STRAS, Circuit Judge.
Carl and Angel Larsen wish to make wedding videos. Can Minnesota require them to produce videos of same-sex weddings, even if the message would conflict with their own beliefs? The district court concluded that it could and dismissed the Larsens' constitutional challenge to Minnesota's antidiscrimination law. Because the First Amendment allows the Larsens to choose when to speak and what to say, we reverse the dismissal of two of their claims and remand with instructions to consider whether they are entitled to a preliminary injunction.
The Larsens, who own and operate Telescope Media Group, use their "unique skill[s] to identify and tell compelling stories through video," including commercials, short films, and live-event productions. They exercise creative control over the videos they produce and make "editorial judgments" about "what events to take on,
The Larsens "gladly work with all people—regardless of their race, sexual orientation, sex, religious beliefs, or any other classification." But because they "are Christians who believe that God has called them to use their talents and their company to . . . honor God," the Larsens decline any requests for their services that conflict with their religious beliefs. This includes any that, in their view, "contradict biblical truth; promote sexual immorality; support the destruction of unborn children; promote racism or racial division; incite violence; degrade women; or promote any conception of marriage other than as a lifelong institution between one man and one woman."
The Larsens now wish to make films that promote their view of marriage as a "sacrificial covenant between one man and one woman." To do so, they want to begin producing wedding videos, but only of opposite-sex weddings. According to the Larsens, these videos will "capture the background stories of the couples' love leading to commitment, the [couples'] joy[,] . . . the sacredness of their sacrificial vows at the altar, and even the following chapters of the couples' lives." The Larsens believe that the videos, which they intend to post and share online, will allow them to reach "a broader audience to achieve maximum cultural impact" and "affect the cultural narrative regarding marriage."
Minnesota has a different idea.
Minn. Stat. § 363A.11, subdiv. 1(a)(1). The second provides:
Id. § 363A.17(3).
Minnesota reads these two provisions as requiring the Larsens to produce both opposite-sex-and same-sex-wedding videos, or none at all. According to Minnesota, the Larsens' duty does not end there. If the Larsens enter the wedding-video business, their videos must depict same- and opposite-sex weddings in an equally "positive"
The Larsens have sued Minnesota in federal district court seeking injunctive relief preventing Minnesota from enforcing the MHRA against them. Their principal theory is that it is unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to require them to make same-sex-wedding videos. They also raise free-exercise, associational-freedom, equal-protection, and unconstitutional-conditions claims, as well as an argument that the MHRA is unconstitutionally vague.
At this juncture, all that is before us are the allegations of the Larsens' complaint. Early on, the district court granted Minnesota's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It also denied the Larsens' request for a preliminary injunction, but only because it had already decided to dismiss their lawsuit. According to the court, the Larsens' free-speech claim failed as a matter of law because the MHRA serves an important governmental interest—preventing discrimination—without limiting more speech than necessary to accomplish this goal. It also ruled that the MHRA did not violate any of the other constitutional rights identified by the Larsens.
Before addressing the merits, we must determine whether the Larsens have standing. At this stage, we assume the allegations in the complaint are true and view them in the light most favorable to the Larsens. See Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 933 n.4 (8th Cir. 2012).
To have standing, the Larsens must establish (1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged law; and (3) that a favorable decision is likely to redress their injury. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). There is no doubt that the Larsens' allegations satisfy the second and third requirements: any injury would be traceable to the MHRA and would be redressed by a judicial decision enjoining Minnesota from enforcing the law against them. The only real question is whether the Larsens have suffered an injury in fact.
Although a harm must be "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical," to constitute an injury in fact, id. at 1548 (citation omitted), a plaintiff need not wait for an actual prosecution or enforcement action before challenging a law's constitutionality, see Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158-59, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014). In fact, all a plaintiff must do at the motion-to-dismiss stage is allege "an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and [that] there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder." Id. at 159, 134 S.Ct. 2334 (citation omitted); see also 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 627 (8th Cir. 2011) (explaining that even "[s]elf-censorship can . . . constitute injury in fact" for a free-speech claim when a plaintiff reasonably decides "to chill his speech in light of the challenged statute").
The Larsens' constitutional claims meet this test. The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment covers films, see Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02, 72 S.Ct. 777, 96 S.Ct. 1098 (1952), so the videos the Larsens intend to make are "affected with a constitutional interest," Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at
Moreover, the Larsens have adequately alleged a "credible threat of enforcement." Id.; cf. Minn. Stat. § 363A.30, subdiv. 4 (establishing criminal penalties for certain violations). If the Larsens enter the wedding-video business and refuse to film same-sex weddings, Minnesota has made clear that it will view their actions as a violation of the MHRA. Indeed, Minnesota has publicly announced that the MHRA requires all private businesses, including photographers, to provide equal services for same- and opposite-sex weddings. It has even employed "testers" to target non-compliant businesses, and it has already pursued a successful enforcement action against a wedding vendor who refused to rent a venue for a same-sex wedding. Minnesota's active enforcement of the MHRA leaves us with little doubt that the Larsens will face legal consequences if they decide to start making wedding videos.
Having determined that the Larsens have standing, we now address their principal claim, which is that the wedding videos are speech and they have a First Amendment right to make them for only opposite-sex weddings. At this stage, our task is to review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges one or more actionable claims. United States ex rel. Raynor v. Nat'l Rural Utils. Co-op. Fin., Corp., 690 F.3d 951, 955 (8th Cir. 2012).
The First Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits laws "abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. Const. amend. I. It promotes the free exchange of ideas by allowing people to speak in many forms and convey a variety of messages, including those that "invite dispute" and are "provocative and challenging." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 S.Ct. 1131 (1949). It also prevents the government from "[c]ompelling individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable." Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2463, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018). As the Supreme Court has made clear, "[t]here is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive" approach because "the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas. . . by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups." Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4-5, 69 S.Ct. 894.
