JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue before us in this case is whether a Social Security claimant is entitled to an award of attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act for representation provided during administrative proceedings held pursuant to a district court order remanding the action to the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
I
Respondent Elmer Hudson filed an application for the establishment of a period of disability and for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 401 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V) on September 9, 1981. On the same day, she filed an application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Act. Respondent, now 50, submitted medical evidence indicating obesity, limitations in movement, and lower back pain. Her application for benefits was administratively denied, and that position was upheld on reconsideration by the Social Security Administration. Respondent requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), where
Based on these two reports, the ALJ rendered her decision finding that respondent was not disabled because she was capable of performing work similar to that she had done in the past. The ALJ's decision was approved by the Social Security Appeals Council, thus becoming the final decision of the Secretary concerning respondent's applications. Respondent then brought an action in the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama under 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the Secretary's decision denying benefits. The District Court found that the Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed the denial of benefits. App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a-44a. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It vacated the Secretary's decision and instructed the District Court to remand the case to the Secretary for reconsideration. Hudson v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 781 (1985). The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that "the Secretary did
Following the District Court's remand order, the Social Security Appeals Council vacated its earlier denial of respondent's request for review and returned the case to an ALJ for further proceedings. App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a. The Appeals Council instructed the ALJ to provide respondent with an opportunity to testify at a supplemental hearing and to adduce additional evidence. Id., at 31a. The Appeals Council also indicated that the ALJ might wish to obtain the services of a medical adviser to evaluate respondent's psychiatric impairment during the period at issue. Ibid. Finally, the Appeals Council instructed the ALJ to apply the revised regulations for determining disability due to mental disorders, which had been published by the Secretary in 1985 pursuant to statutory directive. Ibid. On remand, the ALJ found that respondent had been disabled as of May 15, 1981, as she had originally maintained in her initial applications for benefits. Respondent was represented before the ALJ in the remand proceedings by the same counsel who had represented her before the District Court and the Court of Appeals.
On October 22, 1986, the Appeals Council adopted the ALJ's recommended decision and instructed the Social Security Administration to pay respondent disability and supplemental income benefits. Id., at 21a-23a. On December 11, 1986, the District Court, pursuant to the Secretary's motion,
Because the Court of Appeals' decision granting attorney's fees for representation in administrative proceedings on remand from judicial review of a Social Security benefits determination conflicts with the decisions of other Courts of Appeals, see, e. g., Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988-989 (CA8 1984), we granted the Secretary's petition for certiorari. Sub nom. Bowen v. Hudson, 488 U.S. 980 (1988).
II
In 1980, Congress passed the EAJA in response to its concern that persons "may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against, unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved in securing the vindication of their rights." 94 Stat. 2325. As the Senate Report put it:
The EAJA was designed to rectify this situation by providing for an award of a reasonable attorney's fee to a "prevailing party" in a "civil action" or "adversary adjudication" unless the position taken by the United States in the proceeding at issue "was substantially justified" or "special circumstances make an award unjust." That portion of the Act applicable
Application of this provision to respondent's situation here requires brief consideration of the structure of administrative proceedings and judicial review under the Social Security Act. Once a claim has been processed administratively, judicial review of the Secretary's decision is available pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 405(g), which provides in pertinent part:
As provisions for judicial review of agency action go, § 405(g) is somewhat unusual. The detailed provisions for the transfer of proceedings from the courts to the Secretary and for the filing of the Secretary's subsequent findings with the court suggest a degree of direct interaction between a federal court and an administrative agency alien to traditional review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act. As one source puts it:
Where a court finds that the Secretary has committed a legal or factual error in evaluating a particular claim, the district court's remand order will often include detailed instructions concerning the scope of the remand, the evidence to be adduced, and the legal or factual issues to be addressed. See, e. g., Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (CA9 1987). Often, complex legal issues are involved, including classification of the claimant's alleged disability or his or her prior work experience within the Secretary's guidelines or "grids" used for determining claimant disability. See, e. g., Cole v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 820 F.2d 768,
Two points important to the application of the EAJA emerge from the interaction of the mechanisms for judicial review of Social Security benefits determinations and the EAJA. First, in a case such as this one, where a court's remand to the agency for further administrative proceedings does not necessarily dictate the receipt of benefits, the claimant will not normally attain "prevailing party" status within the meaning of § 2412(d)(1)(A) until after the result of the administrative proceedings is known. The situation is for all intents and purposes identical to that we addressed in Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980). There we held that the reversal of a directed verdict for defendants on appeal did not render the plaintiffs in that action "prevailing parties" such that an interim award of attorney's fees would be justified under 42 U. S. C. § 1988. We found that such "procedural or evidentiary rulings" were not themselves "matters on which a party could `prevail' for purposes of shifting his counsel fees to the opposing party under § 1988."
