VILLAGE OF RIDGEWOOD v. SREEL INVESTMENT CORP.
28 N.J. 121 (1958)
145 A.2d 306
VILLAGE OF RIDGEWOOD, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
SREEL INVESTMENT CORPORATION, A CORPORATION OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
SREEL INVESTMENT CORPORATION, A CORPORATION OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey.
Argued September 22, 1958.
Decided October 20, 1958.
Mr. Milton T. Lasher argued the cause for defendant-appellant.
Mr. Samuel Doan argued the cause for plaintiff-respondent ( Mr. William E. Reinhardt, attorney; Mr. Aaron Dines on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by PROCTOR, J.
The Appellate Division affirmed a judgment of the Law Division entered upon a jury award of $8,200 as compensation for the taking of a part of defendant's property by the plaintiff municipality in the latter's exercise of its power of eminent domain. N.J.S.A. 40:60-25.1; N.J.S.A. 20:1-1 et seq. On the defendant's petition we granted certification.
The defendant corporation was the owner of a plot of land fronting on the westerly side of Oak Street in the Village of Ridgewood. The property and the surrounding area are zoned and occupied for business purposes. The property had a frontage of 75.40 feet, a depth of 150 feet and a rear width of 75.38 feet. A brick building containing four stores, which are leased by the defendant to tenants, occupies the entire front of the lot. The store on the extreme south of the building is 30 feet in width and 70 feet in depth; the one next to it is 15 by 70 feet and the other two toward the north end are each 15 by 50 feet. Each store has a
The municipality adopted an ordinance authorizing the acquisition by condemnation or other lawful means of a number of parcels of land, including rights of way, for the purpose, as stipulated, of making "the lands available to the public for the public parking of vehicles or for other public uses or purposes." Among the properties enumerated in the ordinance was the rear 70 feet of the defendant's lot. The taking of this part of defendant's property occurred on June 22, 1956, leaving the defendant with a lot 75.40 feet in width and 80 feet in depth. The open space in the rear of defendant's building was thereby reduced to 10 feet in depth behind its two stores at the southerly end and 30 feet in depth behind the others. At the corner of the take-line ten feet back of the southerly end of the building the elevation of the portion condemned is two feet higher than defendant's remaining property. Moving north the height gradually diminishes until it becomes level with the defendant's remaining land on the northerly end. A retaining wall which slopes with this decline is located along this line. Also condemned was the easement of the defendant and others in the 14-foot alley for use as a public right of way.
Pursuant to the procedure under N.J.S.A. 20:1-1 et seq., condemnation commissioners were appointed. From their award of $16,450 the defendant appealed and the village cross-appealed. On a trial in the Law Division the jury rendered a verdict for the defendant in the amount of $8,200 for the land taken and "no award for consequential damages." Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied.
On this appeal the defendant first argues that the jury's finding of no consequential damages deprived it of just compensation in the "constitutional sense." N.J. Const. 1947, Art. I, par. 20; U.S. Const., Amend XIV.
The most significant of the trial errors which the defendant complains were prejudicial relates to the court's charge to the jury as to the relationship between the part taken and the remainder of the property.
Defendant called Smith and Schwenn as its experts. They testified that the rear of the property (the part taken) had been used as a parking lot by the defendant in which it rented space on a monthly basis and from which it received an annual gross income of $1,272. Four spaces were reserved without charge for tenants occupying defendant's stores. In addition, this area was used for access to the rear delivery entrances to the stores. According to these witnesses, the taking of this land would result in a diminution in the value of the defendant's remaining property because of the following factors: (1) the elimination of possible future expansion of the building; (2) the difficulty of making rear-door deliveries to the stores; (3) the loss of rear parking privileges by the tenants; (4) the loss of the private right of way in the alley for the tenants' convenience; (5) the impossibility of turning a truck or automobile at a right angle from the alley into the remaining 10-foot
Smith stated that he valued the entire tract at $75,000 before the taking and $50,350 after the taking, or a difference for the taking and the consequential damages of $24,650. Of the last amount he attributed $16,000 to the land actually taken. Schwenn estimated the entire property to be worth $73,500 before the taking and $43,800 afterwards, or a loss of $29,700. Both experts based their computations on the theory that prior to the taking defendant's lot was a functional entity with the value of the building partially dependent upon the availability of the vacant area in the rear.
