REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
Moishe Meyer Rosen, chairman of Jews for Jesus, arrived at Portland International Airport by plane and started distributing religious literature in the airport terminal. He was arrested for violating an ordinance requiring advance registration by those desiring to exercise first amendment rights at the terminal.
Rosen brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face under the first and fourteenth amendments.
The distribution of literature is a form of communication protected by the first amendment. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938). The first amendment is to be given full effect in the public areas of airport terminal buildings. Kuszynski v. City of
The Port of Portland contends that the ordinance, although it affects the exercise of first amendment rights, is justified. The Port asserts the need for advance notice when activity potentially disruptive of normal airport business will occur, so that it may take adequate precautions to preserve the peace. It also suggests that advance notice may enable it to avoid the conflicts that might arise if several groups demonstrated at the same time. Finally, it argues that requiring the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of sponsoring and "responsible" persons will help it to assess the possibility of disruption and will assist in its efforts to make arrangements with those persons for the orderly and peaceful use of the airport's facilities.
Rosen contends that both the advance notice and the identification requirements of the ordinance have a "chilling effect" on free speech. He argues that a public agency may not compel an individual to register with local authorities as a condition to the exercise of free speech rights. He also urges that compulsory disclosure of the identity of sponsors and "responsible" persons is unconstitutional because those communicating with the public have a right to maintain their anonymity.
We begin with the general principles that govern the analysis of statutes or ordinances that regulate or infringe upon the exercise of first amendment rights. Any such law "must survive the most exacting scrutiny." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 96 S.Ct. 612, 656, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). First, the law is presumptively unconstitutional and the state bears the burden of justification. Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F.2d 1130, 1151 (9th Cir. 1973). Second, the law must bear a "substantial relation," Gibson v. Florida Legislative Commission, 372 U.S. 539, 546, 83 S.Ct. 889, 893, 9 L.Ed.2d 929 (1963), to a "weighty" governmental interest. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 85 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1964). The law cannot be justified merely by a showing of some legitimate governmental interest." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64, 96 S.Ct. at 656. Third, the law must be the least drastic means of protecting the governmental interest involved; its restrictions may be "no greater than necessary or essential to the protection of the governmental interest." Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1367 (9th Cir. 1976).
Moreover, any law which imposes a "prior restraint" on the exercise of first amendment rights comes to this Court "with a heavy presumption against its constitutional
With these general principles in mind, we turn to an analysis of the constitutionality of the specific requirements of the ordinance.
The Advance Notice Requirement
We find the requirement of advance registration as a condition to peaceful pamphleteering, picketing, or communicating with the public to be unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court held more than thirty-five years ago that persons desiring to exercise their free speech rights may not be required to give advance notice to the state. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1944). In Thomas, the Court said:
Id. at 540, 65 S.Ct. at 327 (emphasis added).
While Thomas preceded the cases cited for the general principles we noted earlier, it is consistent with the later first amendment cases, and it mandates our decision today. In Thomas, the Court classified the requirement of previous registration as a prior restraint. The Court recently characterized the holding in Thomas as follows: "Thomas held unconstitutional a prior restraint in the form of a registration requirement for labor organizers." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 81, 96 S.Ct. at 664.
The Port points to a few narrow exceptions to the Thomas rule in an attempt to justify its regulations. These exceptions all involve overwhelming governmental interests and precisely tailored regulations; none is applicable to the case before us.
The Port states, correctly, that advance notice provisions may be included in parade permit ordinances. See, e. g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 558, 85 S.Ct. at 466. The governmental interest in regulating parades, when large groups use public streets and disrupt traffic by causing major arteries to be closed and transportation rerouted, is apparent.
Next, the Port cites an exception permitting advance notice requirements for demonstrations in the environs of the White House. See A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717, 735 (D.C.Cir. 1975); A Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 421 F.2d 1111, 1119 (D.C.Cir. 1970). The exception was made because of the unique importance attached to assuring the safety of the President. The Port has no similar justification for regulating expression in the manner provided in the challenged ordinance.
Finally, the Port argues that some speakers, by the nature of their message, need extra police protection and that advance notice would be helpful. We acknowledge the legitimacy of the Port's interest and recognize that many of those who communicate with the public, whether they represent Jews for Jesus, the Ku Klux Klan, the Socialist Workers' Party, or the Moral Majority, may deeply offend or antagonize members of the public. We cannot agree, however, that this interest of the Port justifies the infringement of fundamental first amendment rights.
