NORRIS v. CITY OF MONTGOMERY, ALA.No. Civ.A. 98-T-588-N.
29 F.Supp.2d 1292 (1998)
Wanda & Phillip NORRIS, etc., et al., Plaintiffs,
CITY OF MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA; et al., Defendants.
CITY OF MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA; et al., Defendants.
United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.
October 19, 1998.
Ted G. Meadows, W. Kirk Davenport, Davenport & Willingham, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiffs.
Robert Coleman Black, Jr., Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco, Cole & Black, Montgomery, AL, F. Tim McCollum, City Attorney, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.
MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.
Plaintiffs Wanda and Phillip Norris (on behalf of their deceased son Phillip Heath Norris), Tammie Mosley (on behalf of her minor child Ashley Dantzler), Bo and Minnie Coon (on behalf of their minor child Lee Coon), James Shaw (on behalf of his minor child Jason Shaw), and Bo Coon bring this lawsuit alleging a claim under the due-process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, as enforced through 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, against defendants City of Montgomery, Alabama, Mayor Emory Folmar, Police Chief John Wilson, and Police Officer Thomas Perkins. The plaintiffs also assert state-law claims against these defendants and a private citizen, defendant Michael Perkins.
The case is now before the court on a motion to dismiss filed by the city, its officials, and Officer Perkins on June 19, 1998. For the reasons that follow, the court will grant the motion as to the plaintiffs' § 1983 claim. Because this decision will dispose of the plaintiffs' federal claims and thereby eliminate the basis for the court's supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, the court also will dismiss the plaintiffs' state-law claims against these defendants as well as against defendant Michael Perkins, albeit without prejudice to the pursuit of these claims in state court.
I. LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
In considering a defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court accepts the plaintiffs' factual allegations as true, Jackson v. Okaloosa County,
The pertinent facts of this lawsuit, as alleged by the plaintiffs, are as follows. On August 1, 1997, at about 4:18 p.m., in Montgomery, Alabama, Officer Perkins stopped Michael Perkins, who was driving a 1976 Pontiac automobile, and issued two tickets, one for "excessive smoke" and another for "driving without first obtaining a driver's license." The latter constituted a violation of Montgomery Municipal Ordinance § 25-67.
Pursuant to § 32-5A-203(c)(1) of the Alabama Safe Streets Act of 1995, 1975 Ala. Code §§ 32-5A-200 through -205 (repealed 1998), a law enforcement officer is to impound a vehicle, regardless of ownership, where a driver is unable to produce a valid driver's license on demand. Officer Perkins did not impound Michael Perkins's vehicle when he learned that Michael Perkins was driving without a valid license. By doing so, the plaintiffs allege, Officer Perkins acted in accordance with the policy of the City of Montgomery to return vehicles to drivers who are unable to produce a valid driver's license after being stopped by law enforcement officers.
Later that same day, at approximately 9:55 p.m., Michael Perkins was driving the 1976 Pontiac when he collided with a vehicle driven by Lee Coon and owned by Bo Coon, killing Phillip Heath Norris, injuring Lee Coon, Ashley Dantzler, and Jason Shaw, and destroying the vehicle. At the time of collision, Michael Perkins's blood alcohol level was measured at 0.189, indicating that he was legally drunk.
The defendants raise several grounds for dismissal of the plaintiffs' federal claim, including the defense of qualified immunity. The United States Supreme Court recently emphasized that in an action under § 1983 in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised, the preferred approach is "to identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated" before addressing qualified immunity. Sacramento v. Lewis,
The plaintiffs bring their federal civil-rights claim against the City of Montgomery, its officials, and Officer Perkins under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, which provides a remedy against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the United States Constitution. As the basis of their § 1983 claim, the plaintiffs invoke the due-process clause of the fourteenth amendment, which provides: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const.Amend. XIV, § 1. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to comprise two distinct types of constitutional protection: procedural due process and substantive due process. See McKinney v. Pate,
As the Supreme Court has recently reiterated, "[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government." Lewis, 523 U.S. at ___, 118 S.Ct. at 1716. The precise criteria to be employed in determining whether an
The plaintiffs appear to base their substantive-due-process claim on two independent theories. The first theory is grounded on Officer Perkins's alleged failure to comply with Alabama statutory law that required that he impound Michael Perkins's vehicle upon determining that Michael Perkins was driving without a license. Although not articulated, the plaintiffs seem to make the following two arguments based upon this alleged violation of the law. First, the plaintiffs appear to argue that Officer Perkins's alleged noncompliance with state law necessarily rendered the resulting harm to the plaintiffs a violation of the plaintiffs' substantive-due-process rights. Second, the plaintiffs seem to argue that the Alabama Safe Streets Act created a right, protected by the due-process clause, and that by failing to protect that right, the defendants violated the plaintiffs' substantive-due-process rights. The plaintiffs' second theory claims that the defendants created a "special danger" by failing to impound Michael Perkins's car and thereby violated the plaintiffs' substantive-due-process rights.
Violation-of-state-law theory: Although plaintiffs' pleadings do not make clear the contours of their theory, the court reads their complaint as making the following arguments. First, the plaintiffs seem to contend that noncompliance with state law by a governmental actor automatically renders any harm suffered as a result of that noncompliance a violation of substantive due process. Second, the plaintiffs apparently argue that the Alabama Safe Streets Act gave them a right, protected by the due-process clause, to be protected from unlicensed drivers, and that, by failing to impound Michael Perkins's car, the defendants violated that right. No matter how construed, the plaintiffs' theory fails.
