BARKETT, Circuit Judge:
Huckley Armstrong contests the denial of his pro se motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which gives retroactive effect to certain amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines that lower the sentencing range upon which an
Although Armstrong had previously filed unsuccessful motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the district court first ruled that Armstrong's § 3582(c)(2) motion was not a successive habeas petition, holding that "the existence of prior motions to amend the sentence is ... not a bar to a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)." However, the court also ruled that Armstrong was not entitled to a reduction of his sentence under § 3582(c)(2) on the basis of Amendments 599, 600 or 635 to the Sentencing Guidelines. We agree with the district court on both counts and affirm.
Any retroactive reduction in sentence subsequent to a motion filed under § 3582(c)(2) must be "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The Sentencing Commission's policy statement on retroactive reduction of sentences, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, provides that:
Thus, for a sentence to be reduced retroactively under § 3582(c)(2), a court must determine whether there has been an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines that has lowered the guideline range applicable to that sentence and is listed under § 1B1.10(c).
A. Amendments 600 and 599
B. Amendment 635
Armstrong concedes that, like Amendment 600, Amendment 635
While Amendment 635 makes explicit clarifying changes to the application of § 3B1.2 and thus qualifies as a "clarifying amendment" to the Sentencing Guidelines to be given retroactive effect, the cases Armstrong cites are not applicable to his situation.
As the government maintains, Armstrong's argument regarding clarifying amendments "is without merit because it fails to recognize ... that a motion to modify an otherwise final judgment pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) is a limited and narrow exception to the rule that final judgments are not to be modified." Under this provision, Congress has allowed for limited exceptions to the rule of finality, but only where a sentence of imprisonment was "based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission" and § 3582(b).
We agree with several of our sister circuits that have established the bright-line rule that amendments claimed in § 3582(c)(2) motions may be retroactively applied solely where expressly listed under § 1B1.10(c). See e.g. United States v. Perez, 129 F.3d 255, 259 (2d Cir.1997); United States v. Wyatt, 115 F.3d 606, 608-09 (8th Cir.1997); United States v. Drath, 89 F.3d 216, 218 (5th Cir.1996); United States v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir.1995); United States v. Dullen, 15 F.3d 68, 70-71 (6th Cir.1994); United States v. Avila, 997 F.2d 767, 768 (10th Cir.1993).
We also agree with those circuits that have specifically held that "clarifying amendments" are no exception to this rule and may only be retroactively applied on direct appeal of a sentence or under a § 2255 motion. See, e.g., Drath, 89 F.3d at 217 (noting that clarifying amendments only apply retroactively on direct appeal, not under motions pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) where the amendments are not listed in § 1B1.10(c)); Lee v. United States, 221 F.3d 1335 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished decision) (holding that "while clarifying amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines may be applied retroactively to reduce a defendant's sentence ... [defendant] must seek this relief in a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255").
Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of Armstrong's § 3582(c)(2) motion to apply Amendment 635 retroactively towards reduction of his sentence.