tillman Act in 1907 and subsequent legislation, see Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414-415, 92 S.Ct. 2247, 33 L.Ed.2d 11 (1972); Winkler, 92 Geo. L. J., at 887-900, and it has been endorsed in a long line of our cases, see, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S., at 204-205, 124 S.Ct. 619; Beaumont, 539 U.S., at 152-154, 123 S.Ct. 2200; MCFL, 479 U.S., at 258, 107 S.Ct. 616; NRWC, 459 U.S., at 207-208, 103 S.Ct. 552; Pipefitters, 407 U.S., at 414-416, 92 S.Ct. 2247;
The Court dismisses this interest on the ground that abuses of shareholder money can be corrected "through the procedures of corporate democracy," ante, at 911 (internal quotation marks omitted), and, it seems, through Internet-based disclosures, ante, at 916.
If and when shareholders learn that a corporation has been spending general treasury money on objectionable electioneering, they can divest. Even assuming that they reliably learn as much, however, this solution is only partial. The injury to the shareholders' expressive rights has already occurred; they might have preferred to keep that corporation's stock in their portfolio for any number of economic reasons; and they may incur a capital gains tax or other penalty from selling their shares, changing their pension plan, or the like. The shareholder protection rationale has been criticized as underinclusive, in that corporations also spend money on lobbying and charitable contributions in ways that any particular shareholder might disapprove. But those expenditures do not implicate the selection of public officials, an area in which "the interests of unwilling . . . corporate shareholders [in not being] forced to subsidize that speech" "are at their zenith." Austin, 494 U.S., at 677, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (Brennan, J., concurring). And in any event, the question is whether shareholder protection provides a basis for regulating expenditures in the weeks before an election, not whether additional types of corporate communications
Recognizing the limits of the shareholder protection rationale, the Austin Court did not hold it out as an adequate and independent ground for sustaining the statute in question. Rather, the Court applied it to reinforce the antidistortion rationale, in two main ways. First, the problem of dissenting shareholders shows that even if electioneering expenditures can advance the political views of some members of a corporation, they will often compromise the views of others. See, e.g., id., at 663, 110 S.Ct. 1391 (discussing risk that corporation's "members may be . . . reluctant to withdraw as members even if they disagree with [its] political expression"). Second, it provides an additional reason, beyond the distinctive legal attributes of the corporate form, for doubting that these "expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused," id., at 660, 110 S.Ct. 1391. The shareholder protection rationale, in other words, bolsters the conclusion that restrictions on corporate electioneering can serve both speakers' and listeners' interests, as well as the anticorruption interest. And it supplies yet another reason why corporate expenditures merit less protection than individual expenditures.
Today's decision is backwards in many senses. It elevates the majority's agenda over the litigants' submissions, facial attacks over as-applied claims, broad constitutional theories over narrow statutory grounds, individual dissenting opinions over precedential holdings, assertion over tradition, absolutism over empiricism, rhetoric over reality. Our colleagues have arrived at the conclusion that Austin must be overruled and that § 203 is facially unconstitutional only after mischaracterizing both the reach and rationale of those authorities, and after bypassing or ignoring rules of judicial restraint used to cabin the Court's lawmaking power. Their conclusion that the societal interest in avoiding corruption and the appearance of corruption does not provide an adequate justification for regulating corporate expenditures on candidate elections relies on an incorrect description of that interest, along with a failure to acknowledge the relevance of established facts and the considered judgments of state and federal legislatures over many decades.
In a democratic society, the longstanding consensus on the need to limit corporate campaign spending should outweigh the wooden application of judge-made rules. The majority's rejection of this principle "elevate[s] corporations to a level of deference which has not been seen at least since the days when substantive due process was regularly used to invalidate regulatory legislation thought to unfairly impinge upon established economic interests." Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 817, n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 1407 (White, J., dissenting). At bottom, the Court's opinion is thus a rejection of the common sense of the American people, who have recognized a need to prevent corporations from undermining self-government since the founding, and who have fought against the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electioneering since the days of Theodore Roosevelt. It is a strange time to repudiate that common sense. While American democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of this Court would have thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in politics.
I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Justice THOMAS, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join all but Part IV of the Court's opinion.