The Larsens' videos are a form of speech that is entitled to First Amendment protection. The Supreme Court long ago recognized that "expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 502, 72 S.Ct. 777; see also Schad v. Borough of Mount
Although the Larsens do not plan to make feature films, the videos they do wish to produce will convey a message designed to "affect public attitudes and behavior." Id. According to their complaint, they will tell "healthy stories of sacrificial love and commitment between a man and a woman," depict marriage as a divinely ordained covenant, and oppose the "current cultural narratives about marriage with which [the Larsens] disagree." By design, they will serve as a "medium for the communication of ideas" about marriage. Id.; cf. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 1719, 1727, 201 L.Ed.2d 35 (2018) ("[R]eligious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are protected views and in some instances protected forms of expression."). And like the creators of other types of films, such as full-length documentaries, the Larsens will exercise substantial "editorial control and judgment," Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974), including making decisions about the footage and dialogue to include, the order in which to present content, and whether to set parts of the film to music. The videos themselves are, in a word, speech.
The dissent reaches the opposite conclusion, but only by recasting or ignoring the allegations in the Larsens' complaint,
It also does not make any difference that the Larsens are expressing their views through a for-profit enterprise. See post at 774-75. In fact, in holding that motion pictures are protected by the First Amendment, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the idea that films do not "fall within the First Amendment's aegis [simply] because" they are often produced by "large-scale business[es] conducted for private profit." Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501, 72 S.Ct. 777; see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1745 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]his Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a speaker's profit motive gives the government a freer hand in compelling speech."). Other commercial
Minnesota's position is that it is regulating the Larsens' conduct, not their speech. To be sure, producing a video requires several actions that, individually, might be mere conduct: positioning a camera, setting up microphones, and clicking and dragging files on a computer screen. But what matters for our analysis is that these activities come together to produce finished videos that are "medi[a] for the communication of ideas." Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501, 72 S.Ct. 777; see also Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 n.1, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 180 L.Ed.2d 708 (2011) ("Whether government regulation applies to creating, distributing, or consuming speech makes no difference.").
If we were to accept Minnesota's invitation to evaluate each of the Larsens' acts individually, then wide swaths of protected speech would be subject to regulation by the government. The government could argue, for example, that painting is not speech because it involves the physical movements of a brush. Or it could claim that publishing a newspaper is conduct because it depends on the mechanical operation of a printing press. It could even declare that a parade is conduct because it involves walking. Yet there is no question that the government cannot compel an artist to paint, demand that the editors of a newspaper publish a response piece, or require the organizers of a parade to allow everyone to participate. See, e.g., Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256-58, 94 S.Ct. 2831; Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 572-73, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995). Speech is not conduct just because the government says it is.
Minnesota's interpretation of the MHRA interferes with the Larsens' speech in two overlapping ways. First, it compels the Larsens to speak favorably about same-sex marriage if they choose to speak favorably about opposite-sex marriage. Second, it operates as a content-based regulation of their speech.
The Supreme Court has "held time and again that freedom of speech includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As Janus recognized, the latter is perhaps the more sacred of the two rights. See id. at 2463-64. After all, the "choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view . . . is presumed to lie beyond the government's power to control." Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 654, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554 (2000) (citation omitted).
To apply the MHRA to the Larsens in the manner Minnesota threatens is at odds with the "cardinal constitutional command" against compelled speech. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463. The Larsens do not want to make videos celebrating same-sex marriage, which they find objectionable. Instead, they wish to actively promote opposite-sex weddings through their videos,
Minnesota attempts to downplay this injury by pointing out that the MHRA would not require the Larsens to convey any specific message in their videos. Even if the Larsens must be willing to produce "positive" videos about same-sex marriage, Minnesota argues, they need not actually do so unless a customer requests a film with this point of view.
Even aside from its implausibility—for it seems unlikely that any same-sex couple would request a video condemning their marriage—this argument does not get Minnesota far under First Amendment doctrine. The Supreme Court has recognized that the government still compels speech when it passes a law that has the effect of foisting a third party's message on a speaker. In Hurley, for example, it held that Massachusetts could not use its public-accommodation law to require the sponsors of a private parade to include a group of gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals who wished to march while "carrying [their] own banner." 515 U.S. at 572-73, 115 S.Ct. 2338. The Court explained that compelling the inclusion of others impermissibly "declar[ed] the sponsors' speech itself to be [a] public accommodation" in a way that "alter[ed] the expressive content of their parade." Id.
Similarly, in Tornillo, the Supreme Court addressed a Florida statute that required newspapers that published attacks on the "personal character or official record" of political candidates to publish the candidates' responses too, free of cost. 418 U.S. at 244, 94 S.Ct. 2831. Forced inclusion, the Court reasoned, "fail[ed] to clear the barriers of the First Amendment" because it impermissibly "intru[ded] into the function of the editors." Id. at 258, 94 S.Ct. 2831. The lesson from Tornillo is that the First Amendment is relevant whenever the government compels speech, regardless of who writes the script.
The MHRA also operates in this case as a content-based regulation of the Larsens' speech, even if, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the MHRA does not, "[o]n its face, . . . aim at the suppression of speech." Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). A content-based regulation "[m]andat[es] speech that a speaker would not otherwise make" or "exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of" speech. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) (quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256, 94 S.Ct. 2831). By treating the Larsens' choice to talk about one topic—opposite-sex marriages—as a trigger for compelling them to talk about a topic they would rather avoid—same-sex marriages—the MHRA does both at once. In fact, by requiring the Larsens to convey "positive" messages about same-sex weddings, it even goes a step further. Cf. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2227, 192 L.Ed.2d 236 (2015) (describing content-based regulations as those that operate based on "the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed").
