BUSINESS SERVICE BUREAU, INC. v. WEBSTER No. 4-98-0070.
698 N.E.2d 702 (1998)
298 Ill. App.3d 257
232 Ill.Dec. 611
BUSINESS SERVICE BUREAU, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Angela WEBSTER, Defendant-Appellant.
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.
Decided August 5, 1998.
Sherman J. Brown, Champaign, for Business Service Bureau, Inc.
Justice COOK delivered the opinion of the court:
In March 1995, defendant Angela Webster received ambulance services from Arrow Medical Services (Arrow) and was billed $454. Webster became delinquent on the account and Arrow assigned the debt to plaintiff Business Service Bureau, Inc. (Bureau), a licensed debt collection agency. In July 1997, the Bureau sued Webster for collection of the debt. Webster filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the alleged assignment did not comply with the Collection Agency Act (Act) (225 ILCS 425/8b (West 1996)). The court denied the motion and entered judgment in favor of the Bureau for $454 plus costs. Webster appeals. We reverse.
The purported assignment document from Arrow to the Bureau stated:
The document had a date at the top of the paper that read "03/07/1997." At the bottom of the document, Rita Allen, an agent of Arrow, had signed the document. Underneath her signature was written, "[s]igned and sworn to before me this 13th day of March 1997." The document was notarized and specified Webster's account as the one being assigned.
Section 8b(a) of the Act states that an account may be assigned to a collection agency, provided: "The document manifesting the assignment shall specifically state and include: (i) the effective date of the assignment; and (ii) the consideration for the assignment." 225 ILCS 425/8b(a)(i), (a)(ii) (West 1996). Section 8b(e) states: "No litigation shall commence in the name of the licensee as plaintiff unless * * * there is an assignment of the account that satisfies the requirements of this Section." 225 ILCS 425/8b(e) (West 1996).
Webster contends the assignment was invalid because it did not specify the effective date of the assignment. Instead, it contains two dates, neither of which "specifically states" the "effective date of assignment." Also, Webster argues the assignment fails to specify the consideration for the assignment. The instrument merely states "[for] valuable consideration of an agreed to percentage * * *." Webster argues this violates the plain language and meaning of the statute, which states the parties are required to declare what the consideration is.
Moreover, the assignment agreement does not specifically state the consideration. The assignment agreement stated the consideration was "an agreed to percentage of the amount collected." Theoretically, this "agreed to" percentage could be anything from 100% to 0%. This description of the consideration is tantamount to stating nothing and can hardly be called "specific." The agreement failed to meet this requirement of the statute and the trial court's judgment must be reversed.
Our holding is consistent with the language of the Act. The language of the statute is the best indication of the legislature's intent. Solich v. George and Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill.2d 76, 81,
Our holding is also consistent with the policy of the Act. Concerns have been expressed about assignments of choses in action. At early common law, the doctrines of champerty and maintenance prohibited altogether the assignment of choses in action in order to prevent multiple and useless lawsuits as enterprises and speculations. In re Marriage of Malec,
GREEN and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.
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