MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SUSAN WEBBER WRIGHT, Chief Judge.
What began as a civil lawsuit against the President of the United States for alleged sexual harassment eventually resulted in an impeachment trial of the President in the United States Senate on two Articles of Impeachment for his actions during the course of this lawsuit and a related criminal investigation being conducted by the Office of the Independent Counsel ("OIC"). The civil lawsuit was settled while on appeal from this Court's decision granting summary judgment to defendants and the Senate acquitted the President of both Articles of Impeachment. Those proceedings having concluded, the Court now addresses the issue of contempt on the part of the President first raised in footnote five of the Court's Memorandum and Order of September 1, 1998. See Jones v. Clinton, 12 F.Supp.2d 931, 938 n. 5 (E.D.Ark.1998). For the reasons that follow, the Court hereby adjudges the President to be in contempt of court for his willful failure to obey this Court's discovery Orders.
Plaintiff Paula Corbin Jones filed this lawsuit seeking civil damages from William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, and Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas State Police Officer, for alleged actions beginning with an incident in a hotel suite in Little Rock, Arkansas on May 8, 1991, when President Clinton was Governor of the State of Arkansas. Plaintiff was working as a state employee on the day in question and claimed that Ferguson persuaded her to leave the registration desk she was staffing and visit Governor Clinton in a business suite at the hotel. She claimed the Governor made boorish and offensive sexual advances that she rejected,
Plaintiff's complaint was filed on May 6, 1994. On August 10, 1994, the President filed a motion to dismiss the complaint without prejudice on grounds of immunity and to toll any statutes of limitations until he is no longer President, thereby allowing plaintiff to refile her suit after he is out of office. On December 28, 1994, this Court denied the President's motion to dismiss on immunity grounds and ruled that discovery in the case could proceed, but concluded that any trial should be stayed until such time as the President is no longer in office. See Jones v. Clinton, 869 F.Supp. 690 (E.D.Ark.1994). Both parties appealed. On January 9, 1996, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed this Court's Order denying the President's motion to dismiss on immunity grounds and allowing discovery to proceed, but reversed this Court's Order staying the trial of this matter for the duration of President Clinton's term in office. See Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1996). The President subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States, which was granted, see Clinton v. Jones, 518 U.S. 1016, 116 S.Ct. 2545, 135 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1996), and on May 27, 1997, the Supreme Court handed down an opinion holding that there is no constitutional impediment to allowing plaintiff's
Following remand of the case to this Court, the President, joined by Ferguson, filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated August 22, 1997, this Court granted in part and denied in part the President's motion. See Jones v. Clinton, 974 F.Supp. 712 (E.D.Ark.1997). The Court dismissed plaintiff's defamation claim against the President, dismissed her due process claim for deprivation of a property interest in her State employment, and dismissed her due process claims for deprivation of a liberty interest based on false imprisonment and injury to reputation, but concluded the remaining claims in plaintiff's complaint stated viable causes of action. See id. The Court thereupon issued a Scheduling Order setting forth a deadline of January 30, 1998, for the completion of discovery and the filing of motions.
Discovery in this case proved to be contentious and time-consuming. During the course of discovery, over 50 motions were filed, the Court entered some 30 Orders,
At his deposition, the President was questioned extensively about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, this Court having previously ruled on December 11, 1997, that plaintiff was "entitled to information regarding any individuals with whom the President had sexual relations or proposed or sought to have sexual relations and who were during the relevant time frame [of May 8, 1986, up to the present] state or federal employees." See December 11, 1997 Order, at 3.
The President's denial of a sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky at his deposition was consistent with his answer of "None" in response to plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 10, which requested the name of each and every federal employee with whom he had sexual relations when he was President of the United States. See Pres. Clinton's Resp. to Pl.'s Second Set of Int. at 5; Pres. Clinton's Supp. Resp. to Pl.'s Second Set of Int. at 2. This interrogatory was answered on December 23, 1997, after this Court had entered its December 11th Order ruling on plaintiff's motion to compel responses to her second set of interrogatories and finding that plaintiff was entitled to such information. See December 11, 1997 Order, at 3, 6.
