U.S. v. POINDEXTER Crim. No. 88-0080.
698 F.Supp. 300 (1988)
UNITED STATES of America v. John M. POINDEXTER, Oliver L. North, Richard V. Secord, Albert Hakim.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
June 16, 1988.
F. Richard Janis, Washington, D.C., for defendant Hakim.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GESELL, District Judge.
The indictment in this criminal case was returned by the grand jury on March 16, 1988, after months of thorough investigation. Defendants Poindexter, North and Hakim have jointly moved to dismiss, claiming that their separate Fifth Amendment rights have been infringed by impermissible use of their compelled testimony. The motion was fully briefed and argued.
At the core of the indictment is the claim that the defendants formed and carried out a secret operation to place funds, including funds generated from an authorized government initiative to free American hostages, into unauthorized hands for their personal profit, by deceiving Congress, obstructing investigations, altering documents, abusing the tax laws, and by other means prohibited by law. These activities were allegedly conducted from the White House by the two government officials and two businessmen indicted.
These charges of criminal conduct were preceded by a series of widely publicized congressional committee hearings. Each of the four men subsequently named defendants testified at length concerning his involvement in events later recited in the 101-page, 23-count indictment. After pleading the Fifth Amendment, the three moving defendants were compelled by Congress to testify under separate orders granting each of them use immunity. They claim their immune testimony, both incriminating and otherwise, was thereafter used, directly and indirectly, to gain proof of their alleged criminal misconduct, thus violating their individual Fifth Amendment rights.
Since it was apparent that many trial days would be consumed if the indictment was fully tried, the Court has given extensive pretrial consideration to many aspects of this motion in order to determine, at least preliminarily, whether or not defendants' contentions have sufficient merit to preclude trial from the outset. For the reasons set forth below, the Court, after hearing testimony and considering other materials during this substantial preliminary inquiry, finds no basis for granting the motion pre-trial and has determined in its discretion and in accordance with procedures approved in this Circuit
This case has its origin in an intense political controversy over the appropriate foreign policy for dealing with violent unrest in Nicaragua, which some considered a threat to national security. The President and the Congress had for some time been
In November, 1986, Congress undertook to investigate when it came to believe that the administration was trafficking arms to Iran to bring about release of American hostages and that the proceeds had been diverted to the Nicaraguan contras for military assistance at a time when Congress had legislated to bar such aid to these resistance forces. Select Investigation Committees were eventually chosen from each house. These Committees merged their efforts, sharing information during some 40 days of public hearings, supplemented by closed executive sessions in what came to be known as the Iran-Contra Affair.
Previously, on December 1, 1986, the President appointed a Special Review Board (the "Tower Commission") to conduct an investigation of the same disclosures and on December 4, 1986, Attorney General Meese requested appointment of an Independent Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(2) to investigate the possible criminal conduct of Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, a White House aide, and others unnamed. Lawrence E. Walsh, a former federal judge, was appointed Independent Counsel and given broad authority to investigate by Order of the Division for the Purpose of Appointing Independent Counsels of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on December 19, 1986.
After May 1, 1987, as the two inquiries went forward simultaneously there was a growing fire storm of publicity that brought practically every aspect of defendants' affairs into sharp focus. The moving defendants were vigorously attacked and vigorously defended in the midst of ardent political debate that accompanied the unravelling public disclosure by congressional committees.
Congress purported to pursue its legitimate legislative interest in the Iran-Contra affair but did so in such a persistent manner that it sought, among other things, to fix individual responsibility for conduct it considered unauthorized by law. When Hakim, North and Poindexter, a former Admiral, individually refused to testify before Congress and claimed possible incrimination by asserting their Fifth Amendment rights, they were each, in turn, granted use immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6001 et seq. Their subsequent testimony in each instance was compelled.
The use immunity orders Congress sought and obtained were dated as follows:
Hakim — April 10, 1987 Poindexter — May 1, 1987 North — June 3, 1987
Hakim gave his first public testimony before the Select Committees on June 3, 1987; North followed, commencing his testimony on July 7, 1987; and Poindexter first testified publicly on July 15, 1987.
