NICKERSON, District Judge.
Before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper No. 98); Intervenor Maryland Association of Municipal Wastewater Agencies, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Paper No. 110); and Defendant Environmental Protection Agency's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper No. 112). All motions have been exhaustively briefed and are ripe for decision. Upon a review of the motions and the applicable case law, the Court determines that no hearing is necessary (Local Rule 105.6) and that: Maryland Association of Municipal Wastewater Agencies, Inc.'s motion for partial summary judgment will be granted; Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment will be granted as to Counts I, V, and VI of the 1998 complaint and denied as to all other counts; and, Defendant Environmental Protection Agency's cross-motion for summary judgment will be granted as to Counts I, II, III, and V of the 1997 complaint and denied as to all other counts.
In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("Clean Water Act" or "Act"), 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq., to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." Id. at § 1251(a). Pursuant to the Act, state's are required to take certain actions, such as the establishment of water quality standards, the identification of waters that do not meet those standards, establish proper pollutant load limits to insure that polluted waters achieve the water quality standards, and the adoption of a continuing planning process that is consistent with the Act. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1313. All of these actions are subject to EPA review and approval. See id. In addition, pursuant to the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq., before undertaking any action that may affect an endangered species, threatened endangered species, or critical habitat, all federal agencies must "insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency" is not likely to jeopardize such species or habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
Plaintiffs Sierra Club, Chesapeake Bay Foundation, and American Littoral Society, brought this suit
On August 6, 1999, intervenor MAMWA filed, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), a motion to dismiss Counts IV and V of the 1997 complaint and Count III of the 1998 complaint. In a memorandum and order dated September 13, 2000, MAMWA's motion was granted in part and denied in part in that:
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). For purposes of summary judgment, a dispute about a fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," and a fact is material if, when applied to the substantive law, it affects the outcome of litigation. Id.
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion and identifying the portions of the opposing party's case which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The non-moving party "is entitled to have all reasonable inferences ... drawn in [its] favor." Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1129 (4th Cir.1987).
If the movant demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, the non-moving party must, in order to withstand the motion for summary judgment, produce sufficient evidence in the form of depositions, affidavits or other documentation which demonstrates that a triable issue of fact exists, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Unsupported speculation is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Felty, 818 F.2d at 1128 (citing Ash v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 800 F.2d 409, 411-12 (4th Cir.1986)). Additionally, the existence of only a "scintilla of evidence" is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Instead, the evidentiary materials must show facts from which the finder of fact could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Administrative Procedure Act
When a challenge is made to the substance of an agency action, judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), see 5 U.S.C. § 561, et seq., is appropriate. See Scott v. City of Hammond, Ind., 741 F.2d 992, 995 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 836-37 (7th Cir. 1977)). In performing such a review,
The APA's standard of review is highly deferential and presumes the agency action to be valid. Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C.Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941, 96 S.Ct. 2662, 49 L.Ed.2d 394 (1976). Plaintiffs bear the burden of overcoming this presumption of validity. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Fox, 93 F.Supp.2d 531, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 283 (D.C.Cir.1981)). The reviewing court cannot simply substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Id. Instead, the court "must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Natural Resources Defense Council, 93 F.Supp.2d at 537 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971)).
An agency decision is deemed to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion" if "the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise." Natural Resources Defense Council, 93 F.Supp.2d at 537 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this context, when an agency action is held to be invalid, the court's power is limited to vacating the unlawful agency action and remanding the matter to the agency for further proceedings, or compelling agency action that has been unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. Natural Resources Defense Council, 93 F.Supp.2d at 536. See also, Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 986-87 (9th Cir.1994) (stating that the manner and substance of achieving compliance is best left to the agency); Idaho Sportsmen's Coalition v. Browner, 951 F.Supp. 962, 969 (W.D.Wash.1996) (remanding, for a second time, TMDL submission schedule development to the EPA despite the fact that the schedule previously developed by the EPA, pursuant to court order, was found to be arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion).
