In this civil antitrust suit brought by appellee against Otter Tail Power Co. (Otter Tail), an electric utility company, the District Court found that Otter Tail had attempted to monopolize and had monopolized the retail distribution of electric power in its service area in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 2. The District Court found that Otter Tail had attempted to prevent communities in which its retail distribution franchise had expired from replacing it with a municipal distribution system. The principal means employed were (1) refusals to sell power at wholesale to proposed municipal systems in the communities where it had been retailing power; (2) refusals to "wheel" power to such systems, that is to say, to transfer by direct transmission or displacement electric power from one utility to another over the facilities of an intermediate utility; (3) the institution and support of litigation designed to prevent or delay establishment of those systems; and (4) the invocation of provisions in its transmission contracts with several other power suppliers for the purpose of denying the municipal systems access to other suppliers by means of Otter Tail's transmission systems.
Otter Tail sells electric power at retail in 465 towns in Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota. The District Court's decree enjoins it from refusing to sell electric power at wholesale to existing or proposed municipal electric power systems in the areas serviced by Otter Tail, from refusing to wheel electric power over the lines from the electric power suppliers to existing or proposed municipal system in the area, from entering into or enforcing any contract which prohibits use of Otter Tail's lines
The decree also enjoins Otter Tail from instituting, supporting, or engaging in litigation, directly or indirectly, against municipalities and their officials who have voted to establish municipal electric power systems for the purpose of delaying, preventing, or interfering with the establishment of a municipal electric power system. 331 F.Supp. 54. Otter Tail took a direct appeal to this Court under § 2 of the Expediting Act, as amended, 62 Stat. 989, 15 U. S. C. § 29; and we noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U.S. 944.
In towns where Otter Tail distributes at retail, it operates under municipally granted franchises which are limited from 10 to 20 years. Each town in Otter Tail's service area generally can accommodate only one distribution system, making each town a natural monopoly market for the distribution and sale of electric power at retail. The aggregate of towns in Otter Tail's service area is the geographic market in which Otter Tail competes for the right to serve the towns at retail.
Otter Tail's policy is to acquire, when it can, existing municipal systems within its service areas. It has acquired six since 1947. Between 1945 and 1970, there were contests in 12 towns served by Otter Tail over proposals to replace it with municipal systems. In only three—Elbow Lake, Minnesota, Colman, South Dakota, and Aurora, South Dakota—were municipal systems actually established. Proposed municipal systems have great obstacles; they must purchase the electric power at wholesale. To do so they must have access to existing transmission lines. The only ones available
The antitrust charge against Otter Tail does not involve the lawfulness of its retail outlets, but only its methods of preventing the towns it served from establishing their own municipal systems when Otter Tail's
Colman and Aurora had access to other transmission. Against them, Otter Tail used the weapon of litigation.
As respects Elbow Lake and Hankinson, Otter Tail simply refused to deal, although according to the findings it had the ability to do so. Elbow Lake, cut off from all sources of wholesale power, constructed its own generating plant. Both Elbow Lake and Hankinson requested the Bureau of Reclamation and various cooperatives to furnish them with wholesale power; they were willing to supply it if Otter Tail would wheel it. But Otter Tail refused, relying on provisions in its contracts which barred the use of its lines for wheeling power to towns which it had served at retail. Elbow Lake after completing its plant asked the Federal Power Commission, under § 202 (b) of the Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 848, 16 U. S. C. § 824a (b), to require Otter Tail to interconnect with the town and sell it power at wholesale. The Federal Power Commission ordered first a temporary
It was found that Otter Tail instituted or sponsored litigation involving four towns in its service area which had the effect of halting or delaying efforts to establish municipal systems. Municipal power systems are financed by the sale of electric revenue bonds. Before such bonds can be sold, the town's attorney must submit an opinion which includes a statement that there is no pending or threatened litigation which might impair the value or legality of the bonds. The record amply bears out the District Court's holding that Otter Tail's use of litigation halted or appreciably slowed the efforts for municipal ownership. "The delay thus occasioned and the large financial burden imposed on the towns' limited treasury dampened local enthusiasm for public ownership." 331 F.Supp. 54, 62.
