U.S. v. ROBINSON Nos. 03-4511, 03-4518, 03-4519.
460 F.3d 550 (2006)
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Owen ROBINSON, a/k/a Heavy, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kendall Schuyler, a/k/a Sleepy, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William M. Parros, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Decided August 9, 2006.
ARGUED: Gary Allen Ticknor, Elkridge, Maryland, for Appellants. Robert Reeves Harding, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: G. Godwin Oyewole, Washington, D.C., for Appellant Owen Robinson; Gerald Durand Glass, Towson, Maryland, for Appellant William M. Parros. Thomas M. DiBiagio, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge KING wrote the opinion, in which Judge MOTZ joined. Judge NIEMEYER wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.
KING, Circuit Judge.
Defendants Owen Robinson, Kendall Schuyler, and William Parros (collectively, the "Defendants") have appealed the sentences imposed on them in 2003 in the District of Maryland. This is the third separate occasion for our Court to review sentences the Defendants received on their jury convictions in 1999 for various offenses relating to a large drug trafficking conspiracy, centered in the area of Baltimore, Maryland. The district court initially sentenced the Defendants in March 2000: Robinson and Schuyler each received life in prison, and Parros received thirty years. The Defendants promptly appealed their sentences to this Court (the "First Appeals") and, in November 2001, we vacated and remanded for resentencing under Apprendi v. New Jersey,
In Booker, the Court held, inter alia, that a sentencing court commits Sixth Amendment error if it engages in judicial factfinding, under mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, that results in a sentence exceeding the maximum term authorized by the jury verdict alone. See 543 U.S. at 245-46, 125 S.Ct. 738. As explained below, we reject the contention that the Defendants' constitutional Booker claims are subject to plain error review. The Defendants properly preserved their claims of Sixth Amendment Booker error at their resentencing proceedings in 2003 by raising timely objections under Apprendi, and their contentions here are subject to review for harmless error. And because the district court committed constitutional Booker error in its 2003 resentencing proceedings, and that error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we are obliged to vacate the Defendants' 2003 sentences and remand.
On November 23, 1999, a jury in the District of Maryland convicted the Defendants and three of their co-defendants of various drug-related offenses, including conspiracy to distribute cocaine base (commonly known as "crack cocaine"), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. See Robinson I, 26 Fed.Appx. 111, 2001 WL 1349205, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov.2, 2001). The essential facts underlying the Defendants' convictions were summarized by us in Robinson I as follows:
Id. In addition to finding each of the Defendants guilty of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, in contravention of § 846, the jury convicted Robinson on a separate count of possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and Schuyler for carrying a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
At the Defendants' initial sentencing proceedings, conducted in March 2000, the district court determined that each of the Defendants' criminal activity involved 1.5 kilograms or more of cocaine base, and thus assigned each of them a base offense level of 38 under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. With respect to Robinson, the court enhanced his offense level an additional two levels for possession of a firearm, see USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) (1999), two levels for his leadership role in the offense, see id. § 3B1.1(c), and two levels for obstructing justice by committing perjury at trial, see id. § 3C1.1, for a total of six enhancement levels. The court sentenced Robinson to life in prison for his § 846 conspiracy conviction, and to a separate concurrent life sentence for his § 841 conviction. With respect to Schuyler, the court applied a two-level enhancement for
After the Defendants noted their First Appeals to this Court, but before they filed appellate briefs, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey,
In their First Appeals, the Defendants asserted, as relevant here, that their sentences had been imposed in contravention of Apprendi, in that they each exceeded the applicable statutory maximum. These assertions were premised on the fact that the indictment did not allege, and the jury had not found, any of the threshold drug quantities necessary to authorize the sentences imposed.
Id. at *3. Under the rationale of our Cotton decision, on which we relied in Robinson I, the Defendants' sentences in excess of the statutory maximums constituted plain error requiring correction on appeal, because such error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Cotton, 261 F.3d at 406. Accordingly, in disposing of their First Appeals, we vacated the sentences imposed on the Defendants in 2000 and remanded for resentencing at or below the relevant statutory maximums, as established by § 841(b)(1)(C). See Robinson I, 2001 WL 1349205, at *3.
While the Defendants were awaiting resentencing in the district court following our remand in Robinson I, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cotton, and the district court postponed the Defendants' resentencing proceedings pending the Court's decision. Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed our decision in Cotton, holding that an unpreserved Apprendi error need not be corrected on plain error appellate review if the trial evidence of the allegations missing from the indictment was "overwhelming" and "essentially uncontroverted." United States v. Cotton,
The Defendants were resentenced in the district court on May 23, 2003. At their resentencing proceedings, each of them asserted that, under Apprendi, their sentences could not be enhanced based on facts found by the court, rather than the jury. See J.A. 195 (Schuyler asserted in his 2003 sentencing memorandum that, under Apprendi, he is "entitled to a jury determination" of drug quantity "beyond a reasonable doubt," rather than judicial factfinding (internal quotation marks omitted)); J.A. 240-43, 255-56 (Schuyler maintained at 2003 sentencing hearing that jury had not determined drug quantity, as required for enhanced sentence under Apprendi); J.A. 203-06 (Parros adopted Schuyler's sentencing memorandum and asserted at 2003 hearing that jury did not find quantity of drugs necessary for enhanced sentence); J.A. 276-77 (Robinson contended at hearing that jury did not determine requisite drug quantities for enhanced sentence).