Hakim is named a defendant in five counts of the indictment, Poindexter in seven counts, and North in sixteen counts. All three immunized defendants are named along with Secord, who testified without immunity, in Counts I, II and III of the indictment, which set forth the overall conspiracy, theft and fraud counts.
The congressional power of inquiry is very broad. Congress may compel witnesses to testify over their assertion of Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent for fear of incrimination by granting some form of immunity, as was done here, and it may cause a recalcitrant witness to be punished for contempt if this fails. Few formal procedures or evidentiary rules apply during this process.
This power to compel testimony in aid of legislative inquiry was assumed to exist by American legislatures even before the Constitution itself was ratified, both Houses of Congress took the same view thereafter, and the Supreme Court has recognized the constitutionality of this authority as an appropriate auxiliary function of Congress, sustaining this enormous nonjudicial power in spite of the obvious possibility of abuse.
Thus there is no doubt that Congress can perform its legislative functions through inquiry without regard for the impact its investigation may have upon a prospective or ongoing criminal prosecution.
However, in this instance, Congress was aware of the conflict and efforts were made to reconcile the special interests of both Congress and the Executive. Although Congress felt it needed the immunized testimony, Congress made it abundantly clear that it did not intend to prevent the prosecution of North and other major targets of the grand jury inquiry. Before any major participant was immunized, its own legal staff analyzed the evidence already developed before the congressional committees and by the Tower Commission to demonstrate to the Select Committees that ample proof of the principal crimes subsequently alleged in the indictment already existed and necessary proof was already known from the witnesses and documents available. In addition, the Select Committees gave Independent Counsel ample warning that grants of immunity were contemplated, delaying any public immunized testimony by the defendants even after orders granting immunity had issued. In granting immunity to each of the three defendants, Congress had no intention to stultify the Executive's enforcement of criminal law. Indeed, it was fully expected prosecutions would go forward since ample proof of wrongdoing apparently existed.
As this brief background statement suggests, both Congress and the Executive have pursued their separate responsibilities and the Court is now called on to fulfill the role assigned the judiciary under our system of government to assure that the defendants' Fifth Amendment constitutional rights have not been infringed as a result of the actions of the legislative and executive branches.
The Immunity Statute
As previously noted, under 18 U.S. C. § 6001 et seq. Congress can compel testimony from an unwilling witness who invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by conferring immunity from use of the compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom in subsequent criminal prosecutions.
Section 6002 of the immunity statute reads in full as follows:
This statute was not intended to prohibit a grand jury from indicting or a prosecutor from trying a person granted use immunity. It only limits direct use of the testimony itself and derivative use.
According to the House and Senate Reports, the phrase "any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony" was chosen to conform to "present law" on "the use of evidence derivatively obtained." The Reports cite Wong Sun v. United States,
In short, the section was intended to safeguard an unwilling witness compelled to testify as broadly as, but no more broadly than, the privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. Apfelbaum,
Kastigar, in reaffirming this "exclusionary rule" concept, emphasized the "heavy burden" of proof it places on the United States by stating:
See also Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79 n. 18, 84 S.Ct. at 1609 n. 18; Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy,
Accordingly, where a defendant under indictment has earlier received use immunity the prosecutor is prohibited from using not only the immunized testimony itself, but also any information which is the fruit of the immunized testimony; and the prosecutor bears the "heavy burden" of demonstrating that all its evidence at trial is derived from legitimate sources wholly independent of the compelled testimony; that is, the prosecution must not have been "led", directly or indirectly, to the discovery of evidence through the immunized testimony.
The Court in Kastigar did not expressly decide whether nonevidentiary use is prohibited to the same degree as evidentiary use. See 406 U.S. at 453-54, 459-60, 92 S.Ct. at 1661-62, 1664-65. It should be emphasized, however, that the rule originally set down in Murphy is an exclusionary rule focusing on the exclusion of tainted evidence from use by the prosecution, or as the Court in Kastigar held, the government need only prove that it obtained "the evidence it proposes to use" from independent sources. 406 U.S. at 460, 92 S.Ct. at 1664. (Emphasis added.)