Advance notice or registration requirements drastically burden free speech. They stifle spontaneous expression. They prevent speech that is intended to deal with immediate issues. In addition, the ordinance before us requires every person who wishes to exercise his or her free speech rights to make a trip to the airport at least one business day in advance;
While we view the ordinance as imposing a "prior restraint" and treat it as such, we would reach the same result even if we did not so view it. The ordinance, for reasons which we have expressed previously, fails to meet the rigid standards applicable to any statutes or ordinances which regulate first amendment rights. We note that the ordinance lies somewhere between the classic prior restraint cases in which speech is totally prohibited, see, e. g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 714, 91 S.Ct. 2141 (1971); Near v. Minnesota,
The Identification Requirement
The requirement that those desiring to exercise free speech rights identify themselves and supply the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of sponsoring or responsible persons also has a "chilling effect" on free speech, and is unconstitutional. In Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 80 S.Ct. 536, 4 L.Ed.2d 559 (1960), the United States Supreme Court stated the basic rule of law that is applicable here. In that case, the Court invalidated an ordinance that prohibited the distribution of pamphlets unless they contained the names of the persons who prepared, distributed, and sponsored them. The Court held that the identification requirement of the ordinance imposed unjustified burdens on the right of free expression and violated the first amendment. The Court said:
Id. at 64, 80 S.Ct. at 538. The specific reason which the Court stated for holding the ordinance unconstitutional was "identification and the fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance." Id. at 65, 80 S.Ct. at 539.
The Port argues that the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) supports its contention that identification requirements are constitutional. We disagree. We do not read Buckley as modifying the Talley rule that the government may not compel those who speak or publish to identify themselves or their sponsors.
In Buckley, the Court held that provisions of the Federal Election Law limiting campaign expenditures violated the first amendment, but upheld provisions requiring disclosure to the Federal Election Commission by every person who makes "contributions or expenditures" aggregating over $100. The only challenge to the disclosure provision in Buckley was that it was overbroad in its application to minor parties and independent candidates; appellants argued for a blanket exemption for minor parties and independent candidates.
In Buckley, the Court held that the campaign contributions disclosure requirement was justified by the overwhelming governmental interests in informing voters and deterring corruption and undue influence — interests that the Court found essential to the "`free functioning of our national institution.'" 424 U.S. at 66, 96 S.Ct. at 657. The Court then stated that the requirement imposed "insignificant burdens on individual rights," id. at 68, 96 S.Ct. at 658, but that if the requisite factual showing of "chill
The Port has no interest comparable to those protected by the Federal Election Law. The governmental interest in assuring that those who use the Portland airport are not inconvenienced is simply not of the same order as the governmental interest in protecting the integrity of our national electoral process. Moreover, the realities of "chill and harassment" inherent in the ordinance go far beyond those inherent in the case of the compulsory disclosure of campaign contributions. Although the disclosure provisions in Buckley apply to minority parties and candidates, their principal impact is on those expressing traditional political views. The ordinance, by regulating free expression in the public areas of an airport, affects most frequently those who advocate unpopular causes. It is those who seek to change the status quo who have historically taken to the streets or other public places to promote their causes. Those who are satisfied with our society as it is, normally use other forums. Because the expression of dissident or "unsettling" views, by its very nature, invites retaliation and oppression, the identification requirement of the ordinance presents substantial dangers of "chill and harassment"
The Port seeks to bring its identification requirement within other narrow exceptions to the general rule. The Port cites the parade and White House cases for the proposition that the identification requirements are constitutional. For the same reasons that they were of no assistance to the Port's argument with respect to advance notice, they are unpersuasive here.
Identification requirements impose heavy burdens on the exercise of first amendment rights. The right of those expressing political, religious, social or economic views to maintain their anonymity is historic, fundamental, and all too often necessary. The advocacy of unpopular causes may lead to reprisals — not only by government, but by employers, colleagues, or society in general. While many who express their views may be willing to accept these consequences, others not so brave or not so free to do so will be discouraged from engaging in public advocacy. The Port's interests underlying the identification requirement are insufficient to justify an ordinance so broad in its application and with so chilling an effect.
