In 1971 the petitioner Marco DeFunis, Jr.,
DeFunis brought the suit on behalf of himself alone, and not as the representative of any class, against the various respondents, who are officers, faculty members, and members of the Board of Regents of the University of Washington. He asked the trial court to issue a mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to admit him as a member of the first-year class entering in September 1971, on the ground that the Law School admissions policy had resulted in the unconstitutional denial of his application for admission. The trial court agreed with his claim and granted the requested relief.
He then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, as Circuit Justice, stayed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court pending the "final disposition of the case by this Court." By virtue of this stay, DeFunis has remained in law school, and was in the first term of his third and final year when this Court first considered his certiorari petition in the fall of 1973. Because of our concern that DeFunis' third-year standing in the Law School might have rendered this case moot, we requested the parties to brief the question of mootness before we acted on the petition. In response, both sides contended that the case was not moot. The respondents indicated that, if the decision of the Washington Supreme Court were permitted to stand, the petitioner could complete the term for which he was then enrolled but would have to apply to the faculty for permission to continue in the school before he could register for another term.
We granted the petition for certiorari on November 19, 1973. 414 U.S. 1038. The case was in due course orally argued on February 26, 1974.
In response to questions raised from the bench during the oral argument, counsel for the petitioner has informed the Court that DeFunis has now registered "for his final
The starting point for analysis is the familiar proposition that "federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 246 (1971). The inability of the federal judiciary "to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Art. III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy." Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n. 3 (1964); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 n. 7 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 50 n. 8 (1968). Although as a matter of Washington state law it appears that this case would be saved from mootness by "the great public interest in the continuing issues raised by this appeal," 82 Wn.2d 11, 23 n. 6, 507 P.2d 1169, 1177 n. 6 (1973), the fact remains that under Art. III "[e]ven in cases arising in the state courts, the question of mootness is a federal one which a federal court must resolve before it assumes jurisdiction." North Carolina v. Rice, supra, at 246.
The respondents have represented that, without regard to the ultimate resolution of the issues in this case,
It matters not that these circumstances partially stem from a policy decision on the part of the respondent Law School authorities. The respondents, through their counsel, the Attorney General of the State, have professionally represented that in no event will the status of DeFunis now be affected by any view this Court might express on the merits of this controversy. And it has been the settled practice of the Court, in contexts no less significant, fully to accept representations such as these as parameters for decision. See Gerende v. Election Board, 341 U.S. 56 (1951); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 57-58 (1967); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99,
There is a line of decisions in this Court standing for the proposition that the "voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i. e., does not make the case moot." United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290, 308-310 (1897); Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 43 (1944); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376 (1963); United States v. Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199, 202-203 (1968). These decisions and the doctrine they reflect would be quite relevant if the question of mootness here had arisen by reason of a unilateral change in the admissions procedures of the Law School. For it was the admissions procedures that were the target of this litigation, and a voluntary cessation of the admissions practices complained of could make this case moot only if it could be said with assurance "that `there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.' " United States v. W. T. Grant Co., supra, at 633. Otherwise, "[t]he defendant is free to return to his old ways," id., at 632, and this fact would be enough to prevent mootness because of the "public interest in having the legality of the practices settled." Ibid. But mootness in the present case depends not at all upon a "voluntary cessation" of the admissions practices that were the subject of this litigation. It depends, instead, upon the simple fact that DeFunis is now in the final quarter of the final year of his course of study, and the settled and unchallenged policy of the Law School to permit him to complete the term for which he is now enrolled.
It might also be suggested that this case presents a question that is "capable of repetition, yet evading
Because the petitioner will complete his law school studies at the end of the term for which he has now registered regardless of any decision this Court might reach on the merits of this litigation, we conclude that the Court cannot, consistently with the limitations of
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
I agree with MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN that this case is not moot, and because of the significance of the issues raised I think it is important to reach the merits.