One day prior to the President's deposition, and unknown to this Court, the Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted a request from Attorney General Janet Reno to expand the jurisdiction of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr and entered an Order authorizing the Independent Counsel "to investigate ... whether Monica Lewinsky or others suborned perjury, obstructed justice, intimidated witnesses, or otherwise violated federal law other than a Class B or C misdemeanor or infraction in dealing with witnesses, potential witnesses, attorneys, or others concerning the civil case Jones v. Clinton." In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Ass'n, Div. No. 94-I, 1998 WL 472444 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 1998). A short time later, the President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and OIC's investigation of that relationship broke in the national media.
On the afternoon of January 28, 1998, with less than 48 hours remaining in the period for conducting discovery, OIC filed with this Court a motion for limited intervention and stay of discovery in this civil case. OIC argued that counsel for plaintiff were deliberately shadowing the grand jury's investigation of the matter involving Ms. Lewinsky and that "the pending criminal investigation is of such gravity and paramount importance that this Court would do a disservice to the Nation if it were to permit the unfettered — and extraordinarily aggressive — discovery efforts currently underway to proceed unabated." Motion of OIC, at 2-3. This Court convened a telephone conference the following morning and, after eliciting the views of the parties and OIC, entered an Order granting in part and denying in part OIC's motion. See Jones v. Clinton, 993 F.Supp. 1217 (E.D.Ark.1998) (Order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration). In essence, the Court concluded that the parties could continue with discovery in the short time that remained of those matters not involving Ms. Lewinsky, but that any discovery that did involve Ms. Lewinsky would not be allowed to go forward and, further, that any evidence concerning Ms. Lewinsky would be excluded from the trial of this matter. Id. at 1218-19.
On August 17, 1998, the President appeared before a grand jury in Washington, D.C., as part of OIC's criminal investigation and testified about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and his actions during this civil lawsuit. That evening, the President discussed the matter in a televised address to the Nation. In his address, the President stated that although his answers at his January 17th deposition were "legally accurate," he did not volunteer information and that he did indeed have a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that was inappropriate and wrong. See Pres. Addr., 1998 WL 14394084. The President acknowledged misleading people, in part because the questions posed to him "were being asked in a politically inspired lawsuit which has since been dismissed," and because he "had real and serious concerns about an Independent Counsel investigation that began with private business dealings 20 years ago...." Id. It was during the President's televised address that the Court first learned the President may be in contempt. See Jones v. Clinton, 12 F.Supp.2d at 938 n. 5.
On September 9, 1998, the Independent Counsel, having concluded there was substantial and credible information that the President committed acts that may constitute grounds for impeachment, submitted his findings from his investigation of the Lewinsky matter to the United States House of Representatives pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 595(c). The House of Representatives thereupon commenced impeachment proceedings, ultimately passing two Articles of Impeachment against the President, one alleging perjury in his August 17th testimony before the grand jury and the other alleging obstruction of justice in this civil case. The matter then proceeded to trial in the United States Senate.
On November 13, 1998, while the impeachment proceedings were taking place in the House of Representatives, the plaintiff reached an out-of court settlement for $850,000.00 and withdrew her appeal of this Court's April 1st decision granting summary judgment to defendants. See Jones v. Clinton, 161 F.3d 528 (8th Cir.1998). Thereafter, on February 12, 1999, the Senate acquitted the President of both Articles of Impeachment.
Following the acquittal of the President, this Court held a telephone conference on February 16, 1999, to address the remaining issues before this Court, including the issue of attorney's fees and the issue of whether the President should be subject to contempt proceedings. See February 16, 1999 Order, at 2.
As the Court explained to the parties, however, it is now time to address the issue of the President's contempt as all other proceedings that heretofore have precluded this Court from addressing the issue have concluded. Id.
