MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, Inc., a non-profit Maryland corporation, was organized in 1958 for the purpose of operating a swimming pool. After a membership drive to raise funds, the Association obtained zoning as a "community pool" and constructed its facility near Silver Spring, Maryland. The Association is essentially a single-function recreational club, furnishing only swimming and related amenities.
Only members and their guests are admitted to the pool. No one else may gain admission merely by payment of an entrance fee.
In the spring of 1968 petitioner, Harry C. Press, a Negro who had purchased from a nonmember a home within the geographical preference area, inquired about
In July 1968 petitioners Murray and Rosalind N. Tillman, who were husband and wife and members in good standing, brought petitioner Grace Rosner, a Negro, to the pool as their guest. Although Mrs. Rosner was admitted on that occasion, the guest policy was changed by the board of directors, at a special meeting the following day, to limit guests to relatives of members. Respondents concede that one reason for the adoption of this policy was to prevent members from having Negroes as guests at the pool. Under this new policy Mrs. Rosner thereafter was refused admission when the Tillmans sought to have her as their guest. In the fall of 1968 the membership, by resolution, reaffirmed the policy.
In October 1969 petitioners (Mr. and Mrs. Tillman, Dr. and Mrs. Press, and Mrs. Rosner) instituted this civil action against the Association and individuals who were its officers or directors, seeking damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, particularly under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, now 42 U. S. C. § 1982,
I
In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), this Court, after a detailed review of the legislative history of 42 U. S. C. § 1982, id., at 422-437, held that the statute reaches beyond state action and is not confined to officially sanctioned segregation. The Court subsequently applied § 1982 in Sullivan to private racial discrimination practiced by a nonstock corporation organized to operate a community park and playground facilities, including a swimming pool, for residents of a designated area. The Presses contend that their § 1982 claim is controlled by Sullivan. We agree.
A. The Court of Appeals held that § 1982 would not apply to the Presses because membership rights in Wheaton-Haven could neither be leased nor transferred incident to the acquisition of property. 451 F. 2d, at 1216-1217. In Sullivan, the Court concluded that the right to enjoy a membership share in the corporation, assigned by a property owner as part of a leasehold he was granting, constituted a right "to . . . lease . . . property" protected by § 1982. 396 U. S., at 236-237. The Court of Appeals distinguished property-linked membership shares in Sullivan from property-linked membership preferences in Wheaton-Haven by emphasizing the speculative nature of the benefits available to residents of the area around Wheaton-Haven. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erroneously characterized the property-linked preferences conferred by Wheaton-Haven's bylaws.
The Court of Appeals concluded, incorrectly it later appeared, that the membership had never been full,
Similarly, the automatic waiting-list preference given to residents of the favored area may have affected the price paid by the Presses when they bought their home. Thus, the purchase price to them, like the rental paid by Freeman in Sullivan, may well reflect benefits dependent on residency in the preference area. For them, however, the right to acquire a home in the area is abridged and diluted.
When an organization links membership benefits to residency in a narrow geographical area, that decision infuses those benefits into the bundle of rights for which an individual pays when buying or leasing within the area. The mandate of 42 U. S. C. § 1982 then operates to guarantee a nonwhite resident, who purchases, leases, or holds this property, the same rights as are enjoyed by a white resident.
II
Mrs. Rosner and the Tillmans, relying on 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981,
The operative language of both § 1981 and § 1982 is traceable to the Act of April 9, 1866, c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 30-31 n. 7 (1948).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
FootNotes
The Court of Appeals found it "inferable from Little Hunting Park's organization and membership provisions that it was built by the same real estate developers who built the four subdivisions from which members were drawn, as an aid to the sale of homes." 451 F. 2d, at 1215 n. 8. This inference may be erroneous. App. 24-36 and Tr. of Oral Arg. 24, 31-34, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, supra. In any event, Sullivan did not rest on any relationship between the club and real estate developers.
"That all persons born in the United States . . . of every race and color . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding." 14 Stat. 27.
The present codification of § 1981 is derived from Revised Statutes § 1977 (1874), which codified the Act of May 31, 1870, § 16, 16 Stat. 144. Although the 1866 Act rested only on the Thirteenth Amendment, United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883); United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322, 323 (ED Ark. 1903), and, indeed, was enacted before the Fourteenth Amendment was formally proposed, United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 804 (1966); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32 n. 11 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, supra, 109 U. S., at 22, the 1870 Act was passed pursuant to the Fourteenth, and changes in wording may have reflected the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 695-696 (1898). The 1866 Act was re-enacted in 1870, and the predecessor of the present § 1981 was to be "enforced according to the provisions" of the 1866 Act. Act of May 31, 1870, § 18, 16 Stat. 144.
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