OPINION
KANE, J. —
The Stanislaus County Deputy Sheriffs' Association (appellant), on behalf of certain custodial deputies designated as a "peace officer" by Penal Code
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After attempting to resolve the instant dispute through administrative channels, appellant's petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief, etc. (the petition), was filed in the trial court on August 15, 2013.
Appellant's petition sought a judicial declaration that such custodial deputies are exempt from the law prohibiting concealed firearms and may, while off duty, carry such a firearm on their person or in their vehicle without the necessity of first obtaining a permit to carry a concealed weapon. Additionally, appellant's petition sought a writ of mandate and/or an injunction requiring respondents to provide the custodial deputies with accurate identification cards reflecting and/or certifying that they may carry a concealed firearm while off duty without the necessity of obtaining a license or permit to carry a concealed weapon.
On August 19, 2014, respondents filed opposition in the trial court to the petition, arguing that pursuant to section 830.1, subdivision (c), custodial deputies are peace officers with only limited authority and, as such, cease to have peace officer status or authority outside of their particular custodial assignments. According to respondents, this means that custodial deputies, when off duty, are not exempt from the law that prohibits carrying concealed weapons. As a result, custodial deputies who wish to carry a concealed firearm while off duty must first obtain a "CCW" (carry a concealed weapon) permit. In support of their position, respondents especially rely upon a 2002 Attorney General opinion (i.e., 85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 130 (2002)).
Appellant filed a reply in the trial court on August 29, 2014. Appellant argued therein that the exemption in question, section 25450, does not make the distinctions raised by respondents, but is worded so as to be fully
In connection with the hearing of the petition in the trial court, the parties stipulated in writing to a number of facts. The stipulated facts included the following:
On September 9, 2014, the parties appeared at the hearing and presented oral argument, highlighting the issues and advocating for their respective legal positions. At the close of oral argument, the trial court took the matter under submission.
On November 6, 2014, the trial court issued its tentative decision, siding with respondents' position and ordering that the petition should be denied in its entirety. The tentative decision became final and on January 9, 2015, the trial court entered judgment in favor of respondents. This appeal by appellant followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
The issues presented in this appeal involve the interpretation and application of statutory provisions where there are no material factual disputes. Our review of such legal issues is de novo. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 883 P.2d 960]; People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 11 P.3d 956].)
The question before us involves the interplay of several related sections of the Penal Code. Section 25400
The Attorney General has issued a number of opinions over the years on legal questions relating to peace officers. While not binding on us, such
In 2002, the Attorney General, relying on limiting language in section 830.1, subdivision (c), held that custodial deputies described therein did not have peace officer status when they were away from the county detention facilities appearing at community service events, participating in the sheriff's honor guard, or conducting recruitment background checks or internal affairs investigations. During those occasions, since the deputies purportedly lacked peace officer status, the Attorney General held the custodial deputies "would be subject to certain statutory prohibitions such as those against carrying a concealed weapon." (85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 131.) In the present case, the trial court understood this 2002 Attorney General opinion to mean that the peace officer exemption (§ 25450) did not apply to custodial deputies while they were off duty. Adhering to that Attorney General opinion, the trial court denied all relief to appellant.
In the instant appeal, appellant's position is essentially that section 25450 creates a categorical exemption for "[a]ny peace officer ... listed in [s]ection 830.1," and since custodial deputies are peace officers listed in section 830.1, subdivision (c), they are exempt and need not obtain a license to carry a concealed firearm when off duty. In other words, for purposes of the exemption, a custodial deputy's status as a "peace officer, listed in Section 830.1" (§ 25450, subd. (a)) does not end when he or she is off duty and, therefore, the exemption applies at such times. Appellant maintains the legislative history was clear on this point, and the Legislature's intent governs the issue. Moreover, appellant points out that nothing in section 830.1, subdivision (c), indicates otherwise.
Respondents, relying on 85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at page 130, argue that custodial deputies cease to have the status of peace officers as soon as they are off duty, which would mean they are not exempt under section 25450 at such times and must obtain a permit to carry a concealed weapon.
On balance, we believe that appellant's position is the correct one.
The core issue before us is whether the peace officer exemption in section 25450, which by its terms applies to custodial deputies described in section 830.1, subdivision (c), ceases to apply to such deputies when they are off duty. Of course, the nature or scope of the exemption is a question of statutory interpretation.
A. Rules of Statutory Construction
"Where the statutory language is not clear and allows more than one meaning, the courts nevertheless have a duty to accept the meaning that the Legislature intends if its intention is ascertainable." (Service Employees, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 58.) To clarify ambiguities and to discern legislative intent, it is appropriate to refer to extrinsic aids such as the legislative history and context. (Id. at p. 59.) In this regard, committee reports are often useful in determining the Legislature's intent. (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 646 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 671, 927 P.2d 1175] (California Teachers Assn.).) Prior judicial or administrative construction of the statute may also assist in discerning the Legislature's intent. (Orange County, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 582 [Attorney General opinions].)