Laws that compel speech or regulate it based on its content are subject to strict scrutiny, which will require Minnesota, at a minimum, to prove that the application of the MHRA to the Larsens is "narrowly tailored to serve [a] compelling state interest." Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226; see also, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 654, 120 S.Ct. 2446 ("[T]he choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view . . . is presumed to lie beyond the government's power to control." (citation omitted)); Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573, 115 S.Ct. 2338 ("[T]he fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment[is] that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message."); cf. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464 (suggesting that "a law commanding `involuntary affirmation' of objected-to beliefs would require `even more immediate and urgent grounds' than a law demanding silence" (emphasis added) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 S.Ct. 1628 (1943))); Gralike v. Cook, 191 F.3d 911, 919-20 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying strict scrutiny to a law forcing candidates to speak about term limits). In an as-applied challenge like this one, the focus of the strict-scrutiny test is on the actual speech being regulated, rather than how the law might affect others who are not before the court. See Phelps-Roper v. Ricketts, 867 F.3d 883, 896 (8th Cir. 2017).
The State asserts an interest in ensuring "that all people in Minnesota [are] entitled to full and equal enjoyment of public accommodations and services." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This interest has a substantial constitutional pedigree and, generally speaking, we have no doubt that it is compelling. For example, the Supreme Court has said that antidiscrimination laws typically "are well within the State's . . . power to enact when a legislature has reason to believe that a given group is the target of discrimination." Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572, 115 S.Ct. 2338. Indeed, the MHRA itself withstood a constitutional challenge after Minnesota applied it to compel a "large and basically unselective" social club to accept female members. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621-22, 626-27, 104 S.Ct. 3244. And like the dissent, we have little doubt that Minnesota had powerful reasons for extending the MHRA to protect its citizens
But that is not the point. Even antidiscrimination laws, as critically important as they are, must yield to the Constitution. And as compelling as the interest in preventing discriminatory conduct may be, speech is treated differently under the First Amendment. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579, 115 S.Ct. 2338 ("While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government."). As the Supreme Court has explained, even if the government may prohibit "the act of discriminating against individuals in the provision of publicly available goods, privileges, and services," it may not "declar[e] [another's] speech itself to be [a] public accommodation" or grant "protected individuals . . . the right to participate in [another's] speech." Id. at 572-73, 115 S.Ct. 2338 (emphasis added).
Hurley is particularly instructive. When Massachusetts forced the organizers of a private parade to include a group that wished "to march in the parade as a way to express pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals," id. at 560-61, 115 S.Ct. 2338, the Supreme Court concluded that applying the State's public-accommodation law in this way violated the organizers' freedom of speech, id. at 566, 115 S.Ct. 2338. Although antidiscrimination laws are generally constitutional, the Court reasoned, a "peculiar" application that required speakers "to alter the[ir] expressive content" was not. Id. at 572-73, 115 S.Ct. 2338 (emphasis added). In short, the Court drew the line exactly where the Larsens ask us to here: to prevent the government from requiring their speech to serve as a public accommodation for others.
Similarly, in Dale, the Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts had the right to expel a gay-rights activist, despite a New Jersey antidiscrimination law that otherwise prohibited the action. 530 U.S. at 644, 120 S.Ct. 2446. The reason, the Court said, was that the Boy Scouts' opposition to homosexuality was expressive and "the forced inclusion of [the activist] would [have] significantly affect[ed] its expression." Id. at 650-52, 656, 120 S.Ct. 2446; see also id. at 659, 120 S.Ct. 2446 ("[T]he First Amendment prohibits the State from imposing [an inclusion] requirement through the application of its public accommodations law."). Like Hurley, Dale makes clear that once conduct crosses over to speech or other expression, the government's ability to regulate it is limited.
As these cases demonstrate, regulating speech because it is discriminatory or offensive is not a compelling state interest, however hurtful the speech may be. It is a "bedrock principle . . . that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731 ("[I]t is not . . . the role of the State or its officials to prescribe what shall be offensive."). After all, the Westboro Baptist Church could carry highly inflammatory signs at military funerals, see Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448-49, 460-61, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172 (2011), the Nazis could march in areas heavily populated by Jewish residents, see Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43-44, 97 S.Ct. 2205, 53 L.Ed.2d 96 (1977) (per curiam), and an activist could burn the American flag as a form of
The cases relied upon by Minnesota and the dissent are not to the contrary. In Roberts, for example, the Supreme Court emphasized that an all-male social club had failed to show that a law requiring the admission of female members "impose[d] any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association" or "impede[d] the organization's ability to engage in . . . protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views." 468 U.S. at 626-27, 104 S.Ct. 3244; see also id. at 627, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (highlighting that the law "impose[d] no restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing members"). So too in Hishon v. King & Spalding, in which the Court emphasized that a law firm "ha[d] not shown how its ability to [exercise its expressive and associational rights] would be inhibited by a requirement that it consider [a woman] for partnership on her merits." 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). The unmistakable message is that antidiscrimination laws can regulate conduct, but not expression.
Indeed, if Minnesota were correct, there is no reason it would have to stop with the Larsens. In theory, it could use the MHRA to require a Muslim tattoo artist to inscribe "My religion is the only true religion" on the body of a Christian if he or she would do the same for a fellow Muslim, or it could demand that an atheist musician perform at an evangelical church service. In fact, if Minnesota were to do what other jurisdictions have done and declare political affiliation or ideology to be a protected characteristic, then it could force a Democratic speechwriter to provide the same services to a Republican, or it could require a professional entertainer to perform at rallies for both the Republican and Democratic candidates for the same office. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 2-1402.31; Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code §§ 14.06.010, .020(L), 030(B); cf. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 571-72, 115 S.Ct. 2338 (recognizing that states have the power to create additional protected classes).
