ALLEN v. ST. CABRINI NURSING HOME, INC. No. 00CIV.8558(CM)(LMS).
198 F.Supp.2d 442 (2002)
Adell P. ALLEN, Plaintiff, v. ST. CABRINI NURSING HOME, INC., Defendant.
United States District Court, S.D. New York.
April 11, 2002.
Jeffrey Collazo, Esq., New York.
McMAHON, District Judge.
On November 8, 2000, plaintiff filed the instant federal court Complaint against St. Cabrini Nursing Home ("St. Cabrini" or the "Nursing Home"), alleging violations of Title VII in St. Cabrini's termination of her employment. Plaintiff alleged that St. Cabrini retaliated against her, failed to promote her; provided her with (unspecified) unequal terms and conditions of employment; harassed her; and discriminated against her based on sex; plaintiff also alleged tort claims for harassment and defamation. By decision and order of March 9, 2001, this Court dismissed all of plaintiff's claims except for her retaliation claim. The parties completed discovery on plaintiff's retaliation claim on October 18, 2001, and defendant immediately moved for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's one remaining cause of action.
That motion is granted.
Plaintiff admits that she was fired from her job at Cabrini for repeatedly refusing to cooperate in the Nursing Home's investigation of a Resident's injury. Plaintiff's sole support for her retaliation claim consists of conclusory allegations of an elaborate conspiracy to persecute her, for which she offers no evidence whatsoever. Because plaintiff has failed either to make out a prima facie case of retaliation or to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to St. Cabrini's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing her, the motion is granted and the Complaint dismissed.
Statement of Undisputed Facts
None of the following facts is in dispute.
Plaintiff began work at St. Cabrini as a Certified Nursing Assistant ("CNA") on August 11, 1997 (56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 1, 2). As a CNA, plaintiff's position required her to administer non-professional care and perform routine tasks under the supervision of a nurse (56.1 St. ¶ 3). In particular, plaintiff was responsible for feeding, grooming, dressing, and transporting nursing home residents, as well as assisting residents with personal hygiene, responding to resident calls for assistance, and monitoring residents' temperature, weight, and fluid intake and output. Id. Plaintiff's position as CNA also required her to "report any observations of unusual manner or appearance" regarding the residents to whom she was assigned, including color, skin conditions, restlessness, and lethargy. Id. Plaintiff's position also required her to report any injuries she detected to the nurse in charge, and to take precautions, such as the use of side rails, to ensure the safety of nursing home residents. Id.
Plaintiff was assigned to work part-time on the weekend night shift, from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. (56.1 St. ¶ 4). When Plaintiff reported to work on the night of February 28, 2000, she was assigned to the One West unit of the Nursing Home, and one of the residents assigned to her care was an elderly woman who will be identified herein as E.O. (56.1 St. ¶ 5). Plaintiff states that she left the floor at 7:15 a.m. on the morning of February 29, 2000 (56.1 St. ¶ 6). Plaintiff was relieved that morning by a CNA named Lilly James, whose shift began at 7 a.m. (56.1 St. ¶¶ 6, 7).
When plaintiff reported to work the following evening, February 29, Sicily Jeremiah, RN, instructed plaintiff to complete a written statement documenting her care of Resident E.O. on the night of the injury (56.1 St. ¶ 14). In reply, plaintiff stated to Ms. Jeremiah that she had noticed a "healed up dry area" on one of the resident's legs, but did not remember which leg, and stated that she did not report this to the nurse because "it look[ed] old." (56.1 St. ¶ 15). Plaintiff refused to provide a written statement, and refused to sign the summary Ms. Jeremiah prepared of their conversation, instead sarcastically threatening to call the FBI (56.1 St. ¶ 14, 15). During plaintiff's next scheduled shift on March 6, 2000, Ms. Theoret and union delegate Gloria Hamilton met with plaintiff, and plaintiff was directed a second time to comply with the investigation (56.1 St. ¶ 16).