Significantly, while the Court did note that the petitioners in Kastigar had raised arguments relating to "the subtle ways in which the compelled testimony may disadvantage a witness" (id. at 459, 92 S.Ct. at 1664), it did not impose the same affirmative burden on the prosecution to prove an absence of nonevidentiary use. See id. at 460, 92 S.Ct. at 1664. Instead, the Court responded to the nonevidentiary claims only by adding that the statute "barr[ed] the use of compelled testimony as an `investigatory
The defendants, however, take a far broader view of use immunity strictures. The concept of evidentiary use, it is suggested, should apply in the use immunity context to any use of immunized testimony to refresh the memory of a prospective witness and even the more subtle effects which full or even limited knowledge of the testimony can have on how a witness or a prosecutor exposed to it perceives an event. There is no authority for applying such an expanded view, except under very unusual circumstances not present here,
The Court's Preliminary Considerations
The Court's preliminary pretrial inquiry has not been superficial. The Court has personally reviewed, in camera, the grand jury transcripts and exhibits at length; various precautions taken by Independent Counsel to avoid taint from exposure of the prosecution to publicity and immunized testimony were explored during his two days of public testimony; extensive exhibits illustrating the manner in which these precautions were implemented were filed, some publicly, others in camera; and substantial proof of Independent Counsel's legitimate independent leads to every significant
The Office of Independent Counsel interviewed Secord on eleven occasions: April 29, 1987; April 30, 1987; May 13, 1987; May 14, 1987; May 20, 1987; December 11, 1987; January 22, 1988; January 25, 1988; February 26, 1988; March 9, 1988; and March 12, 1988. This was pursuant to an arrangement approved by his counsel that Secord's statements could not be used as testimony in a case-in-chief against him but could be used for purposes of cross-examination or in a direct case for perjury or false statements. Secord was instructed not to refer either directly or indirectly to any statements made under the grants of immunity to Hakim, North or Poindexter. During interviews totalling nearly 1,400 pages of transcript, Secord went into extraordinarily comprehensive detail about his knowledge of and involvement in almost every aspect of the Iran-contra matter, providing the prosecution with valuable leads and other background information for its case. Nearly 950 pages of transcript cover interviews occurring before either North or Poindexter were compelled to testify publicly.
As will be developed later, Independent Counsel from the outset undertook to enforce a prophylactic system whereby various procedures prevented him or his associates directly involved in the prosecution from being exposed, directly or indirectly, to the immunized testimony, an approach recommended in the U.S. Attorney's Manual.
The Court turns first to the grand jury transcript which it has thoroughly examined with the aid of other supplemental information provided by Independent Counsel. It will be recalled, as previously stated, that Hakim did not testify publicly until June 3, 1987. Between April 10, 1987, when the use immunity order issued, and June 2, 1987, the grand jury heard many witnesses. Some of these witnesses testified to matters involved in another investigation, others included a few key prosecution witnesses who had been identified well before Hakim's testimony. Still other witnesses were questioned concerning materials previously subpoenaed or about matters unrelated to Hakim's testimony.
In the period between June 3, 1987, and June 29, 1987, when the grand jury discontinued taking testimony until the fall, it heard a variety of witnesses. Again the key witnesses were well known, a considerable number testified on matters wholly unrelated to any activity of Hakim, and independent leads had exposed others. The grand jury was reconvened to take testimony on September 2, 1987.
After the grand jury commenced further hearings in September, 1987, 89 witnesses were heard. Many of these witnesses had previously appeared or were simply more routine witnesses associated with document identification and other formal steps preparatory to indictment.
No immunized testimony of any defendant was ever presented to the grand jury at any time in whole or in part.
In reviewing the grand jury transcripts the Court focused primarily on the following:
(1) The nature and extent of the instructions given the grand jurors designed to prevent exposure to defendants' immunized testimony.
(2) Any departure from these instructions suggested by questions or comments of counsel or jurors.
(3) Safeguards and techniques adopted by Independent Counsel to prevent inadvertent or derivative exposure of immune testimony
The grand jurors were specifically, repeatedly and effectively instructed to avoid exposure to any immunized testimony. A sample of these warnings is already in the public record. (Court Ex. D, Kastigar hearing held April 25, 1988.) Many more warnings were given during the course of the grand jury's tenure.
