MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether persons who are registered under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA or Act), 84 Stat. 1242, 21 U. S. C. § 801 et seq., can be prosecuted under § 841 for dispensing or distributing controlled substances. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction of respondent, a licensed physician registered under the Act, on the ground that he was exempted from prosecution under § 841 by virtue of his status as a registrant. We reverse and hold that registered physicians can be prosecuted under § 841 when their activities fall outside the usual course of professional practice.
I
Dr. Moore was charged, in a 639-count indictment, with the knowing and unlawful distribution and dispensation of methadone (Dolophine), a Schedule II controlled substance,
The indictment covered a 5 1/2-month period from late August 1971 to early February 1972. It was reduced before trial to 40 counts, and the jury convicted respondent on 22 counts. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of five to 15 years' imprisonment on 14 counts, and to concurrent terms of 10 to 30 years on the remaining eight counts. The second set of sentences was to be consecutive with the first. Fines totaling $150,000 were also imposed.
Methadone is an addictive drug used in the treatment of heroin addicts. If taken without controls it can, like heroin, create euphoric "highs," but if properly administered it eliminates the addict's craving for heroin without providing a "high." The two principal methods of treating heroin addicts with methadone are "detoxification" and "maintenance." Under a maintenance program, the addict is given a fixed dose once a day for an indefinite period to keep him from using heroin. In detoxification the addict is given a large dose of methadone during the first few days of treatment to keep him free of withdrawal symptoms. Then the dose is gradually reduced until total abstinence is reached.
Maintenance is the more controversial method of treatment. During the period covered by the indictment, registration under § 822, in itself, did not entitle a physician to conduct a maintenance program. In addition to a § 822 registration, the physician who wished to conduct such a program was required to
Respondent concedes in his brief that he did not observe generally accepted medical practices. He conducted a large-scale operation. Between September 1971 and mid-February 1972 three District of Columbia pharmacies filled 11,169 prescriptions written by Dr. Moore. These covered some 800,000 methadone tablets. On 54 days during that period respondent wrote over 100 prescriptions a day. In billing his patients he used a "sliding-fee scale" pegged solely to the quantity prescribed, rather than to the medical services performed. The fees ranged from $15 for a 50-pill prescription to $50 for 150 pills. In five and one-half months Dr. Moore's receipts totaled at least $260,000.
When a patient entered the office he was given only the most perfunctory examination. Typically this included a request to see the patient's needle marks (which in more than one instance were simulated) and an unsupervised urinalysis (the results of which were regularly ignored). A prescription was then written for the amount requested by the patient. On return visits—for
The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, assumed that respondent acted wrongfully but held that he could not be prosecuted under § 841.
It said, further, that §§ 842 and 843 were enacted to enforce that scheme, while § 841 was reserved for prosecution of those outside the "legitimate distribution chain." Persons registered under the Act were "authorized by [the] subchapter" within the meaning of § 841 and thus were thought to be immunized against prosecution under that section.
II
A
Section 841 (a) (1) makes distribution and dispensing of drugs unlawful "[e]xcept as authorized by this subchapter . . . ." Relying on this language, the Court of Appeals held that a physician registered under the Act is per se exempted from prosecution under § 841 because of his status as a registrant. We take a different view and hold that only the lawful acts of registrants are exempted. By its terms § 841 reaches "any person." It does not exempt (as it could have) "all registrants" or "all persons registered under this Act."
The Court of Appeals relied also on § 822 (b), which provides: "Persons registered . . . under this subchapter to . . . distribute, or dispense controlled substances are authorized to possess, . . . distribute, or dispense such substances . . . to the extent authorized by their registration and in conformity with the other provisions of this subchapter." This is a qualified authorization of certain activities, not a blanket authorization of all acts by certain persons. This limitation is emphasized by the subsection's heading "Authorized activities," which parallels the headings of §§ 841-843 "Unlawful acts." We think the statutory language cannot fairly be read to support the view that all activities of registered physicians
If § 822 (b) were construed to authorize all such activities, thereby exempting them from other constraints, it would constitute a sharp departure from prior laws. But there is no indication that Congress had any such intent. Physicians who stepped outside the bounds of professional practice could be prosecuted under the Harrison Act (Narcotics) of 1914, 38 Stat. 785, the predecessor of the CSA. In Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189 (1920), the Court affirmed the conviction of a physician on facts remarkably similar to those before us (e. g., no adequate physical examination, the dispensing of large quantities of drugs without specific directions for use, and fees graduated according to the amount of drugs prescribed). A similar conviction was upheld in United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922), where the defendant-doctor had prescribed heroin, morphine, and cocaine to a person whom he knew to be an addict.
