CITY OF LOS ANGELES v. HELLER

PER CURIAM.

Respondent Ronald Heller sued petitioners, city of Los Angeles and individual members of the Los Angeles Police Commission, and two Los Angeles police officers in the United States District Court for the Central District of California under the provisions of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. He claimed damages by reason of having been arrested without probable cause and having been the victim of excessive force in the making of the arrest. The incident arose as a result of the two Los Angeles police officers stopping him because of a suspicion that he was driving while intoxicated. In the words of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:

The District Court held a bifurcated trial, and first heard respondent's claims against one of the individual police officers.* The jury was instructed that Heller would make out his constitutional claim if he were arrested without reasonable cause, or if he were arrested with "unreasonable force" that exceeded the force necessary under the circumstances to effect arrest. Id., at 1374. The jury was not instructed on any affirmative defenses that might have been asserted by the individual police officer. Tr. in No. 80-2643 (CD Cal.), pp. 803-822, 843. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant police officer and against respondent. The District Court then dismissed the action against petitioners, concluding that if the police officer had been exonerated by the jury there could be no basis for assertion of liability against the city or the persons constituting its Police Commission.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and that court reversed the judgment of the District Court dismissing respondent's case against petitioners even though it did not disturb the verdict for the defendant police officer. Respondent urged, and the Court of Appeals apparently agreed, that "the jury could have believed that Bushey, having followed Police Department regulations, was entitled in substance to a defense of good faith. Such a belief would not negate the existence of a constitutional injury" (footnote omitted). 759 F. 2d, at 1373-1374.

The difficulty with this position is that the jury was not charged on any affirmative defense such as good faith which might have been availed of by the individual police officer. Respondent contends in his brief in opposition to certiorari that even though no issue of qualified immunity was presented to the jury, the jury might nonetheless have considered evidence which would have supported a finding of such immunity. But the theory under which jury instructions are given by trial courts and reviewed on appeal is that juries act in accordance with the instructions given them, see Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604 (1985), and that they do not consider and base their decisions on legal questions with respect to which they are not charged. We think that the Court of Appeals' search for ambiguity in the verdict was unavailing; as that court itself noted later in its opinion, "[b]ecause the instructions required a verdict for [respondent] if either the due process or the excessive force claim was found, the jury's verdict for the defendant required a negative finding on both claims." 759 F. 2d, at 1374, n. 3. This negative, it seems to us, was conclusive not only as to Officer Bushey, but also as to the city and its Police Commission. They were sued only because they were thought legally responsible for Bushey's actions; if the latter inflicted no constitutional injury on respondent, it is inconceivable that petitioners could be liable to respondent.

The Court of Appeals also stated:

But this was an action for damages, and neither Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), nor any other of our cases authorizes the award of damages against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm. If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.

The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE BRENNAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

JUSTICE MARSHALL dissents from this summary disposition, which has been ordered without affording the parties prior notice or an opportunity to file briefs on the merits. See Cuyahoga Valley R. Co. v. Transportation Union, 474 U.S. 3, 8 (1985) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 120-121 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

Whenever the Court decides a case without the benefit of briefs or argument on the merits, there is a danger that it will issue an opinion without the careful deliberation and explication that the issues require. Today's "per curiam" opinion is a fair illustration of the problem. The two important issues presented in this case are not even identified in that document. The District Court's decision to dismiss the action against the city, the Police Department, and the Police Commissioners necessarily rested on two assumptions: (1) there was an inherent inconsistency between the jury verdict in favor of Officer Bushey and a possible verdict against the municipal defendants and (2) that inconsistency required the dismissal of the action against the municipal defendants. Far from specifically addressing those issues, however, the District Court dismissed the action against the city on the ground that it had "become moot."1 In a similar vein, this Court rests its summary decision on the maxim that "juries act in accordance with the instructions given them." Ante, at 798. In my view, neither of the necessary assumptions for the District Court's action — and for this Court's reinstatement of its decision — is remotely present in this case.

I

The first necessary assumption is that there would be an inevitable inconsistency between the jury verdict of no liability for Officer Bushey and a possible verdict of liability against the municipal entities; in the absence of such an inconsistency, the District Court's decision, and this Court's reinstatement of it, are simply inexplicable.

It is undisputed that Ronald Heller crashed through a plate-glass window after some kind of an altercation with Officer Bushey. He had been stopped on suspicion of driving while intoxicated and given sobriety tests.2 In his claim against the municipal entities, Heller contended that the city and the Police Department had adopted a policy of condoning excessive force in making arrests, that the policy was unlawful, and that he had been injured by the application of that policy at the time of his arrest. In his claim against Officer Bushey, Heller contended that his constitutional rights were violated because Officer Bushey had employed "unreasonable force" in arresting him.

