OPINION OF THE COURT
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge.
This appeal presents the conflicting demands two federal statutes — the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (Preservation Act), as amended, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 470 to 470w-6 (West 1985 & Supp.1990), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp.1990) — place upon the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) when the EPA decides to conduct preclean-up studies on a Superfund
The district court dismissed Boarhead's complaint against Edwin B. Erickson, Regional Administrator of the EPA, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 726 F.Supp. 607 (E.D.Pa.1989). It held that the complaint must be dismissed because it did not meet the timing procedures for judicial review specified in § 113(h) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(h).
Although the argument in favor of protecting our Indian heritage does not lack force even when advanced by a polluter, we hold that the district court did not err when it dismissed Boarhead's complaint against Erickson for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. While a district court normally has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp.1990) in a complaint arising under the Preservation Act and while the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-706 (West 1977), establishes a presumptive right to judicial review, these normal means of review are not available when CERCLA is involved. The plain language of CERCLA § 113 shows that Congress intended to deny the district courts jurisdiction to hear complaints challenging the EPA's Superfund clean-up or preclean-up activities, even if a statute other than CERCLA ordinarily
Boarhead's claim that the Indian remains or the artifacts on the land may suffer irreparable harm from delayed review of its complaint is unavailing. In § 113 Congress explicitly limited a district court's power to hear Boarhead's request for equitable relief while the EPA is continuing to perform clean-up related activities. Boarhead's complaint does not fall within any of the five exceptions enumerated in § 113(h), and therefore the district court had no jurisdiction to entertain Boarhead's action.
I.
Boarhead Farm is a 118 acre tract of land Boarhead owns in upper Bucks County, Pennsylvania, near the Delaware Canal. Title to the property traces to a grant from William Penn. A late eighteenth century, largely stone farmhouse is part of the farm, stone field walls traverse the property and there may be archaeological or historical remains on the land. Boarhead says that the farm is eligible to be listed on the National Register of Historic Places.
Most of the Boarhead Farm property is used as gamelands, but the developed portion includes a private residence, a horse farm and a machinery servicing/repair shop for construction and transport vehicles. Adjacent to the gamelands are two large automobile graveyards. In the early- and mid-1970's, three or four serious chemical spills from trucks hauling chemicals and waste for Boarhead's president occurred on the property.
On March 31, 1989, after concluding that there was a significant risk that hazardous substances would be released at Boarhead Farm and after giving interested parties the appropriate notice and comment period, the EPA designated the property as a Superfund site on its National Priorities List. Thereafter, on May 18, 1989, the EPA sent Boarhead a letter telling Boarhead that the EPA intended to conduct several studies to determine the extent of the problem and that it considered Boarhead a "potentially responsible party" for the contamination. See Appellant's Appendix (App.) at 22. The intended studies would include a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS) for remedial action. Depending on what was discovered, the EPA explained that it could take other responsive steps under CERCLA, including "expedited response actions," "emergency removal actions" and "implementing the EPA-approved remedial option." Id. at 23.
Boarhead told the EPA in its reply that Boarhead Farm was eligible to be listed as a historic place and asked the EPA whether it had performed a § 106 review under the Preservation Act. The EPA told Boarhead in a letter dated September 19, 1989, that although it had not conducted a formal § 106 review, any appropriate historic preservation issues would be duly considered as part of its established CERCLA procedures.
The complaint went on to say that the EPA had failed to conduct a § 106 review, as the Preservation Act and regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act, see 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.1-800.15 (1989), required. Review under § 106 of the Preservation Act was designed to expose federal agencies to expertise the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation and state historic preservation officers provided and to force the agencies to consider alternate approaches to problems in order to minimize the damage to historic property without frustrating the agencies in fulfilling their obligations under federal law. Boarhead asked the district court to prohibit the EPA from taking further action on Boarhead Farm until the EPA completed a § 106 review.
Erickson, the EPA's Regional Administrator named as defendant in the suit, moved to dismiss Boarhead's complaint. He asserted that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Boarhead's claims.
On December 15, 1989, the district court issued its order and memorandum opinion granting Erickson's motion to dismiss. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Boarhead's complaint. It wrote:
Boarhead Corp., 726 F.Supp. at 611 (footnote omitted).
II.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West Supp.1990) over the district court's final order granting Erickson's motion to dismiss and dismissing Boarhead's complaint. We exercise plenary review over the question of whether the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Boarhead's complaint. See York Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 851 F.2d 637, 638 (3d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005, 109 S.Ct. 785, 102 L.Ed.2d 777 (1989). As with any motion to dismiss, "[w]e accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them." Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir.1990).
