KALODIMOS v. VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE No. 58467.
103 Ill.2d 483 (1984)
470 N.E.2d 266
MICHAEL KALODIMOS et al., Appellants, v. THE VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
Opinion filed October 19, 1984.
James W. Kissell, David W. Carpenter, and Ted K. Yasuda, of Sidley & Austin, of Chicago (Richard V. Houpt, Sheldon Davidson and Donald J. Moran, of Pederson & Houpt, of Chicago, and Michael K. McCabe, Richard E. Gardiner, and Robert Dowlut, of Washington, D.C., of counsel), for appellants.
Martin C. Ashman, of Martin C. Ashman, Ltd., and Thomas P. Sullivan, Michael H. Salsbury, and Eugene R. Wedoff, of Jenner & Block, of Chicago, for appellee.
Stephen P. Halbrook, of Fairfax, Virginia, and James Valentino, Jr., of Chicago, for
amici curiae Illinois Small Business Men's Association et al.
Victor D. Quilici, of Bensenville, and Robert G. Johnston and Kenneth A. Michaels, Jr., of Chicago, for
amici curiae Illinois State Rifle Association and the Illinois Gun Collectors Association.
Gregory C. Picken, of Barron, Lehman, Picken & Raskin, P.A., of Miami, Florida, for
amicus curiae American Federation of Police.
Duane D. Morse and Valerie A. Lambiase, of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, of Washington, D.C. (James S.
Campbell, of counsel), for amicus curiae Handgun Control, Inc.
JUSTICE SIMON delivered the opinion of the court:
An ordinance of the village of Morton Grove banning the possession of all operable handguns, apparently the first of its kind in the nation, withstood a challenge under the second and ninth amendments to the United States Constitution. (Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove (7th Cir.1982),
The ordinance (Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-11 (June 8, 1981)) provides that "[n]o person shall possess, in the Village * * * [a]ny handgun, unless the same has been rendered permanently inoperative." It exempts from its operation peace officers, prison officials, members of the armed forces, reserve units and the Illinois National Guard, security guards duly employed by a commercial or industrial enterprise or a public utility, and members of licensed gun clubs who entrust their handguns to the club for safekeeping when not using them for target shooting or other recreational purposes. Antique firearms are also specifically exempted from the ordinance.
Morton Grove residents filed this action seeking an injunction and a declaratory judgment that the ordinance violates article I, section 22, of the Illinois Constitution
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ARMS
Article I, section 22, added to the Illinois Constitution in 1970, provides:
The section does not mirror the second amendment to the Federal Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. II); rather it adds the words "[s]ubject only to the police power," omits prefatory language concerning the importance of a militia, and substitutes "the individual citizen" for "the people." The majority report of the Bill of Rights Committee of the constitutional convention, which framed the provision, makes clear that the latter two changes were intended to broaden the scope of the right to arms from a collective one applicable only to weapons traditionally used by a regulated militia (see United States v. Miller (1939),
Equally distinctive, however, is the explicit recognition of "the police power" as a limitation on the liberty the provision affords. The Bill of Rights Committee explained in its report that "[b]ecause arms pose an extraordinary threat to the safety and good order of society,
Plaintiffs contend that section 22 is ambiguous and that the ambiguity can only be resolved to mean that while the State and its subdivisions have the power to regulate the possession and use of weapons which are commonly used for recreation or protection of person and property, such as by requiring that all purchasers of handguns be licensed (see Biffer v. City of Chicago (1917), 278 Ill. 562), they may not enact a flat ban on such weapons or any discrete category of them. Plaintiffs also argue that the proper focus in interpreting a constitutional provision such as section 22 must be on the common understanding of the citizens of the State who voted to adopt the Constitution.
