OPINION OF THE COURT
GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.
This appeal challenges a single-judge district court order dismissing, without convening a three-judge court, a complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to invalidate on federal constitutional grounds certain Pennsylvania provisions governing the election of County Commissioners.
In this case plaintiffs raise two constitutional challenges. First, they question the practice of listing only two candidates from each political party for the three positions. The district court correctly noted that nothing in either the statute or constitution literally mandates this practice. Since this issue had not yet been decided by the Pennsylvania courts, it abstained.
Plaintiffs' second constitutional challenge is to the constitutional and statutory provisions which allow each voter to vote for only two candidates for the three county commissioner positions. There is no ambiguity here. These provisions apply to every county in Pennsylvania except those having home rule
There are two reasons why this decision does not foreclose the issue of whether a substantial federal question is presented. First, as Chief Judge Seitz noted, it is arguable that the issue presented by the instant case was not before the Kaelin court. See 334 F. Supp. at 604. Kaelin was an action which sought to enjoin the defendant from acting as a county commissioner of Bucks County "on the ground that his appointment to fill the vacancy in that office was based on a statute which is unconstitutional on its face or as administered by the appointing authority." Id. Thus, while the entire statute was challenged, the facts of that case really only related to the vacancy provision of the statute, which is Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 16, § 501(b). Consequently, it is arguable that the portion of the opinion upholding the validity of § 501(a) is dicta. Probably Kaelin makes plaintiffs' contentions "doubtful" or of "questionable merit", Goosby v. Osser, supra, 409 U.S. at 518, 93 S.Ct. 854, but it does not make them insubstantial. The mere fact that it is unclear whether the decision in Kaelin on § 501(a) was a holding or dicta should render the federal question substantial under Goosby v. Osser, supra. Cf. LoFrisco v. Schaffer, 341 F.Supp. 743 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 972, 93 S.Ct. 313, 34 L.Ed.2d 236 (1972) (per curiam).
A second and more important reason is that even if Kaelin had decided the precise issue, its holding is not a precedent binding on other courts. The decision of a three-judge court is entitled to no more weight than any other district court decision. See 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 0.402 n.29 at 62. Consequently, the Kaelin decision is not necessarily binding on any other district court, id. at 61, and does not invariably have to be followed in the Eastern District. Id. at 58-59. Clearly the Kaelin case does not meet the standard for insubstantiality announced in Goosby v. Osser, supra, 409 U.S. at 518, 93 S.Ct. 854. A three-judge court should be convened.
We realize that the outcome of the case before a three-judge district court will probably be no different, and that a remand under such circumstances may seem an exercise in futility. The three-judge court statutes, unfortunately, produce many such exercises. The remedy, however, is legislative.