DIXON, Justice.
Maurice Gibbs was indicted for the second degree murder of Russell Taylor in violation of R.S. 14:30.1. A jury of twelve returned a verdict of guilty as charged on September 8, 1976. Defendant was later sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor. On appeal defendant relies upon six assignments of error for reversal of his conviction and sentence. Finding no merit to these assignments, we affirm.
An eyewitness testified that she heard voices in front of her house about noon and went to the door to see who it was. There she saw defendant arguing with the decedent. She went back inside her house, but returned about five minutes later, in time to see defendant shoot decedent in the head repeatedly.
Assignment of Error No. 3
In this assignment defendant contends the trial judge improperly limited his cross-examination of the State's principal witness, Bernita Holmes.
Ms. Holmes identified the perpetrator, whom she called "Reesey," as the defendant, a man she had known for about twenty-five years.
On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned the witness in an attempt to discredit the identification:
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When the trial resumed, defense counsel continued to question the witness as to when and under that circumstances she had seen the defendant over the past several years. Although receiving vague responses to these questions, the defense attorney abandoned that line of questioning and concentrated on ascertaining what Ms. Holmes had seen at the time of the shooting. The nature and extent of Ms. Holmes' familiarity with the defendant was never established.
Further, R.S. 15:494 provides: "It is not competent to impeach a witness as to collateral facts or irrelevant matter." Counsel was permitted to show that the witness only went to the sixth grade when she attended the same school the defendant had attended. He was not permitted to show the number of times she was "held back," nor when the witness "finished" school. The only possible relevance we can discern in the line of questioning which was terminated by the trial judge was a possible defect in the capacity of the witness to observe and relate facts. (Impeachment, 21 Loyola L.Rev. 346, 352 (1975)). A defect in the capacity of the witness is neither argued nor suggested in brief, and we find no error in the action of the trial court in sustaining the objection to the cross-examination on collateral facts and irrelevant matters.
Assignments of Error Nos. 6, 7 and 8
Three assignments are submitted complaining of the charge to the jury. However, the record does not conform to the objections argued in brief. The record seems not to contain a verbatim transcript of the charge as given, but includes copies of pages from the judge's notebook of charges, and some of defendant's requested charges, which bear notations indicating that some of the requested charges were given. For instance, the notation on defendant's requested charge # 6 (the entire article 804 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) is: "Granted Para # 2 read."
One of the charges to which defendant objected is patently erroneous and should not be given.
Finally, the requested charge as to identification evidence was not wholly correct and was adequately covered by the charge given.
These assignments are without merit.
Other Assignments of Error
The remaining assignments are insubstantial.
No. 1—Defendant does not show or even allege that a particular class of people has been discriminated against in the selection of the petit jury venire. State v. Daigle, 344 So.2d 1380 (La.1977). Therefore, we cannot say that use of voter registration lists and lists of volunteers as the sole source denied defendant a right to a jury of a cross section of the community.
No. 2—We have previously determined that C.Cr.P. 784 is applicable to the criminal courts in Orleans Parish, State v. Hoffman, 345 So.2d 1 (La.1977), and thus there was error in calling prospective jurors in the order their names appeared on a list submitted by the jury commissioner rather than by lot in open court. However, in Hoffman we ruled that our construction and reconciliation of C.Cr.P. 409.1 and 784 would only have prospective application to cases in which a jury panel was selected after Hoffman became final (April 26, 1977) except for cases that had been submitted to this court for decision by April 26, 1977 (this appeal was lodged in October, 1977). Therefore, Hoffman has no application to the instant case.
For the reasons assigned, defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.
SANDERS, C. J., and SUMMERS and MARCUS, JJ., concur.
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