Ordered that the order is modified, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, (1) by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the defendants' motion which was for a protective order striking document request number five from the plaintiff's demand for discovery and inspection dated February 10, 2012, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion, and (2) by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the defendants' motion which was for a protective order striking the plaintiff's notice to admit, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
CPLR 3101 (a) provides that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof." However, "unlimited disclosure is not mandated, and the rules provide that the court may issue a protective order `denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure device' to `prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or the courts'" (County of Suffolk v Long Is. Power Auth., 100 A.D.3d 944, 946 , quoting CPLR 3103 [a]; see Accent Collections, Inc. v Cappelli Enters., Inc., 84 A.D.3d 1283 ). "The supervision of disclosure and the setting of reasonable terms and conditions therefor rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and, absent an improvident exercise of that discretion, its determination will not be disturbed" (Montalvo v CVS Pharm., Inc., 102 A.D.3d 842, 843  [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. v Walsh, 45 A.D.3d 531 ).
In the instant action, among other things, to recover damages for fraud, tortious interference with contract, and a violation of General Business Law § 349, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants Halcyon Jet Holdings, Inc., and Halcyon Jets, Inc. (hereinafter together the Halcyon defendants), improperly
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in rejecting the defendants' contention that discovery should be limited to the specified customers and brokers, since that would have improperly limited the plaintiff's discovery to only one of its several causes of action. Most of the plaintiff's demands were proper in that the documents requested were "material and necessary" in the prosecution of the action (CPLR 3101 [a]). However, request number five in the plaintiff's demand for discovery and inspection, which sought "all books and records" of the Halcyon defendants for the years 2007 through 2011, was overbroad, in that it included books and records not material or relevant to the issues in this action (see Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 406 ; Francis v Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc./Burns Intl. Sec. Servs. Corp., 102 A.D.3d 739, 740 ; Elie v City of New York, 92 A.D.3d 716, 718 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for a protective order striking request number five in the plaintiff's demand.
CPLR 3123 provides, in relevant part, that "a party may serve upon any other party a written request for admission by the latter... of the truth of any matters of fact set forth in the request, as to which the party requesting the admission reasonably believes there can be no substantial dispute at the trial and which are within the knowledge of such other party or can be ascertained by him upon reasonable inquiry" (CPLR 3123 [a]). "The purpose of a notice to admit is only to eliminate from the issues in litigation matters which will not be in dispute at trial. It is not intended to cover ultimate conclusions, which can only be made after a full and complete trial" (Ramcharran v New York Airport Servs., LLC, 108 A.D.3d 610, 610  [internal quotation marks omitted]). A notice to admit is not to be used as a "substitute for existing discovery devices" (Singh v G & A Mounting & Die Cutting, 292 A.D.2d 516, 516  [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Ramcharran v New York Airport Servs., LLC, 108 AD3d at 611).