KINNEY v. YERUSALIMCiv. A. No. 92-4101.
812 F.Supp. 547 (1993)
Elizabeth KINNEY, Glenn Niman, Daniel C. Sullivan, Diane Fatula, Cassie James, Erik Von Schmetterling, John Gladstone, Tom Levine, Charles Homiller, Rona Schnall, Mary Barnes, Ann McLaughlin, Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania,
Harold YERUSALIM and Alexander Hoskins.
Harold YERUSALIM and Alexander Hoskins.
United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.
February 2, 1993.
Stephen F. Gold, Philadelphia, PA, for plaintiffs. Barry Kramer, Office of Atty. Gen., Philadelphia, PA, for Harold Yerusalim.
Deborah M. Russo, Asst. City Sol., City of Philadelphia Law Dept., Philadelphia, PA, for Alexander Hoskins.
BARTLE, District Judge.
Plaintiffs, disabled individuals who reside and work in Philadelphia, have filed this class action against Howard Yerusalim, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), and Alexander Hoskins, Commissioner of the Streets Department of the City of Philadelphia ("City"), under the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
Rule 56(c) provides for the entry of summary judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact...." See, Celotex Corporation v. Catrett,
In 1992, Congress passed the ADA to address the problem of discrimination against persons with disabilities. Specifically, the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment (Title I), in public services and public transportation (Title II), in public accommodations (Title III), and in telecommunications (Title IV). Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., which is the subject of this dispute, provides:
42 U.S.C. § 12132. Rather than outline the specific obligations of public entities under this section, the ADA directed the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to promulgate regulations consistent with the anti-discrimination provisions of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("Rehabilitation Act"), and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the DOJ. 42 U.S.C. § 12134. The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against handicapped individuals by any program receiving public funds.
The removal of architectural barriers to the disabled, and particularly the installation of curb ramps or slopes, was a major concern of Congress in passing the ADA. In the ADA's statement of purpose, Congress specifically identified the "discriminatory effects of architectural ... barriers ..." as one of the evils which the ADA was intended to address. 42 U.S.C. § 12101. To this end, the DOJ in its regulations established a scheme intended ultimately to create a society providing physical accessibility to persons with disabilities. The regulations under Title II attempt to accomplish this goal by means of a twotiered process which distinguishes between a public entity's responsibilities concerning "existing facilities" on the one hand, and "new construction or alterations" on the other.
With respect to existing facilities, public entities are not required to modify each facility to provide for access by individuals with disabilities, but must operate all programs, services and activities in a manner such that, when viewed in its entirety, each service or program is "readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities ..." 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a). Furthermore, this section provides an undue burden defense, stating that a public entity is not required "to take any action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens." 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3).
Although public entities may comply with the program accessibility requirements for existing facilities in several
In contrast, the regulations are more demanding with respect to new construction and alterations. They require that when the entity undertakes to engage in new construction or to make alterations to existing facilities it must take that opportunity to make its facilities accessible. 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 states:
Furthermore, this section also specifically requires the installation of curb ramps:
28 C.F.R. § 35.151(e). Plaintiffs contend that resurfacing a street constitutes an "alteration" under this provision and that the City is therefore obligated to provide curb ramps or slopes on all streets which have been resurfaced since the effective date of the statute, January 26, 1992.
The regulations' special emphasis on the installation of curb ramps is not hard to understand. Without curb ramps or slopes, it is extremely difficult, if not dangerous, for persons in wheelchairs and other persons with disabilities to perform the essential task of crossing the street. Because the wheels of wheelchairs are sensitive to obstacles, curbs without ramps or slopes present the danger that the chair will overturn, injuring the occupant. Consequently, disabled persons are sometimes obligated to navigate their chairs in the street, exposed to the peril of traffic. Without the ability to cross streets, the opportunities afforded by the ADA are of little benefit. The disabled are severely limited in their ability to obtain employment and recreation and otherwise to participate fully in society. As the House Report explained, "[t]he employment, transportation, and public accommodation sections of [the ADA] would be meaningless if people who use wheelchairs were not afforded the opportunity to travel on and between the streets." H.Rep. 485(II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1990), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1990, 267, 303, 367.