On March 15, 2000, in the presence of two union delegates, Director of Nursing Diane Patton met with plaintiff again and a third time directed her to cooperate with St. Cabrini's investigation of the resident's injury (56.1 St. ¶ 18). Plaintiff again refused to cooperate. Id. Accordingly, plaintiff's suspension was extended indefinitely, pending a further attempt to elicit her cooperation. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that on December 10, 1998 (over 15 months before her employment was terminated), she submitted a letter to Margaret Marbury, who was then the Acting Director of Nursing and is now the Director of Quality Control and Accreditation at St. Cabrini (56.1 St. ¶ 26), complaining of purported discrimination in that she was allegedly denied the opportunity to work five extra hours. She asserts that she was fired because of this letter, rather than for her refusal to cooperate with the Nursing Home's investigation (56.1 St. ¶ 26). No one in St. Cabrini's management, including Marbury, has any record or recollection of receiving such a document at any time, or any complaint of discrimination from plaintiff whatsoever
Plaintiff has produced no evidence whatsoever of retaliatory intent. She admits that she did not hear any discriminatory remarks during her employment at St. Cabrini, and also admits that she heard no remarks at any point during her employment that would suggest that the decision to terminate her employment was motivated by retaliation (56.1 St. ¶ 32). Subsequent to her alleged submission of the December, 1998 letter, plaintiff cooperated in an internal investigation of an injury suffered by another Nursing Home Resident (Resident H.M.). That investigation took place in April 1999. In the course of this investigation, plaintiff submitted a written statement stating that she knew nothing about H.M.'s injury. This statement was satisfactory to her supervisors (56.1 St. ¶ 31). Plaintiff offers no explanation of why her employer would allegedly pass up one opportunity to retaliate against her, and wait 10 additional months for its next alleged opportunity.
At no point was plaintiff ever accused of deliberately injuring Resident E.O. (56.1 St. ¶ 23). St. Cabrini ultimately concluded that E.O. probably incurred her injury when her leg became wedged between her bed's mattress and side railing (56.1 St. ¶ 24). Aside from her conclusory allegation, plaintiff offers no evidence tending to show that anyone at St. Cabrini ever held her responsible for E.O.'s injury.
Conclusions of Law
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS TO SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S RETALIATION CLAIM
Summary judgment is appropriate where the parties' submissions show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). For plaintiff to defeat summary judgment, she must offer "concrete particulars" to substantiate the claim; she may not merely rely on the pleadings or raise solely metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Dawkins v. Witco Corp.,
A. Analytical Framework for Title VII and New York Human Rights Law Retaliation Claims
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff must prove that: (1) she participated in a protected activity; (2) her employer was aware of this activity; (3) her employer adopted an employment action adverse to plaintiff; and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp.,
If plaintiff meets this burden, the burden of production then shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Quinn, supra, at 768. Plaintiff must then prove that the employer's proffered reason is false, and merely a pretext for discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
Although St. Cabrini does not dispute that it terminated plaintiff's employment on March 28, 2000, and that plaintiff performed her job adequately prior to the misconduct that led to her termination, plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed because the evidence she offers does not, as a matter of law, demonstrate any nexus between her December 1998 complaint of discrimination and her termination fifteen months later.
Defendant urges this Court to conclude, as a matter of undisputed fact, that no one at St. Cabrini received the December 1998 letter. I decline to do so. For purposes of this motion, I will assume that things happened as plaintiff contends: she sent the letter to Maybury in December 1998.
