THOYAKULATHU v. BRENNAN

OPINION

Opinion by Chief Justice MORRISS.

By the end of the last day1 to serve timely expert reports on defendants, Sam G. Thoyakulathu, M.D., and Sam T. George, P.A. (Appellants), health care liability claimant, Francis J. Brennan, had obtained and filed reports, but had not served them on Appellants. Evidence suggests that, on that day, Brennan tried but failed to serve the reports by facsimile transmission. Appellants moved to dismiss Brennan's claims, but the trial court denied the motion and allowed Brennan a thirty-day extension within which to serve the reports. Two orders were entered in connection with the trial court's decision, one granting Brennan a thirty-day extension within which to serve the reports, and the other denying Appellants' motion to dismiss.2 We must determine whether the trial court properly denied Appellants' motion to dismiss. We conclude the trial court erred because, as applied to the facts of this case,3 Section 74.351(1) mandates dismissal and (2) is not unconstitutional.

(1) Section 74.351 Mandates Dismissal

Section 74.351(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code establishes the 120-day deadline:

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 74.351(a). Absent an agreement among the parties for an extension of time to serve the reports, the trial court has no discretion but to dismiss the case with prejudice and to award reasonable attorney's fees and costs of court if the claimant fails to meet this deadline:

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 74.351(b) (Vernon Supp.2005) (emphasis added).

Section 74.351 provides the only two means of obtaining an extension of the expert report deadline. First, the parties may agree to an extension: "The date for serving the report may be extended by written agreement of the affected parties." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 74.351(a). Second, subsection (c) provides for the only extension available without such an agreement:

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 74.351(c) (Vernon Supp.2005). This provision appears to serve as an after-the-fact extension, a second chance at getting the report right. That is, the claimant still must serve the expert report by the 120-day deadline, but, if the trial court determines the timely-filed report is deficient, it may grant an extension in which the claimant may cure any deficiencies in the report.

Since Brennan concedes he failed to serve his reports on Appellants by October 29 and had no agreed extension with the doctors, the only possible statutory relief from mandatory dismissal of his claims against Appellants is found in subsection (c). So, here, the application of Section 74.351(b) is clear: Brennan's claims survive Appellants' motion to dismiss only if Section 74.351(c) applies.

Applying the traditional rules of statutory construction,4 we agree with Appellants that, properly construed, Section 74.351 mandates dismissal on these facts, since all parties agree that Brennan failed to serve the requisite reports on Appellants by the deadline. Looking first to the plain and common meaning of Section 74.351(c)'s language in the context of the entire statute, we note that Section 74.351(c) applies only when "an expert report has not been served within" the 120-day period "because elements of the report have been found deficient." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(c) (emphasis added). This clearly requires a timely-served report that is deficient.

We, therefore, conclude that the subsection (c) extension is available only when a timely-served report does not meet the statutory definition of an "expert report" because it has one or more deficiencies in its contents; subsection (c) does not apply to a report not served by the deadline. See Manor Care Health Servs. v. Ragan, 187 S.W.3d 556, 560 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] no pet. h.); Mokkala, 178 S.W.3d at 74. If a timely-served report is later found to be inadequate, then the trial court may, in its discretion, grant a thirty-day extension to cure the deficiencies. This construction permits each part of the statute to be meaningful in light of the other portions of the statute.

This construction is also consistent with the legislative history of the 2003 amendments to former Article 4590i. As the Houston-Fourteenth Court points out, Representative Joe Nixon, Chair of the House Committee on Civil Practices, presented House Bill 4 and explained that, if the bill were passed, it meant that, if an attorney missed the deadline for the expert report, the plaintiff would be barred from prosecuting that claim. Mokkala, 178 S.W.3d at 74 (including extensive discussion of legislative background of Section 74.351). An extensive article written on the amendments also takes the position that Section 74.351(c) does not apply to this situation: "No extension is available for a failure to file any report." Michael S. Hull, et al., House Bill 4 and Proposition 12: An Analysis with Legislative History, 36 TEX. TECH L.REV. 1, 207 n. 230 (Supp.2005).

The facts before us are not such as would authorize an extension under Section 74.351(c). That being the case, the trial court was bound by Section 74.351(b)'s mandatory dismissal provision. The provisions leave no room for a construction other than the one proposed by Appellants. Dismissal is required, unless the statute is unconstitutional.

