KLOPCHIN v. MASRI

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion is denied.

A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence against the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (see Niyazov v Bradford, 13 A.D.3d 501 [2004]; Russ v Investech Sec., 6 A.D.3d 602 [2004]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 A.D.2d 635 [1995]). "One of several nonnegligent explanations for a rear-end collision is a sudden stop of the lead vehicle" (Chepel v Meyers, 306 A.D.2d 235, 237 [2003]; see Carhuayano v J&R Hacking, 28 A.D.3d 413 [2006]; Gaeta v Carter, 6 A.D.3d 576 [2004]; Purcell v Axelsen, 286 A.D.2d 379 [2001]).

The plaintiffs met their burden by submitting evidence sufficient to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability (see Emil Norsic & Son, Inc. v L.P. Transp., Inc., 30 A.D.3d 368 [2006]; Neidereger v Misuraca, 27 A.D.3d 537 [2006]; David v New York City Bd. of Educ., 19 A.D.3d 639 [2005]; Rainford v Sung S. Han, 18 A.D.3d 638 [2005]). In opposition, the defendants raised a triable issue of fact. The defendants' assertion that the injured plaintiff made a sudden stop and failed to give proper signals, as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163, contradicted the injured plaintiff's contention and, if believed, provided a nonnegligent explanation for the rear-end collision (see Simpson v Eastman, 300 A.D.2d 647 [2002]; Maschka v Newman, 262 A.D.2d 615 [1999]; Artis v Jamaica Buses, 262 A.D.2d 511 [1999]).