Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Thereafter, Briar commenced this action in May 1985 against the city for recovery of economic losses incurred as a result of the city's alleged breach of the prime contract. In or about December 1987 Briar commenced a separate third-party action against A & W seeking contribution or indemnification for whatever damages the city might recover against it on the city's counterclaim for breach of contract. The theory of the third-party complaint is that A & W negligently approved work which varied from the contract plans and specifications. A & W moved for dismissal of the third-party complaint, asserting that absent contractual privity, no claim for pecuniary loss could be maintained against it, and, further, that the contribution statute (CPLR 1401) had no application to a purely contractual claim for recovery of economic loss. The Supreme Court dismissed the third-party complaint on those grounds. This appeal ensued.
Absent "actual privity of contract between the parties or a relationship so close as to approach that of privity" (Ossining Union Free School Dist. v Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 73 N.Y.2d 417, 424), recovery may not be had for pecuniary loss arising from negligent representations of a professional (see, e.g., Ossining Union Free School Dist. v Anderson LaRocca Anderson, supra; Credit Alliance Corp. v Anderson & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536; Ultramares Corp. v Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 182-183). Moreover, absent a violation of a legal duty independent of the contract, a plaintiff is limited to his contractual remedies (see, Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v Long Is. R. R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 389). Simply alleging a duty of due care does not transform a breach of contract action into a tort claim (Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v Long Is. R. R. Co., supra, at 390). On the basis of these principles, we conclude that the Supreme Court properly
We further hold that Briar's third-party cause of action for contribution is legally untenable. CPLR 1401 does not apply to actions seeking recovery for purely economic loss resulting from the breach of contractual obligations (see, Board of Educ. v Sargent, Webster, Crenshaw & Folley, 71 N.Y.2d 21, 26).