FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER
ELFVIN, District Judge.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC") brought this action, pursuant to its authority under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), alleging that the defendant ("A. Sam") sexually harassed its employees Brenda Borello
A. Sam is a farmer, packer and distributor of produce. During the relevant period Essau Sam ("Essau") was its president, his sister Helen Sam ("Helen") was its office manager and corporate secretary and Charles, Essau's son, was its vice president.
A. Sam hired Borello July 4, 1987 as a full-time bookkeeper. Her duties included calculating taxes for A. Sam's trucks, handling accounts payable, converting the accounts payable information from paper documents to computer files and acting occasionally as a receptionist. Titus was hired in November 1986 for a temporary position selling fruit baskets. In January 1987 A. Sam gave her a permanent position converting the accounts receivable information to computer files, performing secretarial work and selling produce. Both Titus and Borello were supervised by Helen.
In 1983, before Borello or Titus was hired, Charles referred to A. Sam's office female employee Tammy Mowrey as a "fucking slut" (Transcript ["Tr."] at 110), compelling her to quit immediately thereafter and making her feel demeaned (Tr. at 113) and emotionally upset (Tr. at 113, 118). After Mowrey had returned home and told her father of this comment, he confronted Helen about Charles's behavior. She apologized and assured him that she would give Mowrey a good reference. (Tr. at 118). During Borello's and Titus's tenure, A. Sam's dispatch office worker Mike Albach overheard Charles state on the telephone "that all the girls are whores and all they're good for is * * * fucking." (Tr. at 126).
Borello's work required her to have intermittent contact with Charles — e.g., delivering telephone messages to him, getting authorizations from him for delivery slips and seeing him when he passed through her office. (Tr. at 42). In addition to Charles's sporadic yelling and screaming at Borello during her employment (Tr. at 73), a more serious series of incidents began late in 1987. On or about December 4th, Borello had left on Charles's desk a delivery slip for his authorization. The following morning she found it on her desk, Charles having written on it "whore what is the amount??" See Plaintiff's Exh. 12.
Later (during the next week) Charles, while walking through Borello's office and in her presence, stated "nothing but a whore, nothing but a little whore, just a whore."
About a week before Borello was dismissed (on or about December 29th) she telephoned Charles to advise him that he had messages. In response, Charles shouted "go fuck yourself" and hung up. Titus, who at the time was sitting very close to Borello, overheard this exchange. (Tr. at 98). Borello again confronted Helen and told her of this incident stating "enough is enough" and that "if [Helen] didn't do something about it, [she] was going to do something about it because [she] shouldn't have to put up with this." (Tr. at 56). Helen then called Titus into her office, at Borello's request, and Titus verified what had occurred (Titus's recollection, however, was that Charles had called Borello a "whore"). Borello also told Essau of Charles's conduct and warned him that if he did not do "something" about Charles's behavior, she would.
Despite their assurances to Borello that they would, neither Helen nor Essau ever confronted Charles about his behavior toward Borello.
Titus also had intermittent contact with Charles during her employment. She claims to have overheard, through the walls of his office, Charles call unspecified persons "whores" on three occasions and claims to have overheard Charles say "what good are
There is no persuasive evidence that Titus ever complained to Essau or Helen that Charles called women whores, that he used sexually derogatory language or that he was discriminatory in his treatment of women.
Helen telephoned Borello the night of January 4, 1988 to inform her that she was being laid off because of a lack of work.
A. Sam advertised for a bookkeeper February 19, 1988 and hired Oliver Davis as such February 27th. His hiring did not ameliorate Schrantz's workload. Davis's duties included updating accounts payable and truck permits, balancing bankbooks and putting inventory and accounts payable information into the computer. Although Davis had taken college-level accounting classes, his high school accounting and basic office skills were sufficient in fulfilling his duties for A. Sam. Davis resigned in May 1988 despite Helen's request that he stay on. Schrantz quit her payroll job in April 1988 and trained her replacement before she left. A. Sam advertised for a bookkeeper June 1st and July 11th. Further, A. Sam advertised for and hired four additional office workers in the year after Schrantz quit.
Helen laid off Titus January 18, 1988 citing lack of work as the reason. Titus had averaged 5.91 hours overtime per week during
The issues of law before this Court are whether Borello and/or Titus were subjected to "hostile work environment" sexual harassment for which an employer is liable under Title VII, and whether Borello and/or Titus were discharged in retaliation for opposing the alleged harassment.
