FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
Susan and Robert Hallstrom appeal the dismissal on summary judgment of their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. They describe themselves as self-taught "legalists" active and vocal in defending their constitutional rights. They claim violations of their rights stemming from the conduct of Ada County, Garden City, and each governmental entity's officers during the arrest of Mr. Hallstrom in March 1982 and the arrest and incarceration of Mrs. Hallstrom in June 1987. They also challenge the constitutionality of Idaho Code § 18-705 (1987), which prohibits obstruction of justice. They seek declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, including exemplary damages. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, and denied summary judgment to plaintiffs, finding that Mr. and Mrs. Hallstrom were not deprived of any constitutional rights. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because we find that Susan Hallstrom's right to be taken before a magistrate in a timely fashion was violated, that she was detained unjustifiably after a judge ordered her released on bail, and that she raises cognizable constitutional claims with respect to her conditions of confinement, we reverse in part and affirm in part.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Hallstroms filed a complaint naming the City of Garden City, the arresting Garden City police officers, Ada County, the Ada County Sheriff and Jail Commander, the State of Idaho, the City of Boise, and other unknown "Doe" officials as defendants. The Garden City police officers were sued in their official and individual capacities, as was the Ada County Jail Commander; the sheriff was sued only in his official capacity. The City of Boise filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in which the State of Idaho joined. Garden City and the Garden City police officers filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the City of Boise and the State of Idaho. The court initially denied the dismissal of the Garden City defendants, but did dismiss the punitive damages claims against Garden City. The Hallstroms do not appeal these determinations. The Garden City defendants and the Ada County defendants then separately filed motions for summary judgment. The Hallstroms filed a cross-motion for summary judgment against Ada County and its officials seeking declaratory
Mr. Hallstrom was arrested in 1982 for obstructing justice by failing to produce identification upon request. He was booked and released. At no time in the course of the encounter was he imprisoned. The charges were dismissed in 1983.
On a Friday morning in 1987, Mrs. Hallstrom's vehicle was stopped by an officer of the Garden City Police Department for a broken taillight. When she refused to show the officer her driver's license or proof of liability insurance coverage, she was arrested. She told the officer that she did not believe Idaho law required her to carry a license, and that, in any event, requiring her to carry one violated her right to travel. Officer Snapp arrested her, searched her car, and transported her to the Ada County jail. Officer Thurston oversaw the impoundment of the car.
While in custody, Mrs. Hallstrom was cited for motor vehicle violations.
III. MR. HALLSTROM'S CLAIMS
With respect to Mr. Hallstrom's arrest, appellees argue that any claims arising from events occurring in 1982 are time-barred. The applicable statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions is the limitations period for personal injury actions in the state where the action arose. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 581-82, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). In Idaho, the applicable statute is Idaho Code § 5-219(4) (1990), which provides for a limitations period of two years from the date the cause of action accrues. Using the broadest interpretation possible, the latest date
IV. MRS. HALLSTROM'S ARREST & SEARCH
Mrs. Hallstrom contends that Officer Snapp illegally arrested her and searched her car and personal effects without probable cause in violation of her Fourth Amendment and other constitutional rights.
No one questions that Officer Snapp had probable cause to stop her vehicle when he observed its broken taillight. Idaho Code § 49-906 (1988); In re Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 744 P.2d 92 (1987) (traffic offenses give police probable cause to stop vehicle). Mrs. Hallstrom erroneously argues that Idaho law does not require her to have a driver's license as a condition of driving a motor vehicle in Idaho. To the contrary, Idaho law makes it a misdemeanor to drive a vehicle without a driver's license. Idaho Code §§ 49-316 (formerly § 49-319), 49-236 (1988 & Supp.1992). Operation of a motor vehicle is a "highly regulated activity, therefore the driver accepts the regulatory burden along with the benefit of using the public roads." State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057, 1070 (1988) (Walters, J., dissenting). The laws requiring drivers to carry proof of insurance and registration are valid laws enacted by the state of Idaho. Idaho Code § 49-1232 (formerly § 49-245) (1988 & Supp.1992); see State v. Gibson, 108 Idaho 202, 697 P.2d 1216, 1218 (App.1985); State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 162, 686 P.2d 842 (App. 1984). Under Idaho Code § 49-1407 (1988), an officer has the option of taking the person "without unnecessary delay" before a magistrate rather than issuing a traffic citation, "[w]hen the person does not furnish satisfactory evidence of identity or when the officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe the person will disregard a written promise to appear in court." Because Mrs. Hallstrom failed to identify herself
Nor did the officer violate Mrs. Hallstrom's Fourth Amendment rights in searching the car and items in it within her reach. Searches incident to lawful arrest constitute a well-established exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224, 94 S.Ct. 467, 471, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); United States v. Lorenzo, 867 F.2d 561, 562 (9th Cir. 1989). Because she committed a misdemeanor in Officer Snapp's presence, he had probable cause to arrest her. His subsequent search of the vehicle and its contents was proper and reasonable.