On the day before trial, the District Judge bifurcated the trial into two phases — the first against Officer Bushey and the second against the municipal entities. The record contains no explanation for this decision, but it does reveal that Heller's counsel opposed bifurcation.3

In the proceeding against Officer Bushey, considerable evidence of the Los Angeles Police Department's policy and custom on the use of force was introduced. An expert witness testified regarding Los Angeles' officially sanctioned use of "escalating force," culminating in the use of the notorious "chokehold."4 Officer Bushey himself testified that Heller's flight through the window resulted from his attempt to impose a chokehold, and that he was carefully following official Police Department policy.5 Officer Bushey's superior, Sergeant Shrader, also testified that Officer Bushey's actions were in complete compliance with official Police Department policy.6 Finally, Officer Bushey's attorney repeatedly emphasized that his client's actions were entirely consistent with established Department policy.7

In submitting the claim against Officer Bushey to the jury, the trial judge gave an instruction that simply stated that whether or not the force used in making an arrest in unreasonable "is an issue to be determined in the light of all the surrounding circumstances."8 After deliberating several hours, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of the officer.

Thus, despite the majority's summary assertion to the contrary, it is perfectly obvious that the general verdict rejecting the excessive force claim against Officer Bushey did not necessarily determine the constitutionality of the city's "escalating force" policy — a subject on which the jury had received no instructions at all. The verdict merely determined that the officer's action was not unreasonable "in the light of all the surrounding circumstances" — which, of course, included the evidence that Officer Bushey was merely obeying orders and following established Police Department policy.

As a result, there was no necessary inconsistency between the verdict for Officer Bushey and a possible verdict of liability against the municipal defendants. On that basis alone, the District Court plainly erred in dismissing as "moot" the suit against the municipal defendants, and the Court of Appeals was plainly correct to reverse the dismissal.9

II

In view of the fact that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that there was no necessary inconsistency between a verdict exonerating Officer Bushey and a verdict holding the city and Police Department liable for the "escalating force" policy, it did not have to consider the appropriate response to a possible inconsistency in the context of a bifurcated trial.

Inconsistent verdicts are, of course, a familiar phenomenon. In a criminal case, a jury's apparently inconsistent verdict is allowed to stand.10 In a civil case, the rule is less clear.11 Nevertheless, in contrast to the Court's blithe assumption today, it is far from certain that the District Court's action — the dismissal — was an appropriate response, even if somehow a verdict against the municipal entities might have created an inconsistency. First, the Court ignores the fact that, in certain circumstances, a court retains the authority, even in a civil case, to allow an apparently inconsistent verdict to stand.12 Second, the Court ignores the fact that, when faced with an apparently inconsistent verdict, a court has a duty to attempt to read the verdict in a manner that will resolve inconsistencies.13 Third, the Court ignores the fact that, upon receiving an apparently inconsistent verdict, the trial judge has the responsibility, not to retain half of the verdict, but to resubmit the question to the jury.14 Finally, the Court ignores the fact that, if verdicts are genuinely inconsistent and if the evidence might support either of the "inconsistent" verdicts, the appropriate remedy is ordinarily, not simply to accept one verdict and dismiss the other, but to order an entirely new trial.15

Although the Court fails to address it, the question this case raises (if, in fact, the initial view of inevitable inconsistency is accepted) is whether a different set of principles should apply in a bifurcated trial — more narrowly, in a trial that was bifurcated over the objection of the plaintiff. Because the question has not been argued, I do not foreclose the possibility that bifurcation should make a difference, but it is not immediately apparent to me why it should. In this case, the same jury would have passed on the municipal entities' liability, and would have relied on the evidence adduced in the first phase of the trial as well as that presented in the second phase. At the very least, it is unclear to me why the normal devices for addressing an apparently inconsistent verdict — construing the verdict in a manner that resolves the inconsistency; resubmitting the case to the jury for it to resolve the inconsistency; or even ordering a new trial — should be unavailable in a bifurcated context.

If the Court's unprecedented, ill-considered, and far-reaching decision happens to be correct, defendants as a class have been presented with a tactical weapon of great value. By persuading trial judges to bifurcate trials in which both the principal and its agents are named as defendants, and to require the jury to bring in its verdict on the individual claim first, they may obtain the benefit of whatever intangible factors have prompted juries to bring in a multitude of inconsistent verdicts in past years; defendants will no longer have to abide the mechanisms that courts have used to mitigate and resolve apparent inconsistencies.16 Perhaps that is an appropriate response to the current widespread concern about the potential liabilities of our municipalities, but I doubt it. Cf. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 843-844 (1985) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).

III

The Court today reverses an interlocutory decision in a constitutional rights case on the basis of assumptions that dramatically conflict with the record and with settled legal principles. The Court mistakenly assumes that there was a necessary inconsistency between the verdict of no liability against the individual officer and a possible verdict against the municipal defendants; it then mistakenly assumes that dismissal was an appropriate response to the perceived inconsistency. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Court achieves these results without the aid of briefs or argument, and relies on an anonymous author to explain what it has done.

I respectfully dissent.