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating "against any individual with respect to * * * compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's * * * sex * * *." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Actionable sexual discrimination under this section can be premised on either of two theories — to wit, "quid pro quo"
Turning first to Borello's hostile work environment claims, this Court has found that Charles directed to her his written message, "whore what is the amount??," that Borello overheard Charles yell to Helen that all the girls in the office were "whores and all [they] knew how to do was fuck," that Charles stated "nothing but a whore, nothing but a little whore, just a whore" in Borello's presence, that he told her "why don't you stare at the time clock a little bit more ya whore" and that he shouted "go fuck yourself" to her over the telephone. The defendant concedes that Borello (and Titus) found Charles's comments unwelcome, but argues that the conduct Borello complains of was not "sufficiently pervasive or severe" to be characterized fairly as a hostile environment because the incidents were sporadic and isolated and were not sexual in nature.
As to an overtly sexual nature of workplace comments, the defendant has cited no case that suggests such is essential to demonstrate an actionable hostile environment. To the contrary, the relevant caselaw clearly rejects this suggestion. See Hall v. Gus Const. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir.1988) (offensive conduct need not be explicitly sexual); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1140 (D.C.Cir.1985) (district court erred in assuming that incident of physical force could not constitute sexual harassment unless "explicitly sexual"); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (harassing intimidation or ridicule need not be explicitly sexual). Whether Charles's conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive is more problematic. Given that the number of incidents (five) and the time within which they occurred (the month of December 1987) were limited, that one of the incidents involved merely overhearing a demeaning comment and that another of the incidents — viz., Charles telling Borello over the telephone to
In other words, infrequency, while relevant, is not alone dispositive. Rather, it is inversely related to the severity of the incidents — i.e., the greater the severity of the individual incidents, the fewer there need to be actionable (and vice versa).
With these factors as a guide, this Court concludes that the incidents alluded to above, in light of all the circumstances, together represent a sufficient quantum of harassment to constitute a hostile work environment vis-a-vis Borello. Although the incidents were not numerous, they were repeated and severe. Not only did Charles call Borello a "whore," but he referred to her as such in a written communication, left in big, bold print on her desk. The severity of the incidents was enhanced further in that Charles, as vice president of the company and son of the president, was not merely an obnoxious co-worker but rather had presumptive authority over Borello. Further, Charles's conduct was "humiliating" rather than "a mere offensive utterance" in that a man calling a woman a "whore" — thereby reducing her to an illicit sexual being — is a direct affront to her self-respect rather than a simple vulgarity that might offend her sensibilities. Finally, as evidenced by Borello's testimony that Charles's comments reduced her to tears (Tr. at 47), demeaned and upset her (Tr. at 50) and made her feel "hopeless", "really lousy", and "on edge" (Tr. at 53), for a woman to be repeatedly called a whore by the vice-president of her company "unreasonably interferes" with her work performance. Harris, supra.
This Court further concludes that Charles's conduct would not have occurred but for Borello's gender. Although Charles testified that he referred to his customers as whores and told them to "go fuck themselves," he did not refer to the male office workers in that manner. (See LeBarren testimony, Tr. at 156 and Davis testimony, Tr.
Less compelling are Titus's claims that she was subjected to hostile environment sexual harassment. Although she, on three occasions, overheard Charles through the walls of his office refer to the women in the office as "whores," Titus herself stated that Charles never called her a whore (Tr. at 98-99) and there is no persuasive evidence that he ever directly referred to or spoke to her in a sexually abusive or even vulgar manner. Titus did testify that she "found [Charles] to be very insulting," that "he was very degrading" and that "didn't like women too much" but such generalities have little evidentiary weight because this Court cannot ascertain whether Titus was reasonable
The only other incidents that are alleged to have created a hostile environment are that Borello showed to Titus the delivery slip upon which was written "whore what is the amount??" and that Titus overheard Charles tell Borello on the telephone to go fuck herself (which Titus either misheard or misremembered, for she testified that Charles had on this occasion called Borello a whore). As to the latter incident, its severity was slight because it was not directed at Titus and because it was a non-gender-specific vulgarity more properly characterized as "offensive" than "humiliating" under the Harris criteria. Further, there is no evidence that Charles directed this term only at women, weakening any suggestion that he used this term in a discriminatory fashion (see, supra, note 14). Re the delivery slip, "whore" is a humiliating, gender-specific term, but, again, its severity was blunted in that it was not directed at Titus. The plaintiff correctly cites Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415-1416 (10th Cir.1987), for the proposition that discriminatorily abusive conduct directed at a plaintiff's co-workers can be used as evidence that a hostile environment existed, but nothing in Hicks suggests that such evidence is not less weighty than conduct directed at such plaintiff or that a few such indirect incidents could establish a hostile environment.