In enacting the CSA Congress attempted to devise a more flexible penalty structure than that used in the Harrison Act. H. R. Rep. No. 91-1444, Pt. 1, pp. 1, 4 (1970).
Section 822 (b) was added to the original bill at a late date
B
Respondent nonetheless contends that §§ 841 and 822 (b) must be interpreted in light of a congressional intent to set up two separate and distinct penalty systems: Persons not registered under the Act are to be punished under § 841, while those who are registered are to be subject only to the sanctions of §§ 842 and 843. The latter two sections, the argument goes, establish modest penalties which are the sole sanctions in a system of strict administrative regulation of registrants.
The operative language of those sections provides no real support for the proposition that Congress intended to establish two mutually exclusive systems. It is true that the term "registrants" is used in §§ 842 and 843, and not in § 841. But this is of limited significance. All three sections provide that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . [to commit the proscribed acts]." Two of the eight subsections of § 842 (a), one of the five subsections of § 843 (a), and § 842 (b) further qualify "any person" with "who is a registrant." The other subsections of §§ 842 and 843 are not so limited. In context, "registrant" is merely a limiting term, indicating that the only "persons" who are subject to these subsections are "registrants."
There are other indications that § 841, and §§ 842 and 843, do not constitute two discrete systems. Section 843 (b), for example, makes it unlawful for any person to use a communication facility in committing a felony under any provision of the subchapter. But violations of both § 841 and § 843 lead to felony convictions; criminal violations of § 842 are misdemeanors.
The legislative history indicates that Congress was concerned with the nature of the drug transaction, rather than with the status of the defendant. The penalties now embodied in §§ 841-843 originated in §§ 501-503 of the Controlled Dangerous Substances Act of 1969. The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on that bill described § 501 (the counterpart of § 841) as applying to "traffickers." S. Rep. No. 91-613, p. 8
C
Congress was particularly concerned with the diversion of drugs from legitimate channels to illegitimate channels. Id., at 6; S. Rep. No. 91-613, p. 4; 116 Cong. Rec. 996 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Dodd). It was aware that registrants, who have the greatest access to controlled substances and therefore the greatest opportunity for diversion, were responsible for a large part of the illegal drug traffic. See id., at 1663 (remarks of Sen. Hruska); id., at 998 (remarks of Sen. Griffin).
Recognizing this concern the Court of Appeals suggested that Dr. Moore could be prosecuted under § 842
But we think it immaterial whether Dr. Moore also could have been prosecuted for his violation of statutory provisions relating to dispensing procedures. There is nothing in the statutory scheme or the legislative history that justifies a conclusion that a registrant who may be prosecuted for the relatively minor offense of violating § 829 is thereby exempted from prosecution under § 841 for the significantly greater offense of acting as a drug "pusher."
III
Respondent argues that even if Congress did not intend to exempt registrants from all prosecutions under § 841, he cannot be prosecuted under that section because the specific conduct for which he was prosecuted was "authorized by [the] subchapter" and thus falls within the express exemption of the section.
The trial judge assumed that a physician's activities are authorized only if they are within the usual course of professional practice. He instructed the jury that it had to find
The Court of Appeals did not address this argument because it concluded that registrants could not be prosecuted under § 841 under any circumstances. But it suggested that if a registrant could be reached under § 841 he could not be prosecuted merely because his activities fall outside the "usual course of practice." 164 App. D. C., at 322 n. 11, 505 F. 2d, at 429 n. 11.
Under the Harrison Act physicians who departed from the usual course of medical practice were subject to the same penalties as street pushers with no claim to legitimacy. Section 2 of that Act required all persons who sold or prescribed certain drugs to register and to deliver drugs only to persons with federal order forms. The latter requirement did not apply to "the dispensing or distribution of any of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by a physician . . . registered under this Act in the course of his professional practice only." 38 Stat. 786. As noted above, Congress intended the CSA to strengthen rather than to weaken the prior drug laws. There is no indication that Congress intended to eliminate the existing limitation on the exemption given to doctors.