V. MRS. HALLSTROM'S ADDITIONAL CLAIMS
Mrs. Hallstrom contends that the county and city officials violated her right to be taken before a magistrate without undue delay, her right to be released upon a court order, and her right to conditions of confinement commensurate with her status as a person awaiting presentation to a judicial officer and due for release on minor traffic citations. We address each of those contentions below. Because we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment against Mrs. Hallstrom and remand the case on other grounds, we do not reach Mrs. Hallstrom's additional constitutional claims including the constitutionality of the Idaho obstruction of justice statute.
A. Delayed Hearing Before a Magistrate
Two provisions of the Idaho Code spell out postarrest procedures. Where an arrest is made without a warrant, "the person arrested must, without unnecessary delay, be taken before the nearest or most accessible magistrate." Idaho Code § 19-615 (1987). Where an arrest is made for "any misdemeanor violation of the [motor vehicle laws]" and the arrested person "does not furnish satisfactory evidence of identity," the arresting officer has the option of issuing a traffic citation (and releasing the offender) or taking her "without unnecessary delay before the proper magistrate as specified in section 49-1411 ..." Idaho Code § 49-1407 (1988). The discretion is very narrow: the arrested person either must be released or taken before a magistrate.
In addition to their duties under state law, the officers were subject to a constitutional duty to ensure that Mrs. Hallstrom be taken before a judicial officer "promptly after arrest." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125, 95 S.Ct. 854, 869, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).
The underlying rationale for according an arrested individual a prompt probable cause hearing before a magistrate is set forth in Gerstein:
420 U.S. at 113-14, 95 S.Ct. at 863. Concerned that local government should have some flexibility and latitude, the McLaughlin Court created a burden of proof mechanism by which to evaluate claims of delay. A person taken before a judicial officer within the 48-hour period may still challenge the arresting officials for unreasonable delay, but she bears the burden of proving that "her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably." ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1670. The Court gave as examples of reasonable delays: "unavoidable delays in transport[ation],"
Mrs. Hallstrom was arrested on Friday morning at approximately 9:00 a.m. Although she repeatedly demanded to see a magistrate, she was not taken before a judge until approximately 4:00 p.m. on Monday afternoon, some seventy-nine hours later, despite the fact that a magistrate is on call twenty-four hours a day in Ada County, and despite the location of the magistrate's office in the same building as the Ada County jail.
To justify delay beyond the 48-hour period mandated by the Court, defendants must establish that an emergency or extraordinary circumstances occasioned the delay in bringing Susan Hallstrom before the judge. Mindful that McLaughlin was decided after the detention at issue in this case, we also analyze the justification for delay in terms of the then prevailing "exigent circumstances" standard. See, e.g., Kanekoa v. City & County Honolulu, 879 F.2d 607, 611 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2055, 114 L.Ed.2d 460 (1991); United States v. Doe, 701 F.2d 819, 824 (9th Cir.1983); Bernard v. City of Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023, 1024 (9th Cir.1983). Under either analysis, the defendants' justification fails. The only reason given by Ada County for delaying Susan Hallstrom's hearing is that she refused to comply with all elements of the booking procedure, including furnishing the police with satisfactory evidence of her identity.
The defendants and the district court appear to believe that the constitutional duty to ensure that an arrested individual receives
An arresting officer's determination of probable cause justifies only a "brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114, 95 S.Ct. at 863. The Court attached special significance to the shifting calculus of interests from the state to the individual "in custody," especially one in custody for a "prolonged" period. It emphasized the "high stakes" involved for individuals' liberty interests and undertook to ensure "meaningful" Fourth Amendment protection. Under Gerstein, refusal to cooperate with booking procedures cannot excuse extended detention based solely on the arresting officer's assessment of probable cause. We note that the officials had other options including completing the booking after the probable cause determination or completing a partial or "Doe" booking; they could have completed booking after the probable cause determination
We are not persuaded by the reasoning of the district court:
Order Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment at 21 n. 9 contained in ER; see also Shaw v. Boise City, No. 84-1088, 1985 WL 11183 (D.Idaho, Sept. 12, 1985) (Ryan, J.); Gibson v. Crowell, No. 84-1475 (D.Idaho, Sept. 13, 1985) (McNichols, J.). The fact that the booking process may be constitutional, Higbee v. City of San Diego, 911 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1990), does not mean that a city or county constitutionally may incarcerate a person indefinitely until she voluntarily submits to booking. Were we reviewing the propriety of a short delay to allow tempers to cool, and the opportunity for calm reconsideration, we might have a different result. In this case, however, the district court allowed a constitutional right to be held hostage for four days to a routine booking practice or policy.