The meaning of a constitutional provision depends, of course, on the common understanding of the citizens who, by ratifying the Constitution, gave it life. (People ex rel. Cosentino v. County of Adams (1980),
The insight offered by these materials is consistent with the interpretation of the provision advanced by the delegates who voted to adopt it. The meaning which the delegates to the convention attached to a provision in the Constitution before sending it to the voters for ratification is relevant in resolving ambiguities which may remain after consulting the language of the provision. (Client Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes (1979),
When presented with the report of the Bill of Rights Committee, the delegates to the convention were faced with a choice of adopting the so-called "majority report," which set forth section 22 in substantially the form in which it was enacted; adopting the "minority report," which recommended that the constitution remain silent concerning a right to arms; or adopting the "Lawlor amendment," which read: "The right of the individual to firearms or other means necessary for defense
In the debate following the opening statements, Mr. Foster was questioned as follows by Delegate Elmer Gertz:
This response was amplified the following day when, in his introduction of the minority report, Mr. Gertz asserted that "[i]t was admitted yesterday, that the [majority report] would prevent a complete ban of hand guns, for example," and Mr. Foster interjected, "[T]hat is inaccurate. The statement of the majority was that it would prevent a complete ban on all guns, but there could be a
During the course of the debates, several delegates who later voted in favor of the majority report voiced an understanding of the report that was similar to Mr. Foster's. For example, one delegate observed that "as everyone has said — * * * hand guns are by far and away the problem in this country and in this state * * *. This [section] does not in any way attempt or intend * * * [to] restrict the state or the county or the city or any other government within our confines of a reasonable * * * control over hand guns. And I submit to you that that would include the prohibition * * *." (Emphasis added.) (3 Proceedings 1717-18 (statement of Delegate Durr).) Another suggested that, far from obstructing State or local legislation aimed at controlling firearms, the majority report gave constitutional sanction to such legislation for the first time. (3 Proceedings 1709-10 (statement of Delegate Elward).) Others stated that, as they understood it, the majority report was a safeguard against the confiscation of all firearms and nothing more. (3 Proceedings 1711 (statement of Delegate Kelleghan), 1712
Conspicuously absent from the debates is any expression by any delegate who favored the majority report that handguns could not be banned under the majority proposal. The only suggestions of this kind were made by delegates who opposed the majority report, and were offered only to demonstrate the possibility that voters or the courts might interpret the right bestowed by section 22 too expansively in favor of the right to arms. (See 3 Proceedings 1694 (statement of Delegate Weisberg), 1710 (statement of Delegate Fay), 1714 (statement of Delegate Ladd).) The plaintiffs argue that these statements show that there was no common understanding among the delegates who voted on the section. However, "the court is not justified in relying upon arguments against a proposed constitutional amendment `as seen by the minority,' to determine its meaning after adoption. A precedent so holding would be mischievous in the opportunity it would afford a minority to frustrate the purpose of the [constitutional convention] and the voters." Hanley v. Kusper (1975),
Plaintiffs contend that the natural interpretation of the words "police power," and that which the voters must have had in mind when considering section 22 under which all classes of firearms rather than merely military ones are protected, includes regulation of such firearms but not a prohibition of any class of arms. We see no basis for this argument. This court has long recognized that the police power comprehends laws "restraining or prohibiting anything harmful to the welfare of the people" (People v. Warren (1957),
The plaintiffs refer to newspaper articles and editorials which they argue led voters to believe that no class of weapons would be subject to complete prohibition (e.g., Con-Con Questions, Answers, Illinois State Register, Dec. 10, 1970, at 2, col. 2; Con-Con unit tested — votes conservative, Chicago Daily News, Feb. 27, 1970 (State ed.), at 11, col. 1; Editorial, The sickening rise in gun killings, Chicago Sun-Times, June 11, 1970, at 71, col. 1; Editorial, A document in democracy, Chicago Sun-Times, June 7, 1970, sec. 2, at 11, col. 1; Editorial, Con-con under the gun, Chicago Sun-Times, Mar. 4, 1970, at 35, col. 1; Editorial, Wrong decision on guns, Chicago Daily News, Feb. 27, 1970 (evening ed.), at 14, col. 1; Editorial, Gun play at con con, Chicago Daily News, Feb. 24, 1970 (evening ed.), at 10, col. 1). These articles either expressed the general fear that the provision as debated and passed by the convention would nullify existing gun-control laws and prevent the passage of new ones or reported similar expressions of fear by convention delegates who had opposed the provision.