I
Otter Tail contends that by reason of the Federal Power Act it is not subject to antitrust regulation with respect to its refusal to deal. We disagree with that position.
"Repeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions." United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-351. See also Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357-361. Activities which come under the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency nevertheless may be subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws.
The District Court determined that Otter Tail's consistent refusals to wholesale or wheel power to its municipal customers constituted illegal monopolization. Otter Tail maintains here that its refusals to deal should be immune from antitrust prosecution because the Federal Power Commission has the authority to compel involuntary interconnections of power pursuant to § 202 (b) of the Federal Power Act. The essential thrust of § 202, however, is to encourage voluntary interconnections of power. See S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20, 48-49; H. R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 8. Only if a power company refuses to interconnect voluntarily may the Federal Power Commission, subject to limitations unrelated to antitrust considerations, order the interconnection. The standard which governs its decision is whether such action is "necessary or appropriate in the public interest." Although antitrust considerations may be relevant, they are not determinative.
There is nothing in the legislative history which reveals
It is clear, then, that Congress rejected a pervasive regulatory scheme for controlling the interstate distribution of power in favor of voluntary commercial relationships. When these relationships are governed in the first instance by business judgment and not regulatory coercion, courts must be hesitant to conclude that Congress intended to override the fundamental national policies embodied in the antitrust laws. See United States v. Radio Corp. of America, supra, at 351. This is particularly true in this instance because Congress, in passing the Public Utility Holding Company Act, which included Part II of the Federal Power Act, was concerned with "restraint of free and independent competition" among public utility holding companies. See 15 U. S. C. § 79a (b) (2).
Thus, there is no basis for concluding that the limited authority of the Federal Power Commission to order interconnections was intended to be a substitute for, or
II
The decree of the District Court enjoins Otter Tail from "[r]efusing to sell electric power at wholesale to existing or proposed municipal electric power systems in cities and towns located in [its service area]" and from refusing to wheel electric power over its transmission lines from other electric power lines to such cities and towns. But the decree goes on to provide:
So far as wheeling is concerned, there is no authority granted the Commission under Part II of the Federal Power Act to order it, for the bills originally introduced contained common carrier provisions which were deleted.
As respects the ordering of interconnections, there is no conflict on the present record. Elbow Lake applied to the Federal Power Commission for an interconnection with Otter Tail and, as we have said, obtained it. Hankinson renewed Otter Tail's franchise. So the decree of the District Court, as far as the present record is concerned, presents no actual conflict between the federal judicial decree and an order of the Federal Power Commission. The argument concerning the pre-emption of the area by the Federal Power Commission concerns only instances which may arise in the future, if Otter Tail continues its hostile attitude and conduct against "existing or proposed municipal electric power systems." The decree of the District Court has an open end by which that court retains jurisdiction "necessary or appropriate" to carry out the decree or "for the modification of any of the provisions." It also contemplates that future disputes over interconnections and the terms
III
The record makes abundantly clear that Otter Tail used its monopoly power in the towns in its service area to foreclose competition or gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, all in violation of the antitrust laws. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107. The District Court determined that Otter Tail has "a strategic dominance in the transmission of power in most of its service area" and that it used this dominance to foreclose potential entrants into the retail area from obtaining electric power from outside sources of supply. 331 F. Supp., at 60. Use of monopoly power "to destroy threatened competition" is a violation of the "attempt to monopolize" clause of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 154; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 375. So are agreements not to compete, with the aim of preserving or extending a monopoly. Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 119. In Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, a cooperative news association had bylaws that permitted member newspapers to bar competitors from joining the association. We held that that practice violated the Sherman Act, even though the transgressor "had not yet achieved a complete monopoly." Id., at 13.
