TACHA, Circuit Judge.
William R. Campbell appeals from a judgment of the district court affirming a denial of social security disability benefits. Campbell claims, among other things, that
Appellant, a former carpenter and construction contractor, was diagnosed in 1970 as having a bi-polar psychosis, manic depressive type, and has been hospitalized several times for problems stemming from the disorder. He has also had arthritis of the knees. Campbell injured his right knee on the job in June 1980 and has not been able to work since December 1980.
Campbell filed an application for disability benefits on March 23, 1982, at the age of 55. The Secretary denied the claim initially, and again on reconsideration, after two physicians and a disability examiner reviewed the evidence and found Campbell was not disabled. Appellant's claim was reviewed de novo by an administrative law judge, who found that Campbell was capable of performing sedentary work and was therefore not disabled.
Campbell sought review before the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council found that while the claimant had a high school education, his schooling was not sufficient for direct entry into skilled work. The Council remanded the case to the administrative law judge, and directed the ALJ to obtain testimony from a vocational expert as to whether Campbell's skills were transferable to other types of work.
On remand, the ALJ heard testimony from Campbell and a vocational expert, who testified that Campbell's skills were transferable to four jobs in the "light" residual functional capacity category. After considering the evidence, the ALJ made findings of fact which included in relevant part:
Based on these facts the administrative law judge concluded that Campbell was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), and denied the claim for benefits.
The Appeals Council denied appellant's request for review, thereby making the ALJ's December 1983 decision the final decision of the Secretary. Appellant filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, seeking review under § 205(g) of the Social Security
This court's function on review is to determine whether the Secretary's decision is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456, 1461 (10th Cir.1987). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support the conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) defines disability as, inter alia, the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." The Secretary evaluates disability claims by a five-step process, set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1986). See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. ___, ___, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2290, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) (describing the five-step process). If a finding of "disabled" or "not disabled" can be made at any step, further inquiry is not needed.
In this case, the Secretary proceeded through each of the five steps before determining that Campbell was not disabled. Campbell argues that the Secretary erred at steps three and five.
Campbell contends that the ALJ erred at step three in finding that the combination of his impairments did not meet or equal the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (1986).
When a claimant has one or more severe impairments the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 requires the Secretary to consider the combined effect of the impairments in making a disability determination. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C). In this case, the Secretary properly considered the medical evidence and the claimant's testimony. The Secretary found that Campbell had not been able to work since December 1980, and that he had two impairments, osteoarthritis and bi-polar syndrome. The ALJ found that these impairments, alone or in combination, did not meet or equal the Listing of Impairments in appendix 1.
The appellant has not suggested how the combination of impairments might meet the criteria in the appendix. We have carefully reviewed the record and find that the Secretary's finding at step three is supported by substantial evidence.
Campbell alleges several errors at step five of the Secretary's determination.
Campbell argues that the Secretary erred in changing his initial finding that Campbell retained a residual functional capacity for sedentary work to a finding that he was capable of performing light work.
The Social Security Administration categorizes jobs in terms of the physical exertion required to perform them: sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 (1986). Light work primarily requires "a good deal of walking or standing," or it may involve "sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1657(b) (1986). Light work may demand "lifting no more than twenty pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds." Id. Sedentary work, on the other hand, involves "lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) (1986). Sedentary work generally involves sitting, although it may require some walking or standing. Id.
The Secretary did not err, as appellant contends, by first finding a residual functional capacity of "sedentary" in his November
Campbell also charges that the Secretary improperly discounted his testimony that he was unable to work due to the pain in his knees.
The ALJ did not ignore Campbell's allegations of pain; rather, he properly weighed them in light of the medical evidence.
We give great deference to the ALJ's conclusions regarding a claimant's credibility. Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 413 (10th Cir.1983). We may not disturb the ALJ's finding when the appellant's complaints of pain are not supported by the medical evidence in the record. While arthritis is a condition known to produce pain, neither Campbell's treating doctor nor Dr. Moore, his consultative physician, made any specific findings of pain. Furthermore, Campbell stated that he does not take any prescribed medicine for pain, and he takes aspirin only about once a week. We hold that the Secretary's finding discounting Campbell's subjective complaints of pain is supported by substantial evidence.
Appellant's final argument is that the Secretary has failed to meet his burden of showing that alternative work exists in the national economy that Campbell can perform notwithstanding his exertional and nonexertional impairments. We agree and reverse on this ground.
If a claimant cannot return to his or her past work, the Secretary has the burden of producing evidence that the claimant retains the ability to do alternative work and that such work exists in the national economy.
The Secretary's conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence. Assuming arguendo that the four listed jobs qualify as "light" work,
Furthermore, a residual functional capacity assessment prepared by Dr. Esther Macam, Campbell's treating psychiatrist at the outpatient clinic, assessed Campbell's ability to respond to customary work pressure as "severely impaired." Finally, the vocational expert testified that a person who was severely limited in his ability to respond to customary work pressure would not be able to function efectively and efficiently in any of the four suggested jobs.
There is not substantial evidence that Campbell can perform a substantial majority of jobs in the light category. Indeed, the record fails to support a determination that Campbell could actually work in any of the jobs listed by the vocational expert. In these circumstances, we conclude that the Secretary has not met the burden of showing that Campbell was capable of performing the full range of light work. However, this holding does not automatically dictate an award of benefits. The ALJ did not determine whether Campbell was capable of performing sedentary work, the sole classification requiring less physical exertion than light work. We cannot determine from this record whether there are sedentary jobs that Campbell can perform. Therefore, we must remand to the Secretary for a determination of whether there are sedentary jobs available in the national economy that Campbell is able to perform. See Dollar v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 530, 534, (10th Cir.1987).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A).
The regulations provide that the Secretary will take notice of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, published by the Department of Labor, in determining the appropriate category of a job. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1) (1986). The Dictionary compels conclusions different than those reached by the vocational expert. The Dictionary places groundskeeper, maintenance repair worker, and lift truck operator (designated as "front end loader operator") in the medium category. Mobile home park manager is apparently not a job title catalogued by the Department of Labor. A mobile home lot utility worker is in the heavy category; an apartment or boarding house manager is in the light category. See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (1981).