Even so, Minnesota argues that we should apply intermediate scrutiny based on a theory that, once again, turns on the distinction between conduct and speech. Specifically, when "`speech' and `nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct" and the government seeks to neutrally regulate the non-speech element, intermediate scrutiny applies under the incidental-burden doctrine. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968)); see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26-27, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (explaining that a regulation must be content-neutral under this doctrine). According to Minnesota, the MHRA only incidentally burdens speech because it neutrally regulates "commercial conduct and economic activity" and requires the Larsens to do nothing more than provide "services to customers regardless of their sexual orientation."
The problem with this theory, even aside from the fact that the MHRA is not content neutral, see supra Part III.B, is that Minnesota does not actually seek to regulate non-speech activity, see Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 26-27, 130 S.Ct. 2705. The "commercial conduct" and "economic activity" to which Minnesota refers is the making of the videos themselves, which, as we have already explained, are speech. Indeed, Minnesota
Importantly, the fact that Minnesota is not shy about its belief that it can regulate the videos themselves distinguishes this case from other applications of antidiscrimination laws that actually do target conduct, which are generally constitutional even when they incidentally affect speech. Cf. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572-73, 115 S.Ct. 2338 (declaring a "peculiar" application of an antidiscrimination law to be unconstitutional). An employment-discrimination law, for example, can unquestionably "require an employer to take down a sign reading `White Applicants Only.'" Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc. (F.A.I.R.), 547 U.S. 47, 62, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006). And a public-accommodation law requiring a restaurant to serve people of all races, genders, and sexual orientations will have the incidental effect of requiring servers to speak to customers to take their orders. But these consequences are incidental because the relevant laws target the activities of hiring employees and providing food, neither of which typically constitutes speech. Here, by contrast, Minnesota is targeting speech itself.
Minnesota also suggests that a lesser form of scrutiny is appropriate because the Larsens can say that they disapprove of same-sex marriage in some other way. But just like New Hampshire could not "require [drivers] to display the state motto" Live Free or Die on their license plates, Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), even if they could disavow the motto through "a conspicuous bumper sticker," id. at 722, 97 S.Ct. 1428 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), so too would a disclaimer here be inadequate. The reason is that the constitutional "protection of a speaker's freedom would be empty" if "the government could require speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next." Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576, 115 S.Ct. 2338 (brackets and citation omitted).
To be sure, the Supreme Court has suggested that the opportunity to provide a disclaimer can make a difference when a law requires an otherwise-silent party to provide a forum for the speech of others. One example is PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, which upheld a requirement compelling the owner of a shopping mall to allow private individuals to distribute political pamphlets on the premises. 447 U.S. 74, 77-78, 88, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). The Court emphasized that the owner could "expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers st[ood]." Id. at 87, 100 S.Ct. 2035. "Notably absent," however, "was any concern that access to [the mall] might affect the shopping center owner's exercise of his own right to speak" or any allegation
Minnesota's reliance on F.A.I.R. is similarly flawed. F.A.I.R. was also about the availability of a forum, but this time for legal recruiters. Law schools, which invited and hosted recruiters of all types, objected to hosting the military because of a disagreement with policies that excluded gays and lesbians from serving. F.A.I.R., 547 U.S. at 51-52, 126 S.Ct. 1297. Federal law, however, required the schools to give equal access to military recruiters or risk losing federal funding. Id. The schools sued, claiming that they had a First Amendment right to exclude military recruiters from campus. Id. at 52-53, 126 S.Ct. 1297. The Supreme Court disagreed, even if the schools had to "send e-mails [and] post notices on bulletin boards on [the recruiters'] behalf"—both "elements of speech." Id. at 61, 126 S.Ct. 1297.
The Supreme Court upheld the law because it did not interfere with the law schools' expression or coopt their speech. Simply hosting recruiters was not speech, according to the Court, so the "accommodation of a military recruiter's message" did not "sufficiently interfere with any message of the school[s]." Id. at 64, 126 S.Ct. 1297. Besides, just like the mall owner in PruneYard, the schools "remain[ed] free . . . to express whatever views they may have [had] on the military's congressionally mandated employment policy." Id. at 60, 126 S.Ct. 1297. Cases like Hurley, by contrast, involved unconstitutionally compelled speech because "the complaining speaker's own message was affected by the speech it was forced to accommodate." Id. at 63, 126 S.Ct. 1297.
The facts of the case, as pleaded by the Larsens, are much closer to Hurley than to PruneYard or F.A.I.R. Rather than serving as a forum for the speech of others, the Larsens' videos will carry their "own message." Id. The MHRA interferes with their message by requiring them to say something they otherwise would not. See id. at 64, 126 S.Ct. 1297. The Larsens, then, lose "the autonomy to choose the content of [their] own message," id. (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573, 115 S.Ct. 2338), which violates the "cardinal constitutional command" against compelled speech, Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463.
* * *
Consistent with the Supreme Court's instruction that antidiscrimination laws "do not, as a general matter, violate the First. . . Amendment," Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572, 115 S.Ct. 2338, our holding leaves intact other applications of the MHRA that do not regulate speech based on its content or otherwise compel an individual to speak. But when, as here, Minnesota seeks to regulate speech itself as a public accommodation, it has gone too far under Hurley and its interest must give way to the demands of the First Amendment.
The district court also ruled that the Larsens could not seek relief on various other constitutional theories. We largely agree that these claims fail. But one—the free-exercise claim—can proceed because it is intertwined with their free-speech claim. Accordingly, the Larsens are free to pursue their so-called "hybrid rights" claim on remand.
