MERTENS v. KAISER STEEL RETIREMENT PLAN No. C-88-3587 MHP.
744 F.Supp. 917 (1990)
William J. MERTENS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. KAISER STEEL RETIREMENT PLAN, et al., Defendants.
United States District Court, N.D. California.
July 16, 1990.
Jeffrey Lewis, Alfred H. Sigman, Sigman & Lewis, Andrew T. Sinclair, Oakland, Cal., for plaintiffs.
George A. Malloch, Michael St. Peter, Richard G. Avila, Kaplan, Russin, Vecchi & Eytan, San Francisco, Cal., for Gerald G. Ferro.
PATEL, District Judge.
Plaintiffs bring this action for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. The parties are now before the
William Mertens and other plaintiffs filed this action on September 9, 1988 and added class allegations on June 23, 1989. The complaint alleges breaches of fiduciary duty by members of the Investment Committee of the now-terminated Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan ("Investment Committee"). According to plaintiffs, who were participants in the Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan ("Plan"), the Investment Committee members failed to insure adequate funding of the Plan and an adequate funding policy and thus breached their fiduciary duties. The court's earlier orders in this matter covered these circumstances in greater detail than shall be done here.
In May 1986, twenty-four Plan beneficiaries filed an action alleging breaches of fiduciary duty by several entities and individuals, including the Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan and the Investment Committee members named as defendants in the present action. That action, denominated Horan v. Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan, CV 86-4424 PAR (Bx), was removed to federal court under ERISA jurisdiction. The Horan plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of an order that the fiduciaries purchase an annuity for each of the plaintiffs. On August 31, 1989 the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in Horan and issued a memorandum and order. Defendants in the present action now argue that the Horan claim, as reflected in the complaint, the briefs and evidence of the parties, and the court's memorandum and order must serve to bar the Mertens litigation on res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment shall be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial ... since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
The court's function, however, is not to make credibility determinations. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. The inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631.
The doctrine of res judicata bars re-litigation by parties or their privies of any claim brought to final judgment on the merits. United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc.,
Under the identity of parties requirement, an earlier action does not have res judicata effect on a later action unless the affected parties to the second action are the same as, or are in privity with, the parties to the first action. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
The defendants in Mertens are indisputably the identical parties as those in Horan since they were also named defendants in that action. There is also no dispute that a subset of the Mertens class members were
According to the defendants, the Plan is the real party in interest in both Horan and the present action since the central cause of action in both is based on breach of ERISA-prescribed fiduciary duties. The defendants correctly note that a civil action alleging a fiduciary's liability under ERISA section 409 ("section 409 action"), codified at 29 U.S.C. section 1109, must be brought on behalf of the benefit plan, since no individual relief is available. In Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
Normally a party who litigates as a representative is in privity with those she represents, See, e.g., Cramer v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp.,
Although the Ninth Circuit has recognized that section 409 suits must be brought on behalf of benefit plans, it has not established the necessary mechanics. See, e.g., Sokol v. Bernstein,
In developing the necessary procedural protections, this court must be mindful of the congressional goals underlying enactment of ERISA. One of the principal goals was to protect benefit plan participants and beneficiaries by establishing standards for fiduciary conduct and by providing ready access to the federal courts. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). Any procedures that are adopted to amplify section 409 suits must reconcile the preclusive effect of representative actions with that animating purpose. Useful paradigms for representative actions are available from two sources: the common law of trusts and shareholder derivative actions.
I. Trust Law Based Protections
Congress intended that courts "`draw on principles of traditional trust law' in formulating remedies for violations of ERISA's fiduciary duty standards." Nieto v. Ecker,
When a trust beneficiary brings a suit which affects more than her own interests, or which affects the corpus of the trust, all other beneficiaries are generally
In ERISA actions, the typically large numbers of participants and beneficiaries in most plans will render joinder impractical. Under those circumstances in common law trust actions, a class action may be maintained. Id. at 130. In section 409 actions plan participants and beneficiaries lack the direct right to relief typically held by class members, since the actions are brought on behalf of benefit plans. Nevertheless, they retain vital interests in those suits, since any equitable or monetary relief awarded to the plan would ultimately benefit them. Those interests could be considerable where the viability of a retirement plan, with its years of income for retirees, hangs in the balance. For retirees and their beneficiaries, the plan may represent their single largest asset. For health and welfare plan participants and beneficiaries, the plan may be all that stands between them and devastating medical bills.
As the Massachusetts Mutual Court noted, plan participants and beneficiaries share a "common interest ... in the financial integrity of the plan." Massachusetts Mutual, 473 U.S. at 142 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. at 3090 n. 9. In the same note the Supreme Court enumerated the four classes of persons who are entitled by statute to enforce fiduciary obligations under section 409. The Court observed that by including the Secretary of Labor in this group, Congress intended that "actions for breach of fiduciary duty be brought in a representative capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole." Id. (emphasis added). This language also suggests the obligations of a party-plaintiff to the plan and to its participants and beneficiaries. Where the Secretary of Labor initiates the action it is presumed the Secretary will act in the best interest of the plan and those who are entitled to share in its benefits. Placing this same responsibility on one or more individuals without the protections of a class action or some similar procedural device could hardly measure up to the statutory expectations described by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts Mutual.