A. Counts I and II of 1997 Complaint: Challenge to EPA
Decision Approving Maryland's 1996 and 1998 § 303(d) Lists
Section 303(d)(1) of the Act requires that every state identify those waters within its boundaries that do not meet, or are not expected to meet, their established water quality standards even after the imposition of various enumerated controls and treatments. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1). This submission is known as a section 303(d) list. Waters identified on this list must be ranked according to priority for treatment based on designated uses for the water and the severity of its impairment. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A). EPA has promulgated various regulations under section 303(d). Pursuant to these regulations, the 303(d) list is to be compiled using all "existing and readily available water quality-related
Upon submission of the list, the Regional Administrator "shall either approve or disapprove" the list "not later than thirty days after the date of submission." 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(d)(2). The list shall be approved only if it meets the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b).
Initial submissions were due 180 days after the date of publication by the EPA of the first identification of pollutants suitable for load calculation. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2). EPA was required to publish such identification by October 18, 1973. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(2)(D). EPA, however, did not actually publish its first identification of pollutants until December 28, 1978. 43 Fed.Reg. 60662, 60665 (December 28, 1978). Therefore, the states' initial 303(d) submissions were due no later than June 26, 1979, 180 days after EPA's publication date. Maryland did not make its initial 303(d) submission until November 5, 1992.
After the initial submission, states are required to make additional section 303(d) submissions to the EPA from "time to time." 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2). EPA regulations require states to submit their additional submissions biennially, on April 1 of every even numbered year. 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(d)(1). Maryland made additional submissions to the EPA on December 23, 1994, November 13, 1996, and August 7, 1998. Each submission was approved by the EPA.
As a preliminary issue, EPA argues that its approval of Maryland's 1998 list moots the challenge to its approval of Maryland's 1996 list. Plaintiffs, and the Court, disagree on the ground that the challenge to the 1996 list falls under the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine.
i. Section 305(b) Report
33 U.S.C. § 1315(b) requires that, on a biennial basis, each state prepare and submit
Plaintiffs contend that the following waters from Maryland's 1996 305(b) Report and 1998 draft 305(b) Report (collectively "305(b) Report") were improperly omitted from its 303(b) lists: five waters listed as restricted/conditionally approved shellfish waters;
Addressing the five shellfish waters first, Plaintiffs alleged that the EPA "invents" an exception, i.e., proximity to wastewater treatment plants, to support its decision to approve the lists. EPA counters that one water, Pokomoke Sound, is on the 303(d) list, and, as to the other four waters, Maryland was not required to list them because they are restricted as a precaution due to their proximity to wastewater treatment plants and not because technology-based limits are insufficient. See Attachment E, EPA Reply Brief. See also, Maryland's Operative 303(d) List Dated Aug. 1998 at 2-9 (stating that waters located near wastewater treatment plants are listed as a precautionary measure, which is an "important application of the principles and practices of public health protection and is not indicative of a water quality violation"). Because there is no data showing actual impairment of these waters or that existing pollution controls are insufficient, the waters need not be listed. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b).
As to the seven lakes listed as impaired, EPA notes that six of the lakes are listed. The seventh lake, Blairs Valley, was not included on the 1997 lake report and, therefore, it need not be included on the 303(d) list. See Attachment C, EPA Reply Brief.
Finally, as to the five bathing areas, Plaintiffs incorrectly claim that EPA concedes that these waters have "long term chronic conditions" due to bacteria levels. While this is true as to the Snowy River and Nanticoke River-Cove Road bathing areas, these have been listed. See Attachment
Because Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that EPA's acceptance of the justifications offered by Maryland was unreasonable, EPA's decision as to these omissions must be upheld.
ii. 1984 304(1) List
Section 304(1) of the Clean Water Act requires the identification of toxic "hot spots." See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(1). Plaintiffs assert that seven waters
iii. Waters Identified by Federal Agencies
Section 303(d) lists are to include impaired waters and pollutants identified by federal, state, and local agencies. 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(5)(iii). Plaintiffs point to the omission of 44 waters identified by the EPA as impaired by excessive levels of fecal coliform, see April 17, 1998 EPA Letter to Haire, Table 1, 31 waters identified by EPA as impaired based on Maryland Biological Stream Survey ("MBSS") data, see id. at Table 2, and 66 additional pollutants identified by EPA as causing impairments, see Plaintiffs' Exh. 17.