Consistent with Client Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes (1979),
Based on the floor debates and the official explanation, as well as on the language of the provision, it is apparent to us that section 22, as submitted to the voters, meant that a ban on all firearms that an individual citizen might use would not be permissible, but a ban on discrete categories of firearms, such as handguns, would be. Convincing indications that the voters ascribed a different meaning to the provision not having been offered by the plaintiffs, we conclude, along with the Federal courts (Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove (7th Cir.1982),
Plaintiffs point out that handguns are a form of weapon commonly used for defense of person and property
Nor do we find merit in plaintiffs' argument that section 22 is a nullity if construed to permit a ban on some of the very categories of weapons it was enacted to protect. We emphasize again that section 22 bestows upon individual citizens for the first time a right to possess some form of weapon suitable for self-defense or recreation,
II. THE PROPRIETY OF THE ORDINANCE UNDER THE HOME RULE POWER
Plaintiffs argue that the regulation of firearms is inherently a matter of exclusive statewide concern because of the mobility of guns and gun owners, and that it is thus beyond the power of local governments acting under color of their home rule power (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, sec. 6) to enact an ordinance banning handguns. They observe that it is conceivable that one home rule unit within the State may forbid some form of weapon which another home rule unit affirmatively requires (see Goreville, Ill., Ordinance 82-2 (Dec. 7, 1982) and Pittsburg, Ill., Ordinance 83-3 (June 6, 1983) (requiring all resident heads of households, with certain enumerated exceptions, to own a firearm with ammunition)), that one whose possession of a handgun on his person is legal under the laws of his home town and the State would be severely inconvenienced and precluded from traveling via Morton Grove if possession of handguns by all persons within that village were unlawful (Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-11, sec. 2(B) (June 8, 1981)), and that in any event a handgun ban that applies only to one community without affecting others in the vicinity would do nothing to reduce the incidence of crimes committed with handguns within the affected community and might in fact attract armed criminals to the community from others nearby where handguns are readily available. City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. (1976),
Article VII, section 6, of our constitution provides in relevant part:
The limitation "pertaining to its government and affairs" has been interpreted to mean that "`* * * the powers of home-rule units relate to their own problems, not to those of the state or the nation.'" City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. (1976),
Whether a particular problem is of statewide rather than local dimension must be decided not on the basis of a specific formula or listing set forth in the Constitution but with regard for the nature and extent of the problem, the units of government which have the most vital interest in its solution, and the role traditionally played by local and statewide authorities in dealing with it. (Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley (1975),
The plaintiffs seek to apply a free-wheeling preemption rule to the exercise of home rule power. They argue in effect that a subject is preempted whenever it is of significant concern to the State or whenever a uniform statewide solution to the problems it entails might arguably be more manageable than individual control by local units of government. Home rule, however, is predicated on the assumption that problems in which local governments have a legitimate and substantial interest should be open to local solution and reasonable experimentation to meet local needs, free from veto by voters and elected representatives of other parts of the State who might disagree with the particular approach advanced by the representatives of the locality involved or fail to appreciate the local perception of the problem. (See Report of the Committee on Local Government, 7 Proceedings 1605-11; City of Evanston v. Create, Inc. (1981),
Although plaintiffs contend that weapons control and crime prevention are matters of statewide rather than local concern, villages such as Morton Grove have an obvious interest not only in reducing premeditated crime within their boundaries but also in minimizing the effects of domestic violence or spontaneous quarrels. They also
This case does not involve local regulation of a State institution such as the court system (Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley (1975),
Plaintiffs finally contend that the enactment by the State of statutes bearing on gun ownership, possession and sale evidence an intent to preempt the field of firearms regulation either expressly or by implication, and leave no room for local laws regulating or restricting possession of firearms. The statutes to which plaintiffs refer are article 24 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 24-1 et seq.) and "An Act relating to the acquisition, possession and transfer of firearms and firearm ammunition * * *" (the Firearms and Ammunition Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 83-1 et seq.). The former is a criminal statute which makes it unlawful to possess certain specified weapons, including pistols and revolvers, on one's person "except when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 24-1(4), (10)) and subject to certain other exceptions. In addition, it provides that any possession of firearms or firearm ammunition by convicted felons, narcotics addicts, recent mental hospital patients, and certain other narrowly defined classes of people is illegal. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 24-3.1.) The Firearms and Ammunition Act, enacted "to provide a system of identifying persons who are not qualified to acquire or possess firearms and firearm ammunition within the State of Illinois" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 83-1), requires all firearm owners to obtain an identification card from the Department of Law Enforcement and makes it illegal for anyone to sell or transfer a firearm or ammunition to a person who does not display a card. It gives the Department of Law Enforcement the authority to deny cards "only" to specified classes of people, including those who are narcotics