The violation of a state law by a governmental actor does not necessarily convert subsequent resulting harm into a due-process violation. As explained by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in McKinney v. Pate, "areas in which substantive rights are created only by state law ... are not subject to substantive-due-process protection under the Due Process Clause because `substantive-due-process rights are created only by the Constitution.'" 20 F.3d at 1556 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing,
The plaintiffs' argument that the Alabama Safe Streets Act of 1995 created an entitlement which was protected under the due process clause is also erroneous. The same argument was clearly rejected by the Eleventh Circuit in Lovins v. Lee,
In Jones, a woman was raped in her home by a individual who was allegedly illegally released from state custody. The court held that "[t]he fact that defendants may have violated the duties set out by state law for employees of the Department of Youth Services does not mean that the defendants deprived plaintiff of her liberty rights without due process of law." 761 F.2d at 647. The court noted that the plaintiff in Jones may have had a state tort action against the defendants
The Lovins court also found that the plaintiffs' argument was foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Collins. In that case, the widow of a city sanitation department employee who died of asphyxia after entering a manhole to unstop a sewer line sued the city and various municipal officials claiming that their failure to train or warn city employees, including her husband, about known hazards in the workplace violated her husband's substantive-due-process rights. 503 U.S. at 116-20, 112 S.Ct. at 1064-65. She grounded her substantive-due-process claim on a state statute requiring that certain employees receive warnings about job hazards. Id. at 129, 112 S.Ct. at 1070. The Court assumed that the state statute had imposed a duty on the city to warn its employees about the dangers posed by noxious gases and to provide safety training and protective equipment to minimize those dangers. The Court further assumed that the statute created an entitlement that qualifies as a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. Even with those assumptions, however, the Supreme Court held that the defendants' violation of that state statute did not give rise to a viable substantive-due-process claim. Id. at 127-30, 112 S.Ct. at 1070-71. Collins and Jones foreclose the argument that the defendants' alleged violation of the Alabama Safe Streets renders their actions a violation of substantive due process.
Special-danger theory: The plaintiffs' second theory is that the defendants violated their substantive-due-process rights by placing the plaintiffs in "greatly enhanced or special danger."
"As a general matter, ... a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause." DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services,
While acknowledging the general rule that the State's failure to protect an individual from harm inflicted by third parties does not constitute a violation of due process, the plaintiffs contend that their case falls within an exception to the rule. One major exception to this rule is where a custodial relationship between the State and the victim renders the victim unable to protect himself. Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005. See also Lovins, 53 F.3d at 1210. Another is when the State has created a danger or placed an individual in a position of "special danger." The plaintiffs attempt to invoke the latter exception.
Accepting the plaintiffs' allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the court still finds that they have failed to present facts sufficient to give rise to liability under the special-danger theory. The plaintiffs claim that Officer Perkins affirmatively endangered the plaintiffs by "giving" Michael Perkins's car back to him. Regardless of whether one construes Officer Perkins's behavior as an affirmative act or an omission, however, the defendants' actions do not satisfy the special-danger standard, because their actions did not increase the danger posed by Michael Perkins to the plaintiffs. Had the defendants given Michael Perkins the alcoholic beverages that caused his intoxication, the defendants arguably would have increased the danger Michael Perkins posed to the plaintiffs. However, Officer Perkins merely failed to impound Michael Perkins's car. By so doing, Officer Perkins did not alter the danger posed by Michael Perkins to other drivers on the roads. The danger posed by Michael Perkins remained the same as if Officer Perkins had never stopped him. And, as mentioned earlier, the defendants were under no constitutional duty to stop Michael Perkins, or any other intoxicated driver, at all.
Furthermore, there was no custodial relationship between the defendants and Michael Perkins. Michael Perkins was not an inmate of an institution, and Officer Perkins did not arrest him. While a traffic stop does involve a restriction on the individual's freedom of movement, a person stopped for a traffic violation is not in custody. Cf. Berkemer v. McCarty,
The plaintiffs cite Reed v. Gardner,
The plaintiffs' reliance on Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tenn.,
Because the court finds that the failure to impound Michael Perkins's vehicle does not render Officer Perkins liable for the plaintiffs' injuries, the court necessarily cannot find the institutional defendants liable for a policy of not impounding vehicles driven by
Because the plaintiffs' federal claims are due to be dismissed, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as to their state-law claims, and thus the motion to dismiss filed by defendants City of Montgomery, its officials, and Officer Perkins will be granted as to these claims as well, albeit without prejudice to the pursuit of these claims in state court. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c)(3). See L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow,
To be sure, the events that gave rise to this litigation are truly tragic, and they engender a deep sympathy, and even desire to do something, anything, to help. Nevertheless, this court is bound by the rule of law, as are all American courts. Therefore, having concluded that the plaintiffs have not stated a viable substantive-due-process claim, the court must dismiss this lawsuit.
An appropriate judgment will be entered.
In accordance with the memorandum opinion entered on this date, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, AND DECREE of the court:
(1) That the motion to dismiss filed by defendants City of Montgomery, Alabama, Emory Folmar, John Wilson, and Thomas Perkins on June 19, 1998, is granted;
(2) That the federal claim against defendants City of Montgomery, Folmar, Wilson, and Thomas Perkins is dismissed with prejudice; and
(3) That the state-law claims against defendants City of Montgomery, Folmar, Wilson, and Thomas Perkins are dismissed without prejudice to being refiled in state court.
It is ORDERED that the state-law claims against defendant Michael Perkins are dismissed without prejudice to being refiled in state court.
It is further ORDERED that costs are taxed against the plaintiffs Wanda and Phillip Norris, Bo and Minnie Coon, Tammie Mosley, and James Shaw, for which execution may issue.
Leagle.com reserves the right to edit or remove comments but is under no obligation to do so, or to explain individual moderation decisions.
- No Cases Found