The 44 waters identified by the EPA as impaired by excessive levels of fecal coliform were omitted because of the lack of an appropriate number of samples. Plaintiffs argue that this is an insufficient reason for the omission because Maryland's own regulations, see COMAR § 26.08.02.03-3(A)(1)(a), require that five samples be taken per 30-day period and, had the regulation been followed, there would have been an adequate number of water quality samples upon which to properly make the decision to list or not to list. Plaintiffs, however, are incorrect in stating that COMAR § 26.08.02.03-3(A)(1)(a) requires
As to the 31 waters identified by the MBSS data as impaired, Maryland claimed, and the EPA accepted, that the MBSS is not reliable in making fact-specific decisions. See July 27, 1998 MDE Letter to EPA at 2 (expressing reluctance to use MBSS data to make regulatory conclusions about impairments in specific waterbody segments because individual MBSS samples are suspected of being highly variable); MBSS Information Sheet, Pls' Exh. 59 (indicating that the MBSS "may not be fully successful for assessing small watersheds"). Given that Maryland has provided an adequate explanation for not relying on MBSS data, the Court cannot find that the EPA's acceptance on this explanation was unlawful.
As to Plaintiffs concerns regarding the omission of 66 additional pollutants causing impairments, Maryland has provided a reasonable explanation for its decision not to list these waters, see generally Aug. 12, 1998 MDE Letter to EPA, the primary reason being that there "is insufficient data to determine a violation of water quality standards." Id. at 4-7. For the reasons stated supra, the Court finds that EPA's acceptance of this explanation was not unreasonable.
iv. Thermal Variances and Anti-Degradation
Each 303(d) list is to include all waters subject to thermal variance, see 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a), and all waters that do not meet anti-degradation standards. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a). Plaintiffs allege that Maryland's 1996 and 1998 lists do not include such waters. Yet, Plaintiffs fail to identify any such impaired water, nor do they identify any available data that contains such information that Maryland did not consider. Because EPA's decision is presumed valid and Plaintiffs bear the burden of overcoming this presumption, Plaintiffs' failure to provide any evidence to support their position provides no basis upon which the Court could find that EPA's approval was arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
B. Count V of 1997 Complaint: Challenge to EPA Decision Not
to Step In and Establish TMDLs for Maryland
Under section 303(d), states must also establish the total maximum daily load ("TMDL") of pollutants that each WQLS can assimilate and still meet water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
As with its initial identification of WQLSs, a state should have submitted its TMDLs to the Administrator of the EPA by June 26, 1979. Thereafter, a state is required to submit TMDLs to the EPA "from time to time." 33 U.S.C.
The record indicates that prior to September 1999, Maryland submitted and the EPA approved TMDLs for three waters in Maryland.
In its letter dated September 17, 1999, EPA commented that it "firmly believes that the most efficient and effective approach for the Agency to implement its oversight responsibilities is to work in partnership with States to assist them in developing State TMDL programs that are consistent with the goals and requirements of the Clean Water Act." Sept. 17, 1999 EPA Letter to Nishida at 3. EPA further states that "[a]t present, EPA believes, in the exercise of its discretion, that Maryland has committed to develop and implement an effective section 303(d) program," which includes the development and implementation of TMDLs. Id. Therefore, "EPA believes it should not exercise its discretion to step into the state's shoes." Id. The letter goes on to provide a detailed
Plaintiffs now assert that EPA's decision not to establish TMDLs in Maryland is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion in violation of the APA.
Plaintiffs primary argument is that Maryland's present compliance does not eliminate decades of non-compliance. In light of Maryland's prior history, Plaintiffs contend that the EPA has a duty to step-in and develop TMDLs in Maryland. Plaintiffs, however, are wrong; "past compliance is irrelevant to the question of an agency's present compliance." Natural Resources Defense Council, 93 F.Supp.2d at 536 (emphasis in original). See also, San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. Browner, Civil Action No. C-00-0132-CAL (N.D.Cal. Feb. 22, 2001) at 10 (stating that because only declaratory and injunctive relief sought, Court is most concerned with what is or what is not being done presently) (emphasis added). This is particularly true where, as here, EPA's initial duty to develop TMDLs has not been triggered.