In June 2003, by way of their Second Appeals, the Defendants challenged their 2003 sentences, contending, as relevant here, that the district court had erred in dismissing their Apprendi objections, and that the evidence against them was neither overwhelming nor uncontroverted. The
Soon thereafter, on January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Booker, utilizing the principles of Apprendi to invalidate the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines under which the Defendants were resentenced in 2003. See
In the present proceedings, on remand from the Supreme Court, the Defendants contend that the sentencing court committed Sixth Amendment Booker error in imposing their 2003 sentences. The Defendants assert that these sentences were impermissibly based upon quantities of drugs, found by the sentencing judge only, which were neither charged in the indictment nor proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We begin by ascertaining the applicable standard of review.
As we have recognized, a defendant who was sentenced prior to the Court's 2005 Booker decision has properly preserved a claim of Booker error if he "plainly notified the court of his position that he was being sentenced illegally, and he identified the line of Supreme Court precedent upon which he now relies." Rodriguez, 433 F.3d at 416 (recognizing that claim of statutory Booker error has been preserved by raising timely Blakely objection at sentencing). Thus, by objecting at sentencing under the rationale of Apprendi, the primary precedent upon which Booker relied, a defendant has properly preserved a claim of Booker error. See United States v. Sullivan,
Here, the Defendants interposed no objections at their sentencing proceedings in March 2000 on the basis of Apprendi or Blakely, because the Supreme Court had not yet rendered either of those decisions.
The Defendants contend that the district court committed Sixth Amendment Booker error in predicating their 2003 sentences upon quantities of cocaine base found by the sentencing judge only, which were neither charged in the indictment nor proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government contends, on the other hand, that the Defendants' sentences should be affirmed because any Booker error committed in the 2003 resentencing proceedings was harmless, and because the evidence of the drug quantities involved was both overwhelming and uncontroverted.
In assessing a contention of Sixth Amendment Booker error under harmless error review, we are obliged to determine (1) whether such an error occurred, and (2) if so, whether it affected the defendant's substantial rights. See United States v. Shatley,
In resentencing the Defendants in May 2003, the district court found each of the Defendants to be responsible for at least fifty grams of cocaine base, and also found that their conspiracy involved "distributing more than 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine." J.A. 266. Having found that "overwhelming" and "uncontroverted" evidence supported the sentences it had imposed in March 2000, the court reimposed the same sentences on the Defendants. Based solely on its findings on drug quantities, the court increased each of the Defendants' base offense levels from 12 (the
First, the Government maintains that the district court can (and likely will) impose the same sentences on remand, under an advisory Guidelines regime, because it has already sentenced the Defendants to their respective sentences on two separate occasions. As we have heretofore explained, however, whether a court, on remand, may impose the same sentence under an advisory Guidelines regime is irrelevant to the assessment of a Sixth Amendment error's effect on a defendant's substantial rights. See Hughes, 401 F.3d at 552 (recognizing that possibility that defendant will receive same sentence under Booker remedial scheme of advisory Guidelines is not relevant to assessment of whether defendant has demonstrated prejudice from Sixth Amendment violation).
Second, the Government contends that two of the Defendants — Parros and Schuyler — would have received the same sentences absent the Sixth Amendment Booker error. With respect to Parros, the Government maintains that he would have received the same sentence because he was designated in the presentence report (the "PSR") as a career offender. In resentencing Parros in 2003, however, the court made no mention of sentencing him as a career offender. Rather, the court explicitly based Parros's sentence upon its finding of a drug quantity (1.5 kilograms of cocaine base) corresponding to an offense level of 38. See J.A. 209. In any event, even if Parros were sentenced as a career offender, as the Government would have it, his maximum Guidelines sentence would have been 327 months, less than the 360 months (thirty years) imposed on him in 2003. Thus, even if Parros could have been sentenced as a career offender, that fact would not render the court's Sixth Amendment error harmless.
The Government also contends that Schuyler would have received a life sentence, absent the Sixth Amendment error, because the cross-reference for murder, pursuant to USSG §§ 2A1.1, 2D1.1(d) (2002), carries a mandatory sentence of life. In finding Schuyler guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm, however, the jury did not thereby also find that he had committed a murder. The application of the murder cross-reference to Schuyler
Finally, the Government maintains, in reliance on the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Cotton,
The Government is thus unable to meet its burden of establishing that the constitutional Booker errors in the Defendants' 2003 resentencing proceedings were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, their 2003 sentences must be vacated, and we are obliged to remand for resentencing. See Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate the Defendants' sentences and remand for such other and further resentencing proceedings as may be appropriate.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
While I concur in the judgment remanding this case for resentencing, I cannot concur in the majority's reasoning in applying the harmless error standard.