III.
At the outset, the parties to this appeal now agree that the district court was correct when it dismissed that portion of Boarhead's complaint seeking to have its name removed from the National Priorities List. See Brief for Appellant at 16; Brief for Appellee at 15 n. 15; see also Brief for Amici at 13 & n. 14. The parties are correct. As § 113(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(a), provides, review of this action may be had only upon proper and timely application in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See United States v. Ottati & Goss, 694 F.Supp. 977, 984 (D.N.H.1988), modified on other grounds, 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir.1990); D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F.Supp. 248, 254 (D.N.J.1983). Boarhead did not make a proper or timely application for removal from the list to the District of Columbia Circuit as CERCLA requires.
The acts that give rise to Boarhead's other claims for relief, however, arose only after its name had been added to the list. The District of Columbia Circuit could not have addressed them within the times set in § 113(a). Therefore, § 113(a) does not mandate dismissal of the entire complaint.
Indeed, absent CERCLA, Congress has expressly given all United States district courts jurisdiction to hear claims arising under the Preservation Act and to stay a federal agency's activities until the historical resource review § 106 of the Preservation Act requires has been conducted. Jurisdiction under the Preservation Act is based on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331. Section 1331 provides: "The district courts shall have
This Court, along with other courts of appeals, has recognized that federal question jurisdiction and a private right of action generally exists in actions arising under the Preservation Act. In Morris County Trust for Historic Preservation v. Pierce, 714 F.2d 271 (3d Cir.1983), we held that the district court did not err in enjoining the demolition of the Old Stone Academy, which was eligible to be listed on the National Register of Historic Places, until the Department of Housing and Urban Development conducted a historical resource review pursuant to § 106 of the Preservation Act. Although Morris County Trust did not discuss the nature of the district court's jurisdiction, it is plain that all jurisdictional prerequisites were met and that the Court properly reached the merits of the appeal. Other courts of appeals have reached the merits of appeals dealing with issues arising under the Preservation Act without finding a jurisdictional barrier to review. See, e.g., Lee v. Thornburgh, 877 F.2d 1053 (D.C.Cir.1989); Vieux Carre Property Owners, Residents & Assocs. v. Brown, 875 F.2d 453 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 720, 107 L.Ed.2d 739 (1990); National Center for Preservation Law v. Landrieu, 635 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.1980) (per curiam); WATCH v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995, 100 S.Ct. 530, 62 L.Ed.2d 426 (1979). Thus, there is little question that Boarhead would have a right of action under the NHPA. Indeed, without discussing that precise issue, Morris County Trust assumed such a right in ruling for the Trust as against HUD.
Moreover, since § 305 of the Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 470w-4, allows a court to award attorneys' fees and other costs "[i]n any civil action brought in any United States district court by any interested person to enforce the provisions of [the Preservation Act], if such person substantially prevails in such action," we agree with the arguments advanced by Boarhead and amici that Congress must have intended to establish a private right of action to interested parties, such as Boarhead, in these situations. See Vieux Carre, 875 F.2d at 458 (holding that a private right of action existed under the Preservation Act against a federal agency); Bywater Neighborhood Ass'n v. Tricarico, 879 F.2d 165, 167 (5th Cir.1989) (citing Vieux Carre), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1296, 108 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990).
The statement of jurisdiction in Boarhead's complaint said only that the district court had jurisdiction "pursuant to 16 U.S.C. Sections 470 et seq., the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966." App. at 17. It could have been more artfully drawn. Still, it is sufficient to allege federal question jurisdiction under the Preservation Act. The facts averred and Boarhead's prayers for relief further support this general statement of jurisdiction. A fair reading of the whole complaint demonstrates that Boarhead bases its claims on several provisions of the Preservation Act, including § 106. In its brief to this Court, Boarhead states that "an enforcement action under [the Preservation Act] presents a federal question, and Congress has given district courts original jurisdiction over federal questions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)." Brief for Appellant at 14.
IV.
Erickson argues that any analysis of jurisdiction limited to § 1331 is incomplete since it fails to take into account the jurisdictional limitations that CERCLA imposes. Boarhead's complaint asserts more than a violation of the Preservation Act. Although the claim is said to arise under the Preservation Act, Erickson asserts that the jurisdictional question must be analyzed under CERCLA since the complaint primarily challenges the EPA's preclean-up activities at a designated Superfund site. Section 113 of CERCLA, according to Erickson, precludes a district court from exercising jurisdiction under the Preservation Act on Boarhead's claims, at least at this time.