I
The University of Washington Law School received 1,601 applications for admission to its first-year class beginning in September 1971. There were spaces available for only about 150 students, but in order to enroll this number the school eventually offered admission to 275 applicants. All applicants were put into two groups, one of which was considered under the minority admissions program. Thirty-seven of those offered admission had indicated on an optional question on their application that their "dominant" ethnic origin was either black, Chicano, American Indian, or Filipino, the four groups included in the minority admissions program. Answers to this optional question were apparently the sole basis
In general, the admissions process proceeded as follows: An index called the Predicted First Year Average (Average) was calculated for each applicant on the basis of a formula combining the applicant's score on the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) and his grades in his last two years in college.
Also beginning early in the admissions process was the culling out of applicants with averages below 74.5. These were reviewed by the Chairman of the Admissions Committee, who had the authority to reject them summarily without further consideration by the rest of the Committee. A small number of these applications were saved by the Chairman for Committee consideration on the basis of information in the file indicating greater promise than suggested by the Average. Finally during the early months the Committee accumulated the applications of those with averages between 74.5 and 77 to be considered at a later time when most of the applications had been received and thus could be compared with one another. Since DeFunis' average was 76.23, he was in this middle group.
Beginning in their May meeting the Committee considered this middle group of applicants, whose folders had been randomly distributed to Committee members for their recommendations to the Committee. Also considered at this time were remaining applicants with averages below 74.5 who had not been summarily rejected, and some of those with averages above 77 who had not been summarily admitted, but instead held for further consideration. Each Committee member would consider the applications competitively, following rough guidelines
Applicants who had indicated on their application forms that they were either black, Chicano, American Indian, or Filipino were treated differently in several respects. Whatever their Averages, none were given to the Committee Chairman for consideration of summary rejection, nor were they distributed randomly among Committee members for consideration along with the other applications. Instead, all applications of black students were assigned separately to two particular Committee members: a first-year black law student on the Committee, and a professor on the Committee who had worked the previous summer in a special program for disadvantaged college students considering application to the Law School.
Thirty-seven minority applicants were admitted under this procedure. Of these, 36 had Averages below DeFunis' 76.23, and 30 had Averages below 74.5, and thus would ordinarily have been summarily rejected by the Chairman. There were also 48 nonminority applicants admitted who had Averages below DeFunis. Twenty-three of these were returning veterans, see n. 2, supra, and 25 were others who presumably were admitted because of other
It is reasonable to conclude from the above facts that while other factors were considered by the Committee, and were on occasion crucial, the Average was for most applicants a heavily weighted factor, and was at the extremes virtually dispositive.
The educational policy choices confronting a university admissions committee are not ordinarily a subject for judicial oversight; clearly it is not for us but for the law school to decide which tests to employ, how heavily to weigh recommendations from professors or undergraduate grades, and what level of achievement on the chosen criteria are sufficient to demonstrate that the candidate is qualified for admission. What places this case in a special category is the fact that the school did not choose one set of criteria but two, and then determined which to apply to a given applicant on the basis of his race. The
Although testifying that "[w]e do not have a quota . . ." the Law School dean explained that "[w]e want a reasonable representation. We will go down to reach it if we can," without "taking people who are unqualified in an absolute sense . . . ." Statement of Facts 420. By "unqualified in an absolute sense" the dean meant candidates who "have no reasonable probable likelihood of having a chance of succeeding in the study of law . . . ." Ibid. But the dean conceded that in "reaching," the school does take "some minority students who at least, viewed as a group, have a less such likelihood than the majority student group taken as a whole." Id., at 423.
It thus appears that by the Committee's own assessment, it admitted minority students who, by the tests given, seemed less qualified than some white students who were not accepted, in order to achieve a "reasonable representation." In this regard it may be pointed out that for the year 1969-1970—two years before the class to which DeFunis was seeking admission—the Law School
II
There was a time when law schools could follow the advice of Wigmore, who believed that "the way to find out whether a boy has the makings of a competent lawyer is to see what he can do in a first year of law studies." Wigmore, Juristic Psychopoyemetrology—Or, How to Find Out Whether a Boy Has the Makings of a Lawyer, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 454, 463-464 (1929). In those days there were enough spaces to admit every applicant who met minimal credentials, and they all could be given the opportunity to prove themselves at law school. But by the 1920's many law schools found that they could not admit all minimally qualified applicants, and some selection process began.
