STATE v. BOOTS

RIGGS, Judge.

Defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated murder. ORS 163.095. We affirm.

This case is a companion to State v. Proctor, 94 Or.App. 720, 767 P.2d 453 (decided this date). The murder alleged in these cases occurred on June 7, 1983. The victim, Oliver, was found dead in the cooler of a convenience store in Springfield, his hands and feet bound with masking tape. He had been hit on the head with a pop bottle and shot three times in the head. Defendant reported the murder and was present when the police arrived. The police interviewed him several times that day and arrested him for the murder on June 24, 1983. He was released unconditionally on June 27, 1983, with no charges having been filed.

The District Attorney presented the case to the grand jury in August, 1983, but withdrew it before the grand jury could decide whether to return an indictment. Over the course of the next two years, defendant made a series of inculpatory statements to various witnesses. The case was eventually presented to a second grand jury, which returned an indictment on September 30, 1986. Defendant was tried and convicted by a jury, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment with a twenty-year minimum term.

Defendant's first assignment of error is the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy trial. This assignment has two aspects: first, that the delay deprived defendant of his right to a speedy trial under Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, and, second, that the delay worked a deprivation of his right to due process of law. Article I, section 10, is directed only to unreasonable delay after a charge has been formally made. State v. Dike, 91 Or.App. 542, 544, 756 P.2d 657, rev. den., 306 Or. 660, 763 P.2d 152 (1988). Defendant does not claim that the postindictment delay in this case was too long. Thus, his constitutional claim, if any, lies in the alleged denial of due process.

The due process effect of preindictment delay is judged by a two-part test: "A defendant must show both substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial and that the delay was done intentionally to gain a tactical advantage." State v. Dike, supra, 91 Or. App. at 544, 756 P.2d 657. Defendant has established neither here. Although he claims prejudice by the delay, no evidence of prejudice was presented. Likewise, there is no evidence that the state delayed the indictment deliberately to gain a tactical advantage at trial. On the contrary, the record supports the state's assertion that it refrained from seeking an indictment only until its case against defendant was complete.

Another assignment of error deals with the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss or set aside the indictment as having been obtained in a second grand jury proceeding convened without permission of the court.1 Defendant's argument is predicated on ORS 132.430.2 That statute does not apply when the defendant has not been held to answer for a crime. State v. Harwood, 45 Or.App. 931, 937-38, 609 P.2d 1312, rev. den., 289 Or. 337 (1980). We have recently interpreted the phrase "held to answer," in the context of ORS 135.745, as meaning that the defendant has been "bound over by a magistrate after a preliminary hearing or held pursuant to an information filed by the district attorney." State v. Schiff, 93 Or.App. 301, 304, 762 P.2d 319 (1988). The phrase has the same meaning in ORS 132.430. Defendant was not bound over by a magistrate or held pursuant to an information before the case was withdrawn from the first grand jury. He was not "held to answer" for the crime when he was released unconditionally and without charges having been filed after his first arrest.

Defendant also assigns as error the giving of this jury instruction:

Defendant argues that the instruction deprived him of his statutory and constitutional rights to a unanimous jury verdict on each of the elements of the crime charged,4 because it is possible that not all the jurors agreed that Oliver's murder was accompanied by any one particular aggravating circumstance.5 Or. Const. Art. I, § 11; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; ORS 136.450.

We addressed a similar issue in State v. Hazelett, 8 Or.App. 44, 492 P.2d 501, rev. den. (1972), where the jury was instructed that not all of them needed to agree whether the defendant, accused of murder, had premeditated the crime or had committed felony murder, so long as they unanimously agreed that one or the other had occurred and therefore that defendant was guilty of murder. In upholding that instruction, we distinguished cases in which the jury was erroneously instructed that it need not agree as to which of several accused acts constituted the crime charged in the indictment:

Similarly, in the present case, only one act — a homicide — was charged and proved. The consequences of the murder were the same whether defendant committed the killing in the course of the robbery or to conceal the robbery or the identities of its perpetrators. So long as all the jurors agreed that defendant committed aggravated murder, they need not have agreed as to the specific theory of aggravation.6

While defendant's appeal was pending in this court, he moved for a new trial on the basis of newly-discovered evidence. Defendant assigns as error the trial court's failure to grant a new trial. The trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the motion after the notice of appeal had been filed. See ORS 19.033(1);7 Ellis v. Roberts, 302 Or. 6, 9, 725 P.2d 886 (1986). We express no opinion as to the issues raised by defendant's motion for a new trial. The motion remains pending in the trial court for decision after this appeal.

Defendant's remaining assignment of error is without merit.

Order denying motion for new trial vacated; judgment affirmed.