The basic premise of the Larsens' free-exercise claim is that the MHRA, as interpreted by Minnesota, prevents them from freely exercising their religious beliefs. It does so, the Larsens say, because
Those seeking relief under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment will ordinarily argue that their religion requires them to engage in conduct that the government forbids or forbids certain conduct that the government requires. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (evaluating whether those who practice Santeria could perform animal sacrifice, the religion's "central element," even though it was illegal); Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (deciding whether members of the Native American Church should be allowed to use peyote, a controlled substance, for "sacramental purposes"); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971) (considering a claim that conscientious objectors should have been able to avoid military conscription during the Vietnam War). If the Larsens' claim fell into one of those two categories, then we would simply apply the rule that neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden "a particular religious practice" do not have to be "justified by a compelling governmental interest." Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531, 113 S.Ct. 2217; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79, 110 S.Ct. 1595 ("We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate." (emphasis added)).
But the Larsens have alleged that the MHRA burdens their religiously motivated speech, not their religious conduct. So their claim falls into the class of "hybrid situation[s]" in which "the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech," can "bar application of a neutral, generally applicable law." Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (emphasis added). Because the Larsens' free-exercise claim is "connected with [their] communicative activity," in other words, the Larsens may use their "Free Exercise Clause concerns" to "reinforce" their free-speech claim. Id. at 882, 110 S.Ct. 1595.
Minnesota, the district court, and the dissent seem to think that we can simply ignore the hybrid-rights discussion from Smith because it was dicta. For two reasons, it cannot be dismissed so easily. First, we applied the hybrid-rights doctrine post-Smith in Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, which rejected a church's stand-alone free-exercise claim but recognized that the church's other constitutional claims "breathe[d] life back into [its] `hybrid rights' claim." 948 F.2d 464, 472-73 (8th Cir. 1991). Because this aspect of Cornerstone Bible Church resurrected a claim that had been left for dead by the district court, our application of the hybrid-rights theory was part of the holding because it was "essential to the judgment in that case." John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A of United Food & Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 550 (8th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing between holdings and dicta).
Second, we do not agree with the premise that Smith's analysis of the hybrid-rights doctrine was dicta. Smith upheld a "neutral, generally applicable law" that interfered with the sacramental use of peyote. 494 U.S. at 881-82, 110 S.Ct. 1595. To reach this conclusion, however, the Supreme Court had to grapple with a long line of cases that had treated the Free Exercise Clause as a shield against laws burdening religious practices. See id. (collecting
This means that Smith did more than simply speculate about how to treat a hybrid claim in some hypothetical future case. Rather, it described the operation of an existing doctrine, one that it then applied to the parties. See id. (highlighting that "[t]here [was] no contention that Oregon's drug law represent[ed] an attempt to regulate . . . the communication of religious beliefs" (emphasis added)). Although the claimants did not prevail under the hybrid-rights doctrine in Smith, the Court's discussion of it was far from dicta.
Of course, it is not at all clear that the hybrid-rights doctrine will make any real difference in the end. After all, the Larsen's free-speech claim already requires the application of strict scrutiny. As a practical matter, then, the fact that the videos also have religious significance may not move the needle much. But because the Larsens have adequately alleged a hybrid-rights claim in their complaint, the district court must allow them to develop it on remand. See Cornerstone Bible Church, 948 F.2d at 473.
The Larsens cannot prevail on any of their remaining claims, beginning with their allegation that the MHRA violates their associational-freedom rights. Their theory is that the law forces them "to join together and speak with those who wish to express an opposing message about marriage," which unconstitutionally "impairs their ability to express their views, and only those views." (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
Although the Larsens call it associational freedom, this is really a disguised free-speech claim. The right to expressive association protects groups from being forced "to accept members [they do] not desire." F.A.I.R., 547 U.S. at 69, 126 S.Ct. 1297 (citation omitted). But requiring the Larsens to produce same-sex-wedding videos would not force them to accept same-sex couples as "members" of their company or of some other group to which they belong. Rather, they would simply have to "`associate' with [same-sex couples] in the sense that they [would need to] interact with them." Id. Standing alone, these interactions would not affect their "ability to advocate public or private viewpoints." Dale, 530 U.S. at 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446. It is only when these interactions require the Larsens to speak in a certain way that the MHRA "impair[s] the[ir] ability. . . to express th[eir] views." Id.
Indeed, the Larsens' allegations all but doom their associational-freedom claim. The complaint stresses that the Larsens will "gladly work with all people—regardless of their . . . sexual orientation"—as long as the message of any video they are asked to make fits with their religious beliefs. The Larsens' counsel reinforced this point at oral argument, explaining that they would have no problem making other types of videos for gay or lesbian customers. It is clear, then, that serving, speaking to, and otherwise associating with gay and lesbian customers is not the harm they seek to remedy. Their real objection is to the message of the videos themselves, which is just another way of saying that the MHRA violates their free-speech rights.
The Larsens have also brought a claim alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The problem with the Larsens' logic lies in the middle step: the classification that they believe they have identified. The MHRA does not classify anyone based on their views about marriage. Rather, under Minnesota's interpretation, every wedding-video business must be willing to film both opposite-sex and same-sex weddings. The point, in other words, is that the law applies equally. Cf. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) ("The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results.").
To be sure, the Larsens, and others like them, are unhappy with the MHRA's requirements, but dissatisfaction with the law is not itself a classification. Cf. id. at 271-72, 99 S.Ct. 2282 (explaining that "many [laws] affect certain groups unevenly, even though the law itself treats them no differently from all other members of the class described by the law"). Indeed, by the Larsens' logic, any rule that affects religiously motivated conduct would be subject to strict scrutiny because it would create two groups of people: those who are happy to follow the law and those who are not. But we know from Smith that the government has the power to enact neutral, generally applicable laws that burden religious conduct. 494 U.S. at 878-80, 110 S.Ct. 1595. We accordingly reject the Larsens' attempt to manufacture a legal classification that does not exist.