Otter Tail relies on its wheeling contracts with the Bureau of Reclamation and with cooperatives which it says relieve it of any duty to wheel power to municipalities served at retail by Otter Tail at the time the contracts were made. The District Court held that these restrictive provisions were "in reality, territorial allocation schemes." 331 F. Supp., at 63, and were per se violations of the Sherman Act, citing Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1. Like covenants were there held to "deny defendant's competitors access to the fenced-off market on the same terms as the defendant." Id., at 12. We recently re-emphasized the vice under the Sherman Act of territorial restrictions among potential competitors. United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 608. The fact that some of the restrictive provisions were contained in a contract with the Bureau of Reclamation is not material to our problem for, as the Solicitor General says, "government contracting
IV
The District Court found that the litigation sponsored by Otter Tail had the purpose of delaying and preventing the establishment of municipal electric systems "with the expectation that this would preserve its predominant position in the sale and transmission of electric power in the area."
V
Otter Tail argues that, without the weapons which it used, more and more municipalities will turn to public power and Otter Tail will go downhill. The argument is a familiar one. It was made in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, a civil suit under § 1 of the Sherman Act dealing with a restrictive distribution program and practices of a bicycle manufacturer. We said: "The promotion of self-interest alone does not invoke the rule of reason to immunize otherwise illegal conduct." Id., at 375.
The same may properly be said of § 2 cases under the Sherman Act. That Act assumes that an enterprise will protect itself against loss by operating with superior service, lower costs, and improved efficiency. Otter Tail's theory collided with the Sherman Act as it sought to substitute for competition anticompetitive uses of its dominant economic power.
We do not suggest, however, that the District Court, concluding that Otter Tail violated the antitrust laws, should be impervious to Otter Tail's assertion that compulsory interconnection or wheeling will erode its integrated system and threaten its capacity to serve adequately the public. As the dissent properly notes, the Commission may not order interconnection if to do so "would impair [the utility's] ability to render adequate service to its customers." 16 U. S. C. § 824a (b). The District Court in this case found that the "pessimistic view" advanced in Otter Tail's "erosion study" "is not supported by the record." Furthermore, it concluded that "it does not appear that Bureau of Reclamation power is a serious threat to the defendant nor that it will be in the foreseeable future." Since the District
Except for the provision of the order discussed in part IV of this opinion, the judgment is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN and MR. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join Part IV of the Court's opinion, which sets aside the judgment and remands the case to the District Court for consideration of the appellant's litigation activities in light of our decision in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508. As to the rest of the Court's opinion, however, I respectfully dissent.
The Court in this case has followed the District Court into a misapplication of the Sherman Act to a highly regulated, natural-monopoly industry wholly different from those that have given rise to ordinary antitrust principles. In my view, Otter Tail's refusal to wholesale power through interconnection or to perform wheeling services was conduct entailing no antitrust violation.
It is undisputed that Otter Tail refused either to wheel power or to sell it at wholesale to the towns of Elbow Lake, Minnesota, and Hankinson, North Dakota, both of which had formerly been its customers and had elected to establish municipally owned electric utility systems. The District Court concluded that Otter Tail had substantial monopoly power at retail and "strategic dominance"
In considering the bill that became the Federal Power Act of 1935, the Congress had before it the report of the National Power Policy Committee on Public-Utility Holding Companies. That report chiefly concerned patterns of ownership in the power industry and the evils of concentrated ownership by holding companies. The problem that Congress addressed in fashioning a regulatory system reflected a purpose to prevent unnecessary financial concentration while recognizing the "natural monopoly" aspects, and concomitant efficiencies, of power generation and transmission. The report stated that
The resulting statutory system left room for the development of economies of large scale, single company operations. One of the stated mandates to the Federal Power Commission was for it to assure "an abundant supply of electric energy throughout the United States with the greatest possible economy and with regard to the proper utilization and conservation of natural resources," 16 U. S. C. § 824a. In the face of natural monopolies at retail and similar economies of scale in the subtransmission of power, Congress was forced to address the very problem raised by this case—use of the lines of one company by another. One obvious solution would have been to impose the obligations of a common carrier upon power companies owning lines capable of the wholesale transmission of electricity. Such a provision was originally included in the bill. One proposed section provided that:
Another proposed provision was that:
Had these provisions been enacted, the Commission would clearly have had the power to order interconnections and wheeling for the purpose of making available to local power companies wholesale power obtained from or through companies with subtransmission systems. The latter companies would equally clearly have had an obligation to provide such services upon request. Yet, after substantial debate,
As the District Court found, Otter Tail is a vertically integrated power company. But the bulk of its business —some 90% of its income—derives from sales of power at retail. Left to its own judgment in dealing with its customers, it seems entirely predictable that Otter Tail would decline wholesale dealing with towns in which it had previously done business at retail. If the purpose of the congressional scheme is to leave such decisions to the power companies in the absence of a contrary requirement imposed by the Commission, it would appear that Otter Tail's course of conduct in refusing to deal with the municipal system at Elbow Lake and in refusing to promise to deal with the proposed system at Hankinson, was foreseeably within the zone of freedom specifically created by the statutory scheme.