The plaintiff's experts, Bogert and Clark, testified that in their opinion there was no damage to the remainder of the property as a result of the taking and that the defendant's sole loss was the value of that part of the land actually condemned. Bogert valued the land taken at $7,230 on a replacement-less-depreciation basis, and at $7,600 on a capitalization-of-income basis. Clark, using the same methods, arrived at valuations of $7,230 and $8,160, respectively. Their conclusion that there was no consequential damages was based upon their opinion that the rents for the remainder would be the same following the taking as before; that access to the rear of the defendant's stores would in no way be impaired and might well be improved; and, as stated by Bogert, "the possibility of a second front door in the rear." The last statement undoubtedly referred to the opportunity for customer access to defendant's stores from the proposed parking lot.
In charging the jury the trial court, after adequately setting forth the appropriate standard of damages, proceeded to state:
However, a parcel of land, in order to put it to its highest and best use, may require its division into parts, and then the income from the several parts, independent of each other, would produce the highest amount of rentals. That often happens when a farm is bought and subdivided into building lots. Building lots collectively bring more than the farm as a whole used for farming purposes would bring. When that happens, where a parcel of land is used in parts and by that means it produces the highest income, and then a part is taken without damaging the other part, there is no diminution in value to the remaining parcels.
That is the problem that we have here. In this case we have four written leases for the stores located on the front of this property. Those tenants have no right to occupy the rear, and the rear is not used in connection with the stores. The rear, according to the evidence, has been leased to, I think, six tenants, who have the right to occupy it with something like 21 or 27 automobiles. Those tenants use it for parking purposes of their cars. I mean, not the tenants who occupy the front, but who occupy only the rear. And there is no relation between the use of the property which is being taken and the front portion, the remainder; no relation in its use, no relation in its productive value. The uses are independent of each other. There is no functional relationship between the front and the rear. One part does not compensate the other part, as a supermarket with its parking lots does. So far as I can see, that is the evidence in this case insofar as the use of this property is concerned." (Italics supplied)
The court then summarized the testimony of the defendant's experts and said of Smith, "if there was no functional
The defendant, having made timely objection to the italicized portion of the charge, argues the instruction eliminated from the jury's consideration the issue of whether there was a functional relationship between the land taken and the property remaining.
The court's allusion in its charge to the supermarket gave a clear example of a parcel of land every part of which is functionally related. The reference to the building lots was an equally clear example of parts of land that are functionally independent. The jury was told that in the former situation "the remaining portion would suffer a diminution in value," while in the latter "there is no diminution in value to the remaining parcels." By then informing the jury that in the present case "there is no functional relationship between the front and the rear" the charge may well have settled in their minds that the severance of defendant's property was the same as the example of the building lots and therefore there could be no consequential damages. This was contrary to the factual testimony as well as the opinions expressed by the defendant's expert witnesses that the part taken was functionally related to the remainder.
A trial judge may comment on the evidence and frequently it is his duty to do so, provided it is to assist and not to control the jury's findings. Wilcox v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 124 N.J.L. 527, 530 (E. & A. 1940); Hare v. Pennell,
As there must be a new trial, it is appropriate to comment on several additional points alleged by the defendant as error.