Neither of these statutes suggests that firearms control is a subject for exclusive State involvement. In fact, the only statement in either act concerning the permissibility of more stringent local control is to the opposite effect: "The provisions of any ordinance enacted by any municipality which requires registration or imposes greater restrictions or limitations on the acquisition, possession and transfer of firearms than are imposed by this Act, are not invalidated or affected by this Act." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 83-13.1.) This provision, in the Firearms and Ammunition Act, refutes any contention that the use of the word "only" in section 8 of that act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 83-8) was intended to declare that all persons not mentioned in that section are qualified to possess firearms notwithstanding municipal regulations to the contrary. This case is therefore distinguishable from Doe v. City and County of San Francisco (1982),
We likewise find no basis for concluding that the two acts on which plaintiffs rely leave no room for more restrictive local laws or are contradicted in any way by Morton Grove's ordinance. In passing, we state that we are not impressed by the fact, relied on by plaintiffs, that section 24-3(h) of the Criminal Code of 1961 outlaws the sale or delivery of only those handguns which
Plaintiffs argue that applying for an identification card in compliance with the Firearms and Ammunition Act involves disclosing certain information to State officials which may incriminate the applicant for purposes of prosecution under Morton Grove's ordinance in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments (see Leary v. United States (1969),
We therefore conclude that the ordinance is a permissible exercise of Morton Grove's home rule powers.
III. THE PROPRIETY OF THE ORDINANCE AS AN EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER
Plaintiffs contend that, inasmuch as guns and gun owners are highly mobile, the ordinance in question is valueless in preventing crime within the village of Morton Grove and may in fact encourage it by disarming law-abiding citizens. They argue that the ordinance is perverse as a safety measure and violates Federal and State guarantees of due process (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 2). In related contentions, they argue that the ordinance, through its exemptions, arbitrarily discriminates between residents of the village in violation of equal protection guarantees, and that because of the fundamental nature of the right to bear arms in self-defense the ordinance is overbroad for
Initially we observe that the search for less onerous alternative means of securing a governmental interest is a hallmark of strict scrutiny, which comes into play only when a fundamental right is invaded. Not every right secured by the State or Federal constitutions is fundamental, however, but only those which "lie at the heart of the relationship between the individual and a republican form of nationally integrated government" (People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos (1977),
Under the rational-basis test, which is the appropriate level of scrutiny when no fundamental right is involved, the relevant inquiry for purposes of due process and equal protection is whether the Morton Grove ordinance bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest, not whether it is overly broad. (Lindsey v. Normet (1972),
For similar reasons, we find no constitutional infirmity in the fact that the ordinance permits security guards or special agents employed by railroads or public utilities to carry handguns regardless of their actual qualifications to possess or handle firearms without endangering the public, whereas ordinary citizens are not permitted to do so regardless of their qualifications or the urgency of their need to carry a gun. The village
Plaintiffs, noting that the case was dismissed upon the entry of summary judgment by the circuit court, urge us to remand the cause to that court for consideration of additional evidence that may have a bearing on the rationality of the ordinance. Our review, however, is not one of fact but purely one of law, and our conclusion is compelled by the judgment that the ordinance bears a rational relation to the goal of reducing weapons-related injuries and accidents within the village of Morton Grove. Minimal scrutiny requires nothing more, and we do not perceive how a remand might alter this judgment. For the reasons stated, therefore, we conclude that the ordinance is a proper exercise of the police power authority.
The judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting:
I join in the very convincing dissent of my colleague, Justice Moran. In addition, I wish to address the question of the use of police power by the village of Morton Grove to ban the ownership of handguns.
The majority opinion concedes that section 22 of article I of our Illinois Constitution broadened the scope of the right to arms from the limited collective right of the
This court, in Nahser v. City of Chicago (1915), 271 Ill. 288, 291-92, addressed what constitutes a legitimate use of the police power by stating:
The majority uses equal protection standards relating to statutory classification to support its statement that police regulations will be upheld if any state of facts may be reasonably conceived to justify them, citing McGowan v. Maryland (1961),
This court's inquiry in reviewing the legislative exercise of the police power should be whether the legislation represents a rational means to accomplish a proper purpose. (Pozner v. Mauck (1978),
As the majority opinion notes, the ordinance, in its preamble, cites certain interests of the village, such as reducing "the potentiality of firearm related deaths and injuries" caused by "the easy and convenient availability of certain types of firearms and weapons," and finds that "handguns play a major role in the commission of homicide, aggravated assault, and armed robbery, and accidental injury and death."
