GODBOLD, Circuit Judge:
In January 1970 plaintiff Robinson, a Negro male, began employment with the Crossroads Community Center, a department of the city of Dallas.
Two months after his suspension, Robinson notified the Crossroads Community Center of his resignation, which he contends was in effect a constructive discharge. Defendants urge that plaintiff terminated his employment voluntarily.
The heart of plaintiff's case is his theory that Rule 7.18 discriminates against blacks in violation of Title VII.
In an attempt to demonstrate the discriminatory effect and establish his prima facie case, plaintiff points to statistics cataloging the race of those disciplined under the "just debts" rule in recent years. These statistics indicate that seven employees, three of whom were black, were disciplined under the "just debts" rule in the period 1965-1973. Looking to years subsequent to 1968 (when, plaintiff argues, blacks first were hired by the city in significant numbers), three of the five employees disciplined under the "just debts" rule have been black. We are unable to conclude, on the basis of these few instances of discipline, that the "just debts" rule has a harsher effect on blacks than whites. Such small numbers are insufficient to support any conclusion as to whether the rule has a discriminatory effect. See Note, Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences Under Title VII, 59 Va.L.Rev. 463, 478 (1973).
Alternatively, plaintiff employs the following analysis. First, he states that people who do not pay their just debts tend to be poor people. Plaintiff offers no support for his assertion but simply contends that the court is required to reach this conclusion. Such a conclusion certainly is not required, nor is the subject matter one for judicial notice. Indeed, we are not even certain that it is correct. Second, plaintiff states that Negroes comprise a disproportionately large portion of the poor people in Dallas. This assertion was supported by evidence.
Plaintiff also attempts to support his conclusion by reliance on several recent Title VII decisions, Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F.Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal.,1971) (Los Angeles case, discharging employees due to multiple garnishments); Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (CA8, 1974) (Missouri case, discharging employees due to multiple garnishments); Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F.Supp. 401 (C.D.Cal., 1970), aff'd 472 F.2d 631 (CA9, 1972) (Los Angeles case, refusing to hire persons with more than a certain number of non-traffic arrests). In each of these cases the racially discriminatory effect of the practice in question was either proved by adequate evidence or was stipulated. In the instant case there is neither stipulation nor evidence but only conjecture, and the evidence in the above cited cases is not a substitute for that required in this case.
Finally the statistics offered by plaintiff indicate that he misconstrues the class. Personnel Rule 7.18 is imposed on employees of the city of Dallas, not on the population generally. If the city of Dallas refused to hire any individual who had ever failed to pay a just debt, statistics concerning the population as a whole would be relevant. But in the present case the employment practice is applied only to employees of the city of Dallas. Thus the question is whether black employees
Plaintiff has failed to show that Rule 7.18 has a discriminatory effect on Negroes. Since he has not established a prima facie case, we need not consider whether defendant succeeded in demonstrating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory "business necessity" rationale for the rule. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 678; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158, 164 (1971).
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
This rule is supplemented by a penalty guide: