JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 106 of Pub. L. 92-129, 85 Stat. 355, note following 5 U. S. C. § 7201 (1976 ed., Supp. IV), prohibits employment discrimination against United States citizens on military bases overseas unless permitted by "treaty." The question in this case is whether "treaty" includes executive agreements concluded by the President with the host country, or whether the term is limited to those international agreements entered into by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate pursuant to Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution. This issue is solely one of statutory interpretation.
In 1944, Congress authorized the President, "by such means as he finds appropriate," to acquire, after negotiation with the President of the Philippines, military bases "he may deem necessary for the mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and of the United States." 58 Stat. 626, 22 U. S. C. § 1392. Pursuant to this statute, the United States and the
In 1971, Congress enacted § 106 of Pub. L. 92-129, the employment discrimination statute at issue in this case.
Simply because the question presented is entirely one of statutory construction does not mean that the question necessarily admits of an easy answer. Chief Justice Marshall long ago observed that "[w]here the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived . . . ." United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805). More recently, the Court has stated:
We naturally begin with the language of § 106, which provides in relevant part as follows:
The statute is awkwardly worded in the form of a double negative, and we agree with the Court of Appeals that "[r]eplacing the phrase `[u]nless prohibited by' with either the words `unless permitted by' or `unless provided by' would convey more precisely the meaning of the statute, but we do not think that this awkward phrasing bears on congressional intent in selecting the word `treaty.' " 206 U. S. App. D. C., at 153, n. 21, 642 F. 2d, at 558, n. 21. Discrimination in employment against United States citizens at military facilities overseas is prohibited by § 106, unless such discrimination is permitted by a "treaty" between the United States and the host country. Our task is to determine the meaning of the word "treaty" as Congress used it in this statute. Congress did not separately define the word, as it has done in other enactments. Infra, at 30. We must therefore ascertain as best we can whether Congress intended the word "treaty" to refer solely to Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, "Treaties" — those international agreements concluded by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate — or whether Congress intended "treaty" to also include executive agreements such as the BLA.
The word "treaty" has more than one meaning. Under principles of international law, the word ordinarily refers to an international agreement concluded between sovereigns, regardless of the manner in which the agreement is brought into force. 206 U. S. App. D. C., at 151, 642 F. 2d, at 556.
Congress has not been consistent in distinguishing between Art. II treaties and other forms of international agreements. For example, in the Case Act, 1 U. S. C. § 112b(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), Congress required the Secretary of State to "transmit to the Congress the text of any international agreement, . . . other than a treaty, to which the United States is a party" no later than 60 days after "such agreement has entered into force."
The fact that Congress has imparted no precise meaning to the word "treaty" as that term is used in its various legislative Acts was recognized by this Court in B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912). There this Court construed "treaty" in § 5 of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, to include international agreements concluded by the President under congressional authorization. 224 U. S., at 601. The Court held that the word "treaty" in the jurisdictional statute extended to such an agreement, saying: "If not technically a treaty requiring ratification, nevertheless it was a compact authorized by the Congress of the United States, negotiated and proclaimed under the authority of its President. We think such a compact is a treaty under the Circuit Court of Appeals Act . . . ." Ibid.
The statute involved in the Altman case in no way affected the foreign policy of the United States, since it dealt only with the jurisdiction of this Court. In the case of a statute such as § 106, that does touch upon the United States' foreign policy, there is even more reason to construe Congress' use of "treaty" to include international agreements as well as Art. II treaties. At the time § 106 was enacted, 13 executive agreements provided for preferential hiring of local nationals. Supra, at 27. Thus, if Congress intended to limit the "treaty exception" in § 106 to Art. II treaties, it must have intended to repudiate these executive agreements that affect the hiring practices of the United States only at its military bases overseas. One would expect that Congress would be aware
It has been a maxim of statutory construction since the decision in Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804), that "an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains . . . ." In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-21 (1963), this principle was applied to avoid construing the National Labor Relations Act in a manner contrary to State Department regulations, for such a construction would have had foreign policy implications. The McCulloch Court also relied on the fact that the proposed construction would have been contrary to a "well-established rule of international law." Id., at 21. While these considerations apply with less force to a statute which by its terms is designed to affect conditions on United States enclaves outside of the territorial limits of this country than they do to the construction of statutes couched in general language which are sought to be applied in an extraterritorial way, they are nonetheless not without force in either case.
