WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge.
The district court granted the plaintiff-appellee Jessie Singleton's motion for attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
Jessie Singleton applied for disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income. His application was denied and Mr. Singleton received a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ concluded that Mr. Singleton was not suffering from a severe impairment which would limit his ability to perform basic work-related activities.
The district court granted Mr. Singleton's motion to remand the case to the Secretary for further proceedings. Furthermore, the court reversed the Secretary's finding that Mr. Singleton's impairments were not severe. The Secretary was instructed to complete the evaluation of Mr. Singleton's application for benefits. The court also found that the ALJ had failed to fully and fairly develop the facts and record of Mr. Singleton's case. Specifically, the court found that the ALJ had failed to secure the plaintiff's current medical records. Therefore, the Secretary was also instructed to obtain the plaintiff's current records.
Without awaiting the outcome of the further administrative proceedings, Mr. Singleton moved for attorney's fees pursuant to the EAJA. The Secretary opposed the award of attorney's fees, arguing that the plaintiff was not a "prevailing party" as required under the EAJA. The district court granted the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and ordered the defendant to pay Mr. Singleton $1,762.50.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the plaintiff became a "prevailing party" under the EAJA for purposes of an award of attorney's fees when the district court remanded the decision to the Secretary for further administrative proceedings. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The EAJA states in pertinent part,
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
The Seventh Circuit has held that Congress intended the EAJA to apply to appeals to the federal courts under the Social Security Act. See, e.g., Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1296 (7th Cir.1983). However, the Seventh Circuit has not addressed the narrower question of whether a Social Security claimant becomes a "prevailing party" within the reach of the EAJA when the claimant obtains a remand from a district court. We hold that a Social Security claimant does not become a "prevailing party" within the reach of the EAJA when the claimant obtains a remand from a district court. The district court's decision is reversed. We join several circuits which have considered the question. See, e.g., Gamber v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 242, 244 (8th Cir.1987); Brewer v. American Battle Monuments Comm'n, 814 F.2d 1564, 1567 (Fed.Cir.1987); Swenson v. Heckler, 801 F.2d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir.1984); Brown v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 747 F.2d 878, 883 (3rd Cir.1984); McGill v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 712 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir.1983); and National Coalition Against Misuse of
In the instant case, the Secretary ultimately determined that Mr. Singleton has been disabled.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.