The test purports to predict how successful the applicant will be in his first year of law school, and consists of a few hours' worth of multiple-choice questions. But the answers the student can give to a multiple-choice question are limited by the creativity and intelligence of the test-maker; the student with a better or more original understanding of the problem than the test-maker may realize that none of the alternative answers are any good, but there is no way for him to demonstrate his understanding. "It is obvious from the nature of the tests that they do not give the candidate a significant opportunity to express himself. If he is subtle in his choice of answers it will go against him; and yet there is no other way for him to show any individuality. If he is strong-minded, nonconformist, unusual, original, or creative —as so many of the truly important people are—he must stifle his impulses and conform as best he can to the norms that the multiple-choice testers set up in their unimaginative, scientific way. The more profoundly gifted the candidate is, the more his resentment will rise against the mental strait jacket into which the testers would force his mind." B. Hoffmann, The Tyranny of Testing 91-92 (1962).
Those who make the tests and the law schools which use them point, of course, to the high correlations between the test scores and the grades at law school the first year. E. g., Winterbottom, Comments on "A Study of the Criteria for Legal Education and Admission to the
The school can safely conclude that the applicant with a score of 750 should be admitted before one with a score of 500. The problem is that in many cases the choice will be between 643 and 602 or 574 and 528. The numbers create an illusion of difference tending to overwhelm other factors. "The wiser testers are well aware of the defects of the multiple-choice format and the danger of placing reliance on any one method of assessment to the exclusion of all others. What is distressing is how little their caveats have impressed the people who succumb to the propaganda of the test-makers
Of course, the tests are not the only thing considered; here they were combined with the prelaw grades to produce a new number called the Average. The grades have their own problems; one school's A is another school's C. And even to the extent that this formula predicts law school grades, its value is limited. The law student with lower grades may in the long pull of a legal career surpass those at the top of the class. "[L]aw school admissions criteria have operated within a hermetically sealed system; it is now beginning to leak. The traditional combination of LSAT and GPA [undergraduate grade point average] may have provided acceptable predictors of likely performance in law school in the past. . . . [But] [t]here is no clear evidence that the LSAT and GPA provide particularly good evaluators of the intrinsic or enriched ability of an individual to perform as a law student or lawyer in a functioning society undergoing change. Nor is there any clear evidence that grades and other evaluators of law school performance, and the bar examination, are particularly good predictors of competence or success as a lawyer." Rosen, Equalizing Access to Legal Education: Special Programs for Law Students Who Are Not Admissible by Traditional Criteria, 1970 U. Tol. L. Rev. 321, 332-333.
But, by whatever techniques, the law school must make choices. Neither party has challenged the validity of the Average employed here as an admissions tool, and therefore consideration of its possible deficiencies is not presented as an issue. The Law School presented no evidence to show that adjustments in the process employed were used in order validly to compare applicants of different races; instead, it chose to avoid making such comparisons. Finally,
III
The Equal Protection Clause did not enact a requirement that law schools employ as the sole criterion for admissions a formula based upon the LSAT and undergraduate grades, nor does it prohibit law schools from evaluating an applicant's prior achievements in light of the barriers that he had to overcome. A black applicant who pulled himself out of the ghetto into a junior college may thereby demonstrate a level of motivation, perseverance, and ability that would lead a fairminded admissions committee to conclude that he shows more promise for law study than the son of a rich alumnus who achieved better grades at Harvard. That applicant would be offered admission not because he is black, but because as an individual he has shown he has the potential, while the Harvard man may have taken less advantage of the vastly superior opportunities offered him. Because of the weight of the prior handicaps, that black applicant may not realize his full potential in the first year of law school, or even in the full three years, but in the long pull of a legal career his achievements may far outstrip those of his classmates whose earlier records appeared superior by conventional criteria. There is currently no test available to the Admissions
The difference between such a policy and the one presented by this case is that the Committee would be making decisions on the basis of individual attributes, rather than according a preference solely on the basis of race. To be sure, the racial preference here was not absolute— the Committee did not admit all applicants from the four favored groups. But it did accord all such applicants a preference by applying, to an extent not precisely ascertainable from the record, different standards by which to judge their applications, with the result that the Committee admitted minority applicants who, in the school's own judgment, were less promising than other applicants who were rejected. Furthermore, it is apparent that because the Admissions Committee compared minority applicants only with one another, it was necessary to reserve some proportion of the class for them, even if at the outset a precise number of places were not set aside.