The district court recognized in its memorandum opinion, see 726 F.Supp. at 610, that the plain language of § 113 shows Congress's intent to limit a private party's ability to challenge the EPA's activities under CERCLA until the EPA has completed its clean-up of a hazardous site. Section 113(h) of CERCLA states that
The limits § 113(h) imposes on a district court's jurisdiction are an integral part of Congress's overall goal that CERCLA free the EPA to conduct forthwith clean-up related activities at a hazardous site. Congress enacted CERCLA so that the EPA would have the authority and the funds necessary to respond expeditiously to serious hazards without being stopped in its tracks by legal entanglement before or during the hazard clean-up. See Wheaton Indus. v. United States EPA, 781 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir.1986); Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. United States EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 886-87 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 106 S.Ct. 1970, 90 L.Ed.2d 654 (1986); Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 314-15 (2d Cir.1986). The limits § 113(h) establishes are designed to prevent time-consuming litigation from delaying the prompt clean-up of these sites. CERCLA's language shows Congress concluded that disputes about who is responsible for a hazardous site, what measures actually are necessary to clean-up the site and remove the hazard or who is responsible for its costs should be dealt with after the site has been cleaned up.
Besides relying on the language of § 113(h), Erickson also points to the legislative
As the Supreme Court wrote in Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980):
Congress could hardly have chosen clearer language to express its intent generally to deprive the district court of jurisdiction over claims based on other statutes when the EPA undertakes the clean-up of toxic wastes at a Superfund site. The section begins: "No federal court shall have jurisdiction under federal law...." No language could be plainer. Thus, it is unnecessary for us to rely upon the legislative history that Erickson cites, even though it is consistent with the statute's plain language.
As we wrote in Shendock v. Director, OWCP, 893 F.2d 1458, 1462 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 81, 112 L.Ed.2d 53 (1990):
Assuming Congress created federally cognizable claims for the preservation of historical sites when it enacted the Preservation Act, there was no requirement that it do so. No constitutional impediment exists to a legislative decision to limit or take away the right of protection the Preservation Act grants. The Preservation Act was the result of the legislative process. So was CERCLA.
Unlike the district court, we find it unnecessary to rely on the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Bywater Neighborhood Ass'n v. Tricarico, 879 F.2d 165 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1296, 108 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990).
The Fifth Circuit held that the Preservation Act could not be used to circumvent the exclusive procedures for review of licensing decisions that federal law established.
Tricarico, 879 F.2d at 168.
Tricarico is not itself dispositive of our jurisdictional question. That case involved the Federal Communications Act, not CERCLA. Moreover, the neighborhood association made no showing of irreparable harm. Though the applicable review procedures in the Communications Act may have delayed consideration of the association's claim under § 106 of the Preservation Act in Tricarico, at some point the association's complaint would have received adequate consideration in the appropriate court. This is not the case with Boarhead's complaint, since delayed review may mean no effective review at all. Therefore, although Tricarico's holding does give some support to our conclusion that the district court has no jurisdiction to hear Boarhead's complaint because of the limits CERCLA imposes through § 113(h), the differences between the language of the Communications Act and the situation there involved render reliance on Tricarico's rationale insufficient.
We recognize, as Boarhead points out, the possibility that the absence of jurisdiction here may do more than simply delay review of the impact that the EPA's actions may have on the historical value of the site; indeed, it may destroy or severely damage the site's historical value. Still, relief must come from Congress. We have considered the fact that the authorities on which Erickson relies deal essentially with challenges to the EPA's authority under CERCLA, not with claims premised on other federal statutes in which a party brings a complaint asserting a claim entirely distinct from any interest it may have under CERCLA. We also recognize that the cases from our Court holding that a district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to conduct preclean-up judicial review of the EPA's emergency or remedial action were brought under the alleged authority of CERCLA. See Wheaton Indus., 781 F.2d at 355-56 (action, predicated on § 113(b) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(b), and APA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 704, that sought to enjoin expenditure of Superfund money on particular project since EPA refused to permit plaintiff to perform and control the investigation
Although these cases construe § 113(h) to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear actions arising under CERCLA, they do not construe that subsection necessarily to eliminate the jurisdiction a district court would otherwise have to hear a complaint arising under a separate federal statute, such as the Preservation Act. These cases involve typical CERCLA actions in which it is apparent that § 113(h) prohibits legal action until the clean-up of the hazardous site is completed and one of the five situations described in that subsection is present. See, e.g., Wheaton Industries, 781 F.2d at 356; Lone Pine, 777 F.2d at 886-88; Southern Pines Assocs. ex rel. Goldmeier v. United States, 912 F.2d 713, 716 (4th Cir.1990); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1095-97 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 509, 112 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990); Alabama v. United States EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557-59 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 538, 107 L.Ed.2d 535 (1989); Wagner Seed v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 314-15 (2d Cir.1986); Barnes v. United States Dist. Court, 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir.1986); J.V. Peters & Co. v. Administrator, EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 164-65 (6th Cir.1985). Construction of § 113(h) to preclude jurisdiction when the complaint is based on the Preservation Act, not CERCLA, and irreparable harm could occur if subject matter jurisdiction were denied until the EPA completed its clean-up activities poses a more difficult case.