We conclude that on this record the plaintiff has established the liability of Ada
Turning to the question of damages, we affirm the district court's holding that Ada County is not liable for punitive damages. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981). However, we reverse its determination that the defense of qualified immunity shielded the Ada County defendants. The court held that the jail commander benefited from the qualified immunity defense of "`objectively reasonable reliance on existing law.' [Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,] 166-67 [105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114] [(1985)]." Order Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment at 18 contained in ER. It stated that in the light of previous decisions and "because it cannot be said that the actions of the Ada County Defendants were `apparently' unlawful, the defense of qualified immunity applies. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 [107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523] (1987). See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 [106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271] (1986)." Order Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment at 23 contained in ER.
The district court erroneously included Ada County and the officials sued in their official capacities among the Ada County defendants for which a defense of qualified immunity is available. A municipality (and its employees sued in their official capacities) may not assert a qualified immunity defense to liability under Section 1983. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1408, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-68, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3104-06, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). Whether the qualified immunity defense applies to the officials of Ada County sued in their individual capacities turns on "the `objective legal reasonableness' of the action assessed in light of legal rules that were `clearly established' at the time it was taken." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. at 3038 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 & 819, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 & 2739, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3017, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) ("[w]hether an official may prevail in his qualified immunity defense depends upon the `objective reasonableness of [his] conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law'") (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738). A two-part analysis is required: "(1) Was the law governing the official's conduct clearly established? (2) Under that law, could a reasonable officer have believed the conduct was lawful?" Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir.1993). At the time of Mrs. Hallstrom's incarceration, Supreme Court precedent clearly established
The fact that prior to its detention of Mrs. Hallstrom, Ada County had been granted summary judgment against other plaintiffs asserting constitutional claims colorably similar to those asserted in this case, see Shaw v. Boise City, No. 84-1088, 1985 WL 11183 (D.Idaho, Sept. 12, 1985) (Ryan, J.); Gibson v. Crowell, No. 84-1475 (D.Idaho, Sept. 13, 1985) (McNichols, J.), does not alter the result.
B. Continued Detention after Judicial Order Releasing on Bail
Hallstrom alleges that her continued detention after the Monday appearance in court when she was ordered released on bail by the state court judge amounted to false imprisonment. It does not appear that the judge conditioned his order on Hallstrom's compliance with booking. Defendants admit that on that same day Robert Hallstrom attempted to post bail but that it was not accepted and would not be accepted until Susan Hallstrom submitted to the booking process. They offer as justification for this continued detention that
Neither the defendants nor the district court address this second period of incarceration as a distinct and separable event. The defendants deny, without elaboration, Hallstrom's charge of false imprisonment. The district court justifies all six days of incarceration on the same rationale without addressing the effect of the intervening court order to release Hallstrom on the fourth day: "`[I]ncommunicado incarceration' of a person who refuses to comply with booking procedures constitutes neither a violation of substantive or procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment." Order Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment at 22 contained in ER.
As we have pointed out with respect to the pre-presentation period of detention, the question is not whether Ada County has a right to book Susan Hallstrom, or whether the booking procedures themselves are constitutional. The question is whether the county constitutionally may "coerce" Susan Hallstrom to comply with booking procedures once a judicial officer has ordered her released on bail. If the defendants wished to book her before release, among available options were partially booking her on the basis of information gleaned from the identification cards and passport found in her purse or seeking an order from the magistrate directing her to comply with booking. They did not have the right to continue her detention in a "battle of wills" when the detention was allegedly based on the "position ... that she can stay there forever; she will not leave until the fingerprints are taken." Dep. of Robert Hallstrom at 22-23 contained in DCR.
C. Cognizable Conditions of Confinement Claims
The district court preserved Hallstrom's "conditions of confinement" claims in an earlier order but failed to address them when it granted summary judgment. These claims are cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1871 & n. 16, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1440 n. 7 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 972, 117 L.Ed.2d 137 (1992).