Plaintiffs next challenge the length of the schedule approved by the EPA. According to Plaintiffs the time allotted to Maryland for TMDL development is unreasonably long and, therefore, EPA's approval constitutes an abuse of discretion. The Court disagrees. Under the APA, EPA's decision is presumed to be valid. Plaintiffs have provided no evidence to substantiate their claim that the length of time given to Maryland for TMDL development is unreasonably long. Here, the schedule calls for TMDLs to be developed for all waters but the Chesapeake Bay by 2008 and for the Chesapeake Bay by 2011. Similar time periods have been upheld in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, 93 F.Supp.2d at 539 (approving 8 year schedule for TMDL development); Sierra Club, 843 F.Supp. at 1314 (accepting 10 year schedule and commenting that "[a]lthough Minnesota and the EPA may not be implementing TMDLs as quickly as plaintiffs would like, the Act does not set deadlines for the development of a certain number of TMDLs"). See also, Sept. 17, 1999 EPA Letter to Nishida at 2 (stating that state schedules for TMDL development should normally extend from 8 to 13 years in length). Additionally, the EPA specifically stated that it
Id. at 4. Because the Court finds that the EPA has not abused its discretion in deciding to leave TMDL implementation in the hands of Maryland, summary judgment in favor of the EPA will be granted as to Count V of the 1997 complaint.
C. Count III of 1997 Complaint: EPA's Alleged Violation of the APA's Notice and Comment Requirements
The APA provides that "[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). "After notice required by this section [is given], the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submissions of written data, views, or arguments." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). These sections make up the APA's "notice and comment requirement."
There is no dispute that the EPA did not provide a public notice and comment period prior to its approval of Maryland's 303(d) lists or its approval of any TMDLs submitted by Maryland. Plaintiff alleges that this failure violates the APA because the 303(d) lists and TMDLs are "rules," the promulgation of which trigger the notice and comment requirements of the APA. EPA, contrarily, asserts that it had no duty to provide for notice and comment because the decisions at issue are not rule making.
The Court agrees with the EPA and finds that approval or disapproval of state submissions under the Clean Water
In addition, the public policy considerations outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 25.3(c), i.e., fostering public awareness and opening the processes of government decision making, are satisfied by this regime. The public is provided notice and the opportunity to comment by the party devising the list or load limit. In the case of the state as rule maker, all comments are forwarded to the EPA as part of the administrative record. This affords the EPA the opportunity to review all comments and request additional information or clarification from the state prior to making a decision to approve or disapprove.
As the EPA simply approved Maryland's submissions, the EPA did not engage in rule making and was under no requirement to provide for public notice and comment. Therefore, summary judgment as to Count III of the 1997 complaint will be granted in favor of EPA.
D. Counts I, II and IV of 1998 Complaint: EPA's Alleged Violation of the CWA and APA with Respect to Maryland's
Continuing Planning Process
To ensure that plans are developed and implemented to achieve water quality standards in all of a state's waters, section 303(e) of the Clean Water Act requires each state to have a continuing planning process ("CPP") that is consistent with the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e). States were required to submit a proposed CPP to the Administrator of the EPA no later than February 17, 1973. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(2). The EPA is required to approve or disapprove a state's proposed CPP within thirty days of its submission. Id. After the initial submission, the EPA is to review each state's approved planning process for the purpose of insuring that it is "at all times" consistent with the Clean Water Act. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that Maryland did not propose a CPP to the EPA until 1986.
The Court, in its September 13, 2000 Memorandum and Order, found that, "at the time Plaintiffs' 1998 complaint was filed, EPA has not approved or disapproved the  proposed CPP or any other CPP." Id. at 13. EPA has presented no evidence to sway the Court from its previous finding.
Counts V and VI of 1998 Complaint: Alleged ESA Violations
The Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq., is the "most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation." Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978). The ESA codifies Congressional findings that various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have either been rendered extinct or are threatened with extinction. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) and (2). To minimalize additional threats, the ESA requires "that all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered and threatened species." 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c). In furtherance of this goal, "[e]ach Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary,
To insure compliance with section 1536(a)(2), each Federal agency, with respect to any contemplated agency action, shall request of the Secretary information as to whether any species or habitat which
Plaintiffs allege that EPA violated section 7 of the ESA by failing to consult on EPA's approval of Maryland's water quality revisions in 1992, and 1995,
EPA, by its own admission, has failed to abide by its obligations under the ESA in approving Maryland's 1992 and 1995 water quality revisions and in approving Maryland's 1996 section 303(d) list submission. Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to these claims will be granted. EPA is to cure these violations by fulfilling the ESA's consultation requirements as to the 1992 and 1995 water quality standard revisions and the 1996 section 303(d) list approval.
For the foregoing reasons, MAMWA's motion for partial summary judgment will be granted, and Plaintiffs' motion and EPA's cross-motion will each be granted in part and denied in part. A separate order consistent with this memorandum will issue.