The consideration of race as a measure of an applicant's qualification normally introduces a capricious and irrelevant factor working an invidious discrimination, Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668. Once race is a starting point educators and courts are immediately embroiled in competing claims of different racial and ethnic groups that would make difficult, manageable standards consistent
The key to the problem is the consideration of each application in a racially neutral way. Since the LSAT reflects questions touching on cultural backgrounds, the Admissions Committee acted properly in my view in setting minority applications apart for separate processing. These minorities have cultural backgrounds that are vastly different from the dominant Caucasian. Many Eskimos, American Indians, Filipinos, Chicanos, Asian Indians, Burmese, and Africans come from such disparate backgrounds that a test sensitively tuned for most applicants would be wide of the mark for many minorities.
The melting pot is not designed to homogenize people, making them uniform in consistency. The melting pot as I understand it is a figure of speech that depicts the wide diversities tolerated by the First Amendment under one flag. See 2 S. Morison & H. Commager, The Growth of the American Republic, c. VIII (4th ed. 1950). Minorities in our midst who are to serve actively in our public affairs should be chosen on talent and character alone, not on cultural orientation or leanings.
I do not know the extent to which blacks in this country are imbued with ideas of African Socialism.
Insofar as LSAT's reflect the dimensions and orientation of the Organization Man they do a disservice to minorities. I personally know that admissions tests were once used to eliminate Jews. How many other minorities they aim at I do not know. My reaction is that the presence of an LSAT is sufficient warrant for a school to put racial minorities into a separate class in order better to probe their capacities and potentials.
The merits of the present controversy cannot in my view be resolved on this record. A trial would
This does not mean that a separate LSAT must be designed for minority racial groups, although that might be a possibility. The reason for the separate treatment of minorities as a class is to make more certain that racial factors do not militate against an applicant or on his behalf.
There is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred. The years of slavery did more than retard the progress of blacks. Even a greater wrong was done the whites by creating arrogance instead of humility and by encouraging the growth of the fiction of a superior race.
The slate is not entirely clean. First, we have held that pro rata representation of the races is not required either on juries, see Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286-287, or in public schools, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 24. Moreover, in Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, we reviewed the contempt convictions of pickets who sought by their demonstration to force an employer to prefer Negroes to whites in his hiring of clerks, in order to ensure that 50% of the employees were Negro. In finding that California could constitutionally enjoin the picketing there involved we quoted from the opinion of the California Supreme Court, which noted that the pickets would " `make the right to work for Lucky dependent not on fitness for the work nor on an equal right of all, regardless of race, to compete in an open market, but, rather, on membership in a particular race. If petitioners were upheld in their demand then other races, white, yellow, brown and red, would have equal rights to demand discriminatory hiring on a racial basis.' " Id., at 463-464. We then noted that
The reservation of a proportion of the law school class for members of selected minority groups is fraught with similar dangers, for one must immediately determine which groups are to receive such favored treatment and which are to be excluded, the proportions of the class that are to be allocated to each, and even the criteria by which to determine whether an individual is a member of a favored group. There is no assurance that a common agreement can be reached, and first the schools, and then the courts, will be buffeted with the competing claims. The University of Washington included Filipinos, but excluded Chinese and Japanese; another school may limit its program to blacks, or to blacks and Chicanos. Once the Court sanctioned racial preferences such as these, it could not then wash its hands of the matter, leaving it entirely in the discretion of the school, for then we would have effectively overruled Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, and allowed imposition of a "zero" allocation.