Bell v. Wolfish sets out the standard by which to judge claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees who have "only [had] a `judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to [the] extended restraint of [their] liberty following arrest.'" Bell, 441 U.S. at 536, 99 S.Ct. at 1872 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 114, 95 S.Ct. at 863). The Court held that the government may subject such a detainee to "the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution." Id., 441 U.S. at 536-37, 99 S.Ct. at 1873. A court, ruling on these claims, "must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose." Id. at 538, 99 S.Ct. at 1873. With respect to the first prong of this test, intent to punish may be discerned if (1) "an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it" or (2) if the restriction "appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it]" or, as restated later, "the conditions ... [are] employed to achieve objectives that could be accomplished in so many alternative and less harsh methods." Id. at 538, 539 n. 20, 99 S.Ct. at 1873, 1874 n. 20. As to the second prong of the test, the Court indicated that the government has a legitimate interest in "ensuring a detainee's presence at trial," "maintaining jail security," and in "the effective management of the detention facility
Since the Bell Court was at pains to point out that a probable cause hearing had taken place for the detainees in question and thus that it did not find itself in a Gerstein context, id. at 533-34, 536, 99 S.Ct. at 1870-71, 1872, we conclude that Hallstrom is entitled at least to the protections afforded pretrial detainees. Notably, during the first period of her incarceration, Susan Hallstrom had not been accorded a probable cause hearing and, during the second period, she was detained despite a court order requiring her release. Justice Stevens focussed on "[t]he pretrial detainees whose rights are at stake" as "innocent men and women who have been convicted of no crimes." Id. at 579, 99 S.Ct. at 1895 (Stevens J., dissenting). Susan Hallstrom, however difficult to deal with, qualifies for this status.
Hallstrom should not be foreclosed from presenting evidence that might establish liability under Bell. The defendants used detention as a means to "coerce" compliance with booking procedures. The detention itself (and her lack of access to a magistrate or release on bail) could be punishment for failing to cooperate. Especially given the alternatives available (including booking over her objections, requesting a booking order, partial booking), six days' incarceration is "excessive" in relation to its purpose. While the government has a legitimate interest in orderly booking, it does not command as high a priority, for example, as ensuring presence at trial or maintaining jail security. "Effective management" might have been achieved by choosing not to confine Hallstrom (and releasing her on the citations or the bail set by the judge) or by employing the alternatives available to effectuate booking without detention.
Hallstrom makes a number of claims detailing the inadequacy of the "conditions of confinement", including lack of access to a telephone, lack of hygienic conditions and privacy, lack of fresh air and exercise, lack of adequate food and liquids which she could eat and drink,
In Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc), we determined that in the context of providing for personal security, "[t]he requirement of conduct that amounts to `deliberate indifference' provides an appropriate balance of the pretrial detainees' right to not be punished with the deference given to prison officials to manage the prisons." Id. at 1443. We noted that this standard would "protect against the deliberate, but arbitrary, choices by government." Id. We remand to the district court for its determination on the merits, guided by standards at least as solicitous as those applied to pretrial detainees.
Since we hold that Susan Hallstrom was deprived of her constitutional right not to be subjected to unreasonable delay in coming before a magistrate, and was held impermissibly after the judge directed her release on bail, we conclude that the Ada County defendants are liable. We affirm the district court's decision that Ada County is not subject to punitive damages. However, we reverse its determination that Ada County and its officials have qualified immunity from either official or personal liability. We remand for the award of compensatory damages against Ada County, the sheriff in his official capacity, and the jail commander in his official and individual capacities. We also remand for a determination as to whether any county official sued in his individual capacity is liable for punitive damages.
As to the Garden City defendants, we remand to the district court for its determination of liability on the merits. Should the court find the Garden City defendants liable, it should make a determination as to damages attributable to the city and to the arresting officers.
On remand, the district court should also determine the merits of Mrs. Hallstrom's claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement and, if liability is found, any damages assessable against the Ada County defendants.
Mrs. Hallstrom is entitled to costs on appeal.
The decision below is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
That is not to say that Susan Hallstrom may not assert federal claims based on the defendants' failure to comply with state law. We recognize Section 1983 actions grounded on claims of the deprivation of state-created liberty or property interests. See infra note 22; see also Davis v. Sherer, 468 U.S. 183, 193 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3018 n. 11, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984).