Although the recited purposes of the ordinance would appear to be laudable and supportive of the exercise of the police power to achieve these ends, the minutes of the meeting of the board of trustees of the village at which the ordinance was adopted do not reflect any discussion of these purposes, or that the ordinance was adopted to achieve them. There was no discussion as to how many, if any, deaths, injuries or crimes involving handguns had been committed in Morton Grove. In this litigation, at the trial level, an affidavit of the chief of police was presented that showed that over a 24-year period there had been a total of 155 incidents of handgun misuse in the village, or an average of about six incidents a year. The statistics presented reveal that the incidents had declined since the late 1970's. The statistics compiled by the chief of police did not disclose the nature of the handgun misuse, or whether the misuse involved a crime, death or injury. Also, the statistics did not disclose if the misuses were committed by residents of Morton Grove. Meager as these statistics are, they reveal that the misuse of handguns is a very minimal problem
The purposes of the ordinance cited in its preamble were therefore pure and simple litany, inserted in the ordinance for window dressing and to help withstand constitutional challenge. Since no discussion was had at the meeting of the village board concerning handgun misuse in the village, and since these statistics concerning such misuse were not compiled until after the ordinance was adopted and were not presented to the village board, it is apparent that some other purpose motivated the adoption of the ordinance. This purpose is disclosed by the minutes of the meeting at which the ordinance was adopted by a vote of four to two. Before voting, the trustees expressed their opinions on the ordinance. As recorded in the minutes, those voting in favor of the ordinance stated:
The majority opinion acknowledges that these statements reflect the possibility that the ordinance was passed for the sole purpose of publicizing a political viewpoint. I am in accord with that conclusion. I am shocked, however, that the majority opinion finds no significance in this possibility. If the police power can be exercised for the sole purpose of publicizing a political
As stated in the language quoted above from Nahser, it must be apparent that the legislation tends in some degree toward the prevention of offenses, or the preservation of public health, morals, safety or welfare; that such an end is the one actually intended; and that there is some connection between the ordinance and such purpose. If it is manifest that the legislation has no such object, but under the guise of a police regulation is an invasion of the property rights of the individual, it is the duty of the court to declare it void. Nahser v. City of Chicago (1916), 271 Ill. 288, 292.
We are not compelled to blindly follow the incantations of a legislative body inserted in legislative enactments to lend an aura of validity to the act. In Commercial National Bank v. City of Chicago (1982),
This court further stated:
The same rationale must apply to this case. If we permit the constitutionally given right to arms to be nullified by simply inserting a few "magic words" in an ordinance which gives the ordinance an appearance of being a valid exercise of the police power, when it is in fact only the assertion of a political philosophy and a publicizing of that viewpoint, then we have in effect eliminated this right that has been granted by the Constitution.
This court, on another occasion, has examined the impingement of the police power on constitutional rights of individuals and found the basis of the ordinance lacking. In City of Chicago v. Wilson (1978),
This court further stated in conclusion:
Thus, it is not sufficient when considering constitutional rights that there be a bare assertion or recital of a proper purpose for the exercise of the police power. As held in City of Chicago v. Wilson, there must be some valid existing reason for the intrusion. In summary, it is my position that although the ordinance recites an accepted purpose for the exercise of the police power, we
UNDERWOOD and MORAN, JJ., join in this dissent.
JUSTICE MORAN, also dissenting:
For more than a decade, the bill of rights to the Illinois Constitution has included a provision on the right to keep and bear arms (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 22). I agree with the majority opinion that the language of section 22 of article I indicates that the right to keep and bear arms is a qualified, not an absolute, right. Nevertheless, I disagree with the conclusion that under section 22 municipalities may enact flat bans on the possession of ordinary handguns. Under the opinion announced today, so long as municipalities allow residents to possess "some form of weapon suitable for self-defense or recreation" municipalities may ban all other weapons. (103 Ill.2d at 499-500.) The majority's strained reading of section 22 defies logic and runs counter to the history surrounding the enactment of the right-to-bear-arms guarantee.