The key to the problem is consideration of such applications in a racially neutral way. Abolition of the LSAT would be a start. The invention of substitute tests might be made to get a measure of an applicant's cultural background, perception, ability to analyze, and his or her relation to groups. They are highly subjective, but unlike the LSAT they are not concealed, but in the open. A law school is not bound by any legal principle to admit students by mechanical criteria which are insensitive to the potential of such an applicant which may be realized in a more hospitable environment. It will be necessary under such an approach to put more effort into assessing each individual than is required when LSAT scores and undergraduate grades dominate the selection process. Interviews with the applicant and others who know him is a time-honored test. Some schools currently run summer programs in which potential students who likely would be bypassed under conventional admissions criteria are given the opportunity to try their hand at law courses,
The argument is that a "compelling" state interest can easily justify the racial discrimination that is practiced here. To many, "compelling" would give members of one race even more than pro rata representation. The public payrolls might then be deluged say with Chicanos because they are as a group the poorest of the poor and need work more than others, leaving desperately poor individual blacks and whites without employment. By the same token large quotas of blacks or browns could be added to the Bar, waiving examinations required of other groups, so that it would be better racially balanced.
If discrimination based on race is constitutionally permissible when those who hold the reins can come up with "compelling" reasons to justify it, then constitutional guarantees acquire an accordionlike quality. Speech is closely brigaded with action when it triggers a fight, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, as shouting "fire" in a crowded theater triggers a riot. It may well be that racial strains, racial susceptibility to certain diseases, racial sensitiveness to environmental conditions that other races do not experience, may in an extreme situation justify differences in racial treatment that no fairminded person would call "invidious" discrimination. Mental ability is not in that category. All races can compete fairly at all professional levels. So
The problem tendered by this case is important and crucial to the operation of our constitutional system; and educators must be given leeway. It may well be that a whole congeries of applicants in the marginal group defy known methods of selection. Conceivably, an admissions committee might conclude that a selection by lot of, say, the last 20 seats is the only fair solution. Courts are not educators; their expertise is limited; and our task ends with the inquiry whether, judged by the main purpose of the Equal Protection Clause—the protection against racial discrimination
We would have a different case if the suit were one to displace the applicant who was chosen in lieu of DeFunis. What the record would show concerning his potentials would have to be considered and weighed. The educational decision, provided proper guidelines were used, would reflect an expertise that courts should honor. The problem is not tendered here because the physical facilities were apparently adequate to take DeFunis in addition to the others. My view is only that I cannot say by the tests used and applied he was invidiously discriminated against because of his race.
I cannot conclude that the admissions procedure of the Law School of the University of Washington that excluded DeFunis is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment of the Washington Supreme Court should be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J., DISSENTING
The following are excerpts from the Law School's current admissions policy, as provided to the Court by counsel for the respondents.
ADMISSIONS
A. Policy Statement Regarding Admission to Entering Classes of Juris Doctor Program—Adopted by the Law Faculty December 4, 1973.
§ 1. The objectives of the admissions program are to select and admit those applicants who have the best prospect of high quality academic work at the law school and, in the minority admissions program described below, the further objective there stated.
§ 2. In measuring academic potential the law school relies primarily on the undergraduate grade-point average and the performance on the Law School Admission Test (LSAT). The weighting of these two indicators is determined statistically by reference to past experience at this school. For most applicants the resulting applicant ranking is the most nearly accurate of all available measures of relative academic potential. In truly exceptional cases, i. e., those in which the numerical indicators clearly appear to be an inaccurate measure of academic potential, the admission decision indicated by them alone may be altered by a consideration of the factors listed below. The number of these truly exceptional cases in any particular year should fall somewhere from zero to approximately forty. These factors are used, however, only as an aid in assessing the applicant's academic potential in its totality, without undue emphasis or reliance upon one or a few and without an attempt to quantify in advance the strength of their
a) the difficulty or ease of the undergraduate curriculum track pursued;
b) the demanding or non-demanding quality of the undergraduate school or department;
c) the attainment of an advanced degree, the nature thereof, and difficulty or ease of its attainment;
d) the applicant's pursuits subsequent to attainment of the undergraduate degree and the degree of success therein, as bearing on the applicant's academic potential;
e) the possibility that an applicant many years away from academic work may do less well on the LSAT than his or her counterpart presently or recently in academic work;
f) substantial change in mental or physical health that indicates prospect for either higher or lower quality of academic work;
g) substantial change in economic pressures or other circumstances that indicates prospect for either higher or lower quality of academic work;
h) exceptionally good or bad performance upon the writing test ingredient of the LSAT, if the current year's weighting of the numerical indicators does not otherwise take the writing score into account;
i) the quality and strength of recommendations bearing upon the applicant's academic potential;
j) objective indicators of motivation to succeed at the academic study of law;
k) variations in the level of academic achievement over time; and
l) any other indicators that serve the objective stated above.