The thrust of these warnings is illustrated by the examples set out below.
On April 10, 1987, when the grant of use immunity to Hakim became effective, but well before he testified, the grand jurors were instructed to cease reading or listening to any news reports concerning him. The instruction was as follows:
Transcript of April 10, 1987 at 3-7.
These instructions were modified and expanded during the spring and summer of 1987. With the impending public immunized testimony of Hakim before the congressional committees, the grand jurors were warned on May 15, 1987 that they should avoid any media reports that "relate to the Iran/contra matter in any way." Transcript of May 15, 1987 at 3. They were also advised at that time, "if you are watching a television program, or listening to the radio, or any report comes on about the Iran/contra investigation or Iran/contra matter, turn the program off." Id. This instruction was copied and made into grand jury exhibit number 353 and served as a continuing reminder as grand jurors reviewed exhibits from time to time. These instructions were repeated numerous times, warning grand jurors not to expose themselves to any media reports concerning the Iran/contra affair.
When the immunized testimony of North and Poindexter became imminent, further instructions were given. Independent Counsel Walsh stated to the grand jury on July 1, 1987:
Again on July 20, 1987, Associate Independent Counsel gave the following instruction to the grand jury:
Transcript of July 20, 1987 at 2-3. On September 2, 1987, when a grand juror indicated he had seen a headline concerning the constitutionality of the Independent
Finally, on March 16, 1988, immediately before the grand jury voted on the indictment submitted to them, Associate Independent Counsel gave the following instruction to the grand jurors:
Transcript of March 16, 1988 at 2. Shortly after receiving this instruction, the grand jury voted unanimously to indict the four defendants in this case.
There is clear indication that the grand jurors understood the warnings and instructions they received. Jurors were warned frequently. Since, as will appear, many grand jury witnesses were specifically advised at the opening of their testimony before the grand jury to avoid testimony based on immunized testimony, the jurors were thus indirectly reminded of their concurrent need to avoid exposure.
While there was no system requiring grand jurors to report about the casual overhearing of a comment or the sighting of a headline while away from the grand jury room, there is no indication in the transcript this ever occurred. The grand jury was attentive. As the warning instructions continued to be given throughout the grand jury sessions, it is significant that by early May, 1987, the conscientious foreman, without prompting, politely pointed out that cautions were being given every session, that the jurors were intelligent, logical people and that Independent Counsel could be assured that the jury, using common sense and intelligence, was taking all appropriate steps to act according to his instructions.
Independent Counsel also took other precautions to avoid exposure of the grand jury to immunized testimony. Beginning in July, 1987, the lawyers and investigators began instructing potential witnesses during interviews not to repeat any of the immunized testimony they may have been exposed to. When the grand jury reconvened in September, grand jury witnesses were formally instructed on matters relating to immunized testimony. Immediately after each witness swore the oath, Associate Independent Counsel were directed to instruct witnesses as follows:
This formal instruction was usually given immediately prior to the witness testifying before the grand jury. In addition, a limited number of cooperating witnesses agreed to avoid exposing themselves to any of the immunized testimony elicited by Congress.
Associate Independent Counsel appearing before the grand jury were apparently careful to avoid broad, rambling questions that might inadvertently invite generalized answers that comprehended facts not personally known to the witness but learned from immunized testimony. The questioning was precise and called for explicit, narrow responses. The practice was also generally followed of excusing a witness before a grand juror presented his or her own questions to make sure the inquiries were expressed so as to avoid inadvertent disclosure by the witness of immunized testimony.
Finally, it should be noted that the grand jury, in denying Secord's request to appear before them and present portions of the immunized testimony of his co-defendants, displayed a clear understanding of the potential consequences of their exposure to immunized testimony and a tenacious desire to avoid such exposure. The transcript reveals that the jurors clearly understood that they must avoid knowledge of immunized testimony, that they would be unable to tell whether or not General Secord was relying on immunized testimony if he could proceed before the jury without guided, precise questioning, and that the foreman had previously advised Associate Independent Counsel in a similar situation that the jury would walk out of the room if immunized testimony was presented. Transcript of January 11, 1988 at 9-13.