This Court concludes, in light of all the circumstances, that the instant factual situation does not establish that Titus was subjected to hostile-environment sexual harassment. Not only were the incidents few, but their severity was mitigated significantly by the fact that they were not directed at Titus. This is true especially of the "whore" comments Charles uttered in his office, which were not directed at any individual and which
Turning next to the plaintiff's claims of retaliation, under Title VII it is "an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees * * * because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter * * *." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee-plaintiff must show that he or she engaged in protected participation or opposition under Title VII, that the employer was aware of this activity, that the employer took adverse action against such plaintiff and that a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action — i.e., that a retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action. Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 622 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1980). The opposition may take the form of informal protests (e.g., complaints to management) of discriminatory employment practices and it is protected so long as the employee-plaintiff reasonably believes that the underlying employment practice opposed is discriminatory. Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1569 (2d Cir. 1989). A causal connection can be established through circumstantial evidence — e.g., by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse action. Davis v. State University of New York, 802 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir.1986). Once a prima facie case is established, "the burden of production shifts to the defendant to `articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' for its action. * * * If they [sic] do so, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff `to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason' for the decision, i.e., that the articulated reason is a pretext." Sumner v. U.S. Postal Service, 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir.1990).
Titus has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there is insufficient evidence to show that she opposed a practice she reasonably believed was discriminatory. Titus did testify that she complained to Helen of Charles's conduct, but when asked to articulate the substance of those complaints, she said she had asked Helen "to have Chuck treat us a little bit more nicer and not swear at us." (Tr. at 80). Not being "nice" tenably could be a discriminatory practice only if it were shown that Charles was not nice only to women, but the plaintiff has made no such showing. See Sheehan, supra, 839 F.2d at 105 (discrimination claim does not lie where supervisor was indiscriminately ill-tempered to men and women). Swearing too could only be discriminatory if it were shown that Charles swore only at women,
The plaintiff argues, citing Titus's testimony, that Titus "voiced her opposition" to Helen after the telephone incident involving Charles and Borello, but the record does not support this characterization. Titus stated only that she verified for Helen what she had
Assuming, arguendo, that Titus had established a prima facie case, her claim would still fail. That, inter alia, two of the major projects upon which Titus worked — i.e., the fruit baskets and the computer conversion — were either completed or near completion just prior to her layoff persuades this Court that A. Sam had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for dismissing Titus. Further, there is insufficient credible evidence to sustain the plaintiff's burden of proving that these reasons were a pretext; for example, given that Titus made no complaints of discrimination the defendant had no discernable retaliatory motive to dismiss her. Further, that Titus was not dismissed until two weeks after Borello's dismissal and that she was dismissed before Borello filed a complaint with the EEOC weakens the suggestion that the defendant's retaliatory motives in firing and not rehiring Borello (see below) extended to Titus.
The evidence clearly establishes a prima facie case of retaliation against Borello. She voiced to Helen and Essau on several occasions her opposition to Charles's discriminatory and abusive conduct, and she was fired within a week of the last time she complained of such. This short time frame between the protected activity — i.e., complaining of discriminatory treatment — and the adverse employment action — i.e., being laid off — suffices to establish the requisite causal connection between the two. Davis, 802 F.2d at 642. Although the defendant articulated nondiscriminatory reasons (e.g., that there was a lack of work and that Borello's work performance was inadequate) for its actions, the preponderance of the evidence establishes that these proffered reasons are pretextual. As to the alleged lack of work, although A. Sam did have fewer employers during the winter months, this was mainly the result of its farm workers — not office workers — being laid off. Regardless, this Court credits Borello's testimony that she had finished only half of the computer conversion work in which she was engaged.
This Court also finds pretextual A. Sam's explanation that it was dissatisfied with Borello's work performance. Not only was there no documentation that A. Sam had ever been dissatisfied with Borello's work, but, as mentioned, Helen wrote for Borello a letter of recommendation, and Borello's layoff was characterized as "temporary" on the unemployment form, a characterization A. Sam gave to its good workers.
Having found that A. Sam sexually harassed Borello and that it retaliated against her for opposing such, she is entitled to damages. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1), if a defendant has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice, a
This Court in its discretion awards backpay of $2,381.60 (representing the money Borello would have earned during the approximately five-month period between her layoff and her subsequent employment elsewhere), together with prejudgment interest thereon compounded monthly, at the I.R.S.
Accordingly, it is hereby