Instead of expressly removing from the protection of the Act those physicians who operate beyond the bounds of professional practice, the CSA uses the concept of "registration." Section 822 (b) defines the scope of authorization under the Act in circular terms: "Persons registered . . . under this subchapter . . . are authorized [to dispense controlled substances] . . . to the extent authorized by their registration and in conformity with the other provisions of this subchapter." But the scheme of the statute, viewed against the background of the legislative history, reveals an intent to limit a registered physician's dispensing authority to the course of his "professional practice."
Registration of physicians and other practitioners
This is made explicit in § 802 (20), which provides that "practitioner" means one who is "registered . . . by the United States or the jurisdiction in which he practices or does research, to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or chemical analysis, a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research." This section defines the term "practitioner" for purposes of the Act. It also describes the type of registration contemplated by the Act. That registration is limited to the dispensing and use of drugs "in the course of professional practice or research."
Other provisions throughout the Act reflect the intent
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to find that respondent's conduct exceeded the bounds of "professional practice."
IV
Respondent further contended at trial that he was experimenting with a new "blockade" theory of detoxification. The jury did not believe him. Congress understandably was concerned that the drug laws not impede legitimate research and that physicians be allowed reasonable discretion in treating patients and testing new theories. But respondent's interpretation of the Act would go far beyond authorizing legitimate research and experimentation by physicians. It would even compel exemption from the provisions of § 841 of all "registrants," including manufacturers, wholesalers, and pharmacists —in addition to physicians.
In enacting the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1236, Title II of which is the CSA, Congress faced the problem directly. Because of the potential for abuse it decided that some limits on free experimentation with drugs were necessary. But it was also aware of the concern expressed by the Prettyman Commission:
Congress' solution to this problem is found in § 4 of Title I of the 1970 Act, 42 U. S. C. § 257a. That section requires the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, after consultation with the Attorney General and national addict treatment organizations, to "determine the appropriate methods of professional practice in the medical treatment of . . . narcotic addiction . . . ." It was designed "to clarify for the medical profession . . . the extent to which they may safely go in treating narcotic addicts as patients." H. R. Rep. No. 91-1444, p. 14. Congress pointed out that "criminal prosecutions" in the past had turned on the opinions of federal prosecutors. Under the new Act, "[t]hose physicians who comply with the recommendations made by the Secretary will no longer jeopardize their professional careers . . . ." Id., at 15. The negative implication is that physicians who go beyond approved practice remain subject to serious criminal penalties.
In the case of methadone treatment the limits of approved practice are particularly clear. As Dr. Moore admitted at trial,
V
Respondent argues finally that the statute is sufficiently ambiguous that it must be construed in his favor despite the clear intent of the Congress. It is true that "when choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite." United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-222 (1952). In this case, however, the principle set forth in United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1948), is appropriately followed:
So ordered.
FootNotes
"Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally—
"(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
"(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a counterfeit substance."
"Dispense" is defined in § 802 (10) to mean "to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user . . . by, or pursuant to the lawful order of, a practitioner, including the prescribing and administering of a controlled substance . . . ." Section 802 (11) defines "distribute" to mean "to deliver (other than by administering or dispensing) a controlled substance." "Administer" refers to "the direct application of a controlled substance to the body of a patient . . . ." § 802 (2).
"(a) Unlawful acts.
"It shall be unlawful for any person—
"(1) who is subject to the requirements of part C to distribute or dispense a controlled substance in violation of section 829 of this title;
"(2) who is a registrant to distribute or dispense a controlled substance not authorized by his registration to another registrant or other authorized person or to manufacture a controlled substance not authorized by his registration;
"(3) who is a registrant to distribute a controlled substance in violation of section 825 of this title;
"(4) to remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol or label required by section 825 of this title;
"(5) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, report, notification, declaration, order or order form, statement, invoice, or information required under this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter;
"(6) to refuse any entry into any premises or inspection authorized by this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter;
"(7) to remove, break, injure, or deface a seal placed upon controlled substances pursuant to section 824 (f) or 881 of this title or to remove or dispose of substances so placed under seal; or
"(8) to use, to his own advantage, or to reveal, other than to duly authorized officers or employees of the United States, or to the courts when relevant in any judicial proceeding under this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter, any information acquired in the course of an inspection authorized by this subchapter concerning any method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection.