In considering the foregoing, it must be emphasized that the immunized testimony taken before the Select Congressional Committees was elicited relatively late and well after the apparent diversion of funds, various cover-up tactics and many other facts relevant and material to the charges in this indictment were known to Independent Counsel. Between January 28, 1987, and April 10, 1987, when the first order granting immunity to a defendant, Hakim, was entered, Independent Counsel issued numerous subpoenas duces tecum for voluminous records and had already presented substantial information to the grand jury. The revealing public report of the Tower Commission had issued and Independent Counsel had had access to interview memoranda, depositions and documents gathered by that inquiry from within the White House and elsewhere. In addition, proceedings before various congressional committees, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, and the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, all relating to aspects of the matter under investigation, had already been held. These proceedings were extensive and informative. General Secord, former National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane, Secretary of State George P. Schultz, and Attorney General Edwin Meese III, for example, were among the congressional witnesses who had testified in public before defendant Hakim was compelled to talk.
Turning, then, from consideration of the grand jury to an examination of the possibility of exposure of the prosecuting attorneys and their immediate assistants to immunized testimony, there must be noted several administrative steps which were taken by Independent Counsel from an early date to prevent exposure of himself and his associate counsel to any immunized testimony. Prosecuting personnel were sealed off from exposure to the immunized testimony itself and publicity concerning it. Daily newspaper clippings and transcripts of testimony before the Select Committees were redacted by nonprosecuting "tainted" personnel to avoid direct and explicit references to immunized testimony. Prosecutors, and those immediately associated with them, were confined to reading these redacted
Overall, the file reflects a scrupulous awareness of the strictures against exposure and a conscientious attempt to avoid even the most remote possibility of any impermissible taint. Douglass apparently operated on a common sense basis. He received reports orally and in writing. Each report was resolved individually in the light of its nature and the role of the reporting individual. Approximately seventy-five reports were processed by Douglass over the period from July, 1987 to April, 1988. Only two or three appear to have had any semblance of meaningful significance.
Finally, the Court has received written materials from Independent Counsel demonstrating that all the prosecutor's substantive witnesses were known to him before the first immunity grant.
Some nonevidentiary problems have been emphasized by defendants. Witnesses, probably a considerable number of them, have had their memories refreshed by the immunized testimony. This has occurred from hearing the testimony, reading about it, being questioned about aspects of it before the Select Committees and, to some extent, by exposure to it in the course of responding to inquiries within their respective agencies. None of this apparently occurred because someone wanted to harm a defendant or help the prosecution; it simply occurred in the natural course of events. Memory is a mysterious thing that can be stirred by a shaggy dog or a broken promise. There is no way a trier of fact can determine whether the memories of these witnesses would be substantially different
Another related nonevidentiary problem concerns the significance of mere exposure to some or all of the testimony. Defendants in their zeal treat this as if even the tiniest exposure to a witness or grand juror constituted exposure to an incurable disease. Such is clearly not the case. Exposure to a fleeting snippet means nothing. It has no evidentiary coherence or impact. Even more significant exposure is trivial where the fact is already known through independent evidence. Surely the law is built at least partly on common sense and it cannot be — contrary to defendants' assertions otherwise — that a prosecutor who inadvertently overhears mention of a fact already confirmed by his own independent investigation can be said to have made a prohibited use of immunized testimony. Clearly the defendants' Fifth Amendment rights are not then affected. Similarly, the defendants' Fifth Amendment rights are not infringed if a witness hears immunized testimony and yet testifies solely to facts personally known to the witness.
Even where extensive publicity was generated which included references to testimony given under use immunity, there is no basis for applying a different standard than that stated by the Supreme Court in considering the effect of use immunity on an individual defendant's Fifth Amendment rights.
The Court has not relied merely on general denials of taint by Independent Counsel. Nothing has developed in the Court's preliminary inquiry into Kastigar and related problems which suggests the defendants who received use immunity have had their Fifth Amendment rights impaired in a manner that significantly affects their right to a fair trial. The good faith of Independent Counsel cannot be questioned on this record and his candid testimony and the many documents reviewed by the Court leave no doubt that he maintained and continues to maintain a vigorous program aimed at minimizing the exposure of himself and his prosecutorial staff to immunized testimony. No improper evidentiary use of the immunized testimony has appeared.