To the contrary, section 22 prohibits a flat ban on those types of firearms that "law-abiding citizens commonly employ for purposes of recreation or the protection of person and property," including ordinary handguns and long guns. Report of the Bill of Rights Committee on the Preamble and the Bill of Rights (Committee Report), 6 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois
This court has long adhered to the principle that a constitutional provision must be interpreted in accordance with the intent and understanding of the electorate who ratified the instrument. (People ex rel. Cosentino v. County of Adams (1980),
Today's opinion places considerable reliance on the comments of certain delegates to the constitutional convention to justify the conclusion that section 22 does not prohibit municipalities from enacting a flat ban on the possession of ordinary handguns. Although this court on occasion has consulted such debates when the meaning of the constitutional provision was in doubt, it has done so only when it appeared that the delegates reached a consensus as to the meaning of the provision. (Client Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes (1979),
After considering the debates on section 22, I am of the opinion that, at most, the debates reflect a lack of consensus as to the meaning of section 22. The debates illustrate that the issue of whether Illinois' citizens
The lack of consensus as to the meaning of section 22 was not lost on a number of delegates. Delegate William Fay, during the course of the debates, noted that "the fact that we have just seen the last two or three speakers here unite in support of this measure for different reasons indicates how this proposal will mean different things to different people." (3 Proceedings 1710.) Delegate Jeffrey Ladd commented that it "seems we got people together on this bill for different reasons, and maybe we ought to know which side is really going to prevail." (3 Proceedings 1714.) Delegate Jeanette Mullen stated, "Seldom have I heard such contradictory argument as has been presented today by the supporters of the majority [committee] report." (3 Proceedings 1719; see also 3 Proceedings 1713 (statement of Delegate Conner).) I feel the court's reliance, in this instance, on the constitutional debates is misplaced.
On the other hand, the report of the convention's Committee on the Bill of Rights left the understanding that municipalities would be prohibited from enacting total bans on the possession of ordinary handguns. Committee members drafted the proposal which eventually became section 22. The committee report at the time that the 1970 Constitution was ratified stated:
The committee report also stated:
The above-quoted language, I submit, gave the understanding that section 22 prohibits municipalities from enacting total bans on the possession of handguns. This conclusion is further bolstered by the cases referred to in the committee report in support of the proposition that a ban on "all possession or use of such arms" would be unconstitutional under section 22. All of these cases involved attempts to ban, directly or indirectly, the possession of handguns. In each of these cases cited by the committee report, the courts held that the governmental body involved exceeded the police powers, and, thus, that the law violated their respective State constitutional provisions on the right to keep and bear arms. (See State v. Kerner (1921), 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222; People v. Zerillo (1922), 219 Mich. 635, 189 N.W. 927; In re Brickey (1902), 8 Idaho 597, 70 P. 609.) Nowhere did the committee report indicate that a total ban on handguns would be permissible. The list of permissible regulations contained in the committee reports, along with appropriate case citations, included the prohibition of "certain deadly weapons not commonly and peacefully used by individuals." (Emphasis added.) (Committee Report, 6 Proceedings 89.) (See, e.g., Morrison v. State (1960), 170
Moreover, the Committee on the Bill of Rights and convention delegates specifically declined to adopt proposals which would have allowed the prohibition of ordinary handguns. The committee rejected a proposed amendment that would have added the phrase "except handguns" following the word "arms" to the text of the draft which became section 22. (Minutes of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, March 12, 1970.) Similarly, convention delegates rejected Member Proposal No. 131, which would have prohibited handguns (7 Proceedings 2901), and Member Proposal No. 220, which would have permitted the General Assembly to ban the possession of any firearm (7 Proceedings 2936). If committee members or convention delegates had desired to give municipalities such wide-ranging power, they would not have rejected every proposal authorizing the right to prohibit handguns.