B. Section 25450
Our starting point in discerning the Legislature's intent as to the scope of the exemption at issue is the language of the exemption statute itself. Section
By its terms, section 25450 exempts the persons described therein from section 25400 — the law that would otherwise prohibit the carrying of concealed firearms. A conspicuous feature of section 25450 is that some of the exempt persons described therein are simply identified as a category or class of peace officers, such as in subdivisions (a) and (b), while other persons referred to in the statute are required to be acting in the scope of a specific duty or activity in order for the exemption to apply, such as in subdivisions (e) and (f). This reflects that when the Legislature wants to limit the exemption to occasions in which a peace officer or other person is acting in the course of particular duties or authority, the Legislature does so explicitly — as it has done in the exemption statute itself, or (as noted below) in the applicable section of chapter 4.5. Since subdivision (a) of section 25450 grants the exemption to "[a]ny peace officer, listed in Section 830.1" (italics added), and does not tie the exemption to the officer's performance of any particular law enforcement duties or responsibilities, it seems reasonable to assume from the language and structure of the statute that the Legislature intended the exemption to apply whether such peace officers were on or off duty.
Consistent with our analysis is the fact that subdivision (a) of section 25450 exempts any peace officer listed in section 830.1 et al., "whether active or honorably retired" (italics added). Obviously, persons who are honorably retired peace officers are not engaged in the scope of a present, on-duty assignment as a peace officer; nevertheless, the exemption applies to them as individuals. It would seem that, at least for purposes of this subdivision of the exemption, the Legislature was interested in benefitting the persons who serve as section 830.1 peace officers, or who are honorably retired from such service, without imposing further conditions (i.e., situational variables) on the exemption such as on duty, off duty or scope of authority. Of course, we will have to consider section 830.1 as well, and we do so below. However, at this point, we simply observe that there is no indication in the wording of section 25450, subdivision (a) itself — which plainly confers the exemption on broad categories of listed peace officers and retired officers — that the exemption
C. Prior Attorney General Opinions and the Orange County Case
We note that past Attorney General opinions have, to a significant extent, agreed with what we have said thus far concerning the peace officer exemption statute. For example, in 1980, the Attorney General held that "Department of Corrections peace officers, as defined in ... section 830.5, are exempt from the prohibition against carrying a concealed firearm ... by virtue of [former] section 12027 [now § 25450] whether such officers are on duty or off duty." (63 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 386.) In considering the wording of the exemption statute, the Attorney General's opinion noted that "[i]f the Legislature had intended the exemption in [former] section 12027 [now § 25450] to apply to peace officers only when they were acting with peace officer authority it could have so stated" (id. at p. 388, fn. omitted), adding that "when the Legislature has determined to limit the exemption of [former] section 12027 [now § 25450] to a person while such person is acting in the course of a certain duty, it has done so" (ibid.). Thus, the Attorney General concluded in that opinion that the Legislature did not intend to limit the exemption to peace officers "while they are acting within the scope of peace officer authority." (Id. at p. 390; accord, 72 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 172; 78 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 217.)
In an apparent response to the opinion in 63 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at page 385, the Legislature added language to section 830.5 to address the carrying of firearms by state correctional officers, and it has continued to amend that section over the years, including the addition of provisions referencing both on-duty and off-duty carrying of firearms by certain officers.
Orange County ultimately involved the interpretation of language in sections 830.33, 830.35 and 830.36, stating that the identified peace officers in those sections may carry firearms "`only if authorized and under terms and conditions specified by their employing agency.'" (Orange County, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at pp. 581-582.) In light of an Attorney General interpretation that such wording referred only to on-duty carrying of firearms, of which interpretation the Legislature was presumably aware at the time the subject provisions were enacted, the Court of Appeal held that the language allowing the employing agency to regulate carrying of firearms applied only to on-duty carrying of firearms, not to off-duty carrying. It concluded: "We must assume the Legislature knew what it was doing when it employed the language of the statutes at issue in this case. If the county wishes to restrict the carrying of concealed weapons by the affected officers, it will have to apply to the Legislature." (Id. at pp. 582-583, fn. omitted.) Because the county in that case had improperly applied the language in question to restrict the peace officers from carrying concealed firearms while off duty, which practice the trial court had upheld, the Court of Appeal reversed with directions to enter declaratory relief for the plaintiff, Orange County Employees Association. (Id. at pp. 577, 583.)
Although the Orange County case involved different provisions of chapter 4.5 (our case involves § 830.1), the basic approach it employed reinforces our observation that when the Legislature wishes to restrict or qualify the scope of the peace officer exemption with respect to a particular classification of peace officer, the Legislature does so — either in the exemption statute itself, or by explicitly addressing the matter of carrying firearms within the applicable provision of chapter 4.5.