Second, the EAJA provides that an application for fees must be filed with the court "within thirty days of final judgment in the action." 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1982 ed., Supp. V). As in this case, there will often be no final judgment in a claimant's civil action for judicial review until the administrative proceedings on remand are complete. See Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 106 (CA4 1983) ("[T]he procedure set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) contemplates additional action both by the Secretary and a district court before a civil action is concluded following a remand"). The Secretary concedes that a remand order from a district court to the agency is not a final determination of the civil action and that the district court "retains jurisdiction to review any determination rendered on remand." Brief for Petitioner 16, 16-17.
Thus, for purposes of the EAJA, the Social Security claimant's status as a prevailing party and the final judgment in her "civil action . . . for review of agency action" are often completely dependent on the successful completion of the remand proceedings before the Secretary. Moreover, the remanding court continues to retain jurisdiction over the action within the meaning of the EAJA and may exercise that jurisdiction
In Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. 546 (1986), we considered whether the costs of representation before federal and state administrative agencies in defense of the provisions of a consent decree entered under the Clean Air Act were compensable under the fee-shifting provision of that statute. Section 304(d) of the Clean Air Act provides for the award of a reasonable attorney fee in conjunction with "any final order in any action brought pursuant to" certain provisions of the Act. 42 U. S. C. § 7604(d). In Delaware Valley, we rejected the contention that the word "action" in the fee-shifting provision should be read narrowly to exclude all proceedings which could be plausibly characterized as "nonjudicial." We indicated that
Similarly, in New York Gas Light Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980), we held that under the fee-shifting provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(k), a federal court could award attorney's fees for services performed in state administrative and judicial
We think the principles we found persuasive in Delaware Valley and Carey are controlling here. As in Delaware Valley, the administrative proceedings on remand in this case were "crucial to the vindication of [respondent's] rights." Delaware Valley, supra, at 561. No fee award at all would have been available to respondent absent successful conclusion of the remand proceedings, and the services of an attorney may be necessary both to ensure compliance with the District Court's order in the administrative proceedings themselves, and to prepare for any further proceedings before the District Court to verify such compliance. In addition, as we did in Carey, we must endeavor to interpret the fee statute in light of the statutory provisions it was designed to effectuate. Given the "mandatory" nature of the administrative proceedings
The Secretary mounts two interrelated challenges to this interpretation of § 2412(d)(1)(A). While the Secretary's contentions are not without some force, neither rises to the level necessary to oust what we think is the most reasonable interpretation of the statute in light of its manifest purpose.
We agree with the Secretary that for purposes of the EAJA Social Security benefit proceedings are not "adversarial" within the meaning of § 504(b)(1)(C) either initially or on remand from a court. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 403 (1971). The plain language of the statute requires that the United States be represented by "counsel or otherwise," and neither is true in this context. Nonetheless,
We conclude that where a court orders a remand to the Secretary in a benefits litigation and retains continuing jurisdiction over the case pending a decision from the Secretary which will determine the claimant's entitlement to benefits, the proceedings on remand are an integral part of the "civil action" for judicial review, and thus attorney's fees for representation on remand are available subject to the other limitations in the EAJA. We thus affirm the judgment of the
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE KENNEDY join, dissenting.
In 1985, Congress reenacted the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 99 Stat. 183, authorizing awards of attorney's fees to parties that prevail in litigation against the United States unless the position taken by the United States is substantially justified or the award unjust. Fees can be awarded only when "incurred . . . in any civil action . . . brought . . . in any court having jurisdiction of that action," 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. V), or when incurred in connection with an "adversary adjudication" conducted by an agency, 5 U. S. C. § 504(a)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. V). Congress refused to extend the EAJA to fees incurred in proceedings before the Social Security Administration, which are nonadversarial, leaving supporters of such an extension "a fight which will have to be fought another day." 131 Cong. Rec. 20350 (1985) (remarks of Sen. Heflin). The majority today awards those supporters a partial victory in that fight without either side having stepped into the legislative ring. Because this judicial TKO ignores the plain language of the EAJA as well as its legislative history, I dissent.
The majority correctly rejects the reasoning of the Court of Appeals that once the Secretary took a position in District Court, by arguing that respondent was not entitled to benefits, the case became an "adversary adjudication" and respondent was entitled under § 504(a)(1) to attorney's fees incurred on remand. As the majority concludes, this interpretation of § 504(a)(1) is flatly contrary to 5 U. S. C. § 504(b)(1)(C) (1982 ed., Supp. V), which defines "adversary adjudication" as one in which the "position of the United States is represented by counsel or otherwise." Proceedings before the Social Security Administration, even on remand
Instead, the majority looks to § 2412(d)(1)(A), the provision of the EAJA dealing with fees incurred in "civil actions," as the basis for authorizing the award of fees at issue here. The majority reasons that "[s]ince the judicial review provisions of the Social Security Act contemplate an ongoing civil action of which the remand proceedings are but a part, and the EAJA allows `any court having jurisdiction of that action' to award fees, 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), . . . the statute. . . permits a court to award fees for services performed on remand before the Social Security Administration." Ante, at 890. In so construing § 2412, however, the majority has committed the same error that the Court of Appeals committed in construing § 504 — in its effort to reach the result it desires, it ignores the plain language of the statute it is construing.