The threshold question in this matter is whether a President of the United States can be held in civil contempt of court and thereby sanctioned. Although federal courts possess the authority to impose sanctions for civil contempt pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their inherent authority, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) (providing that a court may enter an order treating as a contempt of court the failure of a party to obey the court's orders); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (noting that the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts), no court has ever held a President in contempt of court. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 827, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (noting that the issue of whether a President can be cited for contempt could engender protracted litigation). Nevertheless, this Court has considered the matter and finds no constitutional barrier to holding the President in civil contempt of court in this case and imposing sanctions.
This lawsuit involved private actions allegedly taken by the President before his term of office began, and the contumacious conduct on the part of the President was undertaken in his role as a litigant in a civil case and did not relate to his duties as President. Both the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court held in this case that the Constitution does not place the President's unofficial conduct beyond judicial scrutiny. In so ruling, the Court of Appeals specifically rejected the President's argument that "because a federal court will control the litigation, the Third Branch necessarily will interfere with the Executive Branch through the court's scheduling orders and its powers to issue contempt citations and sanctions." Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d at 1361 (emphasis added). Likewise, the Supreme Court explained that "`[it] is settled law that the separation-of-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the United States,'"
Although not expressly addressed by the Supreme Court, a necessary incident of the power to determine the legality of the President's unofficial conduct includes the power to address unofficial conduct which threatens the integrity of the proceedings before the court. The sanctioning provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure vest federal courts with the power to address conduct which threatens the integrity of the judicial process, see, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 (providing that sanctions may be appropriate where a claim is presented for an improper purpose) and 37 (sanctions for failure to cooperate with discovery), and the existence in the federal courts of an inherent power "`necessary to the exercise of all others'" is likewise firmly established and "include[s] the ability to dismiss actions, assess attorneys' fees, and to impose monetary or other sanctions appropriate `for conduct which abuses the judicial process.'" Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1259 (8th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45, 111 S.Ct. 2123), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 828, 114 S.Ct. 94, 126 L.Ed.2d 61 (1993). See also Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276, 110 S.Ct. 625, 107 L.Ed.2d 644 (1990) (noting the axiom that courts have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt).
Certainly the Court recognizes that significant constitutional issues would arise were this Court to impose sanctions against the President that impaired his decision-making or otherwise impaired him in the performance of his official duties. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 708, 117 S.Ct. 1636. No such sanctions will be imposed, however. Throughout the history of this case, this Court has attempted to apply the law to the President in the same manner as it would apply the law to any other litigant, keeping in mind the "high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive" and the Supreme Court's directive that such respect "inform the conduct of the entire proceeding...." See id. at 707, 117 S.Ct. 1636. In that regard, this Court will not impose greater sanctions against the President for his contumacious conduct in this case than would be imposed against any other litigant and member of the bar who engaged in similar misconduct. Moreover, this Court is aware that it is obliged to use the least possible power adequate to the end proposed in selecting contempt sanctions, see Spallone, 493 U.S. at 276, 110 S.Ct. 625, and will base the imposition of sanctions on a principle of proportionality, recognizing that the President's contumacious conduct occurred in a case that was both dismissed on summary judgment as lacking in merit and in which the plaintiff was made whole, having agreed to a settlement in excess of that prayed for in her complaint.
In sum, the Court finds that the power to determine the legality of the President's unofficial conduct includes with it the power to issue civil contempt citations and impose sanctions for his unofficial conduct which abuses the judicial process.
