OVERTON, Justice.
This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, reported at 373 So.2d 935 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), in which the court certified the following question to be of great public interest:
We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution (prior to April 1, 1980, amendment), and answer the question in the affirmative, finding that the Department's letter constituted a temporary license and therefore fulfilled the requirements of section 322.261(2)(b).
Respondent Gillman was the driver of an automobile involved in a two-vehicle collision which killed the second driver. Respondent was taken to a hospital for treatment, and, while there, a hospital employee withdrew a blood specimen at a police officer's request. Respondent made no objection. A biochemist later determined that the specimen's alcoholic blood content was.11%, .01% higher than the level of legal intoxication.
The employee withdrawing the blood sample was a medical technician and had worked at the hospital for about ten months. He had completed three years of college, one year of medical school technology, and was licensed by the American Medical Technologists. Although not permanently licensed by the state, the employee had received a letter from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services authorizing him to work as a clinical laboratory technologist while completing his one-year hospital internship, the requisite for taking the state examination for permanent certification.
The respondent was charged and convicted of vehicular homicide and of motor vehicle manslaughter by intoxication. On appeal, the district court reversed the conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial,
This Court recently held in State v. Bender, 382 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1980), that when the state presents evidence of motor vehicle driver intoxication which includes an approved alcoholic test method, the test results are admissible only upon compliance with the statutory provisions and the administrative rules enacted thereunder. In so holding, we cited the instant district court decision. We agree with this general principle as expressed by the district court, but disagree with the court's application of the principle under the facts of this case. Section 322.261(2)(b) provides:
We construe this section in light of section 483.141, Florida Statutes (1977):
The present unrefuted facts reveal that although the hospital employee was not permanently licensed, he was temporarily authorized as a clinical laboratory technologist by HRS letter. We view this letter to be a temporary license in accordance with the provisions of section 483.141, and find that this temporary license complies with the "duly licensed" requirement set forth in section 322.261(2)(b). We conclude, therefore, that the employee was authorized and properly qualified to withdraw specimens for blood alcoholic determination.
As stated in State v. Bender, all motor vehicle drivers impliedly consent, by statute, to chemical blood analysis, and the partial purpose of section 322.261 is to guard the health of those individuals subjected to this analysis. Our holding today in no manner thwarts the section's purpose or violates any constitutional standard.
Having answered the certified question affirmatively, we quash the district court's decision on the licensing issue and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The district court's decision as to the appropriateness of respondent's sentence is not before us and consequently is unaffected by this decision.
It is so ordered.
SUNDBERG, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
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