REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
In this case, appellant claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to intervene in another plaintiff's age discrimination suit. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the order of the district court.
On June 30, 1988, Plaintiff Richard Anson was laid off from his position with Defendant University of Texas Health Science Center-Houston. Anson's immediate supervisor, Appellant Timothy Parker, had informed Anson that Defendant was no longer going to fund his position. On January 24, 1989, Anson filed a charge of age discrimination with the Texas Commission on Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Defendant terminated Parker's employment in late February, 1989. Parker filed no administrative charge.
The EEOC, having reviewed Anson's charge of discrimination, issued a final determination dismissing and terminating its administrative processing of the charge. On June 6, 1990, Anson filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, alleging age discrimination.
Parker moved to intervene on January 30, 1991. The district court denied the motion. This appeal followed.
As the district court noted in its May 9, 1991 order, a class action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq., must conform not with the "opt out" procedural requirements of Fed. R.Civ.P. 23, but rather with the requirements established by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). See ADEA, § 7(d), 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); La Chapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir.1975) (per curiam). Under Section 216(b), an employee may become an "opt-in" party plaintiff to an already filed suit by filing written consent with the court where the suit is pending. Parker filed such written consent.
As the district court further noted, one cannot take legal action in ADEA cases unless one has filed an administrative charge, in cases arising in Texas, within 300 days of the last act of discrimination. McCorstin v. United States Steel Co., 621 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir.1980). We expressly left open, however, the question of whether one who had not filed an administrative charge could opt-in to a suit filed by a similarly situated grievant whose charge had purported to represent similarly situated employees. Id. at 755-56. McCorstin dealt with a case which arose in 1972 and was tried in 1977. At that time, Section 626(d) provided:
McCorstin, 621 F.2d at 755 n. 9.
At one time, the courts disagreed as to whether or not each potential plaintiff must have filed his own administrative charge in order to join the lawsuit of a similarly situated plaintiff. As the Second Circuit noted:
Tolliver v. Xerox Corp., 918 F.2d 1052, 1056 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1641, 113 L.Ed.2d 736 (1991).
The federal courts now universally hold that an individual who has not filed an administrative charge can opt-in to a suit filed by any similarly situated plaintiff under certain conditions.
The Second Circuit has stated:
Tolliver, 918 F.2d at 1058 (footnote omitted).
The Seventh Circuit, while noting similarity in the statutory language of the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, also noted differences between procedures under the two Acts:
Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 852 F.2d 1008, 1016 (7th Cir.1988) (citations omitted).
Anson's administrative charge alleged:
Anson's charge in no way alleges discrimination against anyone but himself. Nevertheless, Parker claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to intervene because, he alleges, the EEOC investigated the possibility of class-wide discrimination by Defendants. Thus, Parker claims, Defendants were alerted to their potential exposure. Parker offered to subpoena the EEOC investigators for a hearing to show that the agency had investigated possible discrimination against others besides Anson, including himself. The district court declined to conduct such a hearing.
Defendants argue that even if, arguendo, such a hearing were legitimate, the district court properly denied Parker's motion because
Cavanaugh v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 440 F.Supp. 1124, 1128 (S.D.Tex.1977) (citation omitted).
Defendants argue that Parker is therefore barred from intervention because he was still employed when Anson filed his administrative charge, and could therefore not have timely filed a charge contemporaneously with Anson. There may be a problem with this reasoning. Cavanaugh relied upon Pandis v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div. of U.T.C., 431 F.Supp. 793 (D.Conn.1977), which stated that one who could not have timely filed along with the representative plaintiff could not opt-into his suit because
Parker contends that the district court could not use the fact that his claim had not arisen at the time of Anson's administrative charge as a reason for denying the motion to intervene. Noting that the federal courts have often found similarity between the ADEA and Title VII, Parker points out that in Almendral v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 743 F.2d 963 (2d Cir.1984), the Second Circuit held that it was error for the district court to refuse to consider claims arising subsequently to those listed in the administrative charge. The Almendral Court, however, was speaking of further claims from a particular plaintiff, not the addition of further plaintiffs. Therefore, the risk of exposure is more attenuated in the Almendral situation. Moreover, the Second Circuit relied, inter alia, on the fact that the plaintiff's "EEOC complaint plainly stated that the acts of discrimination were on a `continuing' basis." Id. at 967. Anson made no such allegation in his complaint.
Ultimately, we find the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit instructive:
Kloos, 799 F.2d at 400 (citation omitted).
Parker would have us remand this case for a hearing to demonstrate that there was no problem of exposure to claims unanticipated by the administrative charge because the EEOC investigation went beyond the charge's allegations. This is a novel approach, and we are not convinced that Congress meant to burden the courts with such factfinding. In any case, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether such a hearing would ever be appropriate. We hold simply that a district court does not err in denying intervention to one whose claim had not yet arisen at the time of the filing by another of an administrative charge which alleges only past personal complaints regarding one who employs as many as 2,500 people.
Anson's charge of discrimination towards himself alone did not on its face suffice to alert either the EEOC or the Defendants to Parker's potential allegations. Therefore, the order of the district court is