We affirm the trial court's final judgment holding City of Miami Beach zoning ordinance No.-1891, section 27-1.D.3 unenforceable. Although we agree with the result reached by the trial court, we base our holding on the grounds asserted by Amoco Oil Company (Amoco) in its cross-appeal. See In re Yohn's Estate, 238 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1970); Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 424 So.2d 893 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). We hold that by enacting section 563.02, Florida Statutes (1985),
A city or municipal ordinance is invalid to the extent that it attempts to regulate an area expressly preempted to state government. § 166.021(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (1985); see General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 346 So.2d 1049, 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); cf. Texas Co. v. City of Tampa, 100 F.2d 347 (5th Cir.1938) (state statute prohibiting gasoline filling stations in certain portion of city superseded city ordinance dealing with same subject). Section 563.02(1)(a) expressly provides that state regulation preempts municipal and county zoning ordinances to the extent that they attempt to regulate licensed vendors of beer for off-premises consumption.
Claiming that section 563.02(1)(a) does not invalidate its ordinance, the city cites a number of cases where Florida courts have upheld local ordinances regulating certain activities where they occur concurrently with the sale of alcoholic beverages by licensees. See e.g., Nelson v. State ex rel. Gross, 157 Fla. 412, 26 So.2d 60 (1946); City of Miami Springs v. J.J.T., Inc., 437 So.2d 200 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Board of County Comm'rs of Lee County v. Dexterhouse, 348 So.2d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), affirmed sub nom, Martin v. County Comm'rs of Lee County, 364 So.2d 449 (Fla. 1978), appeal dismissed, 441 U.S. 918, 99 S.Ct. 2024, 60 L.Ed.2d 392 (1979). All of the cited cases, however, involve ordinances prohibiting behavior concurrent with the sale of beverages for consumption on the premises of the licensees. The decision in each of these cases was, therefore, unaffected by section 563.02(1)(a) which expressly applies only to vendors of beer for consumption off the premises and is, therefore, controlling here. In addition, the ordinances upheld in those cases were approved because they were construed to be aimed at ensuring "the discipline and good order of persons while in establishments selling alcoholic beverages." Dexterhouse, 348 So.2d at 919. Accord J.J.T., Inc., 437 So.2d at 205; see Nelson, 26 So.2d at 60. The ordinance at issue here is not aimed at controlling customers' behavior in filling stations but is clearly an attempt to prevent a state-licensed vendor from selling alcoholic beverages. Accordingly, the trial court's final order is affirmed.