Congress may not abridge the "right to anonymous speech" based on the "`simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant information,'" id., at 276, 124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995)). In continuing to hold otherwise, the Court misapprehends the import of "recent events" that some amici describe "in which donors to certain causes were blacklisted, threatened, or otherwise targeted for retaliation." Ante, at 916. The Court properly recognizes these events as "cause for concern," ibid., but fails to acknowledge their constitutional significance. In my view, amici's submissions show why the Court's insistence on upholding §§ 201 and 311 will ultimately prove as misguided (and ill fated) as was its prior approval of § 203.
Amici's examples relate principally to Proposition 8, a state ballot proposition that California voters narrowly passed in the 2008 general election. Proposition 8 amended California's constitution to provide that "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California." Cal. Const., Art. I, § 7.5. Any donor who gave more than $100 to any committee supporting or opposing Proposition 8 was required to disclose his full name, street address, occupation, employer's name (or business name, if self-employed), and the total amount of his contributions.
Some opponents of Proposition 8 compiled this information and created Web sites with maps showing the locations of homes or businesses of Proposition 8 supporters. Many supporters (or their customers) suffered property damage, or threats of physical violence or death, as a result. They cited these incidents in a complaint they filed after the 2008 election, seeking to invalidate California's mandatory disclosure laws. Supporters recounted being told: "Consider yourself lucky. If I had a gun I would have gunned you down along with each and every other supporter," or, "we have plans for you and your friends." Complaint in ProtectMarriage.com—Yes on 8 v. Bowen, Case No.
Those accounts are consistent with media reports describing Proposition 8-related retaliation. The director of the nonprofit California Musical Theater gave $1,000 to support the initiative; he was forced to resign after artists complained to his employer. Lott & Smith, Donor Disclosure Has Its Downsides, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 26, 2008, p. A13. The director of the Los Angeles Film Festival was forced to resign after giving $1,500 because opponents threatened to boycott and picket the next festival. Ibid. And a woman who had managed her popular, family-owned restaurant for 26 years was forced to resign after she gave $100, because "throngs of [angry] protesters" repeatedly arrived at the restaurant and "shout[ed] `shame on you' at customers." Lopez, Prop. 8 Stance Upends Her Life, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 14, 2008, p. B1. The police even had to "arriv[e] in riot gear one night to quell the angry mob" at the restaurant. Ibid. Some supporters of Proposition 8 engaged in similar tactics; one real estate businessman in San Diego who had donated to a group opposing Proposition 8 "received a letter from the Prop. 8 Executive Committee threatening to publish his company's name if he didn't also donate to the `Yes on 8' campaign." Donor Disclosure, supra, at A13.
The success of such intimidation tactics has apparently spawned a cottage industry that uses forcibly disclosed donor information to pre-empt citizens' exercise of their First Amendment rights. Before the 2008 Presidential election, a "newly formed nonprofit group ... plann[ed] to confront donors to conservative groups, hoping to create a chilling effect that will dry up contributions." Luo, Group Plans Campaign Against G.O.P. Donors, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 2008, p. A15. Its leader, "who described his effort as `going for the jugular,'" detailed the group's plan to send a "warning letter ... alerting donors who might be considering giving to right-wing groups to a variety of potential dangers, including legal trouble, public exposure and watchdog groups digging through their lives." Ibid.
These instances of retaliation sufficiently demonstrate why this Court should invalidate mandatory disclosure and reporting requirements. But amici present evidence of yet another reason to do so — the threat of retaliation from elected officials. As amici's submissions make clear, this threat extends far beyond a single ballot proposition in California. For example, a candidate challenging an incumbent state attorney general reported that some members of the State's business community feared donating to his campaign because they did not want to cross the incumbent; in his words, "`I go to so many people and hear the same thing: "I sure hope you beat [the incumbent], but I can't afford to have my name on your records. He might come after me next."'" Strassel, Challenging Spitzerism at the Polls, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 1, 2008, p. A11. The incumbent won reelection in 2008.
My point is not to express any view on the merits of the political controversies I describe. Rather, it is to demonstrate — using real-world, recent examples — the fallacy in the Court's conclusion that "[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements ... impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities, and do not prevent anyone from speaking." Ante, at 914 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Of
The Court nevertheless insists that as-applied challenges to disclosure requirements will suffice to vindicate those speech rights, as long as potential plaintiffs can "show a reasonable probability that disclosure... will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties." Ante, at 914 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the Court's opinion itself proves the irony in this compromise. In correctly explaining why it must address the facial constitutionality of § 203, see ante, at 888-897, the Court recognizes that "[t]he First Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to ... seek declaratory rulings before discussing the most salient political issues of our day," ante, at 889; that as-applied challenges to § 203 "would require substantial litigation over an extended time" and result in an "interpretive process [that] itself would create an inevitable, pervasive, and serious risk of chilling protected speech pending the drawing of fine distinctions that, in the end, would themselves be questionable," ante, at 891; that "a court would be remiss in performing its duties were it to accept an unsound principle merely to avoid the necessity of making a broader ruling," ante, at 892; and that avoiding a facial challenge to § 203 "would prolong the substantial, nation-wide chilling effect" that § 203 causes, ante, at 894. This logic, of course, applies equally to as-applied challenges to §§ 201 and 311.