(2) Section 74.351 Is Not Unconstitutional

Brennan claims that Section 74.351, as applied, denies him due process and due course5 of law. Although arising in an unorthodox manner, Brennan's constitutional challenge appears to have been properly before the trial court.6 Additionally, Appellants did not move to strike or otherwise object to the amendments raising the constitutional issues.

The United States Constitution provides that "[n]o State ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. These words "require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)). A restriction on litigants' use of established adjudicatory procedures denies due process when such restriction is "the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right[s]." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971).

A cause of action is a species of property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Logan, 455 U.S. at 428, 102 S.Ct. 1148. Therefore, statutory procedures that deprive someone of a statutory right must be held up to constitutional analysis. Id. at 432, 102 S.Ct. 1148. Due process requires that state procedures must provide proper procedural safeguards before a claimant's property interest is destroyed. Id.; Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist., 765 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied). We must examine Section 74.351 for the presence or absence of those "proper procedural safeguards."

When dealing in the context of restrictions placed on health care liability claims, we operate with two general principles in mind. First, "there are constitutional limitations upon the power of courts... to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his [or her] cause." Walker v. Gutierrez, 111 S.W.3d 56, 66 (Tex.2003) (quoting TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917-18 (Tex. 1991)). Second, the filing of a frivolous lawsuit can be misconduct subject to sanction. Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Tex. 2001).

We begin our analysis presuming that the statute is constitutional. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.121; Walker, 111 S.W.3d at 66; Enron Corp. v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 922 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex.1996). A mere difference of opinion, where reasonable minds could differ, is an insufficient basis for striking down legislation as arbitrary or unreasonable. Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex.1983); Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex. 1968).

No cases have specifically measured Section 74.351 against due process requirements. We, therefore, look to cases addressing Section 74.351's predecessor, Article 4590i. Former Article 4590i withstood constitutional challenges in a number of cases and on several different grounds. See Perry v. Stanley, 83 S.W.3d 819, 825 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.); Knie v. Piskun, 23 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied); Andress v. MacGregor Med. Ass'n, 5 S.W.3d 855, 860 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Horsley-Layman v. Angeles, 968 S.W.2d 533, 537 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. denied); Odak v. Arlington Mem'l Hosp., 934 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).

The Texas Supreme Court confirmed these conclusions, holding that the former Article 4590i's failure to require notice of noncompliance before a motion to dismiss is filed did not render the statute unconstitutional. See Walker, 111 S.W.3d at 65.7 The Court went on to explain that due process does not require "prior notice that the law is serious about a clearly stated consequence." Id. at 66.

Similarly, due process does not require additional or broader grounds for extending the clearly stated service deadline or relief from the clearly stated consequences of failing to meet that deadline. Here, we have a situation arising from a possibly malfunctioning facsimile machine on the last day of the allowable time period. As a result of this last-minute problem, Brennan failed to serve the report on Appellants. Section 74.351 need not provide an exception geared toward such misfortune in order to provide constitutionally adequate safeguards. The trial court must dismiss the claim if an expert report has not been served by the deadline. Mandatory dismissal is a "clearly stated consequence" for failing to comply with the statutory deadline.

Applying the reasoning in Walker to this statute and to these facts, we conclude that statute need not provide exceptions that would encompass any conceivable complication in order to pass constitutional muster.8 We overrule Brennan's contention that due process requires that Section 74.351 provide a claimant with additional extensions or a means of seeking relief from the consequences for failure to meet the statutory deadline. Recognizing the two general considerations — that the State has a legitimate interest in placing restrictions on the filing of health care liability claims but that a court's power to dismiss a claim is limited — we conclude that Section 74.351 is not unconstitutional as applied to Brennan and that, therefore, a contrary conclusion could not serve as a basis for the trial court's denial of Appellants' motion to dismiss Brennan's claims.

Conclusion

As written, Section 74.351(b) requires dismissal of a health care liability claim if no expert report is served by the 120-day deadline. Section 74.351(b) is expressly made subject to subsection (c), which authorizes a thirty-day extension under narrow circumstances not presented here — Brennan concedes he did not timely serve Appellants with an expert report of any kind. There is no provision under which Brennan could seek or be granted an extension. Section 74.351(c) applies only when an expert report was not "served" because it was inadequate, not when no report was served at all.

The absence of such an extension is not unconstitutional as applied to Brennan. The trial court's denial of Appellants' motion to dismiss was error. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's denial of Appellants' motion to dismiss and remand this cause to the trial court for dismissal of Brennan's claims against Appellants and for further proceedings regarding statutory attorney's fees and costs.