In order to achieve these ERISA objectives, the notice normally accorded to absent class members under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2) should be available to absent plan participants and beneficiaries in section 409 actions. Although no opt-out opportunity can be granted, since the right to recovery belongs to the benefits plan, notice of the action would at least afford absent parties the opportunity to consider intervention in order to safeguard their derivative interests. Where absent parties will not only be affected, but may be bound by the litigation, they should receive "the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2).
This court is not the first to recognize the need for class action-type protections in section 409 suits. The Southern District of New York allowed the litigation of a breach of fiduciary duty action by a class of plaintiff beneficiaries in Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc.,
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue in Thornton v. Evans. The Thornton plaintiffs were plan participants and beneficiaries who sued individuals alleged to be co-conspirators with plan fiduciaries in a scheme to defraud the plan. The Seventh Circuit ruled that:
Id. at 1080. The court noted that the safeguards of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 and 23.1, as well as the ability to consolidate actions, can avoid multiple suits while providing a forum for fraud, mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty claims. Such claims affect the plan as a whole and implicate "the interest of every beneficiary."
The Eleventh Circuit has also provided some support for the class action approach to section 409 suits. Although the court did not directly address the class action issue, it implicitly supported its use in Deak v. Masters, Mates and Pilots Pension Plan,
II. Shareholder Derivative Action Protections
As the Seventh Circuit observed in Thornton, the derivative suit is also a useful source from which to engraft procedural safeguards onto section 409 actions.
A. Requirement of Demand on the Trustee
In the ERISA context, the requirement of a demand on the corporation translates to a requirement that the prospective litigant petition the "named fiduciary" or trustee of the benefit plan under 29 U.S.C. sections 1102 and 1103 to institute the suit.
B. Realignment of the Parties
The potential realignment of parties in shareholder derivative suits according to their interests is another salutary device well-suited for section 409 actions. In derivative actions, especially where jurisdiction is not based upon diversity, unless the corporate directors have shown an antagonism towards the plaintiff's
In the ERISA context, realignment of the benefits plan as a party-plaintiff would be appropriate if, after institution of the section 409 action, change of statutory trustees occurred, for example, if the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") became trustee.
C. Notice Requirements
Although the above aspects of the derivative suit are adaptable to the ERISA setting, other aspects are not. Prototypical shareholder derivative actions are bereft of notice provisions which are imperative in section 409 suits in order to safeguard the legitimate interests of absent plan participants and beneficiaries. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, which addresses derivative actions, only requires that notice of the action be given to absent shareholders when the action is compromised or dismissed. While adequate in the context of derivative suits, this rule is insufficient in the ERISA environment. The notice provisions set out above in Section I offer better protection for absent parties in section 409 actions.
III. Protections for Absent Parties in the Horan Action
The third amended complaint in the Horan action alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. Those allegations were necessarily brought on behalf of the benefit plan. Ordinarily, if the protections set out above were available for absent parties, such a suit would have preclusive effect. However, those protections were not present in Horan.
There is no evidence that the court considered realigning the parties at any point during the litigation. This is a significant omission, given the history of the Horan case. Although the Plan was viable when the action was instituted in 1986, it was terminated during the pendency of the suit, in February 1987. The Plan then came under the trusteeship of the PBGC by court order and was thus no longer antagonistic to the interests of the beneficiaries and participants. In re Kaiser Steel Corp., No. 87-B-01552-E (Bankr.D.Colo. Feb. 27, 1987) (order approving agreement for appointment of trustee and termination of plan) (order attached to PBGC Opp. Mem., Breen Dec., Ex. A). Realignment may well have resulted in the PBGC assuming direct responsibility for the action.
Indeed, it appears, after a careful reading of the statute, that the plan should not be named as a defendant. Section 409 renders the action a personal one against the fiduciary. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). Since a section 409 action is one for a breach of the fiduciary's duty to the plan, the plan, if a party at all, is properly a plaintiff. However, this must be rationalized with the civil enforcement section, section 502(a)(2), codified at 29 U.S.C. section 1132(a)(2), which enumerates only the Secretary of Labor, a plan participant, beneficiary or fiduciary as those who may bring a section 409 action. It should be noted, for example, that the parties in Massachusetts Mutual were the plaintiff-beneficiary and the defendant-administrator (who was a fiduciary as defined by ERISA). The plans themselves were not parties.
Finally, no notice of the Horan action was sent to absent plan participants or beneficiaries. The serious impairment of their interests without notice should not operate to bar their claims.
Since the proper alignment of the parties, the presence of the Plan as a defendant and the interests of absent parties were not considered in the Horan action, this court can not give that holding preclusive effect.
For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint.
In this action, unlike in Horan, plaintiffs attempt to proceed by way of a class action. It appears to this court that that is the best means for asserting the "common interest" of the participants or beneficiaries and the best interest of the Plan. Therefore, the court will proceed with the action by way of the class certification motion. At that time the effect of the Horan judgment on those class members who were individual plaintiffs in Horan will be addressed. The court will also then address the procedures to be implemented, including modification, if any, of class action procedures.
Also, in accordance with this court's discussion, the Plan is hereby DISMISSED as defendant.
Since the issues discussed herein are matters of first impression generally, and particularly in this circuit, the court intends to invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) in order to certify the matter to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. This also seems appropriate since Horan is presently on appeal and the Ninth Circuit will have an opportunity
The parties are directed to show cause within fourteen (14) days of the issuance of this order why this issue should not be certified. Memoranda shall not exceed five (5) pages.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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