ONEIDA INDIAN NATION v. COUNTY OF ONEIDA

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Both § 1331 and § 1362 of Title 28 of the United States Code confer jurisdiction on the district courts to hear cases "aris[ing] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."1 Section 1331 requires that the amount in controversy exceed $10,000. Under § 1362, Indian tribes may bring such suits without regard to the amount in controversy. The question now before us is whether the District Court had jurisdiction over this case under either of these sections.

I

The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York by the Oneida Indian Nation of New York State and the Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin against the Counties of Oneida and Madison in the State of New York.2 The complaint alleged that from time immemorial down to the time of the American Revolution the Oneidas had owned and occupied some six million acres of land in the State of New York. The complaint also alleged that in the 1780's and 1790's various treaties had been entered into between the Oneidas and the United States confirming the Indians' right to possession of their lands until purchased by the United States3 and that in 1790 the treaties had been implemented by federal statute, the Nonintercourse Act, 1 Stat. 137, forbidding the conveyance of Indian lands without the consent of the United States. It was then alleged that in 1788 the Oneidas had ceded five million acres to the State of New York, 300,000 acres being withheld as a reservation, and that in 1795 a portion of these reserved lands was also ceded to the State. Assertedly, the 1795 cession was without the consent of the United States and hence ineffective to terminate the Indians' right to possession under the federal treaties and the applicable federal statutes. Also alleging that the 1795 cession was for an unconscionable and inadequate price and that portions of the premises were now in possession of and being used by the defendant counties, the complaint prayed for damages representing the fair rental value of the land for the period January 1, 1968, through December 31, 1969.

The District Court ruled that the cause of action, regardless of the label given it, was created under state law and required only allegations of the plaintiffs' possessory rights and the defendants' interference therewith. The possible necessity of interpreting a federal statute or treaties to resolve a potential defense was deemed insufficient to sustain federal-question jurisdiction. The complaint was accordingly dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction for failure of the complaint to raise a question arising under the laws of the United States within the meaning of either § 1331 or § 1362.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting, ruling that the jurisdictional claim "shatters on the rock of the `well-pleaded complaint' rule for determining federal question jurisdiction." 464 F.2d 916, 918 (CA2 1972). Although "[d]ecision would ultimately turn on whether the deed of 1795 complied with what is now 25 U. S. C. § 177 and what the consequences would be if it did not," id., at 919, this alone did not establish "arising under" jurisdiction because the federal issue was not one of the necessary elements of the complaint, which was read as essentially seeking relief based on the right to possession of real property. The Court of Appeals thought Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74 (1914), directly in point. There, a complaint in ejectment did not state a claim arising under the laws of the United States even though it alleged that the defendants were claiming under a deed that was void under acts of Congress restraining the alienation of lands allotted to Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians. The Court applied the principle that whether a case arises under federal law for purposes of the jurisdictional statute "must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose." Id., at 75-76. Because the only essential allegations were plaintiffs' rights to possession, defendants' wrongful holding and the damage claim, the complaint did not properly assert a federal issue, however likely it might be that it would be relevant to or determinative of a defense. In the present case, noting that the District Judge was correct in holding that under New York law these allegations would suffice to state a cause of action in ejectment, the Court of Appeals considered Taylor to be dispositive.

Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals were in error, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

II

Accepting the premise of the Court of Appeals that the case was essentially a possessory action, we are of the view that the complaint asserted a current right to possession conferred by federal law, wholly independent of state law. The threshold allegation required of such a well-pleaded complaint—the right to possession—was plainly enough alleged to be based on federal law. The federal law issue, therefore, did not arise solely in anticipation of a defense. Moreover, we think that the basis for petitioners' assertion that they had a federal right to possession governed wholly by federal law cannot be said to be so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court, whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the federal issues on the merits. See, e. g., The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913); Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118, 130 (1906); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105-106 (1933); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249 (1951). Given the nature and source of the possessory rights of Indian tribes to their aboriginal lands, particularly when confirmed by treaty, it is plain that the complaint asserted a controversy arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States within the meaning of both § 1331 and § 1362.

