UDALL, Vice Chief Justice:
Petitioner-defendants, James L. and Elsa R. O'Neill, husband and wife hereinafter referred to as defendants, each stand charged in the City Court of the City of Phoenix
Defendants assert that to proceed with said trial without a jury would be a deprivation of due process of law as guaranteed by the Arizona and United States Constitutions and a denial of equal protection of the law as provided by both the Arizona and United States Constitutions.
Defendants' contentions are neither novel nor sustainable. It is old law that the constitutional right to trial by jury does not extend to petty offenses: Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 410 P.2d 479, 16 A.L.R.3d 1362; Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 8 S.Ct. 1301, 32 L.Ed. 223; Cheff v. Schnackenberg et al., 384 U.S. 373, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 16 L.Ed.2d 629.
A violation of A.R.S. § 13-379, Drunk and Disorderly, is a misdemeanor. The severity of punishment to which defendants might be subjected is a maximum fine of $300.00 and/or imprisonment for a term not to exceed six months.
In Rothweiler v. Superior Court, supra, we said:
We note in State v. Cousins, 97 Ariz. 105, 397 P.2d 217, that at common law the crime of drunk and disorderly was not triable by a jury, and we there found that one charged with "drunk and disorderly" under municipal code was not entitled to jury trial in municipal court where the severity of the penalty was a possible $300.00 fine or three months in prison or both.
Insofar as the "moral quality of the act" is concerned, in today's affluent and self-indulgent society it can hardly be suggested that one charged or guilty of mere "drunk and disorderly" conduct is a depraved and inherently base person. In and of itself the charge does not involve serious moral turpitude. We cannot hold that the moral quality of the act is a crime of such nature as warrants a jury trial as a matter of constitutional right where that right did not exist at common law.
There remains but to consider the severity of the penalty. Is the possibility of six month jail sentence on top of a $300.00 fine so severe as to remove this offense from the "petty" category? We think not.
Defendants have seen fit to assert their contentions under both the state and federal constitutions. In the federal system, petty offenses are defined as those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500.00 fine, 18 U.S.C. § 1; and the United States Supreme Court very recently reaffirmed its position that:
We hold that the severity of the possible penalty in this case is not such that requires a trial by jury.
The defendants have argued that had these charges been brought before a justice court rather than before the city court they would have been entitled to a jury; and thus to allow the matter to proceed before city court without a jury is a denial of equal protection under the law. We considered and agreed with a similar question in Rothweiler, supra, where we said:
In the case at bar, however, we have held that the offense charged is in that category of petty offenses not requiring a jury trial. Such is the case regardless of the forum.
The alternative writ is quashed and the permanent writ of prohibition is denied.
McFARLAND, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, BERNSTEIN and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.