Both the advance notice and the identification provisions of the challenged ordinance violate the United States Constitution. Following the mandates of Thomas v. Collins and Talley v. California, we hold that persons desiring to exercise their free speech rights may not be required to give advance notice and to identify themselves and their sponsors to Port authorities. The governmental interests urged by the Port represent legitimate concerns, but they do not justify the ordinance's infringement of first amendment rights.
The order of the district court is reversed and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for appellant.
RUSSELL E. SMITH, District Judge, dissenting:
An airport is constructed for the purpose of facilitating the movement of people and their luggage to and from airplanes. The people who use airports are of necessity funnelled through narrow portals. They must travel in relatively fixed channels from the exit gate to the luggage carrousel; from the ticket counter to the security check; from the security check to the departure gate. These people are in a sense captives. They do not have the freedom to choose alternate routes, as do users of the city streets, nor the freedom to deviate from the route, once chosen, to avoid annoyance or disturbance. I think it is the duty of an airport board to make travel as convenient as possible for these captives.
However valuable the right to speak and proselytize in public places may be, some exercise of free speech can cause disturbances. Thus, a reaction could be expected to a Ku Klux Klan demonstration in the airport at Atlanta, Georgia, or to an anti-Irish demonstration on St. Patrick's Day in the airport at Butte, Montana. In the confines of an airport a demonstration by a sufficient number of people could cause an annoying congestion.
Certainly an airport manager, with advance notice of the nature of an anticipated demonstration and the number of people intending to demonstrate, could, by the employment and deployment of security forces, provide more effective protection for the demonstrators and the public than would be possible if no one was aware of the demonstration until it was taking place. Likewise, congestion could be minimized by the selection of passenger routes and by limitations upon the numbers of demonstrations permitted at given points at given times.
The ordinance here does not empower the airport authorities to censor or forbid any speech, and it abridges first amendment rights only in that it delays for one day (four at the very most) the exercise of the right to speak and it requires that those who would exercise first amendment rights make the effort to give the notice. I do not believe that the effect of the espousal of any idea is so rapid that a one-day, or even four-day, delay would have any serious effect upon a particular cause sought to be advanced or upon the general right to speak freely. I regard the extra effort required to give notice in much the same vein. If that extra effort is so onerous in the mind of the one who would speak that such extra effort would deter speech, then that same mind has placed a minimal value on the worth of the speech and the cause which the speech would espouse.
In any case of this sort the court must balance the restrictions on first amendment rights against the governmental purpose to be served. The majority strikes the balance in one way. I would strike it in another. In my opinion, the affidavit of the airport manager sufficiently discloses the public interest to be served, and the case is distinguishable from Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1973). See Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940, 89 S.Ct. 290, 21 L.Ed.2d 275 (1968).
If the advance notice requirement is valid, then I believe that the identification provision is likewise valid. The affidavit of the airport manager indicates a need to
The current regulatory scheme is as follows: Ordinance 203, as amended by Ordinance 266, provides in part:
Paragraph 6 of the implementing regulations provides in part:
Paragraph 9 of the implementing regulations provides in part:
In this connection, we note paragraph 7.5 of the regulations, which provides:
This section deals with a number of different types of problems, ranging from physical assaults, to the proscribed areas for the exercise of first amendment rights, to prohibitions against certain types of speech. The latter category raises substantial constitutional questions. However, this section of the ordinance is not presently before us. Accordingly, we do not now consider its constitutionality.
It should be noted that at least "one business day in advance" ordinarily means that notice must be given three days in advance if the activity is planned for a Monday and four days in advance if Monday is a holiday and the activity is planned for Tuesday, since the Airport administrative office is open only five days per week and written notice must be given to that office. However, registration papers remain on file for at least 12 months, and "[a]ny person [including groups] with a written notice on file may thereafter give oral notice of a planned non-commercial activity to the Airport Manager at least one business day in advance." See note 2, supra. The oral notice required of a person with a written notice on file may be given by calling the Airport Manager's office at any time, since whenever that office is closed, calls are automatically transferred to the Airport police office, which is always open and is authorized to accept oral notices from persons with written notices on file.