Irony aside, the Court's promise that as-applied challenges will adequately protect speech is a hollow assurance. Now more than ever, §§ 201 and 311 will chill protected speech because — as California voters can attest — "the advent of the Internet" enables "prompt disclosure of expenditures," which "provide[s]" political opponents "with the information needed" to intimidate and retaliate against their foes. Ante, at 916. Thus, "disclosure permits citizens ... to react to the speech of [their political opponents] in a proper" — or undeniably improper — "way" long before a plaintiff could prevail on an as-applied challenge.
I cannot endorse a view of the First Amendment that subjects citizens of this Nation to death threats, ruined careers, damaged or defaced property, or pre-emptive and threatening warning letters as the price for engaging in "core political speech, the `primary object of First Amendment protection.'" McConnell, 540 U.S., at 264, 124 S.Ct. 619 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410-411, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000) (THOMAS, J., dissenting)). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court's judgment upholding BCRA §§ 201 and 311.
As additional "[p]ostratification practice," the dissent notes that the Court "did not recognize any First Amendment protections for corporations until the middle part of the 20th century." Post, at 951, n. 56. But it did that in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936), a case involving freedom of the press—which the dissent acknowledges did cover corporations from the outset. The relative recency of that first case is unsurprising. All of our First Amendment jurisprudence was slow to develop. We did not consider application of the First Amendment to speech restrictions other than prior restraints until 1919, see Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919); we did not invalidate a state law on First Amendment grounds until 1931, see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931), and a federal law until 1965, see Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 85 S.Ct. 1493, 14 L.Ed.2d 398 (1965).
"Liberty of the press, in civil policy, is the free right of publishing books, pamphlets, or papers without previous restraint; or the unrestrained right which every citizen enjoys of publishing his thoughts and opinions, subject only to punishment for publishing what is pernicious to morals or to the peace of the state." 2 American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (reprinted 1970).
As the Court's opinion describes, ante, at 905-906, our jurisprudence agrees with Noah Webster and contradicts the dissent.
"The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets.... The press in its historical connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion." Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938).
The same footnote asserts that "it has been `claimed that the notion of institutional speech ... did not exist in post-revolutionary America.'" This is quoted from a law-review article by a Bigelow Fellow at the University of Chicago (Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U.L.Rev. 1637, 1654 (2006)), which offers as the sole support for its statement a treatise dealing with government speech, M. Yudof, When Government Speaks 42-50 (1983). The cited pages of that treatise provide no support whatever for the statement—unless, as seems overwhelmingly likely, the "institutional speech" referred to was speech by the subject of the law-review article, governmental institutions.
The other authority cited in the footnote, a law-review article by a professor at Washington and Lee Law School, Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 Iowa L.Rev. 735, 775 (1995), in fact contradicts the dissent, in that it would accord free-speech protection to associations.
It is true, as the majority points out, that the McConnell Court evaluated the facial validity of § 203 in light of an extensive record. See ante, at 893-894. But that record is not before us in this case. And in any event, the majority's argument for striking down § 203 depends on its contention that the statute has proved too "chilling" in practice—and in particular on the contention that the controlling opinion in WRTL, 551 U.S. 449, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007), failed to bring sufficient clarity and "breathing space" to this area of law. See ante, at 892, 894-897. We have no record with which to assess that claim. The Court complains at length about the burdens of complying with § 203, but we have no meaningful evidence to show how regulated corporations and unions have experienced its restrictions.
The two dissenters in Pipefitters would not have read the statutory provision in question, a successor to § 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act, to allow such robust use of corporate and union funds to finance otherwise prohibited electioneering. "This opening of the door to extensive corporate and union influence on the elective and legislative processes," Justice Powell wrote, "must be viewed with genuine concern. This seems to me to be a regressive step as contrasted with the numerous legislative and judicial actions in recent years designed to assure that elections are indeed free and representative." 407 U.S., at 450, 92 S.Ct. 2247 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J.).