As noted earlier, a federal district court has two principal sources of authority for finding a party in civil contempt of its discovery orders: Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) and the court's inherent power. See, e.g., Webb v.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) sets forth a broad range of sanctions that a district court may impose upon parties for their failure to comply with the court's discovery orders. The Rule provides that if a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, the court "may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just" and, among others, impose the following sanctions: (1) the court may order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts be taken as established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; (2) the court may refuse to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibit that party from introducing designated matters in evidence; (3) the court may strike any pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or render a judgment of default against the disobedient party; and (4) the court may, in lieu of any of the foregoing sanctions or in addition thereto, enter an order treating as a contempt of court the failure of the party to obey the court's orders. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2). In addition to those sanctions, the Rule provides:
On two separate occasions, this Court ruled in clear and reasonably specific terms that plaintiff was entitled to information regarding any individuals with whom the President had sexual relations or proposed or sought to have sexual relations and who were during the relevant time frame state or federal employees. See December 11, 1997 Order, at 3; Pres. Depo. at 53-55, 66, 78.
At his January 17th deposition, the President responded to a series of questions regarding whether he and Ms. Lewinsky had ever been alone together by maintaining that he could not recall being alone with her. The President testified as follows:
Pres. Depo. at 52-53, 56-59.
At his August 17th appearance before the grand jury, the President directly contradicted his deposition testimony by acknowledging that he had indeed been alone with Ms. Lewinsky on a number of occasions during which they engaged in "inappropriate intimate contact." Pres. GJ Test. at 9-10. He stated he also was alone with her "from time to time" when there was no "improper contact" occurring. Id. at 134. The President began his testimony by reading a statement which reads in part as follows:
Id. at 9-10. The President then testified as follows in response to questions regarding whether he and Ms. Lewinsky had ever been alone together:
Id. at 30-32. In addition, the President recalled a specific meeting on December 28, 1997, less than three weeks prior to his January 17th deposition, at which he and Ms. Lewinsky were alone together. Id. at 34. The President went on to acknowledge that he tried to conceal his "inappropriate intimate relationship" with Ms. Lewinsky by not telling anyone about the relationship and by "do[ing] it where nobody else was looking at it," stating that he would have to be an "exhibitionist not to have tried to exclude everyone else." Id. at 38, 54. The President testified as follows in response to a question regarding how many times that occurred:
Id. at 38-39.
With respect to whether he and Ms. Lewinsky had engaged in sexual relations, the President testified at his January 17th deposition as follows:
Pres. Depo. at 78.
The President confirmed these denials in response to questioning from his attorney regarding Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit and whether he and Ms. Lewinsky ever had a "sexual relationship":
Id. at 204.
Consistent with his denial at his deposition of a sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, the President had earlier answered "None" in response to plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 10, which stated as follows:
See Pres. Clinton's Resp. to Pl.'s Second Set of Int. at 5; Pres. Clinton's Supp. Resp. to Pl.'s Second Set of Int. at 2. As previously noted, this interrogatory was answered without regard to a formal definition of the term "sexual relations" after this Court had entered its December 11th Order ruling that plaintiff was entitled to such information.
At his August 17th grand jury appearance, the President directly contradicted his deposition testimony by acknowledging "inappropriate intimate contact" with Ms. Lewinsky on numerous occasions. Pres. GJ Test. at 9-10, 38-39, 54. When asked by a grand juror what he meant by "inappropriate contact," the President stated, "What I meant was, and what they can infer that I meant was, that I did things that were — when I was alone with her, that were inappropriate and wrong." Id. at 92-93. The President repeatedly refused to provide answers to questions regarding specific sexual activity between himself and Ms. Lewinsky, instead referring to his statement acknowledging "inappropriate intimate contact" and stating that "sexual relations" as defined by himself and "most ordinary Americans" means, for the most part, only intercourse. Id. at 12, 22-24, 92-94, 102-03, 110-11, 139, 168. Nevertheless, the President, while claiming that he did not engage in intercourse with Ms. Lewinsky and did not engage in any other contact with her that would fall within the definition of "sexual relations" used at his deposition, acknowledged that the nature of his "inappropriate intimate contact" with Ms. Lewinsky was such that he would have been an "exhibitionist" had it been viewed by others. Id. at 10, 12, 54, 96. The President went on to state that he did not believe he violated the definition of sexual relations he was given "by directly touching those parts of her body with the intent to arouse or gratify." Id. at 139, 168.