Pursuant to the foregoing memorandum, and for the reasons stated therein, IT IS this day of September 2001, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper No. 98) is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part in that judgment is GRANTED in favor of Plaintiffs as to Counts I, V and VI of the 1998 complaint;
2. That Intervenor Maryland Association of Municipal Wastewater Agencies, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Count V of the 1997 complaint (Paper No. 110) is hereby GRANTED;
3. That Defendant Environmental Protection Agency's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper No. 112) is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part in that judgment is GRANTED in favor of the EPA as to Counts I, II, III and V of the 1997 complaint;
4. That Counts II and IV of the 1998 complaint are hereby DISMISSED as moot;
5. That Defendant EPA shall have 90 days from the date of this order to approve or disapprove Maryland's most recent CPP submission;
6. That Defendant EPA shall have 90 days from the date of this order to comply with all consultation requirements of the Endangered Species Act in respect to Maryland's 1992 and 1995 water quality standard revisions and EPA's approval of Maryland's 1996 section 303(d) list;
7. That this case is hereby CLOSED;
8. That any and all prior rulings made by this Court disposing of any claims against any parties are incorporated by reference herein and this order shall be deemed to be a final judgment within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 58; and
9. That the Clerk of the Court shall mail or transmit copies of the foregoing memorandum and this order to all counsel of record.
American Canoe Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 30 F.Supp.2d 908, 918 (E.D.Va.1998).
First, list submissions are due by April 1 in every even numbered year. 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(d)(1). For litigation purposes, the time span between list submissions is shortened by the fact that final submissions are routinely submitted well past the April 1 deadline. For example, Maryland's final version of its 1996 list was not submitted until November 13, 1996, see Dec. 31, 1996 EPA Letter to Nishida, and the final version of its 1998 list was not submitted until August 7, 1998. See Sept. 28, 1998 EPA Letter to Nishida. EPA then had 30 days in which to approve or disapprove each submission. If a person wants to challenge the EPA action, the Act requires a 60-day notice prior to the instigation of any suit. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). Thus, the time available for judicial review of any given list is far less than two years. "Such brief spans of time have repeatedly been recognized to be too short to permit full litigation of a matter." American Canoe, 30 F.Supp.2d at 916 (finding, in nearly identical circumstances, that the first condition is satisfied). As to the second condition, it is immediately apparent that there is a reasonable expectation that Plaintiffs will be exposed to the same action again; "namely, whether EPA's treatment of the 1998 § 303(d) list will suffer from the same alleged inadequacies as its treatment of the 1996 § 303(d) list." Id. at 917 (finding that, in partially approving the 1998 list, to the extent the deficiencies complained of in the 1996 list were remedied, those deficiencies were moot). Here, the 1996 list was incorporated, in toto, into the 1998 list and both lists were approved in their entirety. Therefore, because any alleged deficiencies were not remedied, the challenge to the 1996 list also satisfies the second condition and is not moot.
The constructive submission doctrine is inapplicable here. Maryland has made several TMDL submissions. This is not a case where Maryland has flatly chosen not to act. To find a constructive submission requires more egregious circumstances than these. See Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. EPA, 84 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C.1999) ("An eighteen-year failure to calculate and submit [any] TMDLs constitutes a constructive — if not outright — determination that no TMDLs are necessary."); Sierra Club, 939 F.Supp. at 871 (only two TMDLs submitted and no long range plan); Alaska Ctr. for the Env't, 762 F.Supp. at 1425 (no TMDLs submitted; no list of impaired waters submitted; and 1990 305(b) Report indicating that TMDLs have "not been attempted" and making no promise to "attempt" them). Cf. San Francisco Baykeeper, Civil Action No. C-00-0132-CAL at 16-22 (finding no EPA duty to act in face of record showing that some WQLS lists and TMDLs were submitted and that EPA now working with California to bring California's TMDL program into compliance); Natural Resources Defense Council, 93 F.Supp.2d at 539 (EPA decision not to intervene upheld on basis of Memorandum of Agreement establishing 8-year schedule for all TMDLs on state's 1996 303(d) list and fact that New York submitted numerous proposed TMDLs during pendency of lawsuit); Sierra Club, North Star Chapter v. Browner, 843 F.Supp. 1304, 1313-14 (D.Minn.1993).