The opinion of the Court emphasizes that Otter Tail's actions were not simple refusals to deal—they resulted in Otter Tail's maintenance of monopoly control by hindering the emergence of municipal power companies. The Court cites Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, for the proposition that "[u]se of monopoly power `to destroy threatened competition' is a violation of the `attempt to monopolize' clause of § 2 of the Sherman Act." This proposition seems to me defective. Lorain Journal dealt neither with a natural monopoly at retail nor with a congressionally approved system predicated on the existence of such monopolies. In Lorain Journal, a newspaper in Lorain, Ohio, used its monopoly position to discourage advertisers from supporting a nearby radio station seen by the newspaper to be a competitor. The theory of the case was that competition in the communications business was being foreclosed by the newspaper's exercise of monopoly power. Here,
The Court's opinion scoffs at Otter Tail's defense of business justification. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, is cited for the proposition that "[t]he promotion of self-interest alone does not invoke the rule of reason to immunize otherwise illegal conduct." This facet of the Court's reasoning also escapes me in the case before us, where the health of power companies and the abundance of our energy supply were considerations central to the congressional purpose in devising the regulatory scheme. As noted above, the Commission is specifically prohibited from imposing interconnection requirements that are unduly burdensome or that interfere with a public utility's ability to serve its customers efficiently. The District Court noted that Otter Tail had offered a "so-called `erosion study' " documenting the way in which its business would suffer if it were forced to wholesale and wheel power to municipally owned companies. The District Court gave little credence to the report's predictions. "But regardless," the court went on, "even the threat of losing business does not justify or excuse violating the law." 331 F. Supp., at 64-65. This question-begging disregard of the economic health of Otter Tail is wholly at odds with the congressional purpose in
This is not to say that Otter Tail's financial health is paramount in all instances,
With respect to decisions by regulated electric utilities as to whether or not to provide nonretail services, I think that in the absence of horizontal conspiracy, the teaching of the "primary jurisdiction" cases argues for leaving governmental regulation to the Commission instead of the invariably less sensitive and less specifically expert process of antitrust litigation. I believe this is
Even assuming that Otter Tail's refusals to wholesale or wheel power to Elbow Lake and Hankinson were colorably within the reach of the antitrust laws, I cannot square the opinion of the Court with our recent decision in Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289. Otter Tail's refusal to wholesale or wheel power to Elbow Lake was the subject of two concurrent proceedings— one in the District Court, and another in the Federal Power Commission. It seems to me that the principles of Ricci, related to but not identical with the traditional doctrine of "primary jurisdiction," should require a District Court in a case like this one to defer to the Commission proceeding then in progress. Surely the regulatory authority of the Commission with respect to interconnection
With respect to the last of the Ricci criteria, it is useful to contrast the cursory treatment given to Otter Tail's business-justification defense by the Court today with the opinion of the Commission ordering permanent interconnection:
The opinion of the Court attempts to sidestep the Ricci problem by noting that the Commission has in fact ordered interconnection with Elbow Lake, resulting in the absence of a present actual conflict with the decree entered by the District Court. The Court goes on vaguely to suggest that there will be time to cope with the problem of a Commission refusal to order interconnection which conflicts with this antitrust decree when such a conflict arises.
But the basic conflict between the Commission's authority and the decree entered in the District Court cannot be so easily wished away. The decree enjoins Otter Tail from "[r]efusing to sell electric power at wholesale to existing or proposed municipal electric power systems in cities and towns located in any area serviced by Defendant."