Because the defendants were tried, convicted, and sentenced without preserving an Apprendi/Booker
Id. at 731, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such forfeited rights, however, may be reviewed in "limited" circumstances as provided by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). Id. at 731-32, 113 S.Ct. 1770.
In this case, the defendants did not — indeed could not — assert and therefore preserve their Apprendi/Booker Sixth Amendment objection during trial because neither Apprendi nor Booker had then been decided. The trial took place in November 1999, and sentencing took place in March 2000. Thus, the trial and sentencing were conducted in conformity with then-existing understandings of the Sixth Amendment's requirements — the jury determined that the defendants trafficked in drugs in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 841(a), and the district court determined that the drug quantities involved exposed the defendants to sentences longer than 20 years' imprisonment, as provided by 20 U.S.C. § 841(b). In accordance with this procedure, Robinson was sentenced to two life sentences, to run concurrently; Schuyler was sentenced to life imprisonment plus 60 months; and Parros was sentenced to 360 months' imprisonment. Because the defendants failed, during those proceedings, to object to the error in procedure that the court, not the jury, was making drug-quantity findings, the defendants forfeited their right to object to the error. Accordingly, appellate review thereafter had to be conducted under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) for plain error, if at all. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 731-32, 113 S.Ct. 1770.
The proceedings that have followed entry of judgment in this case have involved solely the efforts of the district court and this court to review the district court's original sentences and resentences in light of the newly emerging principles of Apprendi and Booker. On the defendants' first appeal, we noticed plain error under Apprendi and remanded for resentencing. See United States v. Johnson, 26 Fed. Appx. 111 (4th Cir.2001). On the defendants' second appeal, we affirmed the defendants' sentences, relying on the plain error doctrine as applied in United States v. Cotton,
To suggest now for the first time that our standard of review must be the harmless error standard is shocking — indeed, no party has even challenged the application of plain error review. The error was originally forfeited at least as early as sentencing in March 2000 and then noticed by us under the plain error doctrine. To review it now under harmless error implies that the objection was made when the error could have been corrected. See United States v. Hubbard,
Of course, to apply a harmless error standard now has significant implications — it shifts the burden from the defendants to show prejudice to the government to show the absence of prejudice. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 741, 113 S.Ct. 1770. If the error had not been forfeited, the government might have been able to avoid the error by presenting evidence of drug quantities to the jury for determination. This is, at bottom, the motivation for making distinctions between plain error and harmless error — to avoid prejudicing a party who acted in conformity with the law as it existed at the time. So it is manifestly unfair now to impose on the government the burden to demonstrate an absence of prejudice from its failure to make a showing that it never had a chance to make. Because the defendants' objections came too late, "[t]his is a plain-error case," and will always be a plain-error case, so "it is [the defendants] who must persuade the appellate court that the deviation from [the Sixth Amendment] was prejudicial." Id.
The majority argues that, because the defendants raised Apprendi at their resentencing and cited Blakely v. Washington,
Not only is the majority's recognition of a "new" error inconsistent with the observations made in Sullivan, the majority's foundational assumptions fail to recognize the nature of the Apprendi/Booker error. At its core, the Apprendi/Booker error is grounded on the failure to submit to the jury for factfinding evidence that theretofore had been considered sentencing facts subject to the court's factfinding. Only a new trial could provide the government with the opportunity to present such facts to the jury.
Thus, at the 2003 resentencing, the fact remained that the government had not been given the opportunity to present evidence of drug quantities to the jury. The 2003 resentencing proceeding was only an effort to work around this still-persistent Sixth Amendment failure through application of doctrines that might avoid the need of a new trial. Thus, the trial court applied the principle that because the evidence of drug quantity was uncontroverted and overwhelming, fact-finding by the court and not the jury did not affect substantial rights.
As we now again send this case back to the district court for resentencing under Booker-specific principles, the court will again determine sentencing facts, but now under a non-mandatory sentencing structure that avoids the Apprendi/Booker error. Even now, however, the 1999 Apprendi/Booker error persists, in that the jury was never given the responsibility of finding sentencing facts. But Booker itself
At bottom, the district court's goal at the 2003 resentencing and now on remand will be to correct the 1999 Apprendi/Booker error that was forfeited but which we noticed on the first appeal. The defendants' repetition of their objection to this error — made on the first appeal; made again to the district court at the 2003 resentencing; and made again to us in the second appeal — does not make the error a new error. Repeating a same, late objection more than once does not make it any more timely. Or stated otherwise, the same error once forfeited cannot be converted to one preserved simply by repeating the objection.
While I thus disagree with the majority's application of harmless error at this stage of the proceedings, I agree that this case should be remanded for resentencing under our most recently announced jurisprudence under Booker. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes,
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