The Johnsons (Johnsons), holders of an Idaho judgment against Peacock Lumber Company, Inc. (Peacock), for $41,755, appeal an order voiding that judgment on the ground that the Idaho court lacked personal jurisdiction over Peacock. We affirm.
Johnsons sued Lloyd Lumber (Lloyd), their immediate supplier, in Idaho, for damages caused by defective beams installed in a residence that they had constructed in Idaho. Peacock, an Oregon based firm, manufactured the beams. Lloyd brought a third party action for indemnification against Peacock and Ashlee Forest Products (Ashlee), the Idaho broker who sold the beams to Lloyd. Peacock was properly served with notice but elected not to appear, apparently believing that the action had been settled. Lloyd obtained a default judgment against Peacock, which it assigned to Johnsons, who registered the judgment in Oregon, pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. ORS 24.105 to ORS 24.175. Peacock moved to set aside the judgment and for a permanent stay against its enforcement. The court voided the judgment on the ground that the Idaho court did not have personal jurisdiction over Peacock.
Johnsons argue that Peacock was subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Idaho courts, primarily because Peacock entered its products in the stream of commerce, knowing that some of them were to be sold in Idaho. Idaho law controls on the nonconstitutional aspects of the problem. Peterson v. Ely, 279 Or. 581, 569 P.2d 1059 (1977); Bay Plaza Management v. Estep, 269 Or. 275, 278, 525 P.2d 56 (1974). Under Idaho law, analysis of personal jurisdiction involves two issues: "whether the acts alleged fall within the acts enumerated by the [long-arm] statute,
Peacock is incorporated in Oregon and maintains its sole place of business in La Grande. It is not licensed to do business in any other state. It solicits business through local Oregon phone directories. All orders are picked up at the mill. Peacock knew that its products are ultimately sold by brokers to customers in other states. Ashlee initiated the purchase in question and arranged for pickup and transportation of the lumber from the Oregon mill site. Peacock has done business with Ashlee since the mid-1970s. Its manager testified at the motion hearing that Peacock has probably sold lumber to Idaho brokers throughout the 30 years that it has been in business.
Peacock introduced its products into the stream of commerce with some awareness of where they might ultimately be used. It knew, for example, that Ashlee was an Idaho broker that sold lumber in Idaho. It also had contacts over a number of years with Idaho brokers. Although it is possible that, in the course of these transactions, Peacock initiated some contacts with the Idaho market or solicited business directly, on this record we cannot say that it did.
The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of proving it. See, e.g., Schneider v. Sverdsten Logging Co., 104 Idaho 210, 214 n. 2, 657 P.2d 1078 (1983). Johnsons failed to produce any evidence of the kind and frequency of contacts that Peacock initiated in Idaho or in the Idaho market. The contacts developed in the record are not sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. Rather, the record indicates that Peacock did not solicit business in Idaho, did not advertise in Idaho and did not directly deliver its goods to Idaho. We conclude that Peacock did not "purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities" in Idaho, Hanson v. Denckla, supra, 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. at 1239, nor did it engage in any other act "purposefully directed" toward Idaho. Asahi Metal Ind. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cty., supra, 480 U.S. at 112, 107 S.Ct. at 1033. We hold that, under the circumstances, the Idaho court did not have jurisdiction to enter a judgment against Peacock.