COVINGTON v. WALKER
3 N.Y.3d 287 (2004)
819 N.E.2d 1025
786 N.Y.S.2d 409
RHONDA COVINGTON, Appellant,
CARLTON WALKER, Respondent.
CARLTON WALKER, Respondent.
Court of Appeals of the State of New York.
Argued September 14, 2004.
Decided October 26, 2004.
Morningside Heights Legal Services, Inc., New York City ( Philip M. Genty, Peggy Cross and Edward Smock of counsel), for appellant. Hancock & Estabrook, LLP, Syracuse ( Alan J. Pierce of counsel), for respondent.
Chief Judge KAYE and Judges G.B. SMITH, ROSENBLATT, GRAFFEO, READ and R.S. SMITH concur.
OPINION OF THE COURT
The issue presented by this appeal is whether plaintiff's cause of action for divorce on the ground of imprisonment pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (3), brought 16 years after the commencement of defendant's confinement, is barred by the five-year statute of limitations as set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 210. Resolution of this question turns on whether the statute of limitations is measured from the date of defendant's third consecutive year of incarceration or from the date of his release from prison (see Domestic Relations Law § 170  [providing that an action for divorce may be maintained on the ground of the defendant's confinement in prison for a period of at least three consecutive years]). We conclude that the cause of action accrues on the date defendant completes his third consecutive year of incarceration, but the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the date he is released from prison. Thus, plaintiff's divorce action is not time-barred.
On May 12, 1983, plaintiff wife and defendant husband were married. Thereafter, on January 28, 1984, defendant was arrested for the shooting death and robbery of a cab driver. In 1985, he was convicted, upon a jury verdict, of murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and sentenced to a prison term of 25 years to life. Defendant has been incarcerated since the date of his arrest. Plaintiff, who was convicted for the same crimes as defendant, is also incarcerated.
On April 10, 2000, plaintiff commenced this action for divorce on the ground that defendant has been confined for a period of three or more consecutive years after their marriage (see Domestic Relations Law § 170 ). Plaintiff moved for summary judgment of divorce pursuant to CPLR 3212, contending that no triable issues of fact exist. In opposition, defendant asserted a number of defenses including the five-year statute of limitations (see Domestic Relations Law § 210). Arguing that the five-year limitations period begins to run from the end of his third
Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff's action on summary judgment. A divided Appellate Division affirmed, the majority concluding that "[t]he imprisonment ground for divorce arose once the defendant had been incarcerated for three years, a date which is more than five years before the commencement of this action" (
In 1966, the Legislature enacted the Divorce Reform Law amending the former laws of this state which, since 1787, recognized adultery as the only ground for divorce (see L 1966, ch 254; see generally Gleason v Gleason,
The general purpose underlying the new statute was to "recognize grounds for divorce . . . as manifestations of dead marriages, marriages that should be terminated for the mutual protection and well being of the parties and, in most instances, of their children" (1966 Report of Joint Legis Comm on Matrimonial and Family Laws to Legislature of State of NY, at 85; see also Gleason, 26 NY2d at 35 [recognizing the legislative
The statute further creates a statute of limitations for these new causes of action. Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 210, "[n]o action for divorce or separation may be maintained on a ground which arose more than five years before the date of the commencement of that action for divorce or separation." Statutory exemptions to section 210 exist only for divorce actions based on abandonment, adultery or a separation decree, judgment or agreement (see Domestic Relations Law § 210 [a]). While the statute makes the grounds and the period clear, it gives no indication as to when the limitations period begins to run against the plaintiff in a section 170 (3) action for divorce.
Defendant here essentially contends that, because section 170 (3) does not permit an action for divorce until the defendant has been confined for three years, the divorce action on this ground arises for statute of limitations purposes only on the date marking that third year. We reject this narrow construction as inconsistent with the statutory scheme (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 96; see also Council of City of N.Y. v Giuliani,
The purpose of the requirement that the defendant be incarcerated for three years prior to the commencement of an action for divorce is to give the convicted party an opportunity to obtain release from prison and to prevent the "natural but sometimes too rash inclination to dissolve a marriage" upon a spouse's conviction (1966 Report of Joint Legis Comm on Matrimonial and Family Laws to Legislature of State of NY, at 89). Nothing in the legislative history suggests, however, that Domestic Relations Law § 170 (3) was intended to start the statute of limitations running against the plaintiff spouse as early as possible so as to create the potential for a spouse, who may have missed the five-year window — indeed, may have had young children and chose not to seek divorce earlier — to unwillingly remain in a dead marriage.
Plaintiff further contends that the words "or more" in Domestic Relations Law § 170 (3) suggest that divorce actions based on imprisonment are actions involving recurring injuries to the parties which implicate the continuous wrong doctrine. We agree. This Court has applied the doctrine in certain cases such as nuisance or continuing trespass where the harm sustained by the complaining party is not exclusively traced to the day when the original objectionable act was committed (see generally Jensen v General Elec. Co.,
While this Court has never applied the continuous wrong doctrine in the context of a divorce action, the Appellate Division departments have consistently found the doctrine applicable in divorce actions where a continuous or recurring course of conduct is alleged (see generally Grubman v Grubman,
Under a continuous wrong or violation rule, where a defendant spouse is incarcerated for a consecutive period exceeding three years, each day of continued confinement beyond three years inflicts new injury on the plaintiff spouse. Thus, although this ground for divorce arises originally at the conclusion of the
Adopting a contrary rule — that an action for divorce based on imprisonment arises only once — would further none of the policy considerations at the heart of our statutes of limitations jurisprudence. "Statutes of Limitation were `designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared'" (Blanco v American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
In divorce actions predicated on confinement in prison these overriding policy concerns are not implicated; the only necessary proof is that the defendant has actually been incarcerated for three or more years — easily shown by Department of Correctional Services records. There is no evidence to be lost or surprise to be had. On the other hand, there is a strong interest in giving the plaintiff the continued right to maintain a cause of action for divorce where "[t]he marriage [has been] killed by separation" (1968 Report of Joint Legis Comm on Matrimonial and Family Laws to Legislature of State of NY, at 27).
The balance is thus best struck by defining the accrual date of plaintiff's cause of action from any time after the conclusion of a defendant's three years of continuous incarceration up until the time such spouse is released from prison and then running the statute of limitations for five years thereafter. The conduct giving rise to the cause of action — the imprisonment — has ceased by the time the limitations period begins to run, and the need for repose is satisfied. Applying these principles, we conclude that plaintiff's cause of action for divorce is not time-barred.
Order reversed, etc.
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