Furthermore, for purposes of this motion, I will assume that the letter constituted protected activity under Title VII, despite Defendant's persuasive argument to the contrary. It is true, as Defendant alleges, that Plaintiff's claim of being bumped from a weekend shift on one occasion —an act that deprived plaintiff only of the opportunity to work five extra hours (which would have amounted to $62.47) (See 56.1 St., Ex. 28)—does not constitute
Despite this persuasive argument, I will give the pro se plaintiff the benefit of every doubt on this motion, and assume (without finding) that she engaged in protected activity under Title VII by sending the December 1998 letter. She nonetheless loses because she has not offered any evidence tending to suggest that the letter had any bearing on her termination over fifteen months later.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff must establish a causal connection between a protected activity and her adverse employment action. Clarke v. City of New York, 2001 WL
A substantial time lag between the protected activity and the adverse employment action suffices to defeat an inference of retaliatory animus. Claims of retaliation are routinely dismissed when as few as three months elapse between the protected activity and the alleged act of retaliation. See Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co.,
Second, plaintiff cannot create an inference of retaliation through comparison with similarly situated employees, because there are none: the misconduct that gave rise to plaintiff's termination (her refusal to cooperate in St. Cabrini's investigation of a resident's injury) was so egregious that Defendant has no record of its happening before (56.1 St. ¶ 22). Where plaintiff's Title VII claim purportedly arises from a disciplinary action, other employees are deemed similarly situated to plaintiff only where they are subject to the same workplace standards and have been disciplined for conduct of comparable seriousness. Graham v. Long Island R.R.,
Third, as noted above, plaintiff offers no direct evidence of retaliatory intent. Plaintiff admits that she never heard any discriminatory remarks or remarks that would suggest retaliatory intent (56.1 St. ¶ 32). Instead, plaintiff speculates about the existence of an elaborate conspiracy, in which the Nursing Home allegedly plots against its own residents (56.1 St. ¶ 25), which speculation, either as to the "conspiracy" itself or to its purported retaliatory motive, is completely unsupported by any admissible evidence. It is well-established in this Circuit that such conclusory allegations will not suffice to defeat summary judgment. Goenaga, supra, at 18.
Finally, plaintiff admits that she did what she was fired for doing—refused to cooperate in the investigation about
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO RAISE AN ISSUE OF FACT CONCERNING THE PRETEXTUAL NATURE OF ST. CABRINI'S REASON FOR TERMINATING HER EMPLOYMENT
Even if plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of retaliation (which she cannot), she does not offer any admissible evidence to show that St. Cabrini's proffered explanation is false, and merely a pretext for retaliation. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
In support of her claim of retaliation, plaintiff alleges, again without evidentiary support, that St. Cabrini fabricated, or perpetrated, E.O.'s injury to thwart plaintiff's efforts to seek a management post, claiming that St. Cabrini "needed" her and her work as CNA was indispensable to St. Cabrini's operations (56.1 St. ¶ 25). Plaintiff also claims that St. Cabrini resented her efforts to further her education, and sought to enlist her to carry out an unspecified but sinister agenda (56.1 St. ¶ 25). Plaintiff offers no evidence to support any of these contentions. Her bald assertion of these matters does not suffice to create a genuine dispute of material fact. Goenaga, supra, at 18; Ofudu, supra, at 516.
Plaintiff's claim of pretext is also belied by the fact that she cooperated in at least one investigation after allegedly filing her internal complaint, in April 1999, by submitting a resident incident report on her own stationery stating that she knew nothing about how one resident H.M.'s injury had occurred (56.1 St. ¶ 31). St. Cabrini accepted this statement, and plaintiff had no further involvement in the investigation. Id. This illustrates that plaintiff was familiar with the investigative process. And because she had already filed her claim of discrimination (the December 1998 letter, which I am assuming was sent for purposes of this motion), plaintiff was also aware that she could participate in an investigation, and even deny knowledge of an incident, without being retaliated
Because plaintiff admits that the facts underlying St. Cabrini's proffered explanation are true, and that she was insubordinate, she raises no genuine issue of material fact as to pretext.
Based on the foregoing, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the complaint is dismissed. The Clerk is directed to close the file. Plaintiff has thirty (30) days from the date this order is entered in the office of the Clerk of the Court to file a Notice of Appeal if she wishes to pursue this matter in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Any Notice of Appeal should be filed in the office of the Clerk of the District Court.
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