Both because I believe Otter Tail's refusal to wheel or wholesale power was conduct exempt from the antitrust laws and because I believe the District Court's decree improperly pre-empted the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission, I would reverse the judgment before us.
FootNotes
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by John P. McKenna, John C. Scott, and Osee R. Fagan for the City of Gainesville, Florida; by Herbert L. Meschke and Jan M. Sebby for the Village of Elbow Lake, Minnesota; by C. Emerson Duncan II and Donald R. Allen for Missouri Basin Municipal Power Agency; and by Northcutt Ely for American Public Power Association.
"Most of the litigation sponsored by the defendant was carried to the highest available appellate court and although all of it was unsuccessful on the merits, the institution and maintenance of it had the effect of halting, or appreciably slowing, efforts for municipal ownership. The delay thus occasioned and the large financial burden imposed on the towns' limited treasury dampened local enthusiasm for public ownership. In some instances, Otter Tail made offers to the towns to absorb the towns' costs and expenses, and enhance the quality of its service in exchange for a new franchise. Hankinson, after several years of abortive effort, accepted this type of offer and renewed defendant's franchise." Ibid.
"The public interest is far broader than the economic interest of a particular power supplier. It is our legal responsibility, as the Supreme Court made clear in Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 343 U.S. 414 (1952), to use our statutory authority to assure `an abundant supply of electric energy throughout the United States,' and particularly to use our statutory power under Section 202 (b) to compel interconnection and coordination when the public interest requires it. The exercise of that authority may well require, as it does here, that we order a public utility to interconnect with an isolated municipal system. The private company's lack of enthusiasm for the arrangement cannot deter us, so long as the public interest requires it."
"Any certificate issued under the provisions of this subsection authorizing the operation of transmission facilities shall be subject to the condition that any capacity of such facilities not required for the transmission of electric energy in the ordinary scope of such applicant's business shall be made available on a common carrier basis for the transmission of other electric energy."
This bill was re-introduced as S. 1472 and H. R. 2072 in the 89th Congress, 1st Session, and also failed to pass. See also S. 2140 and H. R. 7791, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
These bills were all reintroduced in the 90th Congress, as was H. R. 12322, proposing an Electric Power Reliability Act that would have specifically provided the Commission with authority to order wheeling. In the 91st Congress, bills to establish an Electric Power Reliability Act were again introduced. Section 3 of that proposed Act included a grant of authority for the FPC to order wheeling, see, e. g., S. 1071, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. Yet another bill, H. R. 12585, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., included a very broad provision establishing open access to transmission networks at reasonable rates.
The proposed Electric Power Reliability Act was reintroduced in the 92d Congress, 1st Session, as S. 294 and H. R. 605. H. R. 12585 from the 91st Congress was also reintroduced, as H. R. 6972, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. Still another bill would have prevented proposed regional bulk-power supply corporations from contracting with an electric utility unless that utility "permit[s] . . . the use of its excess transmission capacity for the purpose of wheeling power from facilities of such corporation . . . to load centers of other electric utilities contracting to purchase electric power from such corporation." S. 2324, H. R. 9970, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 103 (c) (1) (B). None of these bills was enacted.
The resulting system of regulation is thus more comprehensive than the regulatory apparatus applicable to bank mergers which was held to be insufficient to oust antitrust jurisdiction in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, and the regulatory scheme with respect to broadcasters which similarly failed to displace the antitrust laws in United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334. Nevertheless, the considerable freedom allowed to electric utilities with respect to coordination of service persuades me that the antitrust laws apply to the extent they are not repugnant to specific features of the regulatory scheme. For this reason, litigation and political activities that come within the so-called "sham" exception in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, might constitute an antitrust violation. Similarly, a genuine territorial allocation agreement might be prohibited under the Sherman Act, see n. 5, supra. Were it not for the legislative history noted above, a consistent refusal to deal with municipally owned power companies might also be impermissible under the Sherman Act. For me, however, the legislative history with respect to wheeling and interconnection is dispositive.
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