OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
TOM G. DAVIS, Judge.
Trial was before the jury on appellant's plea of not guilty of attempted capital murder. The jury found appellant guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter and assessed punishment at ten years. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Supreme Judicial District in Dyson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1983). We granted appellant's petition for discretionary review in order to examine the Court of Appeals' holding that the trial court did not err in denying appellant's requested charge on self-defense.
On November 12, 1981, Officer L.T. Wall and his partner responded to a domestic disturbance call at appellant's residence. Before the police were summoned, appellant had become enraged at his brother Cal at the brothers' grandparents' house and challenged him to a fight. Cal refused to fight appellant and appellant walked to an adjacent house where appellant, Cal, and their father lived, returning with a pistol, which he fired into the air. Appellant threatened Cal with the gun and Cal and
Appellant admitted firing the shots, but testified that he did not hear the police identify themselves and thought that the person standing at the front door was his brother Cal. He stated that he was on the telephone trying to reach his sister when he saw an "image or shadow at the door," and thinking that Cal was at the door, fired his gun at the image and later fired his shotgun. He testified that he fired because he was scared and believed that Cal "was coming around to try to shoot me," since Cal had "access to all sorts of guns" at the grandfather's house, and because on a previous occasion Cal had "made a threat... that one of us had to kill each other, or shoot each other." Appellant contends that his testimony is sufficient to have required the trial court to instruct the jury on the law of self-defense.
V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 9.31 provides in pertinent part:
V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 9.32 provides in pertinent part:
It is well settled that if the evidence raises the issue of self-defense, the accused is entitled to have it submitted to the jury. Semaire v. State, 612 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). A defendant is entitled upon timely request to an instruction on every affirmative defense raised by the evidence, "regardless of whether it is strong, feeble, unimpeached, or contradicted, and even if the trial court is of the opinion that the testimony is not entitled to belief." Warren v. State, 565 S.W.2d 931, 933, (Tex.Cr.App.1978); see also Horne v. State, 607 S.W.2d 556 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). The defendant's testimony alone may be sufficient to raise a defensive theory requiring a charge. Warren v. State, supra; Cain v. State, 549 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977).
The issue before this Court is not the truth of appellant's testimony, for that is for the jury. "The issue before this Court is whether, if the testimony is believed, a case of self-defense has been made. Rodriquez v. State, 544 S.W.2d 382 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). If such testimony or other evidence viewed in a favorable light does not establish a case of self-defense, an instruction is not required. See e.g. Barree v. State, 621 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981); Cerda v. State, 557 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Cr.App.1977); Dominguez v. State, 506 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
In the instant case, since appellant used deadly force, there must be some evidence to satisfy the requisites of Secs. 9.31 and 9.32, supra. Thus there must be some evidence to show that appellant reasonably believed that use of deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself against his brother's use or attempted use of unlawful force. That appellant was not in fact attacked by his brother is immaterial. A person has a right to defend from apparent danger to the same extent as he would had the danger been real; provided he acted upon a reasonable apprehension of danger as it appeared to him at the time. See Jones v. State, 544 S.W.2d 139 (Tex.Cr. App.1976).
In overruling appellant's contention, the Court of Appeals held that appellant was not entitled to a self-defense charge because he provoked the attack; because appellant "failed to adequately show that appellant could have reasonably believed that the shadowy figure in front of the house was a danger or threat to him which would justify the use of deadly force;" and because appellant failed to retreat from his home. Dyson v. State, supra, 654 S.W.2d at 579. We find that the first reason given by the Court of Appeals is sufficient to overrule appellant's contention and affirm. In doing so, we need not address appellant's contention that the other two reasons given by the Court of Appeals are incorrect.
It is clear that under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 9.31(b)(4), supra, force used in self-defense "is not justified ... if the actor provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force." Id. Normally provocation is a fact issue, and is included in the court's charge on self-defense as a limitation on that defense. See McClung, Jury Charges for Texas Criminal Practice (1983), p. 330 et seq. In the instant case, however, provocation is not a fact issue since appellant, by his own testimony, established that he intended to provoke a confrontation with his brother.
As Semaire indicates, the appellant's intent is crucial in determining whether provocation has been established as a matter of law. Unlike the defendant in Semaire, appellant expressly stated that his intent was to fight his brother and thus, no "question for the jury on provocation" was created. Therefore, as a matter of law, appellant was not entitled to an instruction on self-defense, absent some evidence of abandonment. See Sec. 9.31(b)(4)(A), supra.
Appellant contends that the evidence shows that he "retreated from his brother and ran to the house" and thus shows that appellant abandoned the difficulty with his brother within the meaning of Sec. 9.31(b)(4)(A), supra. The undisputed evidence, however, shows that appellant did not retreat from his brother but rather that his brother retreated from him at gunpoint and sought refuge in the grandparents' house. Thereafter appellant stood in the yard with his gun calling for his brother to come out. Although appellant did return to his house after his brother refused to come out of the grandparents' house, he did not testify why he returned home. As noted above, appellant had gone home twice before, only to return with his gun each time. The two homes were on adjoining lots and upon returning home the third time, appellant continued to shoot his gun in the direction of the grandparents' house from inside his house. In addition, appellant continued in expressing his rage by beating on his father and holding him at gunpoint. Since appellant admittedly intended to provoke the confrontation, and since there is no evidence to indicate an
Appellant's contention is overruled.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.