In my opinion, municipalities cannot, consistent with section 22, enact flat bans on the possession of handguns or any other firearm which is commonly used by law-abiding
In addition, I strongly disagree with the majority's conclusion that Morton Grove has not exceeded its home rule powers in enacting the handgun ban. Article VII, section 6(a), of our constitution provides that a home rule municipality may exercise any power "pertaining to its government and affairs." (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, sec. 6(a).) This court has stressed that "`the powers of home rule units relate to their own problems, not those of the State or nation.'" Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley (1975),
In City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. (1976),
The problems associated with the use of handguns and other firearms are similarly a subject for State, not local, regulation. Like municipal noise ordinances, municipal handgun ordinances will be conflicting and counterproductive. Municipalities may, consistent with today's opinion, ban the possession of any weapon so long as residents are allowed to possess one type of weapon. Thus, Morton Grove may ban handguns and a neighboring
The majority opinion attempts to justify its conclusion that the Morton Grove ordinance is properly local by stating that the ordinance "does [not] involve regulation of conduct outside the village of Morton Grove * * *." (Slip op. at 12.) Although the ordinance does not purport to regulate conduct outside Morton Grove, the ordinance will affect nonresidents as well as influence conduct outside the village boundaries. Nonresidents are required by the ordinance to make their handguns "permanently inoperable" before transporting their guns through Morton Grove. (Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-11 (June 8, 1981).) The ordinance has the practical effect of forcing nonresidents to avoid Morton Grove if they wish to carry their firearms to a neighboring community where handguns are permitted. Secondly, by banning the possession of handguns within its boundaries, Morton Grove has presumably increased the number of handguns that are present in adjacent communities, since the ordinance does not prohibit its residents from storing, selling, or using their handguns outside the village.
Moreover, today's decision fails to adequately consider the potential problems that could result from inconsistent local gun laws. Inconsistent local gun laws could make it difficult for gun owners to lawfully use their
The issue of whether an Illinois citizen may or may not possess a handgun has never, until today, been thought to be a matter for local governments. The Morton Grove ordinance is the first of its kind. Instead, handguns and other firearms have been subject to extensive regulation by our State government. The Illinois General Assembly enacted the Illinois deadly-weapons statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 24-1 et seq.) and the Firearms and Ammunition Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 83-1 et seq.). The deadly-weapons statute, in particular, is a comprehensive statute which prescribes what types of firearms that may be privately owned, who may own and use such firearms, and where, when and how these firearms may be used. In enacting the deadly-weapons statute, the General Assembly was mindful of the fact that effective gun control requires consistent, orderly and comprehensive legislation. The deadly-weapons statute was adopted with the purpose of creating "one comprehensive, integrated statute, dealing in an orderly manner with deadly weapons," so that State gun-control laws are "consistent with one another." (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 24-1, Committee Comments, at 83-84 (Smith-Hurd 1977).) The deadly-weapons statute, as the court points out, makes it unlawful
Although the existence of a State regulatory scheme on a given subject is not determinative of whether the subject is properly State or local, it is considered evidence that the subject is recognized as a matter of statewide concern. (City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. (1976),
In the present case, the State regulation of firearm possession has been long standing, comprehensive and, for the most part, exclusive. Until now, home rule municipalities have not attempted to enact ordinances of the type adopted by Morton Grove. Until now, the issue of whether or not a person may possess a firearm has been resolved by looking to a State regulatory scheme intended by the General Assembly to deal with firearms in an orderly and consistent manner. The Morton Grove ordinance directly conflicts with the express policy of the deadly-weapons statute. Under the Morton Grove ordinance,
The majority's conclusion that municipalities may circumvent clearly expressed State policy except in those limited instances when the General Assembly has expressly preempted municipal action is incorrect. To the contrary, this court has invalidated municipal or county actions when such actions affect areas which are "generally recognized as falling within the competence of State rather than local authorities" (7 Proceedings 1621-22), particularly when the municipal actions conflict with existing State law. See, e.g., Metropolitan Sanitary District v. City of Des Plaines (1976),
Thus, because the possession of firearms has traditionally been regulated by State law, and because local firearms laws like the one adopted by Morton Grove would necessarily affect persons beyond municipal boundaries, confuse law-abiding citizens and are counterproductive, I am of the opinion that this subject is of State and not local concern. I would therefore hold that Morton Grove has exceeded its home rule authority under article VII, section 6(a), of our constitution in enacting this ordinance.
For the above-stated reasons, I must respectfully dissent.
RYAN, C.J., and UNDERWOOD, J., join in this dissent.
- No Cases Found