It very early became accepted doctrine in this Court that although fee title to the lands occupied by Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign —first the discovering European nation and later the original States and the United States—a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. That right, sometimes called Indian title and good against all but the sovereign, could be terminated only by sovereign act. Once the United States was organized and the Constitution adopted, these tribal rights to Indian lands became the exclusive province of the federal law. Indian title, recognized to be only a right of occupancy, was extinguishable only by the United States. The Federal Government took early steps to deal with the Indians through treaty, the principal purpose often being to recognize and guarantee the rights of Indians to specified areas of land. This the United States did with respect to the various New York Indian tribes, including the Oneidas. The United States also asserted the primacy of federal law in the first Nonintercourse Act passed in 1790, 1 Stat. 137, 138, which provided that "no sale of lands made by any Indians . . . within the United States, shall be valid to any person . . . or to any state . . . unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United States."4 This has remained the policy of the United States to this day. See 25 U. S. C. § 177.

In United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941), a unanimous Court succinctly summarized the essence of past cases in relevant respects:

The Santa Fe case also reaffirmed prior decisions to the effect that a tribal right of occupancy, to be protected, need not be "based upon a treaty, statute, or other formal government action." Id., at 347. Tribal rights were nevertheless entitled to the protection of federal law, and with respect to Indian title based on aboriginal possession, the "power of Congress . . . is supreme." Ibid.

As indicated in Santa Fe, the fundamental propositions which it restated were firmly rooted in earlier cases. In Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823), the Court refused to recognize land titles originating in grants by Indians to private parties in 1773 and 1775; those grants were contrary to the accepted principle that Indian title could be extinguished only by or with the consent of the general government. The land in question, when ceded to the United States by the State of Virginia, was "occupied by numerous and warlike tribes of Indians; but the exclusive right of the United States to extinguish their title, and to grant the soil, has never, we believe, been doubted." Id., at 586. See also id., at 591-597, 603. The possessory and treaty rights of Indian tribes to their lands have been the recurring theme of many other cases.5

The rudimentary propositions that Indian title is a matter of federal law and can be extinguished only with federal consent apply in all of the States, including the original 13. It is true that the United States never held fee title to the Indian lands in the original States as it did to almost all the rest of the continental United States and that fee title to Indian lands in these States, or the pre-emptive right to purchase from the Indians, was in the State, Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810).6 But this reality did not alter the doctrine that federal law, treaties, and statutes protected Indian occupancy and that its termination was exclusively the province of federal law.

For example, in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832), the State of Georgia sought to prosecute a white man for residing in Indian country contrary to the laws of the State. This Court held the prosecution a nullity, the Chief Justice referring to the treaties with the Cherokees and to the

The Cherokee Nation was said to be occupying its own territory "in which the laws of Georgia can have no force . . . ." The Georgia law was declared unconstitutional because it interfered with the relations "between the United States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our constitution, are committed exclusively to the government of the union." Id., at 561.

There are cases of similar import with respect to the New York Indians. These cases lend substance to petitioners' assertion that the possessory right claimed is a federal right to the lands at issue in this case. Fellows v. Blacksmith, 19 How. 366, 372 (1857), which concerned the Seneca Indians, held that the "forcible removal [of Indians] must be made, if made at all, under the direction of the United States [and] that this interpretation is in accordance with the usages and practice of the Government in providing for the removal of Indian tribes from their ancient possessions." In The New York Indians, 5 Wall. 761 (1867), the State sought to tax the reservation lands of the Senecas. The Court held the tax void. The Court referred to the Indian right of occupancy as creating "an indefeasible title to the reservations that may extend from generation to generation, and will cease only by the dissolution of the tribe, or their consent to sell to the party possessed of the right of pre-emption," id., at 771, and noted that New York "possessed no power to deal with Indian rights or title," id., at 769. Of major importance, however, was the treaty of 1794 in which the United States acknowledged certain territory to be the property of the Seneca Nation and promised that "it shall remain theirs until they choose to sell the same to the people of the United States . . . ." Id., at 766-767. The rights of the Indians to occupy those lands "do not depend on . . . any . . . statutes of the State, but upon treaties, which are the supreme law of the land; it is to these treaties we must look to ascertain the nature of these rights, and the extent of them." Id., at 768.7 The State's attempt to tax reservation lands was invalidated as an interference with Indian possessory rights guaranteed by the Federal Government.