It is difficult to construe the President's sworn statements in this civil lawsuit concerning his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky as anything other than a willful refusal to obey this Court's discovery Orders. Given the President's admission that he was misleading with regard to the questions being posed to him and the clarity with which his falsehoods are revealed by the record,
Certainly the President's aggravation with what he considered a "politically inspired
In sum, the record leaves no doubt that the President violated this Court's discovery Orders regarding disclosure of information deemed by this Court to be relevant to plaintiff's lawsuit. The Court therefore adjudges the President to be in civil contempt of court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2).
The Court now turns to the issue of appropriate sanctions. Several of the sanctions contemplated by Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) are unavailable to this Court as the underlying lawsuit has been terminated. The Court cannot, for example, order that the matters upon which the President gave false statements be taken as established, nor can the Court render a default judgment against the President, both of which the Court would have considered had this Court's grant of summary judgment to defendants been reversed and remanded. Moreover, as the Court earlier noted, the determination of appropriate sanctions must take into account that this case was dismissed on summary judgment as lacking in merit — a decision that would not have changed even had the President been truthful with respect to his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky
First, the President shall pay plaintiff any reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by his willful failure to obey this Court's discovery Orders. Plaintiff's former counsel are directed to submit to this Court a detailed statement of any expenses and attorney's fees incurred in connection with this matter within twenty (20) days of the date of entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
Second, the President shall reimburse this Court its expenses in traveling to Washington, D.C. at his request to preside over his tainted deposition. The Court therefore will direct that the President deposit into the registry of this Court the sum of $1,202.00, the total expenses incurred by this Court in traveling to Washington, D.C.
In addition, the Court will refer this matter to the Arkansas Supreme Court's Committee on Professional Conduct for review and any disciplinary action it deems appropriate for the President's possible violation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
In addressing only the President's sworn statements concerning his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, this Court is fully aware that the President may have engaged in other contumacious conduct warranting the imposition of sanctions. See n. 13, supra. The Court determines, however, that this matter can be summarily addressed by focusing on those specific instances of the President's misconduct with which there is no factual dispute and which primarily occurred directly before the Court. While hearings might have been necessary were there an issue regarding the President's willfulness in failing to obey the Court's discovery Orders, the circumstances surrounding the President's failure to disclose his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky as ordered by this Court are undisputed and contained within the record. The President has essentially admitted that he intended to mislead plaintiff in her efforts
This is not to say that the Court considers other instances of possible Presidential misconduct in this case unworthy of the Court's attention. In fact, the Court fully considered addressing all of the President's possible misconduct pursuant to the criminal contempt provisions set forth in Fed.R.Crim.P. 42, but determines that such action is not necessary at this time for two primary reasons.
First, the summary adjudication procedures delineated in Rule 42(a) are most likely inapplicable in this case since the power summarily to convict and punish for contempt of court under that rule generally "rests on the proposition that a hearing to determine guilt of contempt is not necessary when contumacious conduct occurs in the actual presence of a judge who observes it, and when immediate action is required to preserve order in the proceedings and appropriate respect for the tribunal." Smith v. Smith, 145 F.3d 335, 342-43 (5th Cir.1998) (quoting In re Chaplain, 621 F.2d 1272, 1275 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834, 101 S.Ct. 106, 66 L.Ed.2d 40 (1980)). Here, the Court was not aware of any of the instances of the President's possible misconduct until well after this case had been dismissed on summary judgment, and immediate action was not required to preserve order in the proceedings. See International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 832-33, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994) (noting that "[s]ummary adjudication becomes less justifiable once a court leaves the realm of immediately sanctioned, petty direct contempts," and that "[if] a court delays punishing a direct contempt until the completion of trial, for example, due process requires that the contemnor's rights to notice and a hearing be respected").