In Boarhead's situation post clean-up review is likely to be inadequate to redress harm that occurred to archaeological and historical resources on Boarhead Farm during the EPA's clean-up. Nevertheless, the statute's plain language eliminates Boarhead's opportunity to obtain judicial review even in such circumstances.
Boarhead also argues that our decision in Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096, 101 S.Ct. 893, 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981), controls this case. In Susquehanna Valley, we held that the district court had immediate jurisdiction to review a challenge to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's informal decision to authorize the owner of a nuclear power plant to discharge contaminated
In Susquehanna Valley we refused to construe the Environmental Policy Act and associated regulations in a way that would deny the plaintiffs adequate judicial review of their complaint. However, the statute there, unlike § 113(h), did not expressly preclude jurisdiction.
V.
Boarhead and the amici also argue that the EPA's alleged violations of the Preservation Act are presumptively subject to judicial review under the APA. The APA, in § 702, states that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." For purposes of § 702, "agency action" includes the failure to act. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 701(b)(2) (cross-referencing 5 U.S.C.A. § 551(13) (West 1977)).
Judicial review is not available under the APA when another statute, such as CERCLA, precludes such review, see 5 U.S.C.A. § 701(a)(1). Boarhead and the amici argue that there is no clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended CERCLA to preclude review in this situation, where Boarhead's complaint arises under the Preservation Act and irreparable harm may occur before any review would be permitted under § 113 of CERCLA. It is well-established that "only upon a showing of
For further support, Boarhead and the amici rely on 5 U.S.C.A. § 703:
Id. § 703 (emphasis added). Boarhead and the amici argue that since the review procedures specified in § 113 of CERCLA are inadequate to protect historic preservation concerns important to Boarhead, § 703 provides Boarhead with a right to obtain judicial review of Erickson's actions.
Boarhead and the amici's argument that § 702 and § 703 provide Boarhead with a right to judicial review in this situation also runs afoul of the plain language of § 113(h). We cannot understand what clearer evidence could be provided than this language. See Note, Statutory Preclusion of Judicial Review under the Administrative Procedures Act, 1976 Duke L.J. 431. Thus, Boarhead's argument that APA review of violations of the Preservation Act is normally available has no force under CERCLA.
We do not think this conclusion is inconsistent with Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (resolution of the question of whether a right of action exists in a particular situation is separate from the question of whether a district court has jurisdiction to hear a complaint at all). In Bell, the Supreme Court observed:
Id. at 682. See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 675-78, 94 S.Ct. 772, 781-83, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 649, 83 S.Ct. 1441, 1443, 10 L.Ed.2d 605 (1963). The problem here is not the possibility that Boarhead's action under the Preservation Act may fail. Instead, our resolution of this appeal depends upon the inability of the district court to entertain an action under the Preservation Act because § 113(h) of CERCLA deprives it of the power to hear claims under the Preservation Act, or any other statute, that would interfere with EPA's clean-up activities on a Superfund site.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear Boarhead's complaint against Erickson. Therefore, we will affirm the district court's order dismissing Boarhead's complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
FootNotes
16 U.S.C.A. § 470f.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(h). Boarhead's complaint does not fit into any of these five enumerated exceptions.
App. at 26. The EPA sent similar letters to the Pennsylvania Historic Preservation Officer, who is in charge of the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, an amicus curiae in this case, and to the Executive Director of the Bucks County Historical Society. The letters requested their views "on the existence of or means to identify any properties at or near the [Boarhead Farm] Site that are listed, or eligible for listing, on the [National Register]." Id. at 28, 30.