Much later, in United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928 (CA2), cert. denied, sub nom. City of Salamanca v. United States, 316 U.S. 694 (1942),8 the Government sued to set aside certain leases granted by the Seneca tribe on certain reservation lands. It was argued in opposition that the suit was merely an action for ejectment which under state law could be defeated by a tender; but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Indian rights were federal and that "state law cannot be invoked to limit the rights in lands granted by the United States to the Indians, because, as the court below recognized, state law does not apply to the Indians except so far as the United States has given its consent." Id., at 932. There being no federal statute making the statutory or decisional law of the State of New York applicable to the reservations, the controlling law remained federal law; and, absent federal statutory guidance, the governing rule of decision would be fashioned by the federal court in the mode of the common law.9

III

Enough has been said, we think, to indicate that the complaint in this case asserts a present right to possession under federal law. The claim may fail at a later stage for a variety of reasons; but for jurisdictional purposes, this is not a case where the underlying right or obligation arises only under state law and federal law is merely alleged as a barrier to its effectuation, as was the case in Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936). There, the suit was on a contract having its genesis in state law, and the tax that the defendant had promised to pay was imposed by a state statute. The possibility that a federal statute might bar its collection was insufficient to make the case one arising under the laws of the United States.

Nor in sustaining the jurisdiction of the District Court do we disturb the well-pleaded complaint rule of Taylor v. Anderson, supra, and like cases.10 Here, the right to possession itself is claimed to arise under federal law in the first instance. Allegedly, aboriginal title of an Indian tribe guaranteed by treaty and protected by statute has never been extinguished. In Taylor, the plaintiffs were individual Indians, not an Indian tribe; and the suit concerned lands allocated to individual Indians, not tribal rights to lands. See 32 Stat. 641. Individual patents had been issued with only the right to alienation being restricted for a period of time. Cf. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 386 n. 1 (1939); McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U.S. 458 (1907). Insofar as the underlying right to possession is concerned, Taylor is more like those cases indicating that "a controversy in respect of lands has never been regarded as presenting a Federal question merely because one of the parties to it has derived his title under an act of Congress." Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 570 (1912).11 Once patent issues, the incidents of ownership are, for the most part, matters of local property law to be vindicated in local courts, and in such situations it is normally insufficient for "arising under" jurisdiction merely to allege that ownership or possession is claimed under a United States patent. Joy v. City of St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332, 342-343 (1906). As the Court stated in Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669 (1891):

In the present case, however, the assertion of a federal controversy does not rest solely on the claim of a right to possession derived from a federal grant of title whose scope will be governed by state law. Rather, it rests on the not insubstantial claim that federal law now protects, and has continuously protected from the time of the formation of the United States, possessory right to tribal lands, wholly apart from the application of state law principles which normally and separately protect a valid right of possession.

For the same reasons, we think the complaint before us satisfies the additional requirement formulated in some cases that the complaint reveal a "dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which the result depends." Shulthis v. McDougal, supra, at 569; Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 203 (1878).12 Here, the Oneidas assert a present right to possession based in part on their aboriginal right of occupancy which was not terminable except by act of the United States. Their claim is also asserted to arise from treaties guaranteeing their possessory right until terminated by the United States, and "it is to these treaties [that] we must look to ascertain the nature of these [Indian] rights, and the extent of them." The New York Indians, 5 Wall., at 768. Finally, the complaint asserts a claim under the Nonintercourse Acts which put in statutory form what was or came to be the accepted rule—that the extinguishment of Indian title required the consent of the United States. To us, it is sufficiently clear that the controversy stated in the complaint arises under the federal law within the meaning of the jurisdictional statutes and our decided cases.

IV

This is not to ignore the obvious fact that New York had legitimate and far-reaching connections with its Indian tribes antedating the Constitution and that the State has continued to play a substantial role with respect to the Indians in that State.13 There has been recurring tension between federal and state law; state authorities have not easily accepted the notion that federal law and federal courts must be deemed the controlling considerations in dealing with the Indians. Fellows v. Blacksmith, The New York Indians, United States v. Forness, and the Tuscarora litigation are sufficient evidence that the reach and exclusivity of federal law with respect to reservation lands and reservation Indians did not go unchallenged; and it may be that they are to some extent challenged here. But this only underlines the legal reality that the controversy alleged in the complaint may well depend on what the reach and impact of the federal law will prove to be in this case.