Given these factual circumstances, it is not difficult to reach a preliminary decision that the case should proceed to trial.
In summary, based on this preliminary but thorough review of the testimony, documents and other materials listed in the Appendix, the Court finds and concludes that:
1. Defendants' immunized testimony was not submitted to the grand jury in any form.
2. The grand jurors were effectively warned not to read about or look at or listen to this immunized testimony and it
3. The grand jury transcript and exhibits reflect solid proof and ample probable cause to indict on each and every count.
4. None of the testimony or exhibits presented to the grand jury became known to the prosecuting attorneys on Independent Counsel's staff or to him personally either from the immunized testimony itself or from leads derived from the testimony, directly or indirectly.
5. The prosecuting attorneys and Independent Counsel have never read the immunized testimony.
6. Independent Counsel's staff was well aware through legitimate means of all significant witnesses to be called at trial and the essential documents long before any immunized testimony was given by the defendants; and, moreover, its investigators had been in direct contact with these witnesses.
7. The convening of a grand jury to consider possible criminal conduct of North and others was initiated by the Attorney General and grew out of the Attorney General's direct personal knowledge of possible criminal conduct. Immunization of the three defendants occurred much later and their immunized testimony did not serve to enhance the focus of Independent Counsel's investigation.
8. Independent Counsel has at all times proceeded in good faith taking strenuous precautions to safeguard the moving defendants' Fifth Amendment rights at great inconvenience and expense.
9. A person granted use immunity receives no assurance he will not be prosecuted and no such assurance is claimed or demonstrated in this case.
10. Independent Counsel has preliminarily met his "heavy burden" under Kastigar, the inquiry has disclosed no action by the government that has infringed the protection granted each moving defendant against the direct or indirect use of his compelled testimony, and no basis has appeared pre-trial to warrant dismissal of any immunized defendant.
Defendants have fully preserved their rights as outlined in their original filing of April 7, 1988. (Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Violations of the Fifth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 6001 et seq. (Defendants' Joint Pretrial Motion No. 1)). These rights shall not be impaired by deferring further consideration of Kastigar issues to post-trial proceedings should such proceedings prove necessary. If such proceedings need be held, Independent Counsel's claim that much of the immunized testimony was volunteered and therefore not entitled to exclusion under Kastigar can also be considered. This waiver issue has played no part in this preliminary consideration of the Kastigar issues. The Court also notes that its previous Orders relating to severance remove the major Kastigar evidentiary problems that might otherwise have arisen during a joint trial of the four defendants.
Accordingly, Defendants' Joint Pretrial Motion No. 7 to dismiss pretrial or, in the alternative, to hold a full Kastigar hearing pretrial is denied.
The public and sealed materials relied on by the Court for the factual determinations made in this Memorandum are:
* (b) The transcribed portions of the grand jury proceedings, including all testimony given, various nontestimonial portions transcribed at the Court's request, and all grand jury exhibits.
* (c) The "Douglass file."
* (d) Two bound volumes of material establishing independent "leads" to all trial witnesses providing substantive information who may be called in the government's case-in-chief.
(f) Redacted congressional committee testimony made available to Independent Counsel's prosecuting staff.
* (g) The transcript of the voir dire of two replacement grand jurors by the Chief Judge.
* (h) Transcripts of eleven interviews of Richard V. Secord conducted by Independent Counsel between April 29, 1987 and March 12, 1988.
* (i) An index of all subpoenas issued during the course of this investigation.
* (j) Correspondence between Office of Independent Counsel and the United States Congress relating to the subject of use immunity and the relationship between the House and Senate Select Committees and Independent Counsel.
(k) Orders of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granting Poindexter, North and Hakim use immunity for testimony before the Congressional Select Committees Investigating the Iran-contra affair.
(l) Orders issued by this Circuit's Special Division for the Purpose of Appointing Independent Counsels relating to the appointment of Lawrence E. Walsh as Independent Counsel in the matter of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North, U.S.M.C., and others.
(m) April 10, 1987 Order issued by the Chief Judge authorizing the Clerk of Court to take custody of sealed "canned" material.
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