.....
§ 6. Because certain ethnic groups in our society
Qualified minority applicants are therefore admitted under the minority admissions program in such number that the entering class will have a reasonable proportion of minority persons, in view of the obligation stated above and of the overall objective of the law school to provide legal education for qualified persons generally. For the purpose of determining the number to be specially admitted under the program, and not as a ceiling on minority admissions generally, the faculty currently believes that approximately 15 to 20 percent is such a reasonable proportion if there are sufficient qualified applicants available. Under the minority admissions program, admission is offered to those applicants who have a reasonable prospect of academic success at the law school, determined in each case by considering the numerical indicators along with the listed factors in Section 2, above, but without regard to the restriction upon number contained in that section.
No particular internal percentage or proportion among various minority groups in the entering class is specified; rather, the law school strives for a reasonable internal balance given the particular makeup of each year's applicant population.
As to some or all ethnic groups within the scope of the minority admissions program, it may be appropriate to give a preference in some degree to residents of the state; that determination is made each year in view of
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concur, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Many weeks of the school term remain, and petitioner may not receive his degree despite respondents' assurances that petitioner will be allowed to complete this term's schooling regardless of our decision. Any number of unexpected events—illness, economic necessity, even academic failure—might prevent his graduation at the end of the term. Were that misfortune to befall, and were petitioner required to register for yet another term, the prospect that he would again face the hurdle of the admissions policy is real, not fanciful; for respondents warn that "Mr. DeFunis would have to take some appropriate action to request continued admission for the remainder of his law school education, and some discretionary action by the University on such request would have to be taken." Respondents' Memorandum on the Question of Mootness 3-4 (emphasis supplied). Thus, respondents' assurances have not dissipated the possibility that petitioner might once again have to run the gantlet of the University's allegedly unlawful admissions policy. The Court therefore proceeds on an erroneous premise in resting its mootness holding on a supposed inability to render any judgment that may affect one way or the other petitioner's completion of his law studies. For surely if we were to reverse the Washington Supreme Court, we could insure that, if for some reason petitioner did not graduate this spring, he would be entitled to re-enrollment at a later time on the same basis as others who have not faced the hurdle of the University's allegedly unlawful admissions policy.
I can thus find no justification for the Court's straining to rid itself of this dispute. While we must be vigilant to require that litigants maintain a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy to assure that "the questions will be framed with the necessary specificity, that the issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that the litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor to assure that the constitutional challenge will be made in a form traditionally thought to be capable of judicial resolution," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968), there is no want of an adversary contest in this case. Indeed, the Court concedes that, if petitioner has lost his stake in this controversy, he did so only when he
Moreover, in endeavoring to dispose of this case as moot, the Court clearly disserves the public interest. The constitutional issues which are avoided today concern vast numbers of people, organizations, and colleges and universities, as evidenced by the filing of twenty-six amicus curiae briefs. Few constitutional questions in recent history have stirred as much debate, and they will not disappear. They must inevitably return to the federal courts and ultimately again to this Court. Cf. Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 212 (1972) (dissenting opinion). Because avoidance of repetitious litigation serves the public interest, that inevitability counsels against mootness determinations, as here, not compelled by the record. Cf. United States v. W. T. Grant Co., supra, at 632; Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 594 (1960) (dissenting opinion). Although the Court should, of course, avoid unnecessary decisions of constitutional questions, we should not transform principles of avoidance of constitutional decisions into devices for sidestepping resolution of difficult cases. Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404-405 (1821) (Marshall, C. J.).