Over the defendant's objection the plaintiff was permitted to introduce into evidence a plan captioned "Tentative Parking Layout," prepared by the village engineer at the request of one of the village commissioners, depicting a manner in which the defendant's property along with others taken could be used as a municipal parking lot. This plan showed that an 18-foot area of the property taken adjacent to the rear of defendant's stores was to be left vacant for their use as a loading zone. The engineer admitted that
"* * * I am admitting this into evidence merely so that you may see one way in which this parking lot might be laid out. This is not at all binding on the property owner or on the Village, because there may be other ways of laying it out, and this way of laying it out may not be the manner in which it is finally adopted, but I think it will help you in your consideration of the entire problem and how this property might be developed. You are not confined to this. You may consider from your own point of view what are the probable results of the effect on the property in any other way that the property might be laid out for parking."
This admonition merely served to highlight the irrelevancy of the evidence. Not only was the village at liberty to construct a parking lot in a manner other than that represented by the plan, but it could use the property for any other public purpose. In Hepburn v. North Jersey, etc., Comm., 100 N.J.L. 148 (E. & A. 1924), the condemnor's expert was permitted to testify that the taking of a part of the owner's property for the construction of an aqueduct would be advantageous to the remaining part based on his observation of another aqueduct. Photographs of the other aqueduct were also admitted. On appeal it was held that this testimony and the admission of the photographs were improper because the condemning authority was in no way bound to use the land for the construction of an aqueduct but could use it "in any lawful mode," and that there were "many purposes to which the [land] acquired could be put which would damage the remainder." To admit promissory representations of the condemnor's intention might well deprive a landowner of damages to which he is justly entitled on the mere expression of an intention to do something which might never be done. Pursiful v. Commonwealth, 212 Ky. 690, 279 S.W. 1106 (Ct. App. 1926); and see cases collected in 7 A.L.R.2d 364 (1949).
In the present case it was improper for the jury to consider any representations that a loading zone would be provided
Defendant next argues that it was improper for the plaintiff to ask one of its experts "whether or not benefits will accrue to adjoining property owners from the creation and maintenance of a municipal owned parking lot of this kind, graded, lighted and maintained by the municipality." Over the defendant's objection the expert was permitted to give an affirmative answer. This question clearly was directed to what may be termed "general benefits" or benefits which the defendant may enjoy in the future in common with all other property owners in the neighborhood as a result of the proposed improvement. Mangles v. Hudson County Board of Chosen Freeholders, 55 N.J.L. 88, 92 (Sup. Ct. 1892). Our eminent domain legislation, N.J.S.A. 20:1-1 et seq., under which plaintiff is proceeding, does not provide that benefits are to be considered in arriving at an award, except in the limited situation where an assessment is to be levied, in which case it may be set off against any award rendered. N.J.S.A. 20:1-33. In addition, our cases have uniformly held that general benefits may not be considered to reduce the damages which an individual property owner will sustain from the taking of a portion of his property. State v. Miller, 23 N.J.L. 383 (Sup. Ct. 1852); Mangles v. Hudson County Board of Chosen Freeholders, supra; Clausen v. Village of Ridgefield, 91 N.J.L. 238 (E. & A. 1917); see also Robinson v. Borough of Edgewater, 98 N.J.L. 205 (E. & A. 1922). There is no reason why a man whose land is taken
Defendant also alleges as error the court's refusal to charge his Request Number 2. This has no merit. The court's charge adequately instructed the jury on the general principle of law embodied in that request. It is not necessary that the defendant's precise language be employed. Tumarkin v. Goldstein,
Finally, the defendant contends it was prejudiced by the trial court's lengthy examination of the witness Schwenn after his direct and cross-examination had been concluded. The trial judge may question a witness in order to clarify existing testimony or to elicit further information from him. State v. Aeschbach, 107 N.J.L. 433 (E. & A. 1931); In re Parking Authority of City of Hackensack, supra. Indeed, this appears a desirable procedure where in his discretion he considers it necessary. 3 Wigmore, Evidence, § 784 (3d ed. 1940). However, as stated by Judge Gaulkin in Polulich v. J.G. Schmidt Tool Die & Stamping Co.,
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the cause will be remanded for a new trial.
HEHER, J., concurring in result.
For affirmance — None.
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