Section 2412(d)(1)(A), by its terms, does not authorize the recovery of fees incurred in proceedings on remand before the Social Security Administration. That section provides in relevant part that "a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . , including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action." (Emphasis added.) The plain meaning of "civil action" is a proceeding in a court, see Black's Law Dictionary 26, 222 (5th ed. 1979); Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 2, 3, and any argument to the contrary is foreclosed by the statute itself — the civil action must be one brought "in any court having jurisdiction." Clearly, the Social Security Administration is not a court, see 28 U. S. C. § 451 (defining "court of the United States"), and so § 2412 does not apply to fees incurred in proceedings before the Social Security Administration.
Other language in § 2412(d)(1)(A) reinforces this conclusion. The section includes within the meaning of "civil action" the "judicial review of agency action." Congress thus
Section 504, not § 2412, is the provision of the EAJA that governs the recovery of fees in proceedings before administrative agencies; indeed, Congress was careful to place § 504 in Title 5 of the United States Code, which governs procedures before administrative agencies, while placing § 2412 in Title 28, which governs procedures before the courts. The lack of any authorization in § 504(a)(1) for fees under the present circumstances provides further confirmation of the plain meaning of the EAJA. As the majority holds, the fee authorization in § 504(a)(1) is limited to adversary administrative adjudications, which do not include the nonadversary proceedings before the Social Security Administration. Applying the maxim of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express congressional authorization for recovery of fees in adversary agency adjudications coupled with the lack of authorization for recovery of fees in nonadversary adjudications indicates Congress' intent not to authorize recovery of fees in nonadversary agency adjudications. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978).
The majority's dismissal of these arguments misses the mark. First, the majority takes the position that a "civil action" includes remand proceedings before the Social Security Administration because a formal complaint remains pending
In this regard, the majority's reliance on Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. 546 (1986), and New York Gas Light Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980), see ante, at 880-890, is misplaced. In Delaware Valley, we interpreted § 304(d) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7604(d), which allows the "court" to award fees "in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to" § 304(a) of the Act, as allowing recovery of fees incurred in enforcing a consent decree in administrative proceedings. But that Act applied to fee awards in "any action" brought under the Act, and did not expressly limit the award to fees "incurred . . . in any civil action . . . brought . . . in any court," as the statute does here. Moreover, the legislative history of the Clean Air Act equated "action" with "proceeding," suggesting a broader meaning to the term, and certainly did not expressly reject the construction we gave to the statute. Cf. infra, at 897-899. The same is true of Carey, in which this Court construed 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(k), authorizing "the court" to award fees "[i]n any action or proceeding under this title," as well as Webb v. Dyer County Bd. of Education, 471 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (construing 42 U. S. C. § 1988), and North Carolina Dept. of Transportation v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 15 (1986) (same), also cited by the
Second, the majority rejects any negative implication from the express coverage of adversary agency adjudications by the statute. The majority reasons that the fact that "Congress carved the world of EAJA proceedings into `adversary adjudications' and `civil actions' does not necessarily speak to, let alone preclude, a reading of the term `civil action' which includes administrative proceedings necessary to the completion of a civil action." Ante, at 892. But of course that necessarily is what the statute does. Maxims of statutory construction tell us what Congress ordinarily means when it expresses itself in certain ways. When Congress "carved the world of EAJA proceedings into `adversary [agency] adjudications' and `civil actions,' " excluding nonadversary agency adjudications, it meant that nonadversary agency adjudications, including remand proceedings before the agency, are not covered by the EAJA. The majority's argument is no more than fancy footwork.
I find the statutory language plainly and unambiguously to preclude the construction given the EAJA by the majority. But even if the language of the statute might somehow be seen as ambiguous, its legislative history makes unmistakably clear that Congress did not intend fees to be awarded under the EAJA for work done in proceedings on remand before the Social Security Administration.
Little need be said because the legislative history is so straightforward. That history makes clear that in reenacting the EAJA, Congress considered and rejected a provision that would have extended the EAJA to administrative proceedings before the Social Security Administration, including those on remand from district court. An early version of the 1984 bill reenacting the EAJA defined adversary adjudications to include "hearings pursuant to section 205 and section
There is no suggestion in the legislative history that remand proceedings were somehow included elsewhere in the EAJA. To the contrary, the House Report on the 1985 reenactment expressly states that fees cannot be recovered under the EAJA in precisely the situation facing the Court. The House Report reads as follows:
This discussion does not, as respondent asserts, refer only to the initial administrative proceeding and not the proceeding
Our duty is to apply statutes as they were enacted by Congress, not to take it upon ourselves to overcome the "political realities" that blocked what we might consider to be good legislation. However desirable it might be as a matter of policy for Social Security claimants to be able to recover attorney's fees for proceedings on remand before the agency, that is not the statute that Congress enacted. Therefore, I dissent.
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