16 U.S.C.A. § 470w-4 (as added by Pub.L. No. 96-515, Title V, § 501, 94 Stat. 3002 (1980)).
As for Boarhead's request to strike its name from the National Priorities List, Erickson relied on § 113(a):
42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(a). Placement of a site on the National Priorities List is treated as the promulgation of a regulation. See D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F.Supp. 248, 254 (D.N.J.1983). He noted that Boarhead's complaint was not filed in the District of Columbia Circuit, nor was it filed within 90 days of when Boarhead Farm was added to the National Priorities List.
The government has waived sovereign immunity insofar as the APA gives Boarhead a right to judicial review. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 702:
In addition, § 305 of the Preservation Act waives sovereign immunity insofar as Boarhead seeks attorneys' fees in connection with this action. See Morris County Trust for Historic Preservation v. Pierce, 730 F.2d 94 (3d Cir.1983).
In Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 718-19 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961, 99 S.Ct. 2406, 60 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1979), we held that 5 U.S.C.A. § 702, as amended, waives sovereign immunity in equitable actions brought under § 1331 seeking "nonstatutory" review of agency action. "Nonstatutory" review describes those situations where a party's suit is not brought under a statute that explicitly provides for review of agency action. See id. at 718 n. 12. Other courts of appeals have agreed that § 702, as amended, waives the defense of sovereign immunity for injunctive actions brought pursuant to § 1331. See B.K. Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713, 724-25 (2d Cir.1983); Warin v. Director, Dep't of the Treasury, 672 F.2d 590 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam); Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Tile Layers, Local Union No. 419 v. Brown, 656 F.2d 564 (10th Cir.1981); Sheehan v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 619 F.2d 1132, 1139 (5th Cir.1980), rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 728, 102 S.Ct. 2118, 72 L.Ed.2d 520 (1982).
Erickson's argument that sovereign immunity is not waived here because CERCLA overrides the APA's presumptive right to judicial review under 5 U.S.C.A. § 701(a)(1) does no more than ring the changes on his primary argument that § 113 of CERCLA eliminates the jurisdiction a district court may otherwise have to hear a case arising under the Preservation Act. It is simply another way of saying that § 113(h) prohibits a district court from hearing Boarhead's complaint at this time. We thus will address the jurisdictional aspect of Erickson's argument first, because its resolution makes it unnecessary to address separately the sovereign immunity component of that same argument.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9659(a) & (c) (West Supp.1990).
Boarhead does not allege that its complaint against Erickson is a citizens suit, nor did it give the 60-day notice § 9659(d)(1) & (e) require, see, e.g., Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 304, 307 n. 1, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989), before filing the complaint. Moreover, the complaint does not allege that Erickson violated any standard, regulation, condition, requirement or order that became effective pursuant to CERCLA, nor does it allege that Erickson failed to perform a nondiscretionary act or duty required under CERCLA. Under these circumstances, we cannot treat Boarhead's complaint as a citizens suit. Thus, we have no need to consider whether the district court could entertain at this time a citizens suit meeting the requirements of § 9659 of CERCLA. Cf. Alabama v. United States EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th Cir.) (citizen suit exception to limits in § 113(h) applies only after the action is actually completed by the EPA), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 538, 107 L.Ed.2d 535 (1989).
CERCLA § 113(h) states that "[n]o federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law other than under section 1332 of Title 28...." Congress did not, however, make an exception to this general jurisdictional bar for suits arising under the Preservation Act. The language of § 113(h) provides "clear and convincing evidence," see Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 542, 108 S.Ct. 1372, 1378, 99 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988), that Congress intended CERCLA to limit the availability of suits alleging jurisdiction under the Preservation Act.
Boarhead Corp., 726 F.Supp. at 612 (quoting Tricarico, 879 F.2d at 169 n. 15).
Tricarico, 879 F.2d at 167 n. 8. 47 U.S.C.A. § 402(b) (West 1962) provides that in certain enumerated situations, "[a]ppeals may be taken from decisions and orders of the [FCC] to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia...." See Tricarico, 879 F.2d at 167 n. 9.
We cannot help but register our disappointment and surprise at the inability of counsel to communicate and to cooperate in working out a plan, pursuant to the EPA's procedures, which might have obviated this whole litigation. It seems to us a simple matter for the parties to have worked together to formulate a plan for performance of the RI/FS without damage to the artifacts at issue.
Id. Here, in § 113(h), Congress has done just that. By expressly precluding federal court review until after the EPA takes further action, Congress has divested the district court of the power to entertain Boarhead's claim.
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