The Larsens further allege that the MHRA "is vague and allows unbridled discretion." They focus on Minn. Stat. § 363A.17(3), which forbids discrimination "unless the alleged refusal or discrimination is because of a legitimate business purpose." (Emphasis added). According to the Larsens, this exception creates "uncertainty" about the scope of the law and allows Minnesota to enforce the law however it wishes, including more aggressively against those with whom it disagrees.
The MHRA, as applied to the Larsens, is not unconstitutionally vague. "We consider whether a statute is vague as applied to the particular facts at issue, for a plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 18-19, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). The allegations in the complaint once again doom the Larsens' argument, this time because they insist that "the MHRA prohibits them from [creating only opposite-sex-wedding videos]" and that Minnesota has "categorically declared" that their religious objections are not a "legitimate business purpose." So their argument that they are somehow left in legal limbo rings hollow.
Finally, the Larsens' complaint also alleges a violation of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine. They reason that the MHRA "conditions [their] right to promote their religious views about marriage. . . on their willingness to forfeit their rights to be free from government-compelled speech, to freely exercise their religion, and to equal protection of the laws."
This argument is just a replay of their other claims, once again under an ill-fitting legal framework. The unconstitutional-conditions doctrine prevents the government from "deny[ing] a benefit to a person" because of "constitutionally protected [activity]." Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) (emphasis added). This case, however, involves "direct" regulation, not the withholding of benefits, such as "tax exemptions," "unemployment benefits," or "welfare payments." Id. (citation omitted). We accordingly treat this claim for what it is: three miscast, freestanding constitutional claims.
We affirm the district court's judgment in part, reverse it in part, and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the district court must consider in the first instance whether the Larsens are entitled to a preliminary injunction, keeping in mind the principle that, "[w]hen a plaintiff has shown a likely violation of his or her First Amendment rights, the other requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction are generally deemed to have been satisfied." Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 870 (8th Cir.2012) (en banc) (citation omitted).
KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The Larsens want to expand their videography business to provide wedding-video services, but they do not want to supply these services for same-sex weddings. Minnesota has enacted a general antidiscrimination statute that prohibits businesses from discriminating against individuals based on certain protected characteristics, including sexual orientation. The Larsens filed this lawsuit to obtain an exemption that would allow them to deny service to same-sex couples. The court today correctly rejects many of the Larsens' arguments as to why they are entitled to such an exemption. It nonetheless concludes that the First Amendment's protections for free speech and free exercise of religion likely entitle them to relief. From this holding, I must respectfully dissent.
No court has ever afforded "affirmative constitutional protections" to private discrimination.
Instead, the court tries to recharacterize Minnesota's law as a content-based regulation of speech, asserting that it forces the Larsens to speak and to convey a message with which they disagree. Neither is true. The Larsens remain free to communicate any message they desire—about same-sex marriage or any other topic—or no message at all. What they cannot do is operate a public accommodation that serves customers of one sexual orientation but not others. And make no mistake, that is what today's decision affords them license to do. The Larsens concede that they want to operate a public accommodation that serves only opposite-sex couples. Minnesota's law prohibits that conduct just as it would prohibit any hotel from denying its services to an individual based on race, any store from refusing to sell goods to a person based on religion, or any restaurant from charging higher prices to women than to men. That the service the Larsens want to make available to the public is expressive does not transform Minnesota's law into a content-based regulation, nor should it empower the Larsens to discriminate against prospective customers based on sexual orientation.
The axiom that places of public accommodation are open to everyone is deeply rooted in the American legal system. Since at least the sixteenth century, the common law recognized that innkeepers and common carriers were obligated to serve all potential customers.
In that vein, Minnesota enacted the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) more than 130 years ago. The MHRA originally provided that all persons "of every race and color" shall be "entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of" public accommodations within the state. An Act To Protect All Citizens in Their Civil and Legal Rights, ch. 224, sec. 1, 1885 Minn. Laws 295, 296. Like other states, Minnesota eventually broadened the scope of the law's protections to cover a wider swath of businesses and a larger number of protected classes.
The current MHRA contains two antidiscrimination provisions at issue here. The Public Accommodations Provision prohibits denying anyone the "full and equal enjoyment" of the goods or services of a place of public accommodation because of "race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, or sex."
Minnesota's decision to add sexual orientation to the list of protected characteristics was driven by substantial evidence of sexual-orientation discrimination, particularly in rural areas. In April 1990, Minnesota Governor Rudy Perpich appointed a task force to determine whether gay and lesbian Minnesotans were suffering from discrimination and to make policy recommendations.
This evidence is consistent with the well-documented history of discrimination against gays and lesbians in this country. "[F]or centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral."
It was in light of this history that Minnesota amended the MHRA to prohibit various forms of discrimination based on sexual orientation. The amendments sought to ensure that "sexual orientation cannot be used to deny some Minnesotans the basic rights to a place to live, employment and other public accommodations which should be enjoyed by all citizens." Letter from Hubert H. Humphrey III, Att'y Gen., to Hon. Alan Spear, Chair, Senate Judiciary Comm. (Mar. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Humphrey Letter], J.A. 477. As relevant here, the law added sexual orientation to the list of protected characteristics included in the Public Accommodations Provision and the Business Discrimination Provision,
Minnesota is not alone in making sexual orientation a protected characteristic or in prohibiting sexual-orientation discrimination in places of public accommodation. Approximately half the states in the Union, along with the District of Columbia, provide similar protections.
Numerous religious groups supported the inclusion of sexual orientation as a protected characteristic under the MHRA.