"(b) Manufacture.
"It shall be unlawful for any person who is a registrant to manufacture a controlled substance in Schedule I or II which is—
"(1) not expressly authorized by his registration and by a quota assigned to him pursuant to section 826 of this title; or
"(2) in excess of a quota assigned to him pursuant to section 826 of this title."
Section 843 provides:
"(a) Unlawful acts.
"It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally—
"(1) who is a registrant to distribute a controlled substance classified in schedule I or II, in the course of his legitimate business, except pursuant to an order or an order form as required by section 828 of this title;
"(2) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a registration number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person;
"(3) to acquire or obtain possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge;
"(4) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in, or omit any material information from, any application, report, record, or other document required to be made, kept, or filed under this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter; or
"(5) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling thereof so as to render such drug a counterfeit substance.
"(b) Communication facility.
"It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to use any communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter. Each separate use of a communication facility shall be a separate offense under this subsection. For purposes of this subsection, the term `communication facility' means any and all public and private instrumentalities used or useful in the transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds of all kinds and includes mail, telephone, wire, radio, and all other means of communication."
"(a) Schedule II substances.
"Except when dispensed directly by a practitioner, other than a pharmacist, to an ultimate user, no controlled substance in schedule II, which is a prescription drug as determined under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, may be dispensed without the written prescription of a practitioner, except that in emergency situations, as prescribed by the Secretary by regulation after consultation with the Attorney General, such drug may be dispensed upon oral prescription in accordance with section 353 (b) of this title. Prescriptions shall be retained in conformity with the requirements of section 827 of this title. No prescription for a controlled substance in schedule II may be refilled.
"(b) Schedule III and IV substances.
"Except when dispensed directly by a practitioner, other than a pharmacist, to an ultimate user, no controlled substance in schedule III or IV, which is a prescription drug as determined under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, may be dispensed without a written or oral prescription in conformity with section 353 (b) of this title. Such prescriptions may not be filled or refilled more than six months after the date thereof or be refilled more than five times after the date of the prescription unless renewed by the practitioner.
"(c) Schedule V substances.
"No controlled substance in schedule V which is a drug may be distributed or dispensed other than for a medical purpose."
The Attorney General's regulations enacted pursuant to § 829 required:
"A prescription for a controlled substance to be effective must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice. The responsibility for the proper prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances is upon the prescribing practitioner, but a corresponding responsibility rests with the pharmacist who fills the prescription. An order purporting to be a prescription issued not in the usual course of professional treatment or in legitimate and authorized research is not a prescription within the meaning and intent of section 309 of the Act (21 U. S. C. 829) and the person knowingly filling such a purported prescription, as well as the person issuing it, shall be subject to the penalties provided for violations of the provisions of law relating to controlled substances." 21 CFR § 306.04 (a) (1973) (redesignated as 21 CFR § 1306.04 (a) (1975)).
The court below suggested that a violation of the "medical purpose" requirement of § 306.04 (a) makes a prescription something other than the "written prescription" required by § 829. The dissent, which agreed that Dr. Moore could be prosecuted under § 842 (a) (1), did not rely on the regulations. It found inherent in the statutory term "prescription" a requirement that the order be issued for a valid medical purpose.
There was no indication that Congress thought that trafficking doctors could escape felony prosecution altogether under pre-NATA law. Rather, it sought to "cure the present difficulty in such prosecutions because of the intricate and nearly impossible burden of establishing what is beyond `the course of professional practice' for criminal law purposes when such a practitioner speciously claims that the practices in question were ethical and humanitarian in nature." S. Rep. No. 93-192, p. 14 (1973). Dr. Moore's conviction was cited to illustrate that successful criminal actions could be brought only "in the most aggravated of circumstances . . . after prolonged effort to make undercover penetrations." Id., at 13.
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