CHARLES CLARK, Circuit Judge:
A shoot-out between Shillingford and his co-defendants and state and federal officers left one policeman dead and another policeman and an FBI agent wounded. Because of his participation in the incident, Shillingford was indicted by a Mississippi state grand jury for murder and by a federal grand jury for violations of various criminal statutes. Count one of the federal indictment alleged that the defendants conspired to assault federal officers, to use firearms to commit a felony, and to possess unregistered firearms, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count two charged the defendants with assaulting and interfering with federal officers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111.
Shillingford appealed that conviction, and this court affirmed it. United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959, 97 S.Ct. 982, 50 L.Ed.2d 326 (1976). After the Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari in his case, Shillingford filed a motion under Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 35 to reduce his sentence. The district court denied this motion without opinion. Shillingford has appealed this ruling.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3568,
Shillingford also asserts that the sentence he received is contrary to a Supreme Court decision handed down after his Rule 35 motion was denied, Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 98 S.Ct. 909, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978). There is a question whether we should consider the effects of Simpson on Shillingford's sentence since this case presents an appeal from a denial of a Rule 35 motion rather than a direct appeal from a criminal conviction. If a Rule 35 motion were considered to be a collateral attack on Shillingford's conviction, the retroactive application of Simpson might be precluded; some courts, in order to preserve the finality of judgments, have held that some changes in the law are to be applied retroactively only in those cases involving direct appeals from criminal convictions. E. g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965); see 1 B, J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.402[3. — 2-5].
We need not decide, however, whether Simpson worked a change in the law mandating retrospective application in a collateral attack. The Supreme Court, in a case factually similar to Shillingford, has held that a Rule 35 motion is a motion made in the original case. Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 n.6, 79 S.Ct. 451, 453 n.6, 3 L.Ed.2d 407, 410 n.6 (1959). In Heflin, defendant challenged the legality of a sentence he received for bank robbery and for receiving the proceeds from the bank robbery. After his sentence was imposed, the Supreme Court decided Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 70 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (1952), which held that the crime of entry into a bank with intent to rob was not intended to be a separate offense from the consummated robbery. Shortly after Prince was handed down, the defendant in Heflin brought a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding, contending that Prince mandated reversal of his sentence. The Supreme Court held that, although his § 2255 motion was improper, the defendant could seek relief from his sentence under Rule 35 since he contended that the sentence imposed was illegal on its face. The Heflin court, using Rule 35 as a basis, then applied Prince retroactively to invalidate the defendant's sentence. Thus, the appeal from the denial of Shillingford's Rule 35 motion is a part of the appellate process from his original conviction rather than a collateral attack on his sentence. Shillingford is therefore entitled to an examination of his sentence in light of Simpson.
In Simpson, defendants were charged with bank robbery in violation of both 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which provides for an increased sentence if a firearm is used in the commission of a
Shillingford was sentenced under both § 924(c) and the enhancement provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 111, which provide for an increased prison term if a "deadly or dangerous weapon" is used in the commission of an assault on a federal officer. Shillingford urges that the use of both § 924(c) and the enhancement portion of § 111 to increase his sentence is inconsistent with Simpson and with congressional intent in adopting the statutes. We agree.
In reaching its decision in Simpson, the Court relied on a statement made by Representative Poff in introducing § 924(c). He stated:
114 Cong.Rec. 22232 (1968). Thus, in his statement concerning the effects of § 924(c) on § 2113, Representative Poff was equally emphatic in rejecting the idea that § 924(c) and the enhancement provisions of § 111 could both be used to increase a defendant's sentence.
The rationale of Simpson is directly applicable to this case. The brief legislative history of § 924(c) indicates that it and the enhancement provisions of § 111 must be construed to be mutually exclusive. This fact, taken together with the rule of leniency applied in construing ambiguous criminal statutes, means that Shillingford's sentences cannot stand as presently imposed. The case is remanded with directions to the district court to eliminate the illegality in Shillingford's sentences on counts two and three by vacating one of the sentences and to resentence him consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:
Agreeing with the conclusion my brethren have reached, and with almost all of the thorough majority opinion, I respectfully differ only with respect to the instructions on remand and the action that the opinion states in footnote 7 that the trial court may take. Simpson relied on Representative Poff for legislative interpretation; accurately quoted by my brethren both say that section 924(c) is "not intended to apply to title 18, section 111 . . ." The Court further observed ". . . Congress cannot be said to have authorized the imposition of the additional penalty of § 924(c) for commission of bank robbery with firearms already subject to enhanced punishment under § 2113(d)." 435 U.S. at 12, 98 S.Ct. at 913, 55 L.Ed.2d at 77 (emphasis supplied). This means to me that Simpson precludes enhancement under section 924(c) when the defendant has been convicted of any felony to which section 111 is applicable. In this case the distinction may not change Shillingford's ultimate sentence, but the rationale may be important in future cases. Compare United States v. Stewart, 5 Cir. 1978, 579 F.2d 356; United States v. Stewart, 5 Cir. 1978, 585 F.2d 799; United States v. Nelson, 5 Cir. 1978, 574 F.2d 277.