MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MATTHEW T. SCHELP, District Judge.
This case is before the Court on Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Doc. , in which it also seeks the alternative relief of a new trial. A jury found in favor of Plaintiff on her claim that Defendant violated her right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
I. Judgment as a Matter of Law
Prior to the trial in this case, the Court
II. New Trial
For the same reason, Defendant is not entitled to a new trial based on its argument that the "weight of the evidence d[id] not support the verdict." Doc.  at 10. The Eighth Circuit elsewhere has explained that a district court should reject a jury verdict and grant a new trial "only where, after a review of all the evidence giving full respect to the jury's verdict, the court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the jury has erred." Ryan by Ryan v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 734 F.2d 385, 387 (8th Cir. 1984); accord Matthew v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 639 F.3d 857, 869 (8th Cir. 2011). In finding summary judgment improper in this case, the Eighth Circuit necessarily concluded that a reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff based on the evidence. See Shelter Ins. Companies v. Hildreth, 255 F.3d 921, 924 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."); Meier, 934 F.3d at 829 (noting a "reasonable jury could find that [Plaintff's] truck was towed and held pursuant to [Defendant's] unwritten but widespread and persistent policy"). Since the Eighth Circuit found a reasonable jury could find Defendant liable based on the summary judgment record, the Court cannot be left with a definite and firm conviction that the jury erred here when it reviewed substantially the same evidence and found for Plaintiff.
Defendant's remaining argument in support of a new trial is that jury instruction eighteen caused it "material prejudice." Doc.  at 12. Instruction eighteen stated:
Doc.  at 24. Defendant argues that "without any further definition," the "language of `fairly attributable,'" does not "provide a complete definition of the operating under color of law." Doc.  at 12. Assuming Defendant's objection to the instruction was not a general one and preserved a claim of error, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(1), the Court finds the instruction "fairly and adequately" submitted the issue to the jury even if it was not a "model of clarity," Gill v. Maciejewski, 546 F.3d 557, 563 (8th Cir. 2008). Indeed, it would have been problematic to provide the jury with "a complete definition" of operating under color of law, which Defendant argues "fairly attributable" failed to do "without any further definition." Doc.  at 12. "What is fairly attributable is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity." Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). The Supreme Court has noted that its cases "have identified a host of facts that can bear on the fairness of such an attribution." Id. at 296. The Court concludes the provided instruction accurately reflected the law and could be understood and applied by the jury.
After considering Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, and in the alternative its request for a new trial, the Court determines neither is appropriate here.