At the time § 106 was enacted, there were in force 12 agreements in addition to the BLA providing for preferential hiring of local nationals on United States military bases overseas. Since the time of the enactment of § 106, four more such agreements have been concluded, and none of these were submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. Supra, at 27. We think that some affirmative expression of congressional intent to abrogate the United States' international obligations is required in order to construe the word "treaty" in § 106 as meaning only Art. II treaties. We therefore turn to what legislative history is available in order to ascertain whether such an intent may fairly be attributed to Congress.
The legislative history seems to us to indicate that Congress was principally concerned with the financial hardship to
The Conference Report, however, is entirely silent as to the scope of the "treaty" exception. Similarly, there is no mention of the 13 agreements that provided for preferential hiring of local nationals. Thus, the Conference Report provides no support whatsoever for the conclusion that Congress intended in some way to limit the President's use of international agreements that may discriminate against American citizens who seek employment at United States military bases overseas.
On the contrary, the brief congressional debates on this provision indicate that Congress was not concerned with limiting the authority of the President to enter into executive agreements with the host country, but with the ad hoc decisionmaking of military commanders overseas. In early 1971, Brig. Gen. Charles H. Phipps, Commanding General of the European Exchange System, issued a memorandum encouraging the recruitment and hiring of local nationals instead of United States citizens at the system's stores. The hiring of local nationals, General Phipps reasoned, would result in lower wage costs and turnover rates.
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on a statement by Senator Hughes, a sponsor of § 106, that dependents of enlisted personnel "are denied the opportunity to work on overseas bases, by agreement with the countries in which they are located, and are forced to live in poverty." 117 Cong. Rec. 16126 (1971). Taken out of context, this remark is certainly supportive of respondents' position. In context, however, it is not altogether clear to which "agreements" Senator
As we indicated above, the NATO agreements do not contain any provision for preferential hiring of local nationals. Supra, at 34. Senator Hughes could well have been referring to agreements that in effect precluded dependents from working in the local economy. Be that as it may, it suffices to say that one isolated remark by a single Senator, ambiguous in meaning when examined in context, is insufficient to establish the kind of affirmative congressional expression necessary to evidence an intent to abrogate provisions in 13 international agreements.
Finally, respondents rely on postenactment legislative history that "firmly reiterate[s] the Congressional policy against preferential hiring of local nationals." Brief for Respondents 23. In particular, respondents offer two examples of congressional Committees urging the Department of Defense to renegotiate those agreements containing local-national preferential hiring provisions.
While the question is not free from doubt, we conclude that the "treaty" exception contained in § 106 extends to executive agreements as well as to Art. II treaties. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
"1. Preferential Employment. — The United States Armed Forces in the Philippines shall fill the needs for civilian employment by employing Filipino citizens, except when the needed skills are found, in consultation with the Philippine Department of Labor, not to be locally available, or when otherwise necessary for reasons of security or special management needs, in which cases United States nationals may be employed. . . ."
"Unless prohibited by treaty, no person shall be discriminated against by the Department of Defense or by any officer or employee thereof, in the employment of civilian personnel at any facility or installation operated by the Department of Defense in any foreign country because such person is a citizen of the United States or is a dependent of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States." 85 Stat. 355, note following 5 U. S. C. § 7201 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added).
At another point, Senator Schweiker commented: "Here is an American general saying that when the GI's go to their canteen or service post exchange and spend their money, they do not even have the right to have their wives working there because we should give those jobs to German nationals." Id., at 16128.
"Some host nations might view enactment of 777 as a material breach of our agreements, thus entitling them to open negotiations on terminating, redefining or further restricting U. S. basing and use rights. Nations could, for example, retaliate by suspending or reducing our current rights to engage in routine military operations such as aircraft transits." Ibid.