Second, resolving the matter expeditiously and without hearings pursuant to Rule 42(b) is in the best interests of both the President and this Court. Were the Court to delve into conduct which arguably was contumacious but which is not fully apparent from the record, this Court, as previously noted, would be required to hold hearings and take evidence, including, if necessary, testimony from witnesses. Such hearings could possibly last several weeks and might require referral of the matter to a prosecutor. See United States v. Neal, 101 F.3d 993, 997-98 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that when contumacious conduct occurs out of the presence of the court or does not interfere with ongoing proceedings immediately before the court, contempt power does not permit a judge to dispense with a prosecutor altogether and fill the role himself). Because much of the President's conduct has been or is being investigated by OIC, and in order to prevent any potential double jeopardy issues from arising, see, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993) (noting that protection of the double jeopardy clause applies to nonsummary criminal contempt prosecutions), this Court will forego proceeding under Fed.R.Crim.P. 42 and address the President's contempt by focusing on those undisputed matters that are capable of being summarily addressed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2). See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 833, 114 S.Ct. 2552 (noting that certain indirect contempts are appropriate
Nevertheless, the Court will convene a hearing at the request of the President should he desire an opportunity in which to demonstrate why he is not in civil contempt of court, why sanctions should not be imposed, or why the Court is otherwise in error in proceeding in the manner in which it has. In that regard, the Court will stay enforcement of this Memorandum Opinion and Order for thirty (30) days from the date of its entry in which to give the President an opportunity to request a hearing or file a notice of appeal. In addition, the Court will entertain any legitimate and reasonable requests from the President for extensions of time in which to address the matter. Should the President fail to request a hearing or file a notice of appeal within the time allowed, the Court will enter an Order setting forth the time and manner by which the President is to comply with the sanctions herein imposed. Should the President succeed in obtaining a hearing, however, whether at his request or by way of appeal, any interests in an expeditious resolution of this matter and in sparing the President and this Court the turmoil of evidentiary hearings will no longer be a consideration. Accordingly, the President is hereby put on notice that this Court will take evidence at any future hearings — including, if necessary, testimony from witnesses — on all matters concerning the President's conduct in this lawsuit which may warrant a finding of civil contempt.
The Court takes no pleasure whatsoever in holding this Nation's President in contempt of court and is acutely aware, as was the Supreme Court, that the President "occupies a unique office with powers and responsibilities so vast and important that the public interest demands that he devote his undivided time and attention to his public duties." Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 697, 117 S.Ct. 1636. As noted earlier, however, this Court has attempted throughout this case to apply the law to the President in the same manner as it would apply the law to any other litigant, keeping in mind the duties and status of the Presidency and the "high respect" that is to be accorded his office. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 707, 117 S.Ct. 1636. In that regard, there simply is no escaping the fact that the President deliberately violated this Court's discovery Orders and thereby undermined the integrity of the judicial system. Sanctions must be imposed, not only to redress the President's misconduct, but to deter others who might themselves consider emulating the President of the United States by engaging in misconduct that undermines the integrity of the judicial system. Accordingly, the Court adjudges the President to be in civil contempt of court pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) for his willful failure to obey this Court's discovery Orders and hereby orders the following:
1. The President shall pay plaintiff any reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by his willful failure to obey this Court's discovery Orders. Plaintiff's former counsel are directed to submit to this Court a detailed statement of any expenses and attorney's
2. The President shall deposit into the registry of this Court the sum of $ 1,202.00, the total expenses incurred by this Court in traveling to Washington, D.C. at the President's request to preside over his January 17th deposition.
In addition, the Court will refer this matter to the Arkansas Supreme Court's Committee on Professional Conduct for review and any action it deems appropriate.
The Court will stay enforcement of this Memorandum Opinion and Order for thirty (30) days from the date of its entry in order to allow the President an opportunity to request a hearing or file a notice of appeal. Should the President fail to timely request a hearing or file a notice of appeal, the Court will enter an Order setting forth the time and manner by which the President is to comply with the sanctions herein imposed.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 12th day of April 1999.