Act of April 2, 1993, ch. 22, sec. 6, 1993 Minn. Laws at 125-26 (now codified at Minn. Stat. § 363A.26). When Minnesota amended its laws in 2013 to authorize same-sex marriages, it added a third paragraph to the exception:
Act of May 14, 2013, ch. 74, sec. 1, 2013 Minn. Laws 1 (now codified at Minn. Stat. § 363A.26). The 1993 amendments also exempted from the Public Accommodations Provision
Act of April 2, 1993, ch. 22, sec. 5, 1993 Minn. Laws at 125 (now codified at Minn. Stat. § 363A.24 subdiv. 1).
The Larsens have sincere views about marriage rooted in their deeply held religious beliefs. They are "Christians who
But this case is not about the Larsens' rights as individual citizens to worship freely or to speak openly about their faith or political views. It is about their rights as owners of Telescope Media Group (TMG), a Minnesota for-profit corporation. TMG provides a variety of video and media production services to the public, including short films and commercials. TMG does not currently make wedding videos, but the Larsens want to expand TMG to include this service. The Larsens aver that they "desire to use their unique storytelling and promotional talents to convey messages that promote aspects of their sincerely-held religious beliefs." Am. Compl. ¶ 93. To that end, the Larsens want to offer wedding-video services, but they do not want to provide those services to same-sex couples.
The Larsens concede that, by offering wedding-video services to the general public, TMG qualifies as a place of public accommodation under the MHRA's definition.
The Larsens also express a desire to create a website that includes the following disclaimer against providing services to same-sex weddings: "Because of TMG's owners' religious beliefs and expressive purposes, it cannot make films promoting any conception of marriage that contradicts its religious beliefs that marriage is between one man and one woman, including films celebrating same-sex marriages."
The Larsens brought this lawsuit seeking to enjoin application of the MHRA as to TMG, thus providing them an exemption
Before addressing the Larsens' various claims, it is necessary to say a few words about the justiciability of their allegations. Both standing and ripeness are limitations on our judicial power "and must be considered even if not raised by the parties."
Whether the Larsens' claims are justiciable at this juncture hinges on whether their intended course of conduct is arguably proscribed by the MHRA.
Because we are at the pleading stage, our only guidance about how to define TMG's service comes from the complaint.
With this understanding, there is little doubt that offering to film weddings of heterosexual couples but refusing to film weddings of homosexual couples—purely because they are homosexual—would violate both the Public Accommodations Provision and the Business Discrimination Provision of the MHRA. The Larsens concede as much in their complaint, alleging that they want to expand TMG to offer wedding-video services to only opposite-sex couples but that "the MHRA prohibits them from doing so." Am. Compl. ¶ 160.
The court's opinion attempts to cast some doubt about whether the plain text of the MHRA would require TMG to provide wedding-video services for same-sex weddings if it offers those services to heterosexual couples. The implication is that the MHRA would only proscribe the Larsens' conduct because "Minnesota reads" the law that way.
This argument fails. Under the MHRA, a business cannot define its services in such a way as to incorporate a discriminatory characteristic. The Larsens cannot define their service as "opposite-sex wedding videos" any more than a hotel can recast its services as "whites-only lodgings." That is because the MHRA does not merely prohibit TMG from treating customers differently based on the customer's sexual orientation. It prohibits "deny[ing] any person the full and equal enjoyment" of its services "because of . . . sexual orientation," Minn. Stat. § 363A.11 subdiv. 1(a)(1) (emphasis added), or discriminating in business "because of a person's . . . sexual orientation,"
To conclude otherwise would redefine discrimination to no longer encompass a host of actions universally understood to be discriminatory. If a white store owner refuses to sell goods to a white patron because the patron entered the store accompanied by someone of another race, that is still discrimination "because of" race.
Moreover, it is well established that some protected characteristics are so intertwined with particular conduct that discrimination against the conduct becomes discrimination against the protected class.
Accordingly, intentionally refusing to provide services for a wedding because it involves a same-sex couple is prohibited sexual-orientation discrimination under the MHRA. The Larsens have made clear that they would refuse service to any same-sex wedding and that the only reason that they would do so would be "because of" the sexual orientation of the couple involved. That conduct is clearly prohibited by the MHRA, as the Larsens acknowledge in their complaint and as the court recognizes in its rejection of their vagueness challenge.
The MHRA also requires that the services offered to same-sex couples be the same as those offered to opposite-sex couples. The Business Discrimination Provision prohibits a business from "discriminat[ing] in the basic terms, conditions, or performance of the contract" because of a person's sexual orientation or other protected characteristic. Minn. Stat. § 363A.17(3). Thus, TMG cannot avoid violating the MHRA by providing other types of non-wedding services to gay and lesbian clients, nor can it provide services to same-sex couples that are inferior to those that it provides to heterosexual couples. Courts have long rejected the notion that the provision of "separate but equal" services is anything but discrimination by another name.
I recognize that the complaint alleges that the reason for the Larsens' differential treatment of same-sex couples is not because of prejudice against homosexuals, but because they disagree with the message that a video of a same-sex marriage would convey. But that does not make their intended conduct nondiscriminatory under the law. They want TMG to offer different services to customers based on sexual orientation, running afoul of the MHRA. Whatever the Larsens' motivations, the premise of this lawsuit is that TMG would violate the MHRA if it engages in the conduct described in the complaint.
In its First Amendment analysis, the court focuses on a question that is not before us today: whether the MHRA could be applied to require a business to express a specific message to which it objects, such as writing a racial slur on a cake or tattooing a religious message on someone's skin. It is not at all clear that a business violates the MHRA by refusing to express such a message if that is not a service that it would provide to a different type of customer.