This leads to the questions: Does section 830.1, subdivision (c), explicitly restrict or qualify the peace officer exemption granted to the custodial deputies under section 25450, subdivision (a)? Does it expressly address the carrying of firearms, whether on or off duty? Plainly, it does neither.
Section 830.1, subdivision (c), provides that any deputy sheriff of one of the counties listed therein (including Stanislaus County) "who is employed to perform duties exclusively or initially relating to custodial assignments with responsibilities for maintaining the operations of county custodial facilities, including the custody, care, supervision, security, movement, and transportation of inmates, is a peace officer whose authority extends to any place in the state only while engaged in the performance of the duties of his or her respective employment and for the purpose of carrying out the primary function of employment relating to his or her custodial assignments, or when performing other law enforcement duties directed by his or her employing agency during a local state of emergency." (Italics added.)
Indeed, this appears to have been the result actually contemplated by the Legislature, as evidenced by certain legislative committee reports. Custodial deputies of certain counties were initially declared to be peace officers during the 1996 legislative session, when subdivision (c) of section 830.1 was enacted. (Stats. 1996, ch. 950, § 1, p. 5347.) Four years later, custodial
Seven years after San Diego County was added to section 830.1, subdivision (c), Glenn, Lassen and Stanislaus Counties were added as well. (Stats. 2007, ch. 84, § 1, p. 369.) In connection with Assembly Bill No. 151 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.), the Senate Committee on Public Safety again commented on the effect of the counties' custodial deputies being included as peace officers under the proposed law, stating as follows: "Being a peace officer ... confers a special status under several Penal Code provisions, e.g. ... any peace officer listed in ... Sections 830.1, 830.2, is allowed to carry firearms concealed in public while off-duty, even if that person's employing agency does not allow the officer to carry a firearm while on-duty. (Orange County[, supra,] 14 Cal.App.4th [at p.]582.) Additionally, an honorably retired peace officer may carry a concealed and/or a loaded weapon in a public place or vehicle after retirement." (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 151 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 17, 2007, p., 6.) We note that similar statements are contained in committee reports when, in other legislative sessions, other counties were added to section 830.1, subdivision (c), by similar amendment. (See, e.g., Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 272 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 6, 2005, enacted by Stats. 2006, ch. 127, § 1, p. 127 [adding Inyo, Kings & Tulare Counties to § 830.1, subd. (c)].)
Legislative history such as committee reports may be resorted to as an extrinsic aid to discerning legislative intent. (California Teachers Assn., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 646.) Here, the committee reports recited above strongly suggest that, in declaring custodial deputies to be peace officers under section
E. The 2002 Attorney General Opinion
As we noted above, in 2002, the Attorney General, relying on the language of section 830.1, subdivision (c), held that custodial deputies described therein did not have peace officer status or authority when they were away from the county detention facilities appearing at community service events, participating in the Sheriff's honor guard, or conducting recruitment background checks or internal affairs investigations. During those occasions, since the deputies purportedly lacked peace officer status, the Attorney General held the custodial deputies "would be subject to certain statutory prohibitions such as those against carrying a concealed weapon." (85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 131.) The trial court relied on this 2002 Attorney General opinion to conclude that the peace officer exemption (§ 25450) did not apply to custodial deputies while they were off duty. On that basis, the trial court denied all relief.
To the extent that the 2002 Attorney General Opinion held that the peace officer exemption does not apply to custodial deputies under section 830.1, subdivision (c), while they are off duty, we decline to follow it. (85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 131, 133.) Respondents argue, based on said Attorney General opinion, that the limiting language of section 830.1, subdivision (c), relating to custodial deputies' scope of authority as peace officers would cause them to lose their peace officer status at the moment they were off duty. We disagree. Section 830.1, subdivision (c), declares without any qualification that a custodial deputy is a peace officer, and then goes on to delineate a custodial deputy's scope or extent of authority. Nothing in that section's description (including limitations) of custodial deputies' scope of authority as peace officers indicates an entire loss of their status as peace officers while they are off duty.
Moreover, as we have explained at length herein, the pattern used by the Legislature in this statutory scheme is that when it wants to limit the application of the peace officer exemption with respect to a particular classification of peace officer, it does so explicitly. That was not done in section 830.1, subdivision (c), and we find no warrant to find such a limitation by implication.
In its petition in the trial court, appellant sought a judicial declaration that section 830.1, subdivision (c), custodial deputies are exempt (under § 25450, subd. (a)) from the law prohibiting the carrying of concealed firearms, and need not obtain a permit from the sheriff to carry a concealed firearm while off duty. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, appellant is clearly entitled to such declaratory relief. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court with directions to enter a new judgment granting declaratory relief to appellant, consistent with this opinion. On remand, the trial court shall also consider and decide whether there are adequate and proper grounds to grant the other forms of relief sought by appellant in the petition under the related causes of action for writ of mandate and/or injunctive relief.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including the entry of declaratory relief in appellant's favor. Costs on appeal are awarded to appellant.
Hill, P.J., and Gomes, J., concurred.
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