We are also aware that New York and federal authorities eventually reached partial agreement in 1948 when criminal jurisdiction over New York Indian reservations was ceded to the State. 62 Stat. 1224, 25 U. S. C. § 232. In addition, in 1950 civil disputes between Indians or between Indians and others were placed within the jurisdiction of the state courts "to the same extent as the courts of the State shall have jurisdiction in other civil actions and proceedings, as now or hereafter defined by the laws of such State." 64 Stat. 845, 25 U. S. C. § 233.14 The latter statute, however, provided for the preservation of tribal laws and customs and saved Indian reservation lands from taxation and, with certain exceptions, from execution to satisfy state court judgments. Furthermore, it provided that nothing in the statute "shall be construed as authorizing the alienation from any Indian nation, tribe, or band of Indians of any lands within any Indian reservation in the State of New York" or as "conferring jurisdiction on the courts of the State of New York or making applicable the laws of the State of New York in civil actions involving Indian lands or claims with respect thereto which relate to transactions or events transpiring prior to September 13, 1952." The Senate report on the bill disclaimed any intention of "impairing any of their property or rights under existing treaties with the United States." S. Rep. No. 1836, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1950). Under the penultimate proviso the matter of alienating tribal reservation lands would appear to have been left precisely where it was prior to the Act.15 Moreover, the final proviso of the statute negativing the application of state law with respect to transactions prior to the adoption of the Act was added by amendment on the floor of the Senate, and its purpose was explained by the gentleman who offered it to be as follows:

Our conclusion that this case arises under the laws of the United States is, therefore, wholly consistent with and in furtherance of the intent of Congress as expressed by its grant of civil jurisdiction to the State of New York with the indicated exceptions.16

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom MR. JUSTICE POWELL joins, concurring.

The majority opinion persuasively demonstrates that the plaintiffs' right to possession in this case was and is rooted firmly in federal law. Thus, I agree that this is not a case which depends for its federal character solely on possible federal defenses or on expected responses to possible defenses. I also agree that the majority decision is consistent with our decision in Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936). However, I think it worth-while to add a brief concurrence to emphasize that the majority opinion does not disturb the long line of this Court's cases narrowly applying the principles of 28 U. S. C. § 1331 and the well-pleaded complaint rule to possessory land actions brought in federal court.

As the majority seems willing to accept, the complaint in this action is basically one in ejectment. Plaintiffs are out of possession; the defendants are in possession, allegedly wrongfully; and the plaintiffs claim damages because of the allegedly wrongful possession. These allegations appear to meet the pleading requirements for an ejectment action as stated in Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74 (1914). Thus the complaint must be judged according to the rules applicable to such cases.

The federal courts have traditionally been inhospitable forums for plaintiffs asserting federal-question jurisdiction of possessory land claims. The narrow view of the scope of federal-question jurisdiction taken by the federal courts in such cases probably reflects a recognition that federal issues were seldom apt to be dispositive of the lawsuit. Commonly, the grant of a land patent to a private party carries with it no guarantee of continuing federal interest and certainly carries with it no indefinitely redeemable passport into federal court. On the contrary, as the majority points out, the land thus conveyed was generally subject to state law thereafter.

Thus, this Court's decisions have established a strict rule that mere allegation of a federal source of title does not convert an ordinary ejectment action into a federal case. As the Court noted in Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507 (1900), "a suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not necessarily one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, within the meaning of the jurisdiction clauses, for if it did every action to establish title to real estate (at least in the newer States) would be such a one, as all titles in those States come from the United States or by virtue of its laws." This rule was even applied to cases in which land grants to Indians, subject to limited restrictions on alienation, were involved. See Taylor, supra.

The majority today finds this strict rule inapplicable to this case, and for good reason. In contrast to the typical instance in which the Federal Government conveys land to a private entity, the Government, by transferring land rights to Indian tribes, has not placed the land beyond federal supervision. Rather the Federal Government has shown a continuing solicitude for the rights of the Indians in their land. The Nonintercourse Act of 1790 manifests this concern in statutory form. Thus, the Indians' right to possession in this case is based not solely on the original grant of rights in the land but also upon the Federal Government's subsequent guarantee. Their claim is clearly distinguishable from the claims of land grantees for whom the Federal Government has taken no such responsibility.

The opinion for the Court today should give no comfort to persons with garden-variety ejectment claims who, for one reason or another, are covetously eyeing the door to the federal courthouse. The general standards for determining federal jurisdiction, and in particular the standards for evaluating compliance with the well-pleaded complaint rule, will retain their traditional vigor tomorrow as today.