Because the Larsens aver that they want to offer wedding-video services only to couples of one sexual orientation and not others, they have standing, and this case is ripe for judicial decision. Accepting the complaint's allegations as true, no "further factual development" is needed to determine whether the Larsens could be prosecuted for violating the MHRA.
It is well established that videos are a form of speech protected by the First
Courts draw a clear line "between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech."
By contrast, a law is content neutral if it "serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression . . . even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others."
The MHRA neither compels speech nor targets speech based on its content. In fact, the law says nothing about speech at
The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the view that laws targeting discrimination "do[ ] not, on [their] face, target speech or discriminate on the basis of its content."
The court's opinion relies extensively on
The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that applying the public accommodations law to the parade in
Here, taking the complaint as true, the Larsens cannot show that viewers of TMG's wedding videos would be likely to understand them to be expressions of the Larsens' "particularized message" about marriage.
The Larsens acknowledge as much in their complaint: "When an engaged couple asks the Larsens to help them celebrate their marriage, the Larsens want to tell a story of their love and commitment. . . ." Am. Compl. ¶ 131 (emphasis added). Although the Larsens may exercise editorial control over TMG's services, it is still ultimately the couple's story that is being told, not that of the Larsens. "[R]easonable observers would not perceive [the Larsens'] provision of . . . services for a same-sex wedding ceremony as an endorsement of same-sex marriage."
Admittedly, the Larsens take great pains to portray themselves more like independent artists telling their own story than messengers acting on behalf of others. At oral argument, their counsel compared them to "Steven Spielberg, edit[ing] the film[s] to express messages" consistent with their personal and religious views. Oral Arg. at 0:00-1:05. But Steven Spielberg is not a public accommodation; he does not make his filmmaking services generally "available to the public." Minn. Stat. § 363A.03 subdiv. 34. He is thus free to use his talents as he pleases without regard for laws like the MHRA. If the Larsens truly were artists speaking their own message, then TMG similarly would not qualify as a place of public accommodation and this entire lawsuit would be unnecessary.
Therefore, just because the Larsens want to sell services that are in some
The court's opinion warns,
Because the MHRA is content neutral and is not being applied in a manner that substantially burdens the Larsens' right to express their own message, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny.
Although intermediate scrutiny is the applicable standard, the MHRA would survive even strict scrutiny. To satisfy intermediate scrutiny, the MHRA must be narrowly tailored to serve governmental interests that are merely "significant,"
In general, public accommodations laws further compelling state interests of eradicating discrimination and ensuring residents have equal access to publicly available goods and services.
If eradicating discrimination based on race or sex is a compelling state interest, then so is Minnesota's interest in eradicating discrimination based on sexual orientation. Minnesota's decision to extend the MHRA's protections to cover sexual orientation was driven by considerable evidence of discrimination against the state's gays and lesbians.
The Larsens argue that no compelling interest is served by applying the MHRA to TMG because plenty of other businesses are happy to provide wedding-video services to same-sex couples. The argument that victims of discrimination are free to go elsewhere carries little force. Antidiscrimination laws like Title II and the MHRA were not passed to ensure that members of historically discriminated groups had access to some places of public accommodation. They were passed to guarantee equal access to all goods and services otherwise available to the public. "Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment that a person must surely feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of the public because of his race or color."
The court's opinion asserts that while regulating discriminatory conduct may be a compelling state interest, regulating the content of the Larsens' speech is not.
The MHRA is also narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest in eradicating discrimination. Again, it targets only conduct, not speech. The MHRA "therefore `responds precisely to the substantive problem which legitimately concerns' the State and abridges no more speech or associational freedom than is necessary to accomplish that purpose."
The Larsens' free exercise claim fares no better than their free speech claim. The First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth, prevents states from passing laws that prohibit the free exercise of religion.
But although the "freedom to believe" is absolute, the "freedom to act" is not.
Just as the MHRA does not target speech, neither does it target religion. The Public Accommodations Provision and the Business Discrimination Provision make no facial reference to religious practice,
The Larsens argue that the MHRA is not neutral because the Business Discrimination Provision's "legitimate business purpose" exception is vague and allows the state to arbitrarily provide individualized exemptions to non-religious businesses. This argument fails. In
The Larsens also argue that the MHRA should be subject to heightened scrutiny because, even if facially neutral, the law "substantially burdens" their religious exercise. But the Supreme Court rejected that argument in
The court today allows the Larsens' free exercise claim to move forward, on the theory that it is intertwined with their free speech claim. This theory derives from dicta in
None of the Larsens' remaining claims are viable, as the court explains,
By ruling that, under the Larsens' allegations, the MHRA is subject to and fails strict scrutiny, the court carves out an exception of staggering breadth. Under its
The court's opinion is similarly not limited based on the fact that sexual orientation happens to be the protected characteristic at issue in this case. Its logic would apply with equal force to any business that desires to treat customers differently based on any protected characteristic, including sex, race, religion, or disability. And what may start in the wedding business—"we don't do interracial weddings," "we don't film Jewish ceremonies," and so on—likely will not end there. Nothing stops a business owner from using today's decision to justify new forms of discrimination tomorrow. In this country's long and difficult journey to combat all forms of discrimination, the court's ruling represents a major step backward.
It is unremarkable that the Constitution and the laws of the various states "can, and in some instances must," protect same-sex couples in the exercise of their civil rights.
This analysis, however, rests on a faulty premise. If creating videos were conduct that Minnesota could regulate, then the State could invoke the incidental-burden doctrine to forbid the Larsens from advertising their intent to engage in discriminatory conduct. See F.A.I.R., 547 U.S. at 62, 126 S.Ct. 1297. But in this case, Minnesota cannot compel the Larsens to speak, so it cannot force them to remain silent either. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428.