On what appears in this case, I would find that there is an extant controversy and decide the merits of the very important constitutional questions presented.
FootNotes
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by William J. Brown, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Ruzicho, Earl M. Manz, and Stephen J. Simmons, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Ohio; by John P. Harris for the city of Seattle; by Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., and Chesterfield Smith for the American Bar Assn.; by Archibald Cox, James N. Bierman, James A. Sharaf, and Daniel Steiner for the President and Fellows of Harvard College; by J. Harold Flannery for the Center for Law and Education, Harvard University; by Frank Askin and Norman Amaker for the Board of Governors of Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, et al.; by Edgar S. Cahn and Jean Camper Cahn for the Deans of the Antioch School of Law; by Erwin N. Griswold and Clifford C. Alloway for the Association of American Law Schools; by John Holt Myers for the Association of American Medical Colleges; by Howard A. Glickstein for a Group of Law School Deans; by Harry B. Reese and Peter Martin for the Law School Admission Council; by Sanford Jay Rosen, Herbert Teitelbaum, and Melvin L. Wulf for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund et al.; by Cruz Reynoso and Robert B. McKay for the Council on Legal Education Opportunity; by Roswell B. Perkins, Kenneth C. Bass III, David S. Tatel, and R. Stephen Browning for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; by Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, Jeffry A. Mintz, Louis H. Pollak, and John Baker for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; by Derrick A. Bell, Jr., for the National Conference of Black Lawyers; by Bruce R. Greene and Herbert Becker for the American Indian Law Students Assn., Inc., et al.; by Clifford Sweet, C. Lyonel Jones, Dennis R. Yeager, E. Richard Larson, Nathaniel R. Jones, Michael H. Terry, Joseph A. Matera, and C. Christopher Brown for the Legal Aid Society of Alameda County et al.; by Peter Van N. Lockwood, David Bonderman, Sylvia Roberts, and David Rubin for the National Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., et al.; and by Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., for the National Council of Jewish Women et al.
"We gauged the potential for outstanding performance in law school not only from the existence of high test scores and grade point averages, but also from careful analysis of recommendations, the quality of work in difficult analytical seminars, courses, and writing programs, the academic standards of the school attended by the applicant, the applicant's graduate work (if any), and the nature of the applicant's employment (if any), since graduation.
"An applicant's ability to make significant contributions to law school classes and the community at large was assessed from such factors as his extracurricular and community activities, employment, and general background.
"We gave no preference to, but did not discriminate against, either Washington residents or women in making our determinations. An applicant's racial or ethnic background was considered as one factor in our general attempt to convert formal credentials into realistic predictions." 82 Wn.2d 11, 18-19, 507 P.2d 1169, 1174.
Predicted Number of Number First Year Averages Applications Received Accepted 81 1 1 80 2 2 79 11 11 78 42 42 77 105 93 76 169 53 75 210 22
App. 34.
The student, we said, was entitled to "legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to students of other races. Such education is not available to him in a separate law school as offered by the State." 339 U. S., at 635.
"A citizen who is concededly loyal presents no problem of espionage or sabotage. Loyalty is a matter of the heart and mind, not of race, creed, or color. He who is loyal is by definition not a spy or a saboteur. When the power to detain is derived from the power to protect the war effort against espionage and sabotage, detention which has no relationship to that objective is unauthorized." Id., at 302.
As the Arizona Supreme Court denied Johnson admission summarily, in an original proceeding, there were no judicial findings either sustaining or rejecting his factual claims of racial bias, putting the case in an awkward posture for review here. Johnson subsequently brought a civil rights action in Federal District Court, seeking both damages and injunctive relief. The District Court dismissed the action and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the lower federal courts did not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court on admissions to the state Bar. Johnson then sought review here and we denied his motion for leave to file a petition for mandamus, prohibition and/or certiorari on February 19, 1974. Johnson v. Wilmer, 415 U.S. 911. Thus in the entire history of the case no court had ever actually sustained Johnson's factual contentions concerning racial bias in the bar examiners' procedures. DeFunis thus appears to be the first case here squarely presenting the problem.
Comment
User Comments