The City does not dispute the importance of installing curb ramps. The City installs ramps or slopes whenever work is performed on the curb and plans eventually to install ramps or slopes throughout the City, as required by the "existing facilities" provisions of Title II. The City contends, however, that merely resurfacing a street is not an "alteration" which triggers the application of 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(e), and therefore resurfacing a street does not require the installation of curb ramps or slopes.
The City first asserts that the obligations under the "alterations" section of the regulations
28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A (emphasis added).
The parties have cited no case, and we have found none, interpreting the phrase "affecting usability."
Defendants rely on Disabled in Action v. Sykes,
The legislative history of the ADA provides some examples of changes which would "affect usability" under Title III. The report of the House Committee on Education and Labor states:
H.Rep. 485(II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 111-112 (1990), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1990, 394-395.
Whether resurfacing a street constitutes an "alteration" is thus dependent on whether resurfacing affects the usability of the street. We think that it does. As stated above, the DOJ has indicated that the concept of usability should be read broadly. The ADA is a remedial statute, designed to eliminate discrimination against the disabled in all facets of society. As a remedial statute it must be broadly construed to effectuate its purposes. Tcherepnin v. Knight,
Furthermore, the process of resurfacing entails more than minor repair work or maintenance. According to the parties, City streets generally consist of three layers, a sub-base consisting of stone, a base consisting of concrete, and a top layer of asphalt. While sometimes new asphalt may simply be overlaid on top of the old surface, more often the old asphalt is removed by a process known as "milling." Milling consists of removing and then replacing the top layer of asphalt with the use of heavy machinery. This process may require either that the entire surface from curb to curb be removed, or that seven or eight feet from either curb may be removed, depending on the nature of the street. During this process any necessary reconstruction will be performed, for example any cracks in the concrete base of the road will be repaired and manholes may be
The City contends that if resurfacing is an "alteration" it is entitled to assert an "undue burden" defense to the requirement of installing curb ramps. The City relies on § 35.150(3) which provides that a public entity is not required "to take any action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens." This provision, however, is found under the section of the regulations governing "existing facilities," 28 C.F.R. § 35.150. It is separate and distinct from the provisions governing "new construction and alterations" under 28 C.F.R. § 35.151. There simply is no general "undue burden" defense in the ADA. It is provided only in limited circumstances. For example, Title III of the ADA specifically provides that an entity is excused from the "path of travel" requirements if the cost of compliance would be disproportionate to the cost of the alteration. 28 C.F.R. § 36.403. However, the general "alterations" provisions of Title III contain no such defense.
The distinction between the requirements under the "existing facilities" and "alterations" provisions is logical. The "existing facilities" provisions mandate that public entities make all their services and programs as a whole accessible to the handicapped. The regulations do provide an undue burden defense in recognizing that, in some instances, the requirement to modify existing programs and facilities may impose extraordinary costs on the community. In contrast, new construction and alterations present an immediate opportunity to provide for accessibility. We can only conclude that Congress and the DOJ made the determination that when a public entity decides to engage in new construction or to make alterations, it is not an undue burden to require it to provide for accessibility at that time. Congress realized that these requirements might pose difficulties for financially strapped state and local governments, but determined that the overall long term benefit to society outweighed the costs. The House Judiciary Committee explained:
H.Rep. 485(III), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1990) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1990, 473 (emphasis added).
Finally, we must determine whether the City is obligated to install curb ramps on all streets on which the resurfacing was performed after January 26, 1992, the effective date of the statute, or on only those streets which were "bid" after that date. 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 provides that the requirements of that section apply to construction and alterations which were commenced after January 26, 1992. However, the DOJ's analysis of this section provides, "[f]acilities under design on that date will be governed by this section if the date that bids were invited falls after the effective date." 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A. Plaintiffs contend that the DOJ analysis is inapplicable, because the installation of curb ramps requires no actual "design." They assert that the standards and specifications for curb ramps and slopes are detailed in the UFAS and ADAAG guidelines which are
The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment will be granted and the defendant will be ordered to install curb ramps or slopes on every City street, at any intersection having curbs or other barriers to access, where bids for resurfacing were let after January 26, 1992. The defendant's motion for summary judgment will be denied.
AND NOW, this 2nd day of February, 1993, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion of plaintiffs for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and that the Motion of defendant, Alexander Hoskins, Commissioner of the Philadelphia Streets Department, for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that defendant shall install curb ramps or slopes on every City street, at any intersection having curbs or other